生产力的新质态:信息生产力

不同阶段的社会生产力呈现出不同的质态,信息生产力是当今社会发展产生的新质态生产力。文章着重分析了这种新质态生产力的含义、系统构成、特征及动态发展过程中所具有的特性;并在一般生产力普遍性探讨的基础上,分析了作为信息生产力突出表现的电子商务生产力。     

Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information

This paper studies the issue of renegotiation in a model of dynamic moral hazard. I introduce the notion of a renegotiation-proof dynamic contract. I show that the constraint of renegotiation-proofness can have the effect of setting a higher lower bound to the set of attainable expected utilities of the agent. This result extends the notion of “credit rationing” from the static models of optimal contracting to a dynamic setting and is useful for thinking about competition for long-term contracts. This result also has implications for the long-run behavior of the expected utility of the agent under dynamic contracting. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 315.     

Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information

In this paper, I analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting. This infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem. Depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not, the firm either receives rent or receives no rent, associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice. I characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases. I also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non‐linear contract.     

Tariffs,Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*

We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off being uninformed. Finally, we show that if the importing nation cannot commit to its tariff, the use of futures contracts together with the dynamically consistent tariff leads to the same equilibrium as under complete information with commitment.     

Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology

Selecting the type of contract is an important aspect of governinginterfirm transactions. The purpose of this article is to examinethe use of fixed-fee and time-and-materials (T&M, or cost-plus)contracts and a hybrid contract that consists of a T&M contractwith a cap. In addition to uncertainty and measurement factors,we also address a relatively unexplored aspect of contracting—howthe prior relationship between the firms influences the typeof contract the firms select. Using data on 394 contracts fromthe information technology (IT) services industry, we show thatT&M contracts are preferred when the cost of measuring qualityex post is high and when it is difficult to estimate costs exante. We also find site-specific measures of relationship leadto a preference for low-powered T&M contracts.     

试析生产力与先进生产力

本文结合马克思主义生产力理论的经典内容和当今理论观点,提出了一些关于深化生产力理论认识的新概念。     

专用性人力资本投资与工资合约——引入不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全合约理论认为,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠行为从而导致专用性投资的无效率。本文通过在经典的敲竹杠模型中引入关于雇员能力的不对称信息,构建一个新的模型来分析企业工资合约的刚性与灵活性,以解决敲竹杠所导致的专用性人力资本投资不足。分析表明:从保护雇佣双方专用性人力资本投资方面看,固定工资合约优于灵活工资合约;且在固定工资合约下,雇员虽然仍可能面临敲竹杠风险,但敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。     

生产力的质与量和先进生产力

生产力是质与量的统一体。生产力的量指的是生产效率的高低。生产力的质指的是生产力的发展是否有利于人的解放、自由和全面发展,是否符合人类社会发展方向。长期以来人们认为高效率的生产力就是先进生产力。这是对生产力的经济学意义上的理解,它不是生产力的全部内涵。这个认识有深远的理论根源和实践根源,它的正式形成以及对社会生产产生巨大作用,是在资本主义生产方式出现之后。高效率生产力只是先进生产力的必要条件而不是充分条件。先进生产力是高效率生产力和高质量生产力的统一。     

Courts and Relational Contracts

Post-communist countries offer new evidence on the relativeimportance of courts and relationships in enforcing contracts.Belief in the effectiveness of courts has a significant positiveeffect on the level of trust shown in new relationships betweenfirms and their customers. Well-functioning courts also encourageentrepreneurs to try out new suppliers. Courts are particularlyimportant when specific investments are needed for a relationshipto develop. While relationships can sustain existing interactions,workable courts help new interactions to start and develop.     

Conventional Contracts

A "conventional" contract is a contract that each side of a bargain expects the other side to insist on, because it is standard and customary under the circumstances. We consider a process of convention formation in which agents' expectations evolve through repeated interactions in a large-population setting. Agents choose best replies given their knowledge of the precedents, subject to some inertia and random error in their choice behaviour. Over the long run, this adaptive learning process tends to select contracts that are efficient , and egalitarian in the sense that the payoffs are centrally located on the efficiency frontier of the payoff possibility set. When the payoffs form a convex, comprehensive bargaining set, the process selects the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.     

Consumption Commitments and Employment Contracts

We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but may incorporate a possibility of unemployment.     

先进生产力和发展先进生产力的现实选择

工业化和工业化道路是中国共产党对先进生产力的现实选择;新型工业化道路是党在领导中国发展经济的历史进程中,顺应世界经济从传统的工业化向新型工业化发展的要求,对社会生产力发展所选择的正确途径和所设计的与时俱进的方案,是党发展先进生产力的现实选择。     

生态生产力与我国现阶段的生产力发展

生态生产力作为一种先进的生产力形态,代表了当代生产力发展的基本方向。我国发展生态生产力既是落实科学发展观的现实要求,也是积极应对经济全球化的必然选择。我国发展生态生产力的目标指向是社会主义和谐社会的构建并最终实现自然(社会)与人的和谐发展。生态理念是发展生态生产力的理论先导,生态科技是发展生态生产力的物质基础,生态经济是发展生态生产力的具体模式,生态制度是发展生态生产力的现实保障。     

环境与生产力

文章首先评述了学术界对“环境”内涵的不同论述 ,分析了环境的非独占性、外部性和稀缺性特点。在此基础上 ,提出了环境也是生产力的观点 ,并系统地论述了环境与现代化两者之间的内在联系。     

道德、信誉与合约

市场经济之初,人们体会最深,感叹最多的是道德问题和信誉问题。市场经济离不开道德和信誉,缺乏道德和信誉支持的市场经济只能是灾难经济。然而,信誉和道德有着本质区别,但日常生活中人们将它们混在一起来谈论,有时甚至是不分的,本文力图从合约的角度辨清二者之间的关系。     

Regulatory Contracts and Stakeholder Regulation

Abstract **: This paper examines the application of the concept of a regulatory contract in the analysis of UK utilities regulation. It argues that there are serious problems in conceiving of regulatory relations as analogous to contracts, though particular contracts may be a useful tool in the regulatory armoury. This is partly due to problems with principal/agent theory, which has been conceived in different ways by economists and lawyers, and partly due to the essentially political nature of regulatory relations, which make it difficult to tie down regulatory discretion in ways which resemble contractual relations. There is also ambiguity as to who is principal and who is agent, with the danger of adopting a single theoretical category for relationships which are radically different. The early legal structures adopted for UK utility regulation did have elements of a regulatory contract, but with the growth of competition and social regulation, a different model, that of a network of stakeholders, has largely replaced it. This offers the opportunity to develop more sophisticated regulatory procedures, but does not replace the need for substantive values drawn from economics but also from public service values as guides for regulatory decisions .