The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

Exact arbitrage, well-diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets

For a market with an atomless continuum of assets, we formulate the intuitive idea of a “well-diversified” portfolio, and present a notion of “exact arbitrage”, strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of “asymptotic arbitrage”, and necessary and sufficient for the validity of an APT pricing formula. Our formula involves “essential” risk, one based on a specific index portfolio constructed from factors and factor loadings that are endogenously extracted to satisfy an optimality property involving a finite number of factors. We illustrate how our results can be translated to markets with a large but finite number of assets.     

Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes

In this paper we present necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes. These outcomes are derived from the ordinal Nash solution—a reinterpretation and an extension of the Nash bargaining solution that allows bargainers to have preference relations that are more general than expected utility. Our task is undertaken by the construction of a new notion called “induced utilities”. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

Influence of decision styles on use of decision models

This article discusses how the “decision style” of an administrator influences the adoption and use of particular decision models. Several “interactive” and “analytical” decision models often used to guide decision making are described and critiqued to point out their virtues and deficiencies. Propositions are suggested that contend that “systematic,” “judicial”, “speculative”, and “intuitive” styles have clear-cut preferences for a particular decision model. This model seems to be used, even when another would be more suitable. Effective decision makers are postulated to adapt their styles, or at least to see the benefits of different styles. Mixed-mode models are proposed that seem to simulate the behavior of successful decision makers.     

Best response equivalence

Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some “potential game” arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.     

“Constitutionalizing” the corporation

To become effective instruments in the attainment of a sustainable society, corporations should have their constitutional status settled. Thus far, mainly by Supreme Court decisions, corporations have an uncertain status. They are “persons” under the Constitution and have certain rights; but unlike natural persons, they do not have concomitant constitutional duties. Corporations should be viewed as “private” governments exercising substantial power in society. They are, however, considered to be associations of individuals rather than divisions of society. The need is to legitimate their governing power by “constitutionalizing” them. That can be done by corporations accepting, or having imposed upon them, two principal constitutional duties. First, means should be developed whereby corporate officers routinely take the general good into account. That duty could be implemented by making “social impact statements,” analogous to but broader than the familiar environmental impact statements, before making important corporate decisions. Secondly, as “sociological communities,” corporate officers wield considerable power over members of those communities. A bill of rights similar to the Constitution's Bill of Rights is recommended so as to make corporate power that is necessary for achievement of societal goals as tolerable and decent as possible. Acceptance of those duties would make corporations parts of, not separate from, the greater corporation called society. They would be private, profit-making entities with a definite public function. Preferably, the duties should be voluntarily accepted. Congress, however, has undoubted constitutional power to impose both, should it so desire.     

Societal aspects of technology assessment

Despite earnest admonitions in most technology assessments that institutional arrangements, social impacts, and societal implications be taken into account, the methodology commonly used not only systematically and systematically excludes these very dimensions but often creates a distorted focus. The paradigm dominating structural modeling in technology assessment is technically-oriented; the techniques, lineal descendants of systems analysis, are no more reliable for “assessing” the uncertain future than have been their ancestors in “managing” the present.     

Equilibria in systems of social interactions

In this paper, we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in systems with an infinite number of agents and with local and global social interactions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a “Markov”property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homogeneous systems.     

What crises could teach us about complexity and systemic management: The case of the Nestucca oil spill

In this article we attempt to uncover some systemic management principles for the better management of complex issues. Taking a pragmatic approach we have expanded the case methodology proposed by John Dewey to the case study of a major crisis. By proposing that crises allow for a better apprehension of complexity, we study the changes which were carried out or not, to this day, after the 1988 Nestucca oil spill that occurred in Canada only three months prior to the Exxon-Valdez disaster. After conducting a linear and systemic analysis of the crisis, we propose that the changes institutionalized thus far spring mostly from what we call “behavioral” and “paradigmatic” learning which are weak for addressing complex issues. Proposing that 15% of the people we have interviewed where able to derive a “systemic learning” from this crisis, we suggest several unlocking strategies that allow these systemic lessons to be institutionalized.     

How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technology

We explore how firm capabilities affect the diffusion of technology brought with foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a panel dataset on Indonesian manufacturers from 1988 to 1996, we measure how the productivity of differing domestic firms responds to the entry of multinational competitors. We find that firms with investments in research and development and firms with highly educated employees adopt more technology from foreign entrants than others. In contrast, firms that have a small “technology gap,” meaning that they are close to the international best-practice frontier, benefit less than firms with weak prior technical competency. This finding suggests that the marginal return to new knowledge is greater for firms that have more room to “catch up” than it is for already competitive firms.     

At the crossroads of “futurism” and “prospective”: Towards a Canadian synthesis?

North American “future studies” and the French concept of “prospective” have been integrated to provide the basis for an attempted “Canadian Synthesis” in the approach developed by the Montreal-based think-tank, the Gamma Institute. In this paper the founding president of Gamma outlines the four stages of the approach in a conceptual framework entitled the “Chronospace” and illustrates its applicability by referring to some of Gamma's projects in the last 12 years.     

A model of “coupled” technology transfer : A logistic curve approach

This article presents a mathematical model relating to the technology transfer problem. The origin of the problem stems from the existing trade-offs between the strategies of “technological progressiveness” and “static efficiency” employed by firms or countries defined as “leaders” and “followers,” respectively. The formulation of the model is based on the assumption that the technological development of a firm or a country follows a logistic growth curve when related to a specific technology. During the process of a “coupled” technology transfer, the development of the follower changes and its behavior is described by a first order nonhomogenous deferential equation. Different scenarios of the “coupled” technology transfer between the leader and the follower are being discussed.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.     

Explaining the economic trajectories of civilizations: The systemic approach

A civilization constitutes a durable social system of complementary traits. Some of the complementarities of any given civilization are between elements of “material” life and ones commonly treated as integral to “culture.” Identifying the mechanisms responsible for a civilization's observed trajectory involves, therefore, causal relationships that cross the often-postulated “cultural–material” divide. Complementarities make it difficult to transplant institutions across civilizations on a piecemeal basis. They imply that reforms designed to jump-start an economy will fail unless they are comprehensive. Civilizational analysis can benefit, therefore, from attention to institutional complementarities, including ones involving both cultural and material variables.     

Is man doomed to progress?

This paper is dedicated to the empirical exploration of the welfare effect of expectations and progress per se. Using 10 waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a panel household survey rich in subjective variables, the analysis suggests that for a given total stock of inter-temporal consumption, agents are more satisfied with an increasing time profile of consumption: they seem to have a strong “taste for improvement”. This contributes to qualify the “Easterlin paradox” that income growth does not make people happy.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).