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1.
Jason Potts 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2007,20(2-3):123-135
This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework
of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination
and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value
paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the
economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination,
adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general
“generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.
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2.
This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired
by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also
a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold
with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium
is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition
for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz
(Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions
about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition. 相似文献
3.
This paper studies how the strength of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects investments in biological innovations when
the value of an innovation is stochastically reduced to zero because of the evolution of pest resistance. We frame the problem
as a research and development (R&D) investment game in a duopoly model of sequential innovation. We characterize the incentives
to invest in R&D under two competing IPR regimes, which differ in their treatment of the follow-on innovations that become
necessary because of pest adaptation. Depending on the magnitude of the R&D cost, ex ante firms might prefer an intellectual property regime with or without a “research exemption” provision. The study of the welfare
function that also accounts for benefit spillovers to consumers—which is possible analytically under some parametric conditions,
and numerically otherwise—shows that the ranking of the two IPR regimes depends critically on the extent of the R&D cost.
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4.
Antonio Quesada 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):623-627
Summary. Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are “almost
unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are “appropriately heterogeneous”, with preferences
similar to those generating the “paradox of voting”.
Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001 相似文献
5.
This paper suggests a class of stochastic collective learning processes exhibiting very irregular behavior. In particular,
there are multimodal long run distributions. Some of these modes may vanish as the population size increases. This may be
thought of as “bubbles” persistent for a finite range of population sizes but disappearing in the limit. The limit distribution
proves to be a discontinuous function of parameters determining the learning process. This gives rise to another type of “bubbles”:
limit outcomes corresponding to small perturbations of parameters are different. Since an agent's decision rule involves imitation
of the majority choice in a random sample of other members of the population, the resulting collective dynamics exhibit “herding”
or “epidemic” features.
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: L. Gaio 相似文献
6.
Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Viktor J. Vanberg 《Constitutional Political Economy》2007,18(3):199-222
The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing
on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market
players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed,
a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing
rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior.
And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative
economic regime.
相似文献
Viktor J. VanbergEmail: |
7.
8.
Daniel B. Klein 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(4):403-410
Alan Kahan’s Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishers, 2010) treats intellectuals as a class and tells of intellectuals’ yearning to play the role of cleric
and aristocrat. Kahan says that intellectuals are necessarily alienated from “capitalism.” In this essay, I discuss Kahan’s
erudite and insightful—though sometimes exasperating—work, and I take the opportunity to develop some ideas on the topic,
ideas in line with Hayek’s thought. 相似文献
9.
This article discusses the problem of “thought experiments” in Austrian economics and takes as a starting point Lawrence Moss’
argument on the divide between the older Austrian economists—for whom thought experiments were crucial—and the new generation
that, in Moss’ view, has “abandoned” such methods. The article is an attempt not only to bridge this alleged divide but also
to contribute to the development of the Austrian methodology. It is argued that what may be perceived as “abandonment” bolsters
rather than precludes the role of thought experiments in the Austrian paradigm. The article identifies an entire family of
comparative and counterfactual analysis research strategies available to the Austrians, all enjoying a solid epistemological
and methodological grounding. The “comparative-counterfactual analytics” pattern threads together the conjectural histories,
spontaneous orders and empirical case studies of the contemporary Austrians, with the classic tradition of older works. Consequently,
the recent evolution of Austrian scholarship should not be seen as an aberration or abandonment but as a deliberate, natural
and commendable development.
相似文献
Anthony J. EvansEmail: |
10.
Using public policy instruments to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has become standard in most countries, irrespective
of their level of development, geographical location or industrial structure. Against this background the paper analyses the
suitability of various public policies to attract inward FDI based on a sample of 11 countries and 10 industries from the
manufacturing sector over 10 years. For this aim we derive an empirical baseline model of the determinants of inward FDI-stock.
From this baseline model FDI-gaps—measured as the difference between the “estimated actual” inward FDI-stock and the “potential”
FDI-stock, which could be realized if a certain “best practice policy” were carried out—are derived. Thereby the analysis
focuses on business taxation, public research and development expenditures, the information and communication infrastructure
endowment, labor costs as well as institutional and skill-related policies. The analysis inter alia reveals the share of each
of these location factors in the total industry- and country-level FDI-gap. Moreover, the analysis explores how policy advice
depends on the definition of the “best practice policy”. 相似文献
11.
12.
The most fundamental proposition about growth and competition is that there is a tradeoff between static welfare and long-term
growth. This paper reconsiders this basic proposition in an expanding variety endogenous growth model with competitive markets
for “old” innovative products and for a traditional good. We shed light on some implications of monopolistic distortions which
tend to be ignored by standard models. First, no growth may be better than some growth, since modest positive growth potentially
requires sizeable static welfare losses. Second, the economy may converge to a steady state with zero growth, even though
a locally saddle-point stable steady state with positive growth exists if the initial share of “cheap” competitive markets
is sufficiently high, as this implies a relatively low demand for “expensive” innovative goods. Third, such a “no-growth trap”
may happen in a world economy made up of several countries engaged in free trade with each other. The policy implications
are that growth-enhancing policies may be misguided and that quick deregulation as well as quick trade liberalization can
lead to stagnation in the long term.
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13.
Coordinating activity among members is an important problem faced by organizations. When firms, or units within firms, are
stuck in bad equilibria, managers may turn to the temporary use of simple incentives—flat punishments or rewards—in an attempt
to transition the firm or unit to a more efficient equilibrium. We investigate the use of incentives in the context of the
“minimum-effort,” or “weak-link,” coordination game. We allow groups to reach the inefficient equilibrium and then implement
temporary, flat, “all-or-none” incentives to encourage coordination on more efficient equilibria. We vary whether incentives
are positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), whether they have substantial or nominal monetary value, and whether they
are targeted to a specific outcome (the efficient equilibrium) or untargeted (apply to more than one outcome). Overall, incentives
of all kinds are effective at improving coordination while they are in place, but there is little long-term persistent benefit
of incentives—once incentives are removed, groups tend to return to the inefficient outcome. We find some differences between
different kinds of incentives. Finally, we contrast our results to other recent work demonstrating greater long-term effectiveness
of temporary incentives.
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14.
In their recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Bagus and Howden (2010) present “quibbles” with fractional-reserve free banking. Specifically, they raise what they call “unaddressed issues” in
this system, with a particular emphasis on Selgin (1988). We deem their arguments to be more substantial than “quibbles” and see them as part of a longstanding debate about fundamental
aspects of monetary theory. We respond to their objections and attempt to specify how debate between the two sides might proceed
more productively. 相似文献
15.
Harvesting of prey biomass is analyzed in an integrated ecological-economic system whose submodels, a predator–prey ecosystem
and a simple economy, are microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models. These submodels are interdependent because the
ecosystem responds to harvesting—through the reactions of optimizing individual organisms—by changing the provision of public
ecosystem services to consumers. General analytical results are derived regarding the impact of harvesting policies on short-run
equilibria of both submodels, on population dynamics, and on stationary states of the integrated model. A key insight is that
prey biomass carries a positive ecosystem price which needs to be added as a tax mark-up to the economic price of harvested biomass to attain allocative efficiency. Further information on the dynamics is gained by resorting to
numerical analysis of the policy regimes of zero harvesting, laissez-faire harvesting and efficient harvesting.
It “... is a matter of weighing costs and benefits of taking action, whether the action is the “inert” one of leaving resources alone in order to conserve them, or whether it involves exploiting a resource ... for so-called material ends”. Pearce (1976, p. 320)Helpful comments from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility. 相似文献
16.
This paper investigates the duality relationships between Marshallian and compensated price-dependent consumer demands. We
associate the compensated price-dependent demand with Luenberger’s benefit function, which has nice aggregation properties
and provides a general basis for conducting welfare analysis. As an analog to the well-known “Slutsky equation,” we derive
a “Luenberger equation” establishing the general relationships between Marshallian and compensated price-dependent slopes.
Our duality results strengthen the conceptual linkages between positive economic analysis and welfare analysis. 相似文献
17.
This note presents an alternative parameterization of any scoring rule that satisfies the score-expansion property. This parameterization is based on the vector that specifies, for every number of alternatives k, k ≥ 3, the minimal size of a coalition that can veto an alternative which is preferred by everybody outside the coalition. Our result sheds new light on the commonly used plurality and Borda rules, as well as the inverse plurality rule and any “vote for t alternatives rule”. 相似文献
18.
Armin Schmutzler 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(3):511-535
The paper introduces a simple framework for analyzing the environmental effects of local transportation policies, and it reviews
some evidence. In several cases, subsidies for local public transportation have led to substantial reductions in road transportation and have thereby reduced externalities.
Some but not all estimates suggest positive overall welfare effects of such policies. In the rare cases where road pricing has been applied, it has helped to reduce automobile transportation, and it has led to environmental improvements. The experience
with specific driving restrictions like “days without cars” and “low emission zones” has been mixed. Local transportation policy can have a useful role to play
as a complement to national policy instruments, but neither efficiency nor effectiveness can be taken for granted. 相似文献
19.
Charles F. Mason 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(4):537-560
An intriguing alternative to traditional methods for regulating externalities is the provision of information about firms’
environmental attributes. An increasingly important example of this approach is “eco-labeling,” where a third party certifies
firms’ products. Such schemes are currently used in a variety of countries. This paper investigates the equilibria that may
occur with eco-labeling, and the attendant welfare effects. I model certification as a noisy test, subject to both type I
and type II errors, but where green firms more likely to pass than brown firms. While it commonly leads to an increase in
the fraction of green units in the market, the introduction of an eco-label can either increase or decrease welfare. 相似文献
20.
This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures
and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent
analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application
to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study
of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure,
(interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies.
In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and
other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.” 相似文献