OPERATING SYSTEM PRICES IN THE HOME PC MARKET*

Because the demand for OS is a derived demand revealed through the demand for PCs and because its elasticity is relatively small, the profit‐maximizing price of DOS/WIN that would result from a static equilibrium is much higher than the observed price. We investigate this assertion empirically by fitting a differentiated‐products model of the home PC market to panel data of all PC brands sold in the G7 countries over the period 1995–1999. The results confirm that the low value of the aggregate elasticity of demand for PCs is the result of differentiation and substitution among PCs.     

A Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden

Even when heterogeneity of demand for computers is taken into account, Microsoft's pricing of Windows is inconsistent with the government's claim that Windows is a monopoly, protected by high entry barriers. Werden's claim to the contrary rests on confusion between local and global maxima and on his use of assumptions about thePC market that are demonstrably false.     

Reprint of: Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality

The tablet PC market is dominated by two platforms: iOS and Android. In this paper, we combine tablet-level data with data on the quality of the top 1000 mobile applications from these platforms and estimate a structural demand model. We exploit variations over three periods and five European countries to find whether the application quality affects tablet demand. We then run two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual suggests that an improvement in application quality benefits the tablet producers on that platform with a more pronounced effect on the demand for Android-based tablets. The second counterfactual discusses the policy of leveling the app quality of the two stores. It shows that such a policy favors the tablet producers adopting the lowest quality app store (Google) and stimulates the adoption of tablet PCs. This generates consumer surplus in tablet demand.     

A Monopolist Would Still Charge More for Windows: A Comment on Werden's Reply

Werden's reply to our comment does nothing to cast doubt on our fundamental conclusion: Microsoft's pricing of Windows is inconsistent with thegovernment's claim that Windows is a monopoly, protected by high entry barriers.     

Platform competition in the tablet PC market: The effect of application quality

The tablet PC market is dominated by two platforms: iOS and Android. In this paper, we combine tablet-level data with data on the quality of the top 1000 mobile applications from these platforms and estimate a structural demand model. We exploit variations over three periods and five European countries to find whether the application quality affects tablet demand. We then run two counterfactuals. The first counterfactual suggests that an improvement in application quality benefits the tablet producers on that platform with a more pronounced effect on the demand for Android-based tablets. The second counterfactual discusses the policy of leveling the app quality of the two stores. It shows that such a policy favors the tablet producers adopting the lowest quality app store (Google) and stimulates the adoption of tablet PCs. This generates consumer surplus in tablet demand.     

ENDOGENOUS COSTS AND PRICE‐COST MARGINS: AN APPLICATION TO THE EUROPEAN AIRLINE INDUSTRY*

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price‐cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two‐equation set‐up (demand and first‐order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price‐cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976–1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price‐cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.     

Market Delineation under the Merger Guidelines: Monopoly Cases and Alternative Approaches

Despite the well-known Cellophane fallacy, the Merger Guidelines' market-delineation paradigm, which examines the effects of price increases above the prevailing level, has substantial utility in many monopoly cases. For monopoly cases in which the Guidelines' approach is not appropriate due to the Cellophane fallacy, no modification of that approach appears to solve the problem is a useful way. More direct methods for assessing monopoly power are likely to be preferable to structural analysis in many monopoly and merger cases.     

A comment on Bradburd: “Privatisation of natural monopolies”

In a recent issue of this journal, Ralph Bradburd (1995) argues that the efficiency gains of privatising a natural monopoly are likely to outweigh any loss of allocative efficiency. However, a trade-off based on a definition of the total surplus which includes profits but not internal rents is flawed. Correcting the analysis shows that even stronger conditions have to be met before privatising a natural monopoly is beneficial. The same is true if demand schedules are iso-elastic rather than linear. Recent evidence on demand elasticity and efficiency differences suggests that privatisation would be likely to reduce welfare even according to Bradburd's approach.     

自然垄断边界变化与政府管制的调整

自然垄断是政府管制的传统领域之一。技术水平变化、需要扩大以及市场扩张，都在不断地改变自然垄断的传统边界，政府管制的边界也随着发生很大的变化，管制的方法也更多的地借鉴市场和竞争的思路。我国自然垄断是具有自然和人为双重垄断因素，更多地具有政府垄断的特点。由于制度变革、技术变迁和市场扩大的共同作用，我国自然垄断的边界以及政府管制范围和方法也在发生着深刻的变化。     

The political economy of monopoly and competition: A critique of monopoly and stagnation theory

This paper examines critically the Kaleckian theory of monopoly capitalism proposed by Cowling (1982). The supply side of the model is shown to be incapable of providing an aggregate degree of monopoly and the neglect of inter-sectoral competition is highlighted. On the demand side, there is little indication of the source of stagnationary tendencies; it is the emphasis on collusion over conflict which underpins stagnation. The model is characterised by its emphasis on distribution and exchange at the expense of production relations, and is an inadequate representation of ‘monopoly capitalism’.     

Reflections on Learner's index of monopoly power

Lerner's index of monopoly power is considered in light of four axioms or principles the index should exhibit. The index is then defined for various types of market, involving externality, dynamics, increasing returns to scale, multiproduction, price discrimination and non-zero cross-elasticities of demand. The role of monopoly profit as opposed to non-competitive distortions becomes more important with greater generality. A supplementary index is defined to measure rents to technology.     

强制性管制放松与边缘性进入的发生--"小灵通"现象的深层思考

本文的分析表明“小灵通”现象的发生是市场需求结构、管制放松的路径和管制权力安排共同作用的结果。以拆分原有在位者为主要手段的电信业管制放松,所造成的需求与价格的矛盾为“小灵通”的发生提供了市场机会,而高盈利业务的被剥离,迫使原有在位者利用尚存的垄断势力或优势,以及和管制者的“拆分—补偿”关系,向新运营商的市场进行了局部的渗透。这种行为表面上加剧了中国电信业管制的无序和混乱,但却提高了市场的可竞争性和消费者剩余。     

Privatization of natural monopoly public enterprises: The regulation issue

The paper presents a simple model that calculates — as a percentage of industry revenues — the welfare gains or losses that might ensue when a public enterprise natural monopoly is replaced by a profit maximizing private monopoly. The model incorporates both the pre-privatization demand elasticity and production efficiency changes subsequent to privatization. The magnitude of the welfare changes suggests that allocative efficiency improvements do not provide a compelling rationale for post-privatization regulation. Greater consideration must be given to other regulatory objectives including distributional concerns and the need to create an institutional environment that encourages investment.     

Product Development Strategy and Organizational Learning: A Tale of Two PC Makers

The personal computer (PC) marketplace in the US presents a dizzying array of component suppliers and products. No single firm dominates the industry with a complete package of hardware and software components. Although one company's operating systems and general-purpose applications are installed on most PCs in the US, the other system components—processors, memory, storage devices, display adapters, monitors, specialized applications, and so on—come from any number of sources. David T. Methe, Ryoko Toyama, and Junichiro Miyabe point out that the PC industry in Japan also exhibits this decentralized nature. However, they also note that despite the decentralized network structure of the Japanese PC industry, one company—NEC—was able to achieve a dominant market share. To provide insight into the key issues involved in the management of complex technology, they contrast NEC's strategic approach to product development and organizational learning with the approaches taken by Fujitsu—the firm that placed a distant second in this market. Despite matching NEC in terms of technological capabilities, financial resources, and managerial talent, Fujitsu never managed to threaten NEC's dominance of the PC market in Japan. Fujitsu continually emphasized technological leadership, even at the expense of protecting its installed base. Poor coordination of resources and product development efforts resulted in incompatibilities among Fujitsu's various products, and the company failed to foster close relationships with suppliers of such key technologies as software and peripherals. NEC's PCs did not enjoy the advantages of first-to-market status or technological leadership. Instead, NEC achieved market dominance by finding the combination of product technologies that met the needs of the greatest number of consumers. Throughout almost 20 years of competition in the PC industry, NEC successfully maintained consistency and backward compatibility across its product lines. NEC also recognized the importance of third-party software developers, and carefully cultivated relations with these firms as a source of competitive advantage. In other words, NEC struck the right balance between three key factors: technological innovation, motivation of third-party developers of software and peripherals, and service to its installed base of customers.     

Price behavior in tight oligopoly

The study examines price behavior in tight oligopoly. The investigation proceeds from the premise that tacit cooperation is the rational response of firms comprising tight oligopoly. The study’s thesis is that cooperative conduct in tight oligopoly will reflect one of two general pricing patterns: (1) shared monopoly pricing, or (2) mark-up pricing. A unique empirical test of this dual price hypotheses is developed. The test focuses on the nature of price responses to cost and demand changes as reflected in a price equation that is estimated for each of fifty four-digit SIC industries. The study’s results indicate infrequent, but still notable, instances of shared monopoly pricing. More common is evidence of mark-up pricing, a general category within which demand proved to be significant in roughly half of the industries examined. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Bundling,tying, and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.     

Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation

This paper characterizes the payoffs and pricing policies of auction hosting sites when both the bidders’ and the sellers’ participation is endogenous. Sellers have heterogeneous opportunity costs and make a listing decision depending on the listing fee and the expected revenue from the sale. On the other side of the market, factors such as facility in navigating an interface layout and prior bidding experience result in bidder heterogeneity with respect to participation costs. Bidders participate if their ex ante expected payoff from searching the site exceeds their participation costs. The auction site earns revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller resulting from a higher fee with the revenue reduction from the loss of sellers. Though this appears to be a classic monopoly problem, there are important differences. The reduction in the number of sellers participating in a site has feedback effects, as it affects the number of bidders who choose to visit that site, which in turn again affects the attractiveness of the site to sellers, and thus further reduces seller participation. In this environment the monopolist’s ability to extract rents is severely limited, even if one considers rent extraction from the seller side of the market only. It is demonstrated that the inverse demand curve is flatter than the demand curve obtained from the (inverse) distribution of seller costs. Moreover, the inverse demand curve has at least one and possibly multiple flat segments, leading to discontinuities in the profit function. Thus, small changes in the environment can lead to large changes in the optimal fee and market participation.     

Economies of scope within market frameworks

The purpose of this paper is to look at the circumstances under which a market organised to take advantage of economies of scope is superior to one neglecting these but as a consequence involving less monopoly power. The question is investigated theoretically by means of two simple models in order to obtain insights into the main forces involved. It transpires that if cross-elasticities of demand are low relative to own-price-elasticities then gaining economies of scope is likely to be worthwhile from society's viewpoint, otherwise not.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

The reverse Cellophane fallacy in market delineation

In the landmark Cellophane case, the Supreme Court erroneously concluded that du Pont did not have significant market power because the Court evaluated the elasticity of demand for Cellophane at the monopoly equilibrium, at which the elasticity was far higher than at the competitive equilibrium. The Court's error is commonly referred to as the Cellophane fallacy. This paper contends that there also is a reverse Cellophane fallacy. Markets delineated on the basis of prevailing demand elasticities are likely to be too small and the potential for the exercise of market power is likely to be overstated.