Matching Capital and Labor

We establish an important role for the firm by studying capital reallocation decisions of mutual fund firms. The firm's decision to reallocate capital among its mutual fund managers adds at least $474,000 a month, which amounts to over 30% of the total value added of the industry. We provide evidence that this additional value added results from the firm's private information about the skill of its managers. The firm captures this value because investors reward the firm following a capital reallocation decision by allocating additional capital to the firm's funds.     

Does a Parent–Subsidiary Structure Enhance Financing Flexibility?

I examine whether firms exploit a publicly traded parent–subsidiary structure to issue equity of the overvalued firm regardless of which firm needs funds, and whether this conveys opposite information about firm values. Using 90 subsidiary and 37 parent seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements during 1981–2002, I document negative returns to issuers but insignificant returns to nonissuers in both samples, and insignificant changes in combined firm value and parent's nonsubsidiary equity value in subsidiary SEOs. Firms issue equity to meet their own financing needs. My evidence contrasts with previous studies and suggests that parent–subsidiary structures do not enhance financing flexibility.     

The Impact of the Corporate Control Market on IPO Decisions

Entrepreneurs who take their firm public during an active corporate control market face an increased risk of losing control through a takeover. I examine the extent to which the threat of takeover impacts IPO firms’ decisions and find that an active takeover market in an IPO firm's industry increases the probability that the firm incorporates in a state with state‐level antitakeover provisions. IPO firms backed by venture capital investors and reputable underwriters are less likely to incorporate in a state offering antitakeover provisions. A closer examination of equity carve‐outs suggests that control is not a first‐order consideration for some IPO firms.     

Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets

Using hand‐collected data on divisional managers at S&P 500 firms, we study their role in internal capital budgeting. Divisional managers with social connections to the CEO receive more capital. Connections to the CEO outweigh measures of managers' formal influence, such as seniority and board membership, and affect both managerial appointments and capital allocations. The effect of connections on investment efficiency depends on the tradeoff between agency and information asymmetry. Under weak governance, connections reduce investment efficiency and firm value via favoritism. Under high information asymmetry, connections increase investment efficiency and firm value via information transfer.     

More than words: Can tone of consumer product reviews help predict firms’ fundamentals?

Although financial market participants are increasingly interested in the financial value of unstructured qualitative information regarding the prospects of a firm, empirical evidence remains sparse on the properties of qualitative content in consumer product reviews and their capital market implications. Using a broad sample of consumer reviews posted on Amazon.com, I examine whether the linguistic tone of aggregate consumer product reviews conveys information that is associated with firms’ sales, earnings, stock returns and risk. I find that aggregate review tone successfully predicts a firm's forthcoming quarterly sales. Moderating analyses show that this predictability is stronger for firms operating in a highly competitive environment. I further find that review tone predicts a firm's quarterly earnings surprises, abnormal stock returns and risk. A path analysis shows that the effect of review tone on stock prices is partially channeled through its effect on firms’ earnings. I finally find that negative review tone is more informative and useful than positive tone in predicting a firm's fundamentals. Importantly, these results hold after controlling for other review characteristics, including review rating, review volumeand review dispersion. Overall, my findings highlight the importance of considering the tone of consumer reviews when evaluating a firm's prospects and value.     

Disclosure of outsourcing in the annual report: Causes and market returns effects

Firms increasingly are utilizing outsourcing to enhance or maintain their competitiveness. Prior research shows that capital markets value a firm's decision to outsource. This study uses a sample of firms announcing outsourcing arrangements in a press release to examine which factors are associated with the subsequent decision to voluntarily provide or withhold information about outsourcing in their annual report. The paper also examines whether annual report disclosure is a reliable signal of future market performance. We find that underperforming firms, larger firms, and firms experiencing negative outsourcing announcement market returns and negative long-term market returns are more likely to disclose outsourcing in their annual reports. There is also evidence that firms' disclosure of outsourcing in the annual report signals an improvement in market performance that is credible to the capital markets. We contend that the disclosure and subsequent firm performance issues we investigate apply to any type of outsourcing arrangement, and therefore our results are relevant to future information systems research on this subject. Our findings also suggest that regulatory standards could reduce private information search costs for investors by providing a common disclosure methodology for outsourcing activities.     

Good cop,bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management

We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions by outside claimholders. We show it can be useful to commit to inefficient liquidation when monitors fail to produce information: this provides stronger incentives to monitor. The implication for firm capital structure is that more information is generated about firm prospects – and hence firm value increases – when a firm’s cash flow is split into a ‘safe’ claim (debt) and a ‘risky’ claim (equity) compared to when a single claim is sold. We also derive the optimal allocation of control rights between safe and risky claims. This partially resolves the Tirole (2001) puzzle as to why firms issue multiple securities that generate ex post conflicts of interest.     

A MULTIPERIOD MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The continuing interest in the capital structure issue among financial researchers is evidenced by the stream of capital structure models that have appeared in the literature. Much of this research has used a risk-neutral and/or a single-period framework. In this paper, we develop a capital structure model for multiperiod firms and allow for the firm's cash flows to grow over time, for the firm to issue new debt, and for two types of bankruptcy costs to occur. The types of bankruptcy costs that occur are determined by the firm's uncertain operating cash flows and negotiations between the firm and creditors. Risk is priced via the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model. Multiperiod risk-priced models, we argue, realistically represent actual firms and are thus an important step toward the development of more testable and usable models of capital structure. We execute a demonstration example in which the value of the levered firm achieves a maximum and discuss the steps the firm would take to maximize shareholder wealth within this example. The example illustrates that the value of the firm passes through an interior optimum as the promised debt payment is increased. A simulation of the effect of changes in firm-specific parameters shows that the model exhibits expected and appealing relationships between these parameters and the value of the levered firm.     

CEO inside debt and internal capital market efficiency

Agency theory argues that managerial equity-based incentives are more effective when firm solvency is likely while debt-based incentives are more effective when firms face a greater likelihood of bankruptcy. We examine the relation between chief executive officers' (CEOs') inside debt holdings and the internal capital market allocation of multi-segment firms. We find that CEO inside debt holdings are associated with conservative capital allocation to firm segments, with the result driven by financially distressed firms. Further analysis indicates that although CEO inside debt, on average, is negatively related to firm value, the relation is positive for financially distressed firms. Our evidence indicates that inside debt holdings align the interests of managers and external creditors, inducing managers to pursue conservative capital allocation strategies that appear to be optimal for firms facing insolvency.     

Overnight block trades in the Korean stock market

We examine the characteristics of overnight block trades in the Korean stock market from 2004 to 2015. We find that the discount on the offering price is negatively related to the number and return volatility of shares, the offering price is higher for firm-commitment contracts than for best-effort contracts, the discount level is lower for larger deal values under best-effort contracts, commission fee rates and fees are more pronounced under firm-commitment contracts, and a deal's uncertainty is related to the firm's contract choice. The incentives of sellers and investment banks are aligned unless sellers face an informational disadvantage.     

Labor Rights,Venture Capital,and Firm Performance

We investigate the role of labor unions in the performance of venture capital (VC)‐backed firms. Using a large sample of initial public offering firms from 1983 to 2013, we find that VC‐backed firms in highly unionized industries have lower Tobin's Q and are less likely to survive. This effect is robust to endogeneity concerns and to controlling for industry and firm characteristics. The findings suggest that strong labor rights impede innovative firms’ performance and survival, thereby adversely affecting innovation, economic growth, and employment.     

Why and how firms use operating cash flow in compensation**

This study considers the choice of operating cash flow (OCF) in contracts and further examines the sensitivity of the CFO's and CEO's compensation to OCF performance, conditional on our stylized indicator of the importance of working capital management (WCM). The analysis depicts OCF as conveying distinct information about WCM, and predicts that firms for which WCM is an important source of value are more likely to contract on OCF. The importance of WCM is instrumented by firm conditions that create strong demand for WCM, including large working capital, rapid growth in working capital, highly volatile working capital, and large debt relative to total assets. Using a sample of firms whose incentive plans explicitly include OCF measures and a control sample of firms without such plans, we show that all four indicators of the importance of WCM have positive association with the likelihood of contracting upon OCF, individually and collectively. In compensation regressions, we find that WCM importance has a pronounced positive effect on the weight of OCF, but muted effect on the weight of accrual earnings. The results suggest that firms include measures of OCF performance in contracts largely to provide incentives for WCM and internal cash generation.     

FINANCING DECISIONS AND SIGNALING BY PARTIALLY ACQUIRED FIRMS

It is well documented that financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about that firm. Our goal is to determine whether financing decisions by firms can signal valuable information about large stakeholders who have a substantial investment in those firms. In particular, we focus on financing decisions by firms after they had been partially acquired to determine whether these decisions signaled information that affected the values of their corresponding partial acquirers. We find that some financing policies by partially acquired firms may not only signal valuable information about themselves, but may also signal valuable information about their corresponding partial acquirers. We also find that the magnitude of the signal for the partially acquired firm that enacts a financing policy is dependent on the degree of monitoring imposed by the respective partial acquirer. JEL classification: G14, G34     

Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice

When capital market investors and firm insiders possess the same information about a company's prospects, its liabilities will be priced in a way that makes the firm indifferent to the composition of its financial liabilities (at least under certain, well-known circumstances). However, if firm insiders are systematically better informed than outside investors, they will choose to issue those types of securities that the market appears to overvalue most. Knowing this, rational investors will try to infer the insiders' information from the firm's financial structure. This paper evaluates the extent to which a firm's choice of risky debt maturity can signal insiders' information about firm quality. If financial market transactions are costless, a firm's financial structure cannot provide a valid signal. With positive transaction costs, however, high-quality firms can sometimes effectively signal their true quality to the market. The existence of a signalling equilibrium is shown to depend on the (exogenous) distribution of firms' quality and the magnitude of underwriting costs for corporate debt.     

Informational Feedback,Adverse Selection,and Optimal Disclosure Policy

Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.     

Capital structure with dividend restrictions

This paper develops a symmetric information model of a new firm which incorporates a constraint on dividend payments known as a balance sheet test. This test solves moral hazard problems that arise in credit markets where complete contracting over future actions is not possible. This constraint breaks down the traditional symmetric information result of separability between financial and real variables, and thus maximizing shareholder returns in this setting is not equivalent to maximizing total firm value. As a consequence, more profitable firms, those with a higher average product of capital, will have lower debt/equity ratios. Debt/equity ratios will be positively correlated with the firm's physical capital and negatively correlated with the firm's market power.     

Innovation and Price Informativeness

We study whether the innovation decisions of a firm are improved as a result of information reflected in the firm's stock price. We show that firms with more informative stock prices, as measured by price nonsynchronicity, have better innovation outcomes, as measured by the number of patents and patent citations. Our results are not driven by managerial private information and are robust to various alternative specifications. We also find that price informativeness is more important to innovation when managers are less experienced or face greater uncertainty about the optimal innovation strategy, and that these effects are primarily observed in small‐ and mid‐sized firms where additional information may be of greater value. Our results are consistent with the notion that capital markets can have real effects on the economy.     

The impact of debt on market reactions to the revaluation of noncurrent assets

This study provides evidence that noncurrent asset revaluations are differentially considered by market participants based on the level of debt in the capital structure. Contracting theory (e.g. Brown et al., Abacus 28 (1992) 36) implies that revaluations made by firms with high-debt levels may be viewed as being opportunistic, while revaluations for firms with low-debt levels may be viewed as reducing information asymmetry between the firm and capital providers. For a sample of New Zealand firm/years that excludes certain observations with extreme stock returns, we find that revaluations of fixed assets are more value-relevant for firms with low leverage than for firms with high leverage. This suggests that the value relevance of fixed asset valuations depends on management's motivation for making the revaluation. The results of the research should be considered within certain limitations such as a small sample.     

The value impact of strategic intent on firms engaged in information systems outsourcing

While information systems outsourcing has been on the rise in recent years, empirical evidence about whether IS outsourcing is value creating for shareholders is limited. Little is known about what factors influence the relation between information systems outsourcing and firm value. This study examines the effect of information systems outsourcing announcements on firm value by analyzing whether equity market reactions are associated with the management's strategic intent for outsourcing and firm characteristics of the outsourcing firm. After examining 103 IS outsourcing announcements made during the period from 1996 to 2003, results suggest that value is created for firms outsourcing with short-term operational intent rather than for longer term strategic reasons. In addition, the increase in firm value from an IS outsourcing announcement is positively associated with the firm's operating asset efficiency and the firm being in a service industry.     

The effects on investment incentives of an allowance for corporate equity tax system: the Belgian case as an example

The Modigliani–Miller theorem serves as the standard finance paradigm on corporate capital structure and managerial decision making. Implicitly, it is assumed that the market possesses full information about the firm. However, if firm managers have insider information, they may attempt to ‘signal’ changes in the firm’s financial structure and, in competitive equilibrium, shareholders will draw deductions from such signals. Empirical work shows that the value of underlying firms rises with leverage because investors expect such firms to implement positive NPV projects. We empirically examine this view using a sample of debt issue announcements by publicly traded firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. We argue that the timing of debt issues is fundamental in determining the relationship between leverage and risk-adjusted returns. We show that an announcing firm’s intrinsic value may not rise depending on when management publicly ‘signals’ changes in their firm’s capital structure. Specifically, we show that risk-adjusted returns rise positively for firms that make debt announcements during normal economic conditions while they tend to decline for firms making debt announcements during recessionary periods. During recessionary periods, market risk and loss aversion rise and investors focus less on the potential growth of debt announcing firms and focus more on potential losses instead. We conclude that the timing of new debt is of paramount importance and managers’ inability to prudently time such announcements can lead to exacerbated levels of systematic risk coupled with a significant erosion in shareholder wealth.