THE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL REPORTING REVIEW PANEL ON ASPECTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF AUDITORS AND THEIR ATTITUDES TO COMPLIANCE IN THE UK

The UK Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) enforces the regulatory framework for larger companies and requires companies to restate non-compliant accounts. It is authorized to deal with directors but not auditors. Recent UK based research indicates a belief that the FRRP's activities have enhanced auditor independence and changed attitudes to accounting compliance. Defective accounts indicate a lack of audit quality as the auditor must have failed to detect and/or prevent the deficiency. By analysis of fifteen semi-structured interviews with finance directors and audit firm partners with experience of an FRRP inquiry, and by review of publicly available information, the impact of the FRRP on some aspects of audit quality is sought. The FRRP is found to have motivated auditors to improve accounting compliance by increasing the possibility of some errors being exposed. It is also found to have enhanced the independence of auditors at the pre-conventional level of ethical cognition as identified by Ponemon and Gabhart (1990), by changing the cost-benefit for auditors of permitting non-compliance. FRRP inquiries cause auditors to incur non-recoverable costs, can undermine the auditor–client relationship and increase the risk of client loss. Personal embarrassment, possible career damage and the risk of an ICAEW disciplinary inquiry arise for the audit partner. The FRRP is found to provide auditors with an additional negotiating tool in dealing with directors, thus making in easier for auditors at the conventional and post conventional level of ethical cognition to prevent non-compliance. Direct evidence is, therefore, found that the FRRP's activities have provided incentives for all auditors to focus more on accounting compliance (at least for items visible from an inspection of the accounts) and have provided incentives and mechanisms for auditors at lower levels of ethical cognition to be independent.     

The auditor’s strategy selection for negotiation with management: Flexibility of initial accounting position and nature of the relationship

The audit partner is usually the first mover in a negotiation with client management and has an intended strategy set going into such a negotiation. Negotiation strategies that make up the set may be integrative (both parties can gain or at least not lose) and distributive (there is a winner and a loser). We focus on five strategies: two integrative (expanding the agenda or problem solving) and three distributive (contending, conceding or compromising) and measure the audit partner’s intent to use these strategies’ associated tactics. We report the results of an audit negotiation experiment in which 140 highly experienced audit partners planned a negotiation in response to a case scenario that incorporated two key theoretical variables: the flexibility of the client initial accounting position and the nature of the prior relationship between the auditor and client management. In addition to intended tactics, we also examine these two variables’ effects on commitment to the goal of reducing net income. Our results indicate that in contrast to findings in the generic negotiation literature that show negotiators have a preference for distributive tactics and have difficulty employing integrative ones, our audit partners generally favored the use of integrative tactics over distributive ones when entering negotiations, irrespective of circumstance. However, the two theorized variables led to particular strategic choices when distributive tactics were intended; for example, when the audit partner perceived he or she was facing a client management that was inflexible in its initial accounting position, the partner was more likely to use contending tactics and less likely to use conceding and compromising tactics. Finally, we discuss implications of these results for practice and research.     

Audit and non-audit fees and capital market perceptions of auditor independence

This study provides evidence on whether auditor independence-in-appearance, proxied by earnings response coefficients, is related to the non-audit fee ratio (non-audit to total fees from a client) or client importance (total fees from a client as a percentage of the total revenues of the audit firm). The results from large samples over the period 2001–2006 show, contrary to popular belief and the findings of some prior studies, that there is no evidence of a relation between perceived auditor independence and the non-audit fee ratio. However, perceived auditor independence is negatively associated with client importance, consistent with the economic theory of auditing. Our paper adds to the literature by examining the relative importance of non-audit fee ratios and client importance as determinants of independence-in-appearance.     

Can clients of economically dependent auditors benefit from voluntary audit firm rotation? An experiment with lenders

This study utilizes a nationwide random selection of 111 lenders in a 2?×?2 between-subjects experiment to determine whether the level of an auditor's economic dependence on a client and type of auditor rotation affect lenders’ independence and reliability perceptions and decisions to lend money to a potential borrower. Previous literature shows that financial statement users use client importance as a measure of audit quality when revenue streams are not equal across clients. This can negatively affect perceptions of independence and financial statement reliability. As United States regulators look for ways to improve audit quality under the current partner rotation mandate, this study explores whether an audited entity that voluntarily adopts a policy of firm rotation can mitigate the negative effects of the auditor's dependence on the client. Findings suggest that lenders view clients of economically dependent auditors (CEDA) as less independent from its auditor and perceive its financials as less reliable than clients without a dependent auditor (non-CEDA). Lenders are less likely to grant a loan to CEDA. However, under firm rotation, there is not only an increase in lenders’ perceptions of reliability of CEDA financials, but also no difference in perceptions of reliability of CEDA and non-CEDA financials.     

To switch or not to switch? The effect of audit firms’ economies of scale on audit firm switches after audit price deregulation in China

We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

Effects of Multiple Clients on the Reliability of Audit Reports

This paper demonstrates the existence of two different kinds of externalities induced by an auditor servicing multiple clients at the same time. First, we show that the capital market price for a client can increase in the number of qualified reports that his auditor issues to his other clients, thus producing a stock price externality. Second, when the audit firm has limited wealth, an additional client can actually decrease the audit quality and increase the average likelihood of audit failure relative to a single‐client setting because of reporting externalities. Our analysis also demonstrates how requiring a more effective audit oversight mechanism can actually produce unintended consequences such as an increased likelihood of audit failures.     

Auditor economic incentives and going-concern opinions in a limited litigious Continental European business environment: empirical evidence from Belgium

Theory predicts that auditor reporting behaviour may be influenced by the perceived consequences of disclosing going-concern uncertainty in the audit report (DeAngelo 1981, Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) and Louwers (1998) have addressed this issue empirically in a US context. The results of Krishnan and Krishnan (1996) suggested that one of the important factors in the auditor's opinion decision is the risk of litigation. The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between auditor economic incentives and the propensity to issue going-concern opinions in a limited litigious business environment, Belgium. In spite of the low risk of litigation and the fact that most Belgian companies are privately held, various regulations have been put into effect to safeguard audit quality in Belgium. However, the results suggest that the auditor's going-concern opinion decision in Belgium is associated with factors relating to the perceived consequences of disclosing a going-concern opinion. Specifically, the results suggest that auditors in Belgium are significantly less likely to issue going-concern opinions to clients that pay higher audit fees, and when the audit firm has lost a relatively high proportion of its clients in the preceding year. The auditor's going-concern opinion does not appear to be significantly influenced by the length of the auditor-client relationship, year of the auditor engagement period, and auditor type. The results of this study are to some extent different from the study by Louwers (1998), in which none of the incentive variables related to the auditor's loss function was significant.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Auditors' Conflict Management Styles: An Exploratory Study

This study explores the conflict management styles used by auditors when resolving disputes with clients concerning financial statement issues. Rahim's (1983a, 1990) ROCI–II conflict management instrument was used to establish both the styles generally used and also those used in a scenario concerning possible inventory obsolescence. Size of the client and the strength of its corporate governance mechanisms were manipulated in the scenario. It was found that auditors indicate that they primarily use the integrating style to resolve disputes. The compromising and dominating styles are used to a lesser extent while the obliging and avoiding styles are rarely used. Partners are more likely than managers to use more assertive styles of conflict management. The size of the client and the strength of corporate governance mechanisms in place have a significant but relatively minor impact on the choice of styles. The study also identifies the parties whom the auditor would expect to help resolve the dispute. It was found that, when resolving a dispute with the client's chief financial officer, the audit committee is perceived to give the most assistance, followed by the chief executive of icer.     

The effects of precedents and client position on auditors' financial accounting policy judgment

This paper investigates whether precedents (content, perceived similarity, and source) and the client's preferred accounting policy affects audit partner and manager financial accounting policy judgments. The research employs a combination of an experiment with an analysis of archival data. The experimental results show clear support for precedent content and perceived precedent similarity affecting auditor judgment. The archival data analysis suggests that precedent source and client position may indirectly affect auditor judgment through the precedent generation process. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

An examination of the influence of mutual CFO/audit firm tenure on audit quality

This study examines whether the extent of professional relationships between an audit firm and their client’s CFO influences audit quality. If regulators’ concerns that the relationship that develops over time between an audit firm and their client’s CFO impairs auditor judgment are justified, then we should observe a negative relationship between the length of audit firm’s tenure with their client’s CFO and audit quality. The results suggest that mutual audit firm-CFO tenure is associated with lower audit quality measured by the magnitude of discretionary accruals, the reduced incidence of issuance of going-concern audit opinions for distressed companies, and an increased likelihood of the receipt of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) from the US. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These affects are concentrated in a subsample of firms with higher levels of corporate governance concerns. These findings have implications for policies related to audit firm rotation. Specifically, the results suggest that regulators need to consider other relationships underlying audit firm tenure, such as the relationships that form between audit firm and client personnel, when evaluating audit firm rotation policies.     

The effect of inspections,rotations and client preferences on staffing decisions

With increased regulatory focus on audits and concerns about whether audit regulation is achieving its stated aims, it is timely to investigate how regulator inspection of audit files and partner rotations may be affecting staffing decisions. This is an important issue, which affects all audits, as the calibre of staff allocated across engagements impacts the quality of audit work delivered. This study reports the results of an experiment where auditor participants allocate staff across two audits, where regulation anticipated (none, inspection, rotation) and a client request for the best staff (absent, present) are manipulated between‐subjects. We find that auditors allocate lower calibre staff when neither an inspection nor rotation is anticipated than when either is anticipated. When an inspection is anticipated, auditors allocate staff with more knowledge and compliance skills. When a rotation is anticipated, auditors allocate staff with more people skills. A client request for the best staff only has an effect when a partner is due to be rotated, where auditors allocate staff with more people skills in response to the client request. Our findings provide greater understanding of staffing decisions, which may affect audit quality if concerns around audit inspections and partner rotations are perceived by auditors as more important than the underlying risk or complexity of an engagement when allocating staff.     

The impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence-some evidence from Denmark

The Enron case has highlighted that the provision of management advisory services (MAS) can endanger auditor independence. Recently, a number of changes have not only been made to the relevant international and US regulations, but also to the Danish regulations in this area. Theoretical research explains the emergence of non-independence and demonstrates that the provision of MAS can decrease independence. According to the economic model of DeAngelo, the existence of client-specific quasi-rents impairs auditor independence. The provision of MAS increases quasi-rents and thus, is a threat to independence. Antle used an agency theoretical approach. Information asymmetries between auditor and client could lead to a moral hazard risk, i.e. the auditor could give up independence from client's management and accept payments for withholding detected errors and irregularities. The client's management could also use MAS to legally compensate the auditor for giving away independence.A large number of empirical studies have investigated the influence of MAS on the perceived independence of the auditor. Most of these studies were performed in English speaking countries and the majority found a negative impact. Sociological research reveals cultural differences between English speaking and Nordic countries, e.g. concerning the dimension ‘masculinity’. Thus, an empirical investigation of the impact of MAS on perceived auditor independence in Denmark is promising. It was found that shareholders, bank loan officers and journalists perceive a negative effect on auditor independence if MAS are provided. The recent liberalization in Denmark is inconsistent with this finding. Furthermore, it was shown that the type of MAS influences the degree to which auditor independence is perceived to be impaired. Thus, independence rules related to MAS should be differentiated. Additionally, the study ascertained that perceived auditor independence does not increase if MAS are provided by a separate department of the audit firm. An internal separation of the auditing and the consulting function within the same audit firm is not viewed as being beneficial in Denmark.     

Does Ethical Culture in Audit Firms Support Auditor Objectivity?

The suggested cause of constrained auditor objectivity has been centred on auditors' financial incentives and long audit tenure. Recent research has challenged those assumptions and questioned the effectiveness of auditor rotation to counteract short-tenure threats to auditor objectivity. Audit firms and regulators need to adopt methods for enhancing auditor objectivity that are effective in various auditor–client relationships. This study examines whether audit firm ethical culture is positively related to auditor objectivity. Based on the responses of 281 practising auditors, the findings indicate that auditors are more likely to make objective judgments in ethical cultures characterized by the rewarding of ethical behaviour and punishment of unethical behaviour, prevalence of ethical norms, visible ethical leadership, and low emphasis on obedience to authority. In conclusion, evidence indicates that auditors in audit firms with a strong ethical culture are more likely to maintain auditor objectivity than are auditors in less supportive cultures. This suggests that audit firms should promote a strong ethical culture to reduce the risk of constrained auditor judgment.     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

AUDITOR PREFERENCES FOR LIABILITY LIMITATION

Debate over statutorily limiting auditor civil liability has implicitly assumed auditors are homogeneous in their preferences for capping liability. This study examines the preferences of auditors for limiting auditor liability and investigates reasons for the preferences. The study uses an Australian setting in which there has been a persistent debate for a decade or more over regulatory intervention in this area. The study provides a background to the debate over this issue and addresses the effects of two factors suggested by the extant literature, namely auditor size and the business risk of an auditor's client portfolio. These factors are argued to affect the expected costs of litigation facing auditors and therefore their preferences on capping liability. Using the submissions by audit firms on an Australian Companies and Securities Law Review Committee Discussion Paper on limiting auditor liability, the study finds larger audit firms that have greater capacities to lobby and greater expected costs of litigation from unlimited liability than smaller firms, dominate the respondents on the Paper and tend to be more supportive of liability limitation than smaller audit firms. Within the array of possible methods of capping liability canvassed by the Discussion Paper, the study documents evidence of diversity in preferences among audit firms. Larger audit firm size is associated with a preference for a group of methods that provides such firms with opportunities to benefit from the capping at the expense of the smaller audit firms. The method most preferred by the larger audit firms is the multiple of fee with a prescribed minimum. Perhaps not surprisingly, this is also the preferred method of the professional accounting bodies in Australia. As to the effect of the riskiness of the client portfolio on preferences for methods of limiting liability, the study finds that higher business risk in an auditor's portfolio is associated with a preference for methods that give greater control over their liability exposure. The study has implications for the impact of regulation of capping liability on competition in the audit services market.     

Non‐audit Services and Auditor Independence Depending on Client Performance

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on auditor independence in Korea is based on audit client performance. Further, we suggest that an audit client with low performance has an incentive to purchase non‐audit services (NAS) from an incumbent auditor to facilitate earnings management and steer accounting practices in a preferred direction. We find evidence that as non‐audit fees in Korea increase, auditor independence is reduced only for low‐performing audit clients. Thus, unconditional prohibition of NAS seems unnecessary. Regulators and policymakers should examine the motivation for purchasing NAS, particularly among audit clients with poor performance.     

Barbados Spirits Inc.

This case focuses on the audit of a subsidiary in Barbados of a Multi‐National Entity (“MNE”), a distiller in Toronto. The MNE is a large and important international client to the accounting firm. The firm provides both tax advisory and audit services to the MNE. The MNE, following advice of the accounting firm, has utilized an offshore related party to structure transactions that avoid taxes in Barbados. These related party transactions are a detriment to the interests of critical users of the financial statements, namely the minority shareholders and the tax authorities of Barbados. The auditor is now faced with evaluating the adequacy of the related party note disclosure and the completeness of the income tax provision. Independence issues of a self‐interest threat (importance of the client) and self‐review threat (evaluating the adequacy of the income tax provision based on tax advice provided by the firm) are explored.