ECONOMICS OF THE LIVING DEAD*

Zombie firms are those firms that are insolvent and have little hope of recovery but avoid failure thanks to support from their banks. This paper identifies zombie firms in Japan, and compares the characteristics of zombies to other firms. Zombie firms are found to be less profitable, more indebted, more dependent on their main banks, more likely to be found in non‐manufacturing industries and more often located outside large metropolitan areas. Overall, larger size makes the firm less likely to be a zombie, but among small firms, relatively larger firms are more likely to be protected and become zombies. Controlling for profitability, the exit probability for zombie firms does not differ from that for non‐zombies. Zombie firms tend to increase employment by more (but do not reduce employment by more) than non‐zombies. Finally, when the proportion of zombie firms in an industry increases, job creation declines and job destruction increases, and the effects are stronger for non‐zombies.     

THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET QUALITY ECONOMICS*

This study is based on my observation that high quality markets are indispensable for the healthy growth of a modern economy. Many problems surrounding markets are attributable to the lack of high quality markets. An industrial revolution creates extremely vibrant but unhealthy markets. This study introduces a concept of fairness in dealing and pricing (competitive fairness), which differs from efficiency, and defines market quality as a measure for the efficiency of allocation and the fairness of dealing and pricing. This study shows that competitive fairness is achieved by several market mechanisms that I constructed in my previous work.     

THE ECONOMICS OF SECTION 301: A GAME-THEORETIC GUIDE*

Extrapolating from some simple game-theoretic models, this paper suggests that invoking Section 301 will tend to shift the terms of agreement in the US's favor. This shift will be larger (a) the greater the harm to the targeted country from having its access to the US market limited; (b) the smaller the targeted country's ability to harm the US in retaliation; (c) the smaller the costs within the targeted country of complying with the US demands; and (d) the greater the benefit to the US – in the US negotiators' perception – from the demanded liberalization. But these determinants of the success of a Section 301 action do not identify the areas where the social gains from freer trade are largest. Thus there is a tendency to direct Section 301 actions at the wrong targets. Section 301 increases bargaining frictions: attempts to exploit the bargaining power that comes from either private information or commitments can lead to costly delays to agreement or even the possibility of a complete breakdown in the negotiations. And the use of retaliatory strategies can upset an existing global equilibrium and lead to counter-retaliation.     

ECONOMICS OF THE CANADIAN BISHOPS

The author welcomes the bishops' statement as an expression of the uniquely moral aspect of the Canadian unemployment crisis. The statement is dramatic, compassionate and deeply ethical in its concern for the Canadian economy and its people—especially for the poor, the afflicted, and the oppressed. However, the bishops' public policy recommendations are ill-advised and incompatible with the attainment of their very worthwhile goals. By relying on a quasi-Marxist economic analysis, the bishops misconstrue the role and effects of inflation, price controls, technological progress, welfare, and the labor union movement. To achieve economic progress, including a cure for unemployment, a move toward freer markets is needed—not more government intervention.