ARE SURVEYS OF EXPERTS UNBIASED? EVIDENCE FROM COLLEGE FOOTBALL RANKINGS

Policymakers are frequently interested in soliciting unbiased information regarding alternative policies, and expert surveys can be influential. As ranking policies is an often subjective process, there is always the concern of bias, both intentional and not. Expert bias is difficult to discern in the policy world, but surveys of expert opinion are compiled and “tested” for accuracy weekly in college football, allowing for hypothesis testing. Although previous research has used college football rankings to determine the ability of surveys to incorporate relevant information, this article examines the Associated Press and American Football Coaches' Association rankings for evidence of systematic bias. Specifically, more than 1,300 games from the 2003 to 2008 regular seasons are tested for factors that are systematically correlated with upsets. Both polls predict the winner nearly 80% of the time, and although there is evidence of systematic conference bias, correcting the rankings would only improve the accuracy of the polls by about 1%. There is no evidence of a bias favoring “big market” teams, nor teams that have strong journalism programs or are from the East Coast. (JEL D4, L8)     

Media capture in a democracy: The role of wealth concentration

Since objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those effects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to influence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.     

That Pesky Problem of Persistent Gender Bias

This article provides a brief overview of the way that economists think about and measure gender pay gaps and labour market discrimination. Recent Australian evidence is then presented which highlights the relationship between the gender pay gap and both statistical and self‐assessed discrimination measures. Finally, the policy implications of these relationships are considered. In particular, it is argued that public policy needs to be targeted towards addressing the issue of gender bias more broadly, rather than focusing narrowly on the issue of gender pay gaps alone. This includes addressing the issue of sexual harassment.     

Using Psychology to Improve Economic Policy

In this Australian Treasury seminar, I discuss the contributions that psychology could make to public policy formation via a new field: public policy psychology. Behavioural economics provides a precedent for my new field of public policy psychology. Unlike economics, psychology provides a solid scientific model of how individuals make decisions. I discuss shortcomings of economics in policy formation: model blindness, the focus on evidence supporting theories, the focus on markets, plus the importance of elements left out of conventional economic models (for example, irrational decision‐makers). I end by discussing two Treasury case studies: the mining tax and government responses to the Global Financial Crisis.     

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET: AN EXAMINATION OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUST CLASSIFICATION IN THE UK

ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue that national accounting categories provide an inadequate basis for evaluating differences between public and private sector services. This is because accounting categories rely on economic concepts such as market price but do not take account of substantive public policy goals such as universality. The argument has important consequences for the structures and systems of delivery especially where nonprofit providers and social enterprise models are substituted for public bodies formerly integrated into the government's delivery system. Using an example taken from the UK's National Health Service, we show that the mechanisms for ensuring universality through redistribution are not sufficiently taken into account for classification purposes.     

The purpose of competition policy

Conclusion We believe that the Commission attributes too great a significance, almost magical powers, to business rivalry as a force in economic life. There are no grounds for this either in the Treaty or in actual experience. While not wishing to deny that business rivalry may entail great benefits, we would insist that its drawbacks should not be ignored and that competition policy should turn mainly on market performance.In fact, the Commission is not pursuing a liberal competition policy but has adopted a case-by-case, noneconomic, legal approach that takes no account of performance.Monopoly is generally condemned. But monopoly, no more than oligopoly, which is usually coordinated, should not be condemnedper se. Monopoly may even result in better market performance than oligopoly.Competition policy must not therefore be considered an end in itself but must be seen in the light of general economic policy and, more specifically, of price policy. It must be regarded in fact as a component part of price policy.     

Why Excel?

Advanced Placement economics leaves thousands of high school students with a misleading impression of modern economics. The courses fail to cover key sources of growth and prosperity, including private ownership, dynamic competition, and entrepreneurship. The tools of public choice economics are totally ignored. Government is modeled as a corrective device available to impose ideal solutions. Market failure is covered, but there is no such thing as government failure. The macroeconomics course reflects the simplistic 1960s Keynesian view of stabilization policy. Time lags, incentive effects, secondary effects of budget deficits, and other factors that complicate effective use of stabilization policy are almost entirely ignored. In contrast, the 20 Voluntary National Content Standards in Economics of the Council for Economic Education illustrate what a balanced course in modern economics would look like.     

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information

In this paper, we analyze the optimal regulation policy when the regulated firm has better information concerning the market demand than the regulator. We show that introducing a cost on public funds into the Planner's objective function does not lead to qualitative results similar to those obtained by introducing distributional considerations. In particular we show that under constant marginal cost the full information policy is not implementable and that the optimal regulatory policy results in informational rents. The social value of private information and the firm's informational rents are both increasing functions of the cost of the public funds.     

Politically Motivated Fiscal Deficits: Policy Issues in Closed and Open Economies

In this paper we reconsider the trade-off between rules and discretion in fiscal policy in the presence of politically motivated fiscal deficits. We present a model of political bias in the budget process appropriately developed to allow for tax-smoothing-motivated deficits as well as for the consideration of deficit biases in open economies. We find that endowing politically-biased governments with the ability to respond to economic shocks with deficit finance will not exacerbate the existing biases. In an open economy, the ability to borrow abroad will significantly increase the deficit. However, restrictions to public foreign borrowing will not reduce the political bias as long as the private sector has access to international capital markets at the same terms as the government.     

Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information*

We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision.     

ASSESSING THE VALUE OF ECONOMICS RESEARCH: THE CASE OF THE BIAS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX

Economists provide sometimes contradictory information about economic systems that contribute to policy design. How does one value this type of knowledge? A political‐economic game is presented that allows for reinforcing and contradictory research messages. Policy makers are assumed to follow a Bayesian decision theory process and the model is tested with quantitative estimates of the value of research on the degree of bias in the Consumer Price Index. Most economists agree that a bias exists, but published estimates vary widely. A blue‐ribbon panel of economists recommended revisions to how the index is calculated, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics subsequently made revisions that differed from their original plans, but how much influence did the panel really have on the revisions? (JEL Z00)     

Effects of public funding on firm innovation: transforming or reinforcing a weak innovation pattern?

ABSTRACT

This paper adds to the ongoing debate on the effects of public funding programmes on business innovation. This policy instrument, based upon a simple but a robust rationale, has been applied in an almost homogeneous manner in different contexts, but evidence from such experiences is far from shown homogeneous effects. The main contribution of this paper is that it shows the limitations faced by public funding instruments in affecting a traditionally low innovative pattern. Using panel data techniques, we find heterogeneous effects of public funding on the innovation behaviour of Uruguayan firms between 2001 and 2015. Our results show that, after a strong public policy effort, the critical mass of innovative firms has hardly changed. Input additionality effects of public funding in private innovation investment are found, but only for innovation activities based on the acquisition of embodied knowledge. Moreover, we obtain some evidence of behavioural additionality in process and organizational innovation leading to higher productivity levels, but we find no effects on interaction for innovation.     

Wal‐Mart innovation and productivity: a viewpoint

Abstract Technology effects, business process development, and productivity growth are considered in the context of a single company: Wal‐Mart. The starting point is the 2001 McKinsey Global Institute report, which finds that over 1995–2000, a quarter of U.S. productivity growth is attributable to the retail industry, and almost a sixth of that is attributable to Wal‐Mart. Wal‐Mart is interesting as well because of its rapid growth in Canada. This is now Canada's largest private sector employer. We also consider other evidence relevant to public policy formation concerning Wal‐Mart and conclude with a discussion of options for partially filling important data gaps.     

中国公共政策监督失效的原因及其对策分析

公共政策的制定是为了解决直接关系到人们切身利益的重大社会问题,而在其落实执行过程中常受到各种因素的干扰和阻碍,需要我们对公共政策进行必要的监督。由于历史惯性和现状体制中各种弊端的综合作用,中国公共政策的监督存在着诸多问题。在当前构建社会主义和谐社会的进程中,对这些问题进行系统地归纳和分析,并提出相应的完善路径,无疑有着重要的理论和现实意义。     

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries

We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule. We offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regardless of the size of the jury, and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed. We prove a “jury theorem” for our general model: As the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule. For unanimity rule, the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence. Our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency, a property that could emerge only in a continuous model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72.     

Public Sector Rationing and Private Sector Selection

We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium.     

Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters.     

HOW DID UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY AFFECT ECONOMIC FORECASTS?

We study how unconventional monetary policy announcements affected professional forecasters' predictions of bond rates, gross domestic product growth and inflation using data from the monthly survey by the Wall Street Journal. We find that unconventional monetary policy (UMP) announcements moved predicted bond rates in the direction the Fed intended. UMP announcements had differential impacts on forecasters' predictions; they also tended to move growth and inflation predictions in directions opposite those the Fed intended due to Fed information effects. A policy implication of our study is that the Fed should communicate economic projections to the public separately from monetary policy announcements to mitigate Fed information effects. (JEL E52, E58)     

经济学视域下的公共政策分析:批判与反思

当前主流经济理论对公共政策的分析主要是基于其广泛适用的规则和假设,在进行演绎式分析推理过程中,其所使用的抽象效率标准将公平分析几乎完全排除在外,从而使公共政策在很大程度上失去了其应有的价值判断。现实中,社会性个体基于契约理性追求角色意义上的目标及其协调,因此,公共政策首先应考虑的是目标定位与一致认可,这必然要兼顾公平与效率,并全面考虑人类行为的伦理、经济和法律方面,这是人作为一切社会关系的总和的必然产物和要求。政府公共政策及其引导下的集体行动是对个体角色目标的协调一致的表现和结果,因此公共政策只有能够满足诸多个体实现不同的个人目标,才有被认可并得到执行的可能。由此可见,公共政策首先应当有其价值判断,该价值判断建立在共识判断的基础之上。