Business groups and competition in post-Soviet transition economies: The case of Russian “agroholdings”

The paper questions from an Austrian perspective the hypotheses that enjoy widespread support in mainstream economics that business groups are a symptom of imperfect competition and a threat to competition with negative impacts on social welfare. For this, an Austrian theoretical framework is developed and then applied to analyze the interaction of competition and business groups regarding the case of “agroholdings” in Russia. It is maintained that the orthodox literature does not adequately account for the characteristic features of competition in the real world, and therefore may lead to wrong normative conclusions on the relation between business groups and competition. It is argued that also in transition economies for competition to function as an entrepreneurial discovery process, no perfect markets are needed but only freedom to entry and property rights security. Then there is no pattern of action, which in and of itself is inconsistent with competition. Therefore, unless there is evidence for government support, business groups must principally be seen as the result of competitive entrepreneurial discoveries. It is further argued that the only real danger of business groups for competition does not come from their ability to raise non-legal barriers to entry, but from government protection. This may either result from successful lobbying of business groups or from the preference of government officials for this particular form of business organization. Case studies evidence from business groups in Russia’s agro-food sector illustrates these arguments.     

Rights and relations in modern economic theory

The paper is the 1980 Böhm-Bawerk-lecture given at the University of Innsbruck. Starting from Böhm-Bawerk's book. ‘Rights and relations from the point of view of the economic theory of goods’ the paper tries to evaluate rights and phenomena like goodwill from the perspective of innovation. A framework of three levels of economic activity is developed. The three levels are: consumption (the lowest level), production and innovation (the highest level). Rights are interpreted as instruments of protection of higher level activity from lower level activity. Focus of attention are industries with very high rates of technical progress and innovation. There the most important positive externality of innovation is the increased potential for even more innovations. It is argued that competition policy, as a rule of thumb, must foster competition by innovation and must discourage competition by imitation.     

Tax competition, rent-seeking and fiscal decentralization

The present paper provides a basis for evaluating fiscal decentralization of expenditure and tax responsibilities, by encompassing the literature on tax competition and rent seeking. Both tax and rent seeking competitions are conceived of as being wasteful and self-defeating. We find that rent-seeking activities account for political distortions which may be mitigated in the process of fiscal decentralization, while tax competition results in economic distortions associated with decentralization. Welfare evaluation should be based on the balance of the political gain and the economic cost.     

Limited Consumer Attention in International Trade

This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love‐of‐variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that international integration needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and process information is limited. Rather, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention, which causes mutual overbidding of producers in their advertising expenditures. The mutual overbidding renders advertising—which is informative in principle—wasteful and diverts purchases to imported goods at an inefficient scale. Wasteful advertising provides scope for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. However, if the tax instrument is not allowed to discriminate against foreign producers, it cannot eliminate inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports; hence it needs not be successful in securing gains from international integration in this framework.     

Government Spending and Welfare with Returns to Specialization

We explore a novel channel through which government spending can stimulate consumption and welfare through its effects on aggregate productivity, without directly affecting either utility or production possibilities. In the presence of monopolistic competition and increasing returns to specialization, it is shown that government spending can partly alleviate the inefficiencies of monopolistic competition. This is because government spending generates an endogenous increase in total factor productivity by increasing the variety of intermediate goods. If the degree of increasing returns to variety is large enough, a rise in such wasteful government spending may increase consumption levels enough to increase welfare.
JEL classification : E 60     

An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government

Endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents, each enjoying some degree of autonomy. In this paper, policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and the agent at the other tier. Our results concerning multi-tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one-tier lobbying. In particular, the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies. Moreover, the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier. It is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight. Extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures, like federations or firms.     

Markets wanted: expectation overshooting in transition economies

This paper analyzes and compares individual beliefs about the effects of competition and the evolution of those beliefs over time in transition economies and experienced market economies. At the onset of transition, competition beliefs in transition countries are far more positive than in experienced market economies. Over time, this difference vanishes and competition beliefs converge. It is argued that overly optimistic competition beliefs in transition countries contributed to the possibility of implementing far-reaching pro-market reforms. It is shown that competition beliefs positively affect support for economic reform.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.     

Integrating innovation system and management concepts: The development of electric and hybrid electric vehicles in Japan

Policymakers as well as corporate managers want to know how to gain the lead and benefit from a paradigmatic shift in technology. This paper develops and uses a combined policy and firm-level theoretical framework to derive policy implications from a case study of the development of battery, hybrid and fuel cell electric vehicles (BEVs, HEVs and FCVs) in Japan. Among the implications of the study, it is argued that Japanese national policy has so far had a limited direct role in the electrification of vehicles; this has been very largely decided and carried out in-house at the automakers. Policymakers need to consider this as well as the inherently international nature of the automotive industry. One key factor behind Toyota's and Honda's early and sustained lead in the electrification trajectory is the intense and in some aspects quite specific type of competition on the domestic market, which has nurtured firms with a strong product development capability. Finally, it is argued that the proposed theoretical framework contributes to a more balanced view of the role of policy in this potential paradigmatic shift in technology in a mature industry, compared to traditional policy or firm-level approaches.     

A tale of two federalisms: Germany,the United States and the ubiquity of centralization

This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.     

Generalized Lotka-Volterra equations and the mechanism of technological substitution

This paper demonstrates that if technological substitution is viewed as the result of competition between old and new technology in which new technology wins, and if generalized Lotka-Volterra equations are taken to describe this competition, then various models of technological substitution can be obtained as very special cases. It is argued that this could lead to a better understanding of the substitution process itself.     

Economic Competition and Evolution: Are There Lessons from Ecology?

After generally discussing models in ecology and economics that combine competition, optimization, and evolution, this article concentrates on models of intraspecific competition. It demonstrates the importance of diversity/inequalities within populations of species and other environments for the sustainability of their populations, given the occurrence of environmental change. This is demonstrated both for scramble (open-access) and contest competition. Implications are drawn for human populations and industrial organization. The possibility is raised that within-industry competition may not always exist between firms in all stages of the development of a new industry. Policy implications are considered. For example, it is argued that policies designed to encourage intense business competition and maximum economic efficiency have the drawback of eventually making industries highly vulnerable to exogenous economic changes. (JEL L100 , J100 , Q150 )     

The changing state–market condominium in East Asia: rethinking the political underpinnings of development

This article addresses the effects of inequality on the globalisation process. It is argued that the recent financial and economic crisis is a manifestation of a tendency of the aggregate demand to fall relatively to aggregate supply, generated by an asymmetric income distribution, which in turn both increases, and is reinforced by, the mobility of goods, capital and labour, in a process of cumulative causation. This process has not become manifest earlier due to counteracting tendencies generated by the financial system, that were disrupted during the crisis. It is also argued that mainstream economics does not have the adequate framework for explaining the crisis, and actually contributed to the crisis through its theories and policies. Hence an alternative economic framework is suggested for addressing the crisis, drawing upon the contributions of several heterodox economic traditions, especially post-Keynesianism.     

Strategic restraint in contests

Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.     

The politics of technology management: influence and tactics in project selection

It is observed that technical information presented in aformalized way is used as ‘rational’ evidence to suport one particular point of view during the process of project selection. This ‘political’ action increases the chances of a favoures course of action being carried through provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided by the rational actor model gives a biased and unrealistic view of the selection process because this political dimension is ignored. In the evidence presented here, and attempt is made to identify the discriminating factors associated with the supportive use of technical information at the level of the individual, the organization and the project. The data indicate that technical information is most likely to be used in a political manner by mature managers working in relatively small, low-tech companies. It is concluded that the supportive role played by technical information is political and symbolic in nature.     

The politics of technology management: influence and tactics in project selection

It is observed that technical information presented in aformalized way is used as 'rational' evidence to suport one particular point of view during the process of project selection. This 'political' action increases the chances of a favoures course of action being carried through provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided by the rational actor model gives a biased and unrealistic view of the selection process because this political dimension is ignored. In the evidence presented here, and attempt is made to identify the discriminating factors associated with the supportive use of technical information at the level of the individual, the organization and the project. The data indicate that technical information is most likely to be used in a political manner by mature managers working in relatively small, low-tech companies. It is concluded that the supportive role played by technical information is political and symbolic in nature.     

Evolutionary macroeconomics: a research agenda

In this article, the goal is to offer a new research agenda for evolutionary macroeconomics. The article commences with a broad review of the main ideas in the history of thought concerning the determinants of economic growth and an introduction to the evolutionary perspective. This is followed by a selective review of recent evolutionary approaches to macroeconomics. These approaches are found to be somewhat disconnected. It is argued that the ‘micro-meso-macro’ approach to economic evolution is capable of resolving this problem by offering an analytical framework in which macroeconomics can be built upon ‘meso-foundations’, not micro-foundations, as asserted in the mainstream. It is also stressed that the economic system and its components are complex adaptive systems and that this complexity must not be assumed away through the imposition of simplistic assumptions made for analytical convenience. It is explained that complex economic systems are, at base, energetic in character but differ from biological complex systems in the way that they collect, store and apply knowledge. It is argued that a focus upon stocks and flows of energy and knowledge in complex economic systems can yield an appropriate analytical framework for macroeconomics. It is explained how such a framework can be connected with key insights of both Schumpeter and Keynes that have been eliminated in modern macroeconomics. A macroeconomic framework that cannot be operationalized empirically is of limited usefulness so, in the last part of the article, an appropriate methodology for evolutionary macroeconomics is discussed.     

CONFLICT IN THE CO-OPERATIVE RETAIL SOCIETY

This paper considers the nature of organizational conflict in general and conflict in the co-operative society in particular. It examines the unitary and pluralistic views of organizations and considers the suggestions that conflict is necessary for the independence of the individual, is constructive for the organization and is inevitable in any form of society. It investigates the proposed mechanisms for restraining conflict so that it is constructive. It is then argued that the co-operative retail society is a pluralistic organization comprising a number of different interest groups with their own sets of values. These groups tend to be engaged in an evaluation of the other groups and this evaluation carries with it the framework for competition rather than co-operation. It is contended that when economic conditions are favourable and there is a substantial surplus in the society the different groups can be satisfied and the inherent conflict remains submerged. The evaluation process is, in these conditions, latent, and internal competition is likely to be minimal. When economic conditions are unfavourable it is suggested that the divergent interests come to the surface. There is less dividend available for the members, the demands of managers and staff for higher wages and salaries may be difficult to meet, the members may be concerned about their capital and wish to draw it at a time when management want to retain it in the society. Within management the competition for scarce resources becomes sharper, and between management and staff there is increased tension as the former increase the pressure for greater efficiency. Economic values predominate and the holders of social values feel their position within the society to be threatened. To reassert themselves, they may stress the need for more effective democratic control. This emphasis on democratic control is a part of a wider feeling of anti-professionalism. This may take a number of forms, all, of which are aimed to redress the balance between managers and laymen. The attempt to establish firmer democratic control and the broader issue of anti-professionalism are both likely to intensify the conflict situation in a retail society at a time of economic stress.     

Social value of public information re-examined

As an extension of Hirshleifer's horse race example into a competitive exchange market framework, this paper quantitatively re-examines the condition under which social value of public information can be positive. For a prototype economy of two risk averse traders, we prove that their discordance of beliefs makes the social value of a certain class of inconclusive information either positive or negative depending on whether their endowments are or are not predominantly associated with states they regard as more probable, whereas it has been known that information acquisition is always socially wasteful under concordant beliefs.     

REGULATORY REFORM: LESSONS FOR NATURAL GAS PIPELINES

This article examines regulatory reform and some possible consequences of reform designed to increase the role that competition plays in the interstate natural gas pipeline industry. The analysis first provides a conceptual framework for viewing the "problem of natural monopoly" as a basis for regulation. It summarizes ways in which introducing competition for a market may be possible even if competition within a market is not possible–through competitive auctions, monopolistic competition, or contestability. The analysis then relates briefly to this framework the experiences of three U.S. industries that have undergone substantial reform during recent years–airlines, motor carriers, and railroads. Finally, it compares the natural gas pipeline industry with the others examined and suggests types of regulatory reform that might succeed–and those that might not succeed–in improving resource allocation.