Mineral Exploration and the Neutrality of Rent Royalties*

Bayesian techniques are used to analyze the effect on mineral project selection of the imposition of an ideal form of resource rent tax in which all costs, including exploration costs, are fully deducted from taxable income. It is demonstrated that higher rates of resource rent tax generally will alter the a priori probability of a deposit being mined due to a direct risk-sharing effect as well as indirectly by changing the amount of exploration undertaken before the firm decides whether to mine or not.     

Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests

Contests have different, sometimes quite complex, organisational structures. In particular, while most of the existing literature focusses on simultaneous contests, multistage contests are also quite frequently encountered. This paper seeks to provide a rationale for the latter by endogenising the choice of a contest structure, which is made by an organiser of a contest interested in maximising the efforts expended by the contenders.     

Rent Seeking and Allocative Efficiency

This paper considers a rent‐seeking game (specifically, a winner‐takes‐all contest) with incomplete information. By allowing for sequential moves, a Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium can be constructed. It can be shown that, at the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium, it is always possible that the allocative efficiency argument fails. That is, there are cases in which the Stackelberg follower is more efficient but loses the contest. Using a specific class of distributions, it is also shown that sometimes the corrupt official will choose the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium over the Bayesian‐Nash equilibrium in order to maximise the expected bribe revenue. That is, when designing the rules of the rent‐seeking game, the dynamic nature of competition will be taken into account.     

Rent Royalties*

On neutrality grounds, royalties designed to tax only the economic rent of mining or petroleum operations are preferable to royalty schemes currently used in Australia. The Resource Rent type of royalty generally has a predictable but asymmetrical effect on the probability distribution of the net present value of projects being considered for investment. This effect is independent of the characteristics of individual projects, and so with appropriate selection of the operating parameters, this royalty scheme would not greatly affect the screening of projects for investment purposes.     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

On The Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking

We consider the effects of rent-seeking activities on resource allocation. Before rent-seeking activities take place, there are prior probabilities that an object will be given to one of several agents. The posterior probability depends on prior probabilities and the expenses incurred by all agents. In the case of two agents who equally value the object, prior and posterior probabilities coincide, and thus rent seeking has no effect on resource allocation. If there are two agents with different valuations of the object or we have more than two agents, rent seeking matters and posterior probabilities reflect the valuations of the agents.     

An Analysis of the Distributional Impact of Imputed Rent Taxation*

This paper examines the short-run distributional implications of withdrawing the implicit subsidies which accrue to owner-occupiers through the non-taxation of their imputed income. It is argued that the distributional implications of taxing imputed income from owner-occupied housing depend on the interaction of house value, equity and income over the life cycle of the owner-occupier and that a failure to take all of these factors into account could result in a policy of imputed income taxation having unintended distributional effects within the owner-occupied sector. The revenue gained from the introduction of such a policy, however, would be more than adequate to offset these effects.     

Policies to Reduce Rent Seeking in Controlled Markets

Abstract

We analyze the effects of various policies to reduce rent seeking in the controlled market in which buyers have heterogeneous valuation regarding the coveted good. The good is allocated according to the buyer-specific signal (‘test score’), which is determined by the quantity of wasteful ‘rent seeking’ exerted by the buyer. We consider three common forms of market control: minimum qualification score, quota, and price ceiling. The potential buyers with higher valuations are more likely to receive the good in equilibrium, while they exert more rent-seeking efforts. Marginally relaxing market control does not necessarily decrease the aggregated amount of rent-seeking activities, and the effectiveness of policy measures usually depends on the current degree of competitiveness in the market.     

国有企业外部人控制：—个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络。政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生。可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生。"外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统。国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化。解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象。     

国有企业外部人控制:一个寻租视角

国有企业的公共物品性导致国有企业蜕变为一个多重寻租网络.政府作为国有企业的外部控制人,借助政企不分、个人权力的无约束和责任体系弱化、多层委托与多重代理等体制性弊病的掩饰,与国有企业代理人合谋寻租,国有企业的"内部人控制"应运而生.可以说,国有企业若不存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"几乎不可能产生;国有企业若存在"外部人控制","内部人控制"便几乎一定会产生."外部人控制"产生的必要前提是国有企业泛化为公共物品,而国有企业泛化为公共物品,必须具备以下条件:包括存在可供寻租的租金、存在制度性的寻租通道、存在租金和信息的传递系统.国有企业外部人控制具有极大的危害,主要表现为降低企业家的生产性努力水平和使得企业家行为寻租化.解决问题的关键在于进行产权改革,使产权得到清晰界定并得到有效保护,同时不会出现事后寻租的现象.     

公司多元化折价:寻租与投资偏差

相对于业务集中的企业来说,多元化公司往往出现市场价值贬损,尽管造成这一现象的原因多种多样,但部门经理寻租引致公司经理配置资源出现偏差,则是产生公司多元化折价的重要根源之一.文章基于这一思想,通过建立模型进行了深入分析,得出多元化公司往往出现折价并给出了影响折价的一些重要因素.     

融资成本、寻租行为和企业内部资本配置

本文构造了一个两层次委托代理模型,强调了外部资本市场和内部资本市场之间的相互作用,分析表明,资本配置扭曲和资本使用效率低下的关键是外部资本市场运作不完善对企业内部管理者的寻租行为的影响。本文的分析表明,融资成本偏低的外部资本市场不仅会促使企业CEO过分扩大融资规模,而且会加剧企业内部管理者的寻租行为,导致资本配置不当、投资缺乏效率的不良后果。本文的政策含义是,必须改变融资成本偏低的现状,并加强公司治理结构建设,才能解决我国企业融资过热、资本使用效率低下等一系列问题。     

On Opposition to Rent Seeking: Implications for Developing Countries

A model is developed to study the implications of the presence of rent-opposing activities for the measurement of deadweight losses and for cost–benefit analysis. The analysis provides an upper bound on the social cost of rent-seeking in the presence of potential rent-opposers. Remarks are offered on the interactions between merits and skills in the determination of success in rent-seeking, and on the pervasiness of corruption in developing economies.     

Rent Seeking and Government Ownership of Firms: An Application to China''s Township–Village Enterprises

Using its control of regulated inputs, a government agency extracts rents from a manager who undertakes an investment. Such government rent-seeking activity leads to a typical hold-up problem. Government ownership serves as a second-best commitment mechanism, through which the government agency will restrain itself from the rent-seeking activity and may even offer the manager assistance in the form of tax breaks and subsidies. This mechanism works at a cost, however, as government ownership also compromises ex post managerial incentives and creates distortion in resource allocation. Nevertheless, government ownership Pareto dominates private ownership under certain conditions. These conditions correspond to a host of stylized empirical observations concerning local-government-owned firms, i.e., township–village enterprises, during China's transition to a market economy.J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. Department of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 328 David Kinley Hall, Urbana, Illinois 61801. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D72, L33.     

Rent Seeking Behavior in Transition Countries: The Case of Romania

This paper points out, in the changing institutional setting of transition in Romania, Some relevant factors influencing economic actors to behave in a way that pushes them to devote resources to unproductive goals, rather than to embark on activities that add economic and social value. The theoretical insights offered in the literature of rent seeking are applied to the issues of transition. A mathematical model of a rent seeking economy is presented, analyzing the influence of interest groups activity on the overall income of the economy. Some examples of rent seeking behavior that severely hamper the economic efficiency are illustrated for the case of Romania. The conclusion is that, in appreciating the progress in transition, the reduction in rent seeking is an important factor to be taken into consideration.     

Policy Design and Rent Seeking: Targeted versus Broad Based Intervention

The present paper analyzes how policy intervention should be designed so as to create industrialization. We focus on whether intervention should be targeted, promoting investment in specific firms or industries, or broad based, increasing the profitability of investment in general. Our main argument is that in areas with weak institutions, broad based policies should be chosen, while in areas with strong institutions, targeted policies may be less costly in moving the economy out of a poverty trap. The targeted policy is attractive because it internalized a demand externality, but is also more exposed to rent seeking, since “picking a winner” involves a greater measure of discretion in policy formulation and implementation. The broad based policy does not discriminate between industries and is, hence, less likely to be captured by rent seekers, but also does not take advantage of the demand externality.     

行政垄断、寻租与腐败——转型经济的腐败机理分析

本文试图利用寻租经济学的方法，对中国渐进转型过程中所产生的特有的腐败形式——行政垄断的本质、成因、形式、特征进行了分析；基于现有对转型经济中腐败现象的研究，提出了转型经济中腐败现象的新的分类；并对行政垄断，主要是行业垄断的经济损失规模及租金的耗散等问题进行了初步的研究；最后，回顾了中国反垄断改革的进展，并提出了进一步改革的议程。     

On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach

The aim of this paper is to extend the rent–seeking literature to the equilibrium selection problem in competitive coordination games, i.e., games in which more than one equilibrium exists, and individuals' preferences are opposed. We analyze alternative correlated equilibria: contractual agreements and legally enforced equilibria. The latter are to be understood as the outcome of rents–seeking contests in which players invest resources in order to set a norm. The contest is analyzed in its basic two–person setting and later generalized to the two–populations case. There we show that the outcomes depend on the relative payoff structure of the game, the technological properties of the contest, and the population distribution. Finally, the efficiency analysis focuses not only on the extent of the rent dissipation, but also on the comparative analysis of the inefficiencies that arise in the market (not coordinated) equilibrium.     

On the Neutrality of the Resource Rent Tax*

This paper investigates the existence of an investtnent'neutral Resource Rent Tax using a model of optimal investment to extract an unknown quantity of resource stock. This model is solved by numerical methods to show that the levels of profit margin and resource stock uncertainty are key parameter values in determining both the existence and the characteristics of an investment-neutral Resource Rent Tax.     

寻租理论在我国的研究与发展

寻租理论是由《经济社会体制比较》杂志于1988年首先引入我国改革理论的研究的，这一理论为我国理论界分析转轨过程中腐败问题提供了新的方法和新的视点，也为我国政府适应市场经济体制的要求转变职能提供了新的思路。《经济社会体制比较》既注意刊载国外寻租理论的经典文献，又注意关注我国理论界的讨论热点，并从比较中提出了改革的对策，对推动我国改革理论的深化发挥了重要作用。20世纪90年代以后，寻租理论广泛应用于各类经济行为和现象的研究，特别是转轨经济的研究，至今这一趋势仍在继续。