Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

Corporate Debt Value,Bond Covenants,and Optimal Capital Structure

This article examines corporate debt values and capital structure in a unified analytical framework. It derives closed-form results for the value of long-term risky debt and yield spreads, and for optimal capital structure, when firm asset value follows a diffusion process with constant volatility. Debt values and optimal leverage are explicitly linked to firm risk, taxes, bankruptcy costs, risk-free interest rates, payout rates, and bond covenants. The results elucidate the different behavior of junk bonds versus investment-grade bonds, and aspects of asset substitution, debt repurchase, and debt renegotiation.     

Are target leverage ratios stable? Investigating the impact of corporate asset restructuring

If firms balance the benefits and costs of leverage, then we might expect corporate asset shocks to trigger a change in corporate target leverage. We investigate the impact of corporate asset restructuring and find that target leverage after restructuring is reduced for downsizing firms and increased for upsizing firms. Changes in target leverage are stabilized by the second year after the restructuring event and are monotonic relative to the degree of restructuring. Decomposition analysis shows that corporate asset restructuring directly and significantly affects target debt ratios. Compared to control firms, downsizing firms adjust claims by repurchasing debt while upsizing firms issue debt securities. As expected, debt repurchases are associated with lower tax liabilities while debt issuance decisions correspond to lower growth proxies and are consistent with a higher adverse selection cost of issuing equity, positive leverage deficit, higher tax liabilities, and lower bankruptcy risk.     

Does ambiguity matter for corporate debt financing? Theory and evidence

Traditional tradeoff theories puzzlingly predict that firms use high leverage, issue debt carrying a high duration and low yield spread, and have optimal debt policies highly affected by managerial risk-shifting behavior. We offer an ambiguity-based explanation for these corporate debt puzzles. The key intuition is that ambiguity-averse managers hold the worst-case belief about EBIT growth, resulting in upward (downward) distortion of bankruptcy (restructuring) probability. While firms under ambiguity aversion take less leverage, optimal leverage increases with ambiguity (if holding information constraints fixed). Our theoretical predictions about the impact of ambiguity aversion on corporate debt financing are supported by empirical evidence. Moreover, we document that the tradeoff models allowing for ambiguity aversion achieve a better performance in fitting real data, and information-constraint heterogeneities can be a distinctive determinant of leverage variations.     

Government as borrower of first resort

Optimal government bond supply is examined under asymmetric information and safe asset scarcity. Corporations issue junk debt when demand for safe debt is high since uninformed investors then migrate to risky overheated debt markets. Uninformed demand stimulates informed speculation, driving debt prices toward fundamentals, encouraging pooling at high leverage. As borrower of first resort, government can issue bonds, siphoning off uninformed demand for risky corporate debt, reducing wasteful informed speculation. Government bonds eliminate pooling at high leverage or improve risk sharing in such equilibria. Optimal government bond supply is increasing in demand for safe assets and non-monotonic in marginal Q.     

Strategic Debt Service

When firms experience financial distress, equity holders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debtholders and paying less than the originally-contracted interest payments. This article incorporates strategic debt service in a standard, continuous time asset pricing model, developing simple closed-form expressions for debt and equity values. We find that strategic debt service can account for a substantial proportion of the premium on risky corporate debt. We analyze the efficiency implications of strategic debt service, showing that it can eliminate both direct bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt.     

The Debt Trap: Wealth Transfers and Debt‐Equity Choices of Junk‐Grade Firms

If outstanding debt is risky, issuing equity transfers wealth from equity holders to debt holders. If existing leverage is high and bankruptcy costs are small, this wealth transfer effect outweighs the gains to stockholders from optimizing firm value. Empirically, we find that for investment‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing equity, as expected in a standard tradeoff model. However, consistent with the impact of wealth transfer effects, for junk‐grade firms, higher leverage implies a greater likelihood of issuing debt. The analysis implies an additional route through which historical shocks determine firms’ financing choices.     

Options on Leveraged Equity: Theory and Empirical Tests

We develop an option pricing model for calls and puts written on leveraged equity in an economy with corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs. The model explains implied Black-Scholes volatility biases by relating them to the firm's structural characteristics such as leverage and debt covenants. We test the model by comparing predicted pricing biases with biases observed in a large cross-section of firms with liquid exchange traded option contracts. Our empirical study detects leverage related pricing biases. The magnitudes of these biases correspond to those predicted by our model. We also find significant pricing biases for firms financed primarily by short-term debt. This supports our model because short-term debt introduces net-worth hurdles similar to net-worth covenants.     

Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective

Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition of firms. To distinguish between the two effects, we break down institutional investors into different groups: transient institutional investors (TRA who are sensitive to information asymmetry but unlikely to participate in corporate governance, and the dedicated ones (DED) who act oppositely. Based on a most up-to-date and comprehensive bond data spanning the past 20 years, we find that credit spreads narrow (widen) with an increase in equity ownership by TRA (DED). The effects are most prominent among short-term bonds, bonds with lower ratings, higher leverage and higher volatilities. The results persist after controlling for potential endogeneity and other information asymmetry measures, and are unlikely due to an asset substitution effect. Overall, our findings provide strong support for the effect of information asymmetry on credit spread, and highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of institutional investors.     

AN IMPLICIT CLIENTELE TEST OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXATION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE

This paper presents a test for the existence of high and low tax bracket debt clienteles. The test generates some evidence consistent with the implication of debt clientele theory that over time, firms' debt ratios should vary with the relative tax incentives for investors to hold debt. The results, however, do not support the existence of extreme financial leverage clienteles. Rather they are consistent with an incomplete equity market: low tax bracket investors hold the stock of highly levered firms and high tax bracket investors hold the stock of the low leverage firms.     

Optimal Entrepreneurial Financial Contracting

This paper studies the optimal financing (capital structure) of entrepreneurial activity in the context of risk-aversion by incorporating the deadweight costs of bankruptcy and taxes. Unlike the extreme debt ratio (corner solution) predicted by scholars using linear models, this paper provides unique interior results for risk-free as well as risky debt, irrespective of corporate taxes. The paper also shows the necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of debt, and the pareto-optimality of one over the other. The important findings of this paper are: (i) the existence of an equilibrium, where the borrowing interest rate is greater than the lending rate, despite the violation of Fisher separation theorem (1930); (ii) wealth plays a critical role in determining the debt ratio and the equilibrium risk-free rate of interest, complementing the De Meza and Webb (1987 and 1999) studies; (iii) an explanation for the preferred stock and income bond puzzles, extending Fooladi et al. (1991) and McConnell and Schlarbaum (1991).     

The Disciplining Role of Leverage in Dutch Firms

In this study we investigate the role of leverage indisciplining overinvestment problems. We measure the relationships between leverage, Tobin's qand corporate governance characteristics for Dutch listed firms. Besides, ourempirical analysis tests for determinants of leverage from tax and bankruptcy theories. Representinggrowth opportunities, q is expected to be an agency-based determinant of leverage.Simultaneously, q represents firm value, which is determined by leverage and governancestructures. We test a structural equations model in which we deal with this simultaneousnature of the relation between leverage and q. Our results indicate that Dutch managersavoid the disciplining role of debt, when they are most likely to overinvest. Leverage is mainlydetermined by tax advantages and bankruptcy costs. In addition, we test the impact ofleverage on excess investment. We do not find a difference in the influence of leverage oninvestment between potential overinvestors and other firms. This confirms that the disciplinary roleof leverage in Dutch firms is absent.     

OPERATING LEVERAGE AND UNDERINVESTMENT

Using a contingent claims model, we examine the impacts of both operating leverage and financial leverage on a firm's investment decisions in the context of capacity expansion. Our model shows that quasi‐fixed operating costs could significantly mitigate the underinvestment problem for debt‐financed firms. The existing debt induces equity holders to delay equity‐financed expansion because the expanded earnings base will also benefit the debt holders by lowering the bankruptcy risk. The operating costs decrease this type of wealth transfer from equity holders to debt holders by magnifying the bankruptcy risk of the existing debt upon investment. By applying the Cox proportional hazard model on a large sample of publicly traded U.S. firms over 1966–2016, we offer empirical support for the theoretical predictions. The results are robust to various measures of operating leverage.     

Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures?

We empirically examine whether firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of their capital structures while allowing for costly adjustment. We begin by showing that the presence of adjustment costs has significant implications for corporate financial policy and the interpretation of previous empirical results. After confirming that financing behavior is consistent with the presence of adjustment costs, we find that firms actively rebalance their leverage to stay within an optimal range. Our evidence suggests that the persistent effect of shocks on leverage observed in previous studies is more likely due to adjustment costs than indifference toward capital structure.     

TAXATION,BANKRUPTCY COSTS,AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A MULTI-PERIOD CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

In this paper, a multi-period version of the CAPM is used to establish conditions for an optimal capital structure in the presence of a tax on corporate earnings, and bankruptcy costs. It is shown that the optimal point is reached when the marginal tax advantage arising from an increase in debt, is equal to the marginal increase in expected bankruptcy penalties.     

Pecking order as a dynamic leverage theory

Static tradeoff theories, which do not explicitly treat the impact of transaction costs, do not explain the policy of asymmetry between frequent small debt transactions and infrequent large equity transactions. Nor do these theories explain why the debt ratio is allowed to wander a considerable distance from its alleged static optimum, or how much of a distance should be tolerated. We offer a class of diffusion models that mimic this behaviour in a stochastic-dynamic framework and are designed to optimize a financing strategy using any static tradeoff theory as input. The models developed reveal the determinants of the size and frequency of equity transactions and the range of values over which leverage variations are tolerated in four generic scenarios. They also yield a new formulation of the cost of capital that recognizes stochastic transaction costs and a penalty for deviation from any static-optimal leverage. Our class of models augments the pecking order theory, provides a flexible quantitative framework for its implementation as a decision tool, and facilitates the formulation of additional hypotheses for its empirical validation. Symmetrically, our results show the importance of dynamic factors in designing and interpreting empirical tests of static tradeoff theories. The results presented have important implications for the role played by static tradeoff theories in a stochastic-dynamic framework. One such implication is that the static-optimal leverage has no direct effect on the firm's leverage policy in this setting. The target leverage for refinancing transactions is different from the static-optimal leverage, and the mean leverage is generally different from both. As a consequence, the latter cannot be used to estimate the former. Another implication is that even when the mean leverage equals the static optimum, mean reversion is not an optimal behaviour and therefore not a legitimate test for the existence of a static tradeoff in a dynamic context. Still another implication is that wide variations in leverage ratios cannot be interpreted as evidence of leverage indifference. It follows that the pecking order theory is consistent with static tradeoff theories and does not require the assumption of leverage indifference.     

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE PUZZLE: ANOTHER LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE

Since the formulation of the M & M irrelevance propositions 40 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes current firm value. Some finance scholars have followed M & M by arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the increased probability and costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M & M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other “contracting”) costs, and information costs (the main factor in the pecking order theory) all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much if not most of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (leverage ratios) and flows (specific choices between debt and equity). Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal deviation from those targets—one that will depend on the transactions and information costs associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating from the target. As the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the target.     

How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt-to-firm value ratios.     

Investor sentiment and firm capital structure

We provide novel evidence of the role of investor sentiment in determining firms' capital structure decisions from three perspectives: leverage ratio, debt maturity and leverage target adjustment. We find that when investor sentiment is high, firms increase their leverage ratios, supporting our contention that high investor sentiment increases firms' debt capacity and facilitates the use of an aggressive leverage policy. Debt maturity is shorter in high sentiment periods, implying that firms are confident about future earnings and use shorter debt maturity to signal their financial solvency. Leverage target adjustment is slower in low sentiment periods, indicating higher costs of external finance. Furthermore, the sentiment-leverage relationship sensitivity is greater for financially constrained firms. Our extended analysis determines that leverage-increasing firms generate lower stock returns subsequent to a period of high sentiment, offering practical insights into the economic consequences of increasing leverage in high sentiment periods on corporate value for investors. Our research advances the understanding of the impact of investor sentiment on firms' financing decisions and stock returns.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.