THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.     

SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

Since the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry's political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policy-makers' tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free riding on innovations.     

INTEREST GROUPS,ELECTORAL COMPETITION,AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING FOR TRADE POLICIES*

Current models of trade policy formation in representative democracies lack the micro foundations from which the political actions of voters, interest groups, and policy makers can be deduced. This paper provides microfoundations for the most influential of representative democracy models, the Magee-Brock-Young (MBY) model. Probabilistic voting is formally introduced, the conditions for active lobbying are examined, uniqueness of lobbying equilibrium is established, and the responses of different groups' lobbying to exogenous changes are discussed. Finally, the existence of tariff equilibria is studied when, different from MBY, both parties share a common strategy space.     

产业升级中的中国劳动成本优势

丰富的劳动力资源是我国参与国际产业分工最大的比较优势。我国在产业升级的过程中出现了劳动成本上升和劳动效率下降的趋势,这是产业分工的低端劳动力资源数量过剩和产业分工的高端劳动力资源数量不足的具体表现。在产业分工的低端,劳动成本优势主要体现在劳动力资源的规模优势上;而在产业分工的高端,劳动成本优势主要体现在劳动力资源的素质优势上。劳动力资源在产业分工低端的规模供给,无法替代产业升级中的产业高端的素质需求。我国面对产业分工水平提升的要求,劳动成本优势的发挥应该依靠高效率克服高成本。产业分工知识含量的提高,要求提高产业工人的知识素养。     

THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS*

This paper investigates the incentives for candidates to make informative campaign speeches concerning their policy intentions. Electoral competition is modeled as a game of communication in which candidates’policy preferences are private information and they compete by making pre-electoral policy announcements. An equilibrium is shown to exist in which candidates reveal their true policy intentions. We find that campaign messages are more likely to be informative, the less powerful is the elected office, the more attractive are candidates’opportunities outside of office, and the more uniform are candidates’prior beliefs as to the median voter's preferred policy.     

THE MEASUREMENT OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION DYNAMICS WHEN DEMOGRAPHICS ARE CORRELATED WITH INCOME

We show how to account for differentials in demographic variables, in particular mortality, when performing welfare comparisons over time. The idea is to apply various ways of "correcting" estimated income distribution measures for "sample selection" due to differential mortality. We distinguish the direct effect of mortality, i.e. individuals who die leave the population and no longer contribute to monetary welfare, from the indirect effect, i.e. the impact on survivors in the deceased's household who may experience a decrease or increase in monetary welfare. In the case of Indonesia, we show that the direct and indirect effects of mortality on income distribution have opposite signs, but are roughly the same in magnitude. Moreover, the effects of other demographic changes dominate the effects of mortality, whether direct or indirect. However, in the post-crisis period these demographic changes also explain a substantial part of the overall change in the distribution of income.     

TALL TREES, PEOPLE, AND POLITICS: THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF THE REDWOOD NATIONAL PARK

Because individuals in the marketplace directly face opportunity costs, they must balance marginal costs against marginal benefits. In contrast, in politics, the opportunity costs facing decision makers are diluted. Estimates of the social costs of various public programs are generally understated, while the estimates of social benefits are exaggerated
This paper places the establishment and expansion of the Redwood National Park within this framework and analyzes it as a public investment decision. It is shown that in the initial creation of the Redwood National Park in 1968, the costs of land acquisition and employment loss were underestimated, while the projections for gains in tourism were excessive. Despite the opposition of local landowners and residents, the Park was further expanded 10 years later in 1978. There was again a misstatement of costs and benefits and also the creation of an expensive new entitlement program to defuse the opposition of labor
The experience with the redwood National Park illustrates the results of the political process, which allows decision makers to internalize benefits and externalize costs. Emotion and rhetoric tend to displace a careful weighing of marginal costs and benefits     

ON ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES OF THE PARAMETERS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT DEMAND AND SUPPLY SYSTEMS WHEN DEMOGRAPHICALLY CATEGORIZED PURCHASING PATTERN DATA ARE AVAILABLE*

We derive asymptotic properties of an estimator for supply and demand models extended with additional moments relating consumer demographics to the characteristics of purchased products. We clarify the structure of a practical sampling scheme in which the extended estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal, and more efficient than the original estimator. We provide conditions guaranteeing the asymptotic theorems hold for the random coefficient logit model of demand with oligopolistic suppliers. Extensive simulation studies demonstrate significant benefits of the additional moments in estimating the random coefficient logit model.     

ENTRY AND QUALITY SIGNALLING WHEN ONLY SOME CONSUMERS ARE INFORMED OF THE ENTRANT'S QUALITY

This paper focuses on competition between an incumbent and an entrant when only the entrant's quality is unknown to (some) consumers. The incumbent may or may not know the entrant's quality. The model reveals a separating equilibrium where the entrant's high price signals its high quality when the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value. The case in which the incumbent knows the entrant's quality generates two additional equilibria. When the proportion of informed consumers is large enough, firms choose their prices as in the complete information case. The entrant's high price in combination with the incumbent's low price signals the entrant's high quality. When the proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate value, the incumbent's high price signals the entrant's low quality, while its low price signals the entrant's high quality. Interestingly, we find that entry may be facilitated with informational product differentiation.