EVALUATING RATIONAL PARTISAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY: A RESPONSE*

In a recent article published in this journal Steven Sheffrin presented the results of two tests on the so called “Rational Partisan Theory”. Sheffrin concluded that the evidence provides “little support for a strict interpretation of the theory”. This note argues that, although interesting in itself, the tests performed by Sheffrin are not particularly informative about the empirical relevance of the Rational Partisan Theory. Also, this note reconciles Sheffrin's results on OECD economies with the literature, which, in general, has found rather supportive evidence for the Rational Partisan Theory.     

AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS*

This paper documents the post-war business cycle facts for Australia. The Hodrick-Prescott filter is used to remove the trend component from quarterly macroeconomic series. The business cycle facts we report are the volatilities of the cyclical (detrended) series and their cross correlations with cyclical real output. These facts are consistent with the business cycle facts reported for the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand with one exception. For most of the period since 1974, the real wage in Australia is strongly counter-cyclical whereas for these countries it is procyclical.     

HOUSING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE*

In the United States, the percentage standard deviation of residential investment is more than twice that of nonresidential investment. In addition, GDP, consumption, and both types of investment co‐move positively. We reproduce these facts in a calibrated multisector growth model where construction, manufacturing, and services are combined, in different proportions, to produce consumption, business investment, and residential structures. New housing requires land in addition to new structures. The model can also account for important features of industry‐level data. In particular, hours and output in all industries are positively correlated, and are most volatile in construction.     

THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES*

The “Partisan Theory” of macroeconomic policy is based on the idea that political parties typically weight nominal and real economic performance differently, with left-party governments being more inclined than right-party ones to pursue expansive policies designed to yield lower unemployment and higher growth, but running the risk of extra inflation. Given suitable assumptions about the structure of the macroeconomy, partisan models imply a political signal in demand management, output and inflation movements originating with shifts in party control of the government. In this paper I develop and test with postwar US data a revised Partisan model that allows for (i) uncertainty among policy authorities about the sustainable output growth rate and therefore about how aggregate demand expansions will be partitioned between extra output and extra inflation, and (ii) ex-post and projective learning and preference adjustment under such uncertainty. Dynamic numerical analysis of a small, stylized political-economic model based on these extensions of Partisan Theory generates within-sample forecasts that correspond remarkably well to the observed pattern of price, output and nominal spending fluctuations under the parties.     

CORPORATE LEVERAGE AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE

This paper examines the pattern of corporate leverage in the United States during the 1980s. Firms in other countries increased their debt during this period. However, the United States was the only major industrialized country in which firms experienced increases in both leverage and interest burden. Previous studies analyzing the distribution of corporate debt across sectors in the United States concluded that to the extent a pattern is discernible, highly indebted firms are concentrated in the stable sectors. This study confirms this earlier finding but shows that the U.S. firms that have been increasing their leverage most rapidly have been concentrated in cyclical sectors.     

THE FED AND THE POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

This study asks whether the Federal Reserve has actively made monetary policy so as to aid the president's reelection. Using Shiller's smoothness "prior" to estimate the shape of cycles, the study finds a political business cycle in unemployment and a preelection increase in growth of the money supply. But the timing of these two cycles is inconsistent. Furthermore, little evidence exists of a cycle in the instruments of monetary policy. Thus, the Fed is not actively creating a political business cycle. Apparently, movements in real money that are not caused—but are not offset—by the Fed are an important cause of the political business cycle.
Elections influence Fed behavior. Monetary tightness occurs early in a presidential term, before reelection incentives become critical. This is due to the Fed's political weakness. Thus, the Fed's independence only partly insulates it from electoral pressures.     

PRODUCTIVE GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN MONETARY BUSINESS CYCLE MODELS

This paper assesses the transmission of fiscal policy shocks in a New Keynesian framework where government expenditures contribute to aggregate production. It is shown that even if the impact of government expenditures on production is small, this assumption helps to reconcile the models' predictions about fiscal policy effects with recent empirical evidence. In particular, it is shown that government expenditures can lead to a rise in private consumption, real wages, and employment if the government share is not too large and public finance does not solely rely on distortionary taxation. When government expenditures are partially financed by public debt, unit labor costs fall in response to a fiscal expansion, such that inflation tends to decline. Households are willing to raise consumption if monetary policy is active, i.e. ensures that the real interest rate rises with inflation. Otherwise, private consumption can also be crowded out, as in the conventional case where government expenditures are not productive.     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.     

A STATE‐LEVEL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS CYCLE ASYMMETRY

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of asymmetry in US state‐level business cycles. We consider two different types of asymmetry in the adjustment process of a stationary time series: deepness and steepness. The data used in the study are a comparable set of state‐level coincident indexes (SCIs) developed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Specifically, results from using the momentum‐threshold autoregressive model provide evidence of asymmetry in the growth rate of 23 SCIs as well as the equivalent national coincident index.     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

This article evaluates the distribution of public expenditure on subsidized goods and services over income categories. It is argued that undifferentiated application of usual measures of dispersion must be rejected when judging the distribution of these expenditures, because there are hardly any subsidized goods and services for which the government aims at equal consumption. Such an application requires a normative distribution of expenditure. The normative distribution of expenditure is derived from a normative distribution of consumption and the distribution of normative charges. Central elements are needs of consumers and their financial capacity. The normative distribution of consumption is based on government intentions with respect to the goods and services under consideration.     

FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE*

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non-economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycle.     

FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION AND BUSINESS CYCLE VOLATILITY IN A MONETARY UNION

This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium two‐country sticky‐price model to analyze the implications of financial market integration for the propagation of asymmetric productivity and government spending shocks in a monetary union. Financial market integration has a small effect on the propagation of these shocks if households can only trade in risk‐free bonds. However, financial market integration has a more substantial effect on the propagation of these shocks in a monetary union with a complete market for state‐contingent claims. This result indicates that it may be important to account for threshold effects in empirical analyses of the impact of financial market integration on business cycle volatility in a monetary union.