Political Denials: The Policy Effect of Intercameral Partisan Differences in Bicameral Parliamentary Systems

Bicameralism in legislatures affects both the legislative processand partisan competition. In the United States, divided partisancontrol of Congress has been found to lead to interparty logrollsand increased budget deficits. In parliamentary systems, itis generally assumed that similarly divided legislatures havelittle effect on policy. I argue, by contrast, that party disciplinemeans that divided control of the legislature has the oppositeeffect: because cooperation dilutes party labels, parties havean interest in passing and claiming credit for policy, but alsoin preventing their counterparts from doing the same. The resultis a game in which chamber majorities balance the desire tomake policy with the need to differentiate themselves from eachother (to the extent that they are different). I test the hypothesisof an inverse relationship between divergence and policy makingin a nine-country, TSCS regression of deficits on an index ofchamber divergence.     

A MODEL OF VOTER CHOICE IN A LIFE-CYCLE SETTING

This paper employs an overlapping generations framework in which voters choose political parties based on the economic shocks faced over their lifetimes. Parties internalize voting preferences and develop platforms based on this information. The resulting equilibrium implies that voters select parties that maximize income in their labor period and that minimize inflation in their retirement period. The equilibrium also has the property that individuals switch their votes between the parties, in the presence of adverse states of nature. These results provide an explanation for post World War II voting patterns in the United States. The paper also provides empirical support for the theoretical findings.     

The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case

Why do political parties form? I test a theory of party formation in which legislators coalesce into voting blocs to coordinate their votes and influence policy outcomes. I use historical roll‐call data from the United States Congress. During the First and Second Congresses (1789–1793), there were no organized political parties. By the Fourth Congress (1795–1797), the Federalist and Republican parties shaped Congress. The analysis uses the Roll‐call data from the first two Congresses to predict which legislators will coalesce into parties in future Congresses. I compare this prediction with the parties that eventually emerged in the House and in the Senate. I find strong support for the theory in the Senate, and favorable but less significant results in the House.     

INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS AND THE POSITIONING OF PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE 1992, 1996, AND 2000 ELECTION CYCLES

The present study tests the theory that states can impact the size of the grants they receive (per capita) from the federal government by becoming pivotal players in the federal electoral (primary/caucus) process. That is, by rearranging their presidential primary and caucus dates, states can play an important role in determining the field of candidates for the two major political parties in the United States. States are then likely to be rewarded within the budgetary process at the federal level, which begins with the executive branch. Results from a simultaneous equation system suggest that the impact of the average movement of primaries/caucuses in the sample period (10.36 days closer to 1 January) results in an increase of federal grants of $362 million to $1.2 billion (over a two-year period) for the average state. These results are consistent with the current pattern in the American political process of more front-ended presidential primaries and caucuses.     

LOCAL BENEFIT-SEEKING IN THE LEGISLATURE: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL STAFFING DECISIONS*

In prior work, I proposed a prisoner's dilemma theory for the partisan pattern that political ticket splitting has taken in the United States: where Republicans, since 1932, have done consistently better in races for the White House than in contests for Congressional seats. The theory relies on the key assumption that Democratic legislative representatives are more willing to engage in local benefit-seeking. By examining the personal staffing decisions made by members of the House this paper provides some empirical support for such an assumption. Relative to their Republican counterparts, Democratic legislators both hire more personal staff and allocate a higher percentage of the staff hired to district rather than Washington offices.     

Partisan Cycles in Offshore Outsourcing: Evidence from U.S. Imports

The wage and employment effects of offshoring roil politics in the United States and around the world. Firms that offshore either outsource their activities to unaffiliated businesses, or internalize production by establishing subsidiaries from which they import intrafirm. We argue that the political environment in trade partner countries influences U.S. offshoring patterns in ways that have been ignored in the extant literature. Drawing on the political business cycle literature, we expect higher production costs and lower profits for firms in capital (labor) intensive sectors when the Left (Right) is in power. These partisan cycles, in turn, shape the sectoral composition of exports from the partner to the United States, and the degree to which trade is conducted intrafirm. Under a Left‐ (Right‐) leaning government in a partner country, U.S. intrafirm imports of capital‐ (labor‐) goods increase relative to total imports in these industries. Examining highly disaggregated U.S. import data, we find strong support for our argument. Our results indicate that the effect of partisan governments on offshore outsourcing depends on factor intensities of production, which vary across industries. The degree of internalization in global sourcing is shaped in part by the distributional objectives of partisan governments, and not by economic factors alone.     

POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY†

When strategic complementarities lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, a change in control of government may lead to changes in economic behavior by consumers or firms even if the different parties pursue the same policies. The existence of multiple equilibria, however, is not necessary to predict partisan effects. Furthermore, electoral uncertainty is not necessary to generate partisan effects; indeed, such uncertainty can dampen the cycle.     

Tax smoothing and tariff behavior in the United States

This paper develops and tests a public finance theory of tariff behavior. Tariffs are viewed as being part of the optimum revenue raising tax package so that tariff revenue is closely tied to government spending. A key implication of the theory is that tariff rate movements should be consistent with tax-smoothing behavior. The test focuses on the United States during the years 1869–1916. The results of the test support the theory.     

The Econometrics and Economics of the Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: Getting from Known Unknowns to Known Knowns

I discuss the econometrics and the economics of past research on the effects of minimum wages on employment in the United States. My intent is to try to identify key questions raised in the recent literature, and some from the earlier literature, which I think hold the most promise for understanding the conflicting evidence and arriving at a more definitive answer about the employment effects of minimum wages. My secondary goal is to discuss how we can narrow the range of uncertainty about the likely effects of the large minimum wage increases becoming more prevalent in the United States. I discuss some insights from both theory and past evidence that may be informative about the effects of high minimum wages, and try to emphasize what research can be done now and in the near future to provide useful evidence to policy‐makers on the results of the coming high minimum wage experiment, whether in the United States or in other countries.     

TRADE,TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE,AND WAGE INEQUALITY: THE CASE OF MEXICO

Following the U.S.–Mexico trade integration, the skill premium rose dramatically in Mexico. Standard trade theory predicts the skill premium in a skill‐scarce country should fall—not rise—following such an integration. This article reconciles theory and data by building a model in which intermediate producers in Mexico begin to produce for the U.S. supply chain following liberalization. To do so, they must rent ideas from the United States, which are more skill‐intensive, thus increasing the skill premium. This mechanism is supported by the data: Mexican plants and industries that trade more with the United States rent more U.S. technology and have higher skill premia.     

BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH

Entitlements have become an increasing component of total government spending in the United States over the last six decades. Using a political-economy model where parties bargain over taxes and entitlements, we argue that such dynamics can be explained by two factors: “unequal growth,” where top earners became richer while the income of the bottom 50% stagnated, and budget rules that provide bargaining power to low-income earners through a “status quo effect.” In a model calibrated to the United States, we show that sustained bargaining power by a party representing the poor results in a rising share of entitlements consistent with the data.     

A REVISIT OF INTERNATIONAL STOCK MARKET LINKAGES: NEW EVIDENCE FROM RANK TESTS FOR NONLINEAR COINTEGRATION

Based on a theory proposed for the possible link between financial market integration and nonlinear cointegration, this study reinvestigates international stock market linkages by performing both conventional linear cointegration tests and newly developed rank tests for nonlinear cointegration. The stock price indexes of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States are used, with daily data spanning from 29 May 1992 to 10 April 2001. Much more evidence of market integration emerges from nonlinear than linear cointegration analysis, suggesting that comovements among various national stock markets may well take nonlinear forms. Our findings challenge the conclusion of market segmentation reached in some previous studies that only conducted linear cointegration analysis.     

Is time-variant information stickiness state-dependent?

This paper estimates information stickiness with regard to inflation expectations in the United States and the Eurozone for the 1981/06–2015/12 and 1998/Q4–2015/Q2 periods, respectively, and further investigates whether such information stickiness is state-dependent. Based on a bootstrap sub-sample rolling-window estimation, we find that information stickiness varies over time, which contradicts the strict time dependency implied under sticky-information theory. We provide evidence that information stickiness depends on inflation volatility, which indicates that information stickiness is state-dependent and that it has a time trend. Using a threshold model, we estimate structural changes in the state-dependence and time-trend of information stickiness. The results show that information stickiness has been more dependent on inflation volatility and has had a higher time-trend in both regions following the 2008 financial crisis.     

Who Wants an Independent Central Bank? Monetary Policy‐making and Politics

The costs and benefits of cooperative monetary and fiscal policy are analysed in the framework of a partisan business-cycles model. It is shown that political parties with different ideologies prefer to choose different arrangements for macroeconomic policy-making. More specifically, right-wing parties favour independent central banks more than left-wing parties. An independent central bank is also the generally preferred option from a social welfare point of view. In addition, the form of policy-making arrangements between the fiscal and monetary authorities is shown to influence the extent of partisan cycles.
JEL classification : E 32; E 58; E 63; C 72     

Variable rational partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty

Variable rational partisan theory of political business cycles suggests differences in inflation under left-wing and right-wing governments. Fluctuations of economic activity result from uncertainty about the electoral outcome and the exact timing of elections. However, the core hypothesis that post-electoral booms and recessions depend upon the degree of electoral uncertainty has rarely been tested. Using polling data, we provide empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis of the existence of variable rational partisan cycles.     

Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States

This article is concerned with the effects of the kinds of framers involved in constitution-making on the content of constitutional provisions proposed during the drafting process. It tests the hypotheses that predict framers’ constitutional preferences on the basis of their institutional position, partisan background and constitutional expertise with two specific cases: the Constitutional Assembly of Estonia (1991–1992) and the Federal Convention (1787) of the United States. The case studies show that most of the hypotheses find only partial confirmation in both instances of constitution-making. The institutional position of a framer (being a member of existing legislature or executive) and constitutional expertise does not necessarily influence his or her constitutional preferences in the predicted way. The only theoretical proposition that is corroborated in both cases concerns the importance of group interest in a constitutional choice of electoral system and modes of representation: in the Estonian case, the design of the constitutional electoral rules was strongly influenced by partisan interest; in the US case, the interests of territorial subunits played a major role.     

Partisan influence on social spending under market integration,fiscal pressure and institutional change

In this paper we examine whether partisan influence on social expenditure in the OECD has decreased over the past three decades. We analyze whether a reduced partisan influence is due to more trade openness, larger budget deficits or the creation of new supranational institutions. Our empirical approach distinguishes between the effects on the long-run growth of social expenditures and its short-run adjustment to violations of the long-run equilibrium linking social spending with macroeconomic and demographic trends. We find that partisan motives, indeed, play an important role in the explanation of short-run dynamics in social spending. Left-wing parties are found to spend significantly more than their right-wing counterparts and parties spend more before elections. However, the partisan influence has changed over time. While ideology has lost some of its influence, the electoral cycle has become more important to explain changes in social expenditure. This result should be addressed to a general institutional change that took place in the early 1990s and continued over that decade. While changes in trade openness, indebtedness and budget deficits have not changed the partisan influence on social spending, they are particularly important to explain the short-run dynamics of social spending.     

Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

One area of fiscal policy in which several countries have delegated responsibility to an independent agency is the distribution of national resource transfers across regional and local governments. Such delegation is expected to promote equity and efficiency, and mitigate distortions created by political incentives. This paper tests whether delegation to an independent agency indeed makes a difference by contrasting the impact of partisan politics on two types of fiscal transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972–1995. The pattern of evidence shows that, while the transfers that are determined by the central political executive are indeed distributed to favor particular states that are politically important for the central ruling party, the transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain such partisan impact.     

Party hacks and true believers: The effect of party affiliation on political preferences

This paper examines the effect of party affiliation on an individual's political views. To do this, we exploit the party realignment that occurred in the U.S. due to abortion becoming a more prominent and highly partisan issue over time. We show that abortion was not a highly partisan issue in 1982, but a person's abortion views in 1982 led many to switch parties over time as the two main parties diverged in their stances on this issue. We find that voting for a given political party in 1996, due to the individual's initial views on abortion in 1982, has a substantial effect on a person's political, social, and economic attitudes in 1997. These findings are stronger for highly partisan political issues, and are robust to controlling for a host of personal views and characteristics in 1982 and 1997. As individuals realigned their party affiliation in accordance with their initial abortion views, their other political views followed suit.     

Using mean reversion as a measure of persistence

This paper suggests a new scalar measure of persistence together with a companion estimator, which has the advantage of not requiring the specification and estimation of a model for the series under investigation. The statistical properties of the companion estimator are established, which allow tests of hypotheses to be performed, under very general conditions. The use of the new measure is illustrated by re-evaluating persistence of inflation for the United States and the Euro Area. The conclusions for the United States do not differ significantly from what has been found in previous empirical studies. However, for the Euro Area we find evidence of a significant break occurring in 2001/2002, such that persistence becomes virtually nil for the period that follows the launch of the euro and the implementation of a common monetary policy by the European Central Bank.