URBANISATION AND INFORMALITY IN AFRICA'S HOUSING MARKETS

Urbanisation is a growing phenomenon in Africa. Across the continent cities are drawing more and more people in search of economic opportunity. The majority of these people end up living in informal settlements: slums. As Africa's slums expand, international organisations, NGOs, and governments themselves call for strong public-sector action to deal with the problems in these settlements and to limit their expansion. However, government intervention in African housing markets may have contributed significantly to the growth of informal settlements. A maze of regulations and administrative barriers has imposed high transaction costs on formal-sector housing entrepreneurs. By raising the costs of providing low-income housing, African governments bear much responsibility for driving formal-sector entrepreneurs out of the housing market and for driving their citizens into slums.     

THE USE AND ABUSE OF MARKETS IN HOUSING POLICY

This paper argues that, despite its rhetoric in support of markets, government does not understand how markets work, but is rather trying to use certain aspects of markets to control social housing. The paper looks at three areas: first, the idea of private finance and how this is used by government as a form of public policy; second, the notion of risk and whether it actually occurs in social housing; and third, the contention that government is incapable of appreciating the manner in which markets operate because it only wishes to provide safe options and so cannot countenance real choice and competition.     

CAREER CONCERNS: INCENTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS LEARNING IN LABOUR MARKETS

Abstract. Models of career concerns provide a framework for analysing the actions that may be taken by a manager in an attempt to influence performance signals that the market uses to update its beliefs on her productivity, and the incentive problem that arises if such actions do not coincide with those that maximise the financial return to a firm's owner. This survey provides a formal introduction to the main types of models of career concerns (hidden action and hidden information), and discusses some extensions of these models. Applications of the career concerns framework to explain aspects of managerial behaviour and the form of labour market institutions are emphasised.     

INSTITUTIONS AND PERFORMANCE IN EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS: TAKING A FRESH LOOK AT EVIDENCE

Abstract This paper presents a selective survey of the recent literature on labour market institutions and offers new empirical EU‐based evidence on the impact of labour market reforms on employment and labour market adjustment. Although the literature traditionally treats labour market institutions as exogenous, attention shifted recently towards understanding the underlying causes of specific institutional arrangements. As a consequence, the literature highlights the great importance of an efficient policy design exploiting these interactions wisely and identifies general principles for achieving an efficient policy design at both macro and micro levels. Although empirical evidence does not show a major change in terms of intensity of labour market reform after the setting of the Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the euro, the reforms aiming at strengthening the labour market attachment of vulnerable groups tend to have been successful both in raising their employment and increasing labour market adjustment.     

MARKETS, IMPER FECTIONS AND THE DANGERS OF OVER-REGULATING ENERGY MARKETS

Government regulation in general has over-expanded. However, in British energy markets, a new form of regulation, concentrating on promoting competition in gas and electricity, has emerged to the benefit of consumers. If the government pursues its policy of targeting favoured energy activities, these gains will disappear, the costs of achieving environmental targets will be unnecessarily heavy and energy markets will be re-politicised.     

MARKETS, TACIT KNOWLEDGE AND EDUCATION

James Tooley argues that markets in education are both feasible and desirable. Focusing on compulsory schooling he advocates liberalisation organised around individual learning accounts and competing suppliers. He argues his views are implicitly informed by Hayek's economic analysis. I build on this here by drawing particular attention to Hayek's distinction between tacit and codifiable knowledge. I argue this makes Tooley's theoretical critique of compulsory schooling even more far-reaching, as well as pointing to additional policy reforms. I compare these implications with actual schools policy under New Labour.     

MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) may have noble objectives but there are concerns that the associated transfer of resources from wealthy to poor countries could be counter-productive in terms of long-term economic performance. Reforming the institutions of governance and removing barriers that hinder the efficient functioning of markets are the most effective ways for poor countries to achieve MDGs. Poor countries can also improve living standards by relying on market forces rather than monopolistic public agencies for the delivery of services.     

AVERAGE EARNINGS,MINIMUM WAGES AND GRANGER-CAUSALITY IN AGRICULTURE IN ENGLAND AND WALES

Abstract The Agricultural Wages Board (AWB) for England and Wales sets minimum wages, hours and overtime rates. Post-war average earnings have always exceeded minimum wages. This paper examines the relationship between average earnings and minimum wages from 1948–1993 for regular whole-time males using cointegration analysis. The results imply the existence of such a relationship, and that earnings Granger-cause minimum wages. The AWB therefore has been reactive having had no impact on average earnings.     

AN EXAMINATION OF THE UK LABOUR MARKET FOR DOCTORS

One area of health services in the UK which has been neglected by commentators is the supply of skilled medical staff within a nationalised health service. This is a surprising omission because in the UK we have a labour market for doctors which exhibits the worst aspects of monopoly. Furthermore, the combination of monopoly control by the medical profession on the supply side and the nationalised National Health Service on the demand side has resulted in a lower number of doctors per head than in other Western European countries. Overseas doctors are recruited to make up some of the shortfall but the deficiency in numbers is such that government plans to deliver more healthcare more quickly cannot be met in the short term without importing overseas firms with their staff, and in the long term require an expansion in medical education.