Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?

We examine how leveraged buyouts from the most recent wave of public to private transactions created value. Buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006 are more conservatively priced and less levered than their predecessors from the 1980s. For deals with post‐buyout data available, median market‐ and risk‐adjusted returns to pre‐ (post‐) buyout capital invested are 72.5% (40.9%). In contrast, gains in operating performance are either comparable to or slightly exceed those observed for benchmark firms. Increases in industry valuation multiples and realized tax benefits from increasing leverage, while private, are each economically as important as operating gains in explaining realized returns.     

ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT

The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar ; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt.
Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980–1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch.     

Establishing bounds on the tax advantage to debt

The partial dismantling of the imputation tax system that commenced in July 1997 once more opens the discussion on the relative tax advantage to debt and its impact on the cost of capital. In this paper we examine the implications of these recent changes for the value of the tax advantage to debt. We analyse the value of debt-related tax shields by computing the individual tax liabilities of 1268 quoted companies that reported during the period 1980–2000 taking account of any tax exhaustion or surplus ACT. We use these estimates to establish an upper bound on the tax advantage to debt. We conclude that even following the 1997 changes in the imputation tax system the probable value for the average current tax advantage to debt in the UK at present is at most about 13% of the value of debt.     

Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options

Employees tend to exercise stock options when corporate taxable income is high, shifting corporate tax deductions to years with higher tax rates. If firms paid employees the same dollar value in wages instead of stock options, the average annual tax bill for large U.S. companies would increase by $12.6 million, or 9.8%. These direct tax benefits of options increase in the convexity of the tax function. In addition, profitable firms can realize indirect tax benefits because stock options increase debt capacity. Although tax minimization is probably not the main motive for option grants, firms with larger potential tax benefits grant more options.     

Management Buyouts of Divisions and Shareholder Wealth

This paper examines the wealth effects to parent company shareholders around the announcement of divisional management buyouts. Despite the relative absence of “arm's-length” bargaining between buyer and seller, there is no evidence that divisional management buyouts result in reductions in parent company share prices. Instead, small but statistically significant wealth gains are found during the two-day period surrounding the buyout announcement. This evidence suggests that divisional buyouts reallocate ownership of corporate assets to higher valued uses and that parent company stockholders share in the expected benefits of this change in ownership structure.     

Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect

The markets for management buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe have experienced dramatic growth in the past ten years. In the U.K., buyouts accounted for half of the total M&A activity (measured by value) in 2005. And as in the U.S. during the‘80s, the greatest number of U.K. buyouts in recent years have been management‐ and investor‐led acquisitions of divisions of large corporations. In continental Europe, by contrast, the largest fraction of deals has involved the purchase of family‐owned private businesses. But in recent years, increased pressure for shareholder value in countries like France, Netherlands, and even Germany has led to a growing number of buyouts of divisions of listed companies. Like the U.K., continental Europe has also seen a small but growing number of purchases of entire public companies (known as private‐to‐public transactions, or PTPs), including the largest ever buyout in Europe, the €13 billion purchase this year of the Danish corporation TDC. In view of the record levels of capital raised by European private equity funds in recent years‐which, until 2005, exceeded the amounts invested in any given year‐we can expect more growth in private equity investment in the near future. In continental Europe, the prospects for buyouts remain especially strong, given both the pressure from investors to restructure larger corporations and the possibilities for adding value in family‐owned firms. But, as the authors note, today's private equity firms face a number of challenges in earning adequate returns for their investors. One is increased competition. In addition to the increased activity of U.S. private equity firms, local private equity investors are also facing competition from hedge funds and new entrants such as government‐sponsored operators, family offices, and wealthy entrepreneurs. Another major challenge is finding value‐preserving exit vehicles. Although an IPO is an option for the largest buyouts with growth prospects, most buyout investments are harvested either through sales to other companies or, increasingly, other private equity firms. The latter transactions, known as “secondary” buyouts, now account for a significant share of new funds invested by private equity firms across Europe.     

Syndication of European Buyouts and its Effects on Target‐Firm Performance

Using a unique dataset of 859 leveraged buyouts in Europe during the period 1999–2009, the authors' recent study reports that buyout financiers syndicate their transactions to other buyers to achieve benefits that include diversification of different types of target risk, the combination of complementary investor information and skillsets, and an increase in future deal flow. The authors also report that lead financiers structure their syndicates in ways designed to minimize syndication costs, in particular potential information and incentive problems with co‐investors in the syndicate, while also aiming to maximize the syndication benefits mentioned above. For example, through effective management of conflicts of interest with co‐investors within their syndicates, lead financiers are likely to acquire a reputation for looking out for the interests of their co‐investors that ends up increasing their own deal flow. As additional evidence in support of this claim, the authors also report finding that the post‐buyout profitability and growth of the target companies are higher when buyouts are syndicated (even after adjusting for the “endogeneity” of such decisions) and when the syndicates are structured to limit inter‐investor conflicts of interest within the syndicate. And as the authors point out, this finding, when viewed with the other main findings cited above, provides a more positive view of European buyout syndicates than the one projected by studies of Anglo‐American syndicates to date, whose findings have emphasized the potential for collusion among the buyout financiers.     

Secondary buyouts: Why buy and at what price?

This paper studies the economic logic and pricing of secondary buyouts, a form of leveraged buyout that has become increasingly popular. I investigate three potential explanations for secondary buyouts: efficiency gains, liquidity-based market timing, and collusion. The results are most consistent with the liquidity-based market timing hypothesis. Specifically, firms are more likely to exit through secondary buyouts when: the equity market is “cold”, the debt market condition is favorable, and the sellers face a high demand for liquidity. While this hypothesis shows a constrained optimal strategy for private equity firms, I do not find any strong efficiency gains for the target firms. Further, my analyses on pricing show that secondary buyouts are priced higher than first-time buyouts due to favorable debt market conditions. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that secondary buyouts serve no purpose aside from alleviating the financial needs of private equity firms.     

Modigliani and Miller Again Revisited: The Cost of Capital with Unequal Borrowing and Lending Rates

The financial literature asserts that financial managers must borrow at least to some degree if they are to optimise the value of their companies. This result has been described in the literature as ‘perhaps the single most important result in the theory of corporate finance obtained in the last 30 years’ (Copeland and Weston, 1988, p. 443). Based on US tax systems, the value added to a company by debt has been estimated as high as 35 to 50% of the debt's market value. More recently in this journal, Ashton (1989b) has argued that under the present UK tax system, the theoretical tax advantage afforded by debt should be estimated at no more than 13% of the debt's market value. The contribution of this paper is to draw attention to an aspect of borrowing that has largely escaped attention, but which nevertheless affects the above conclusions: namely, that the market spread between borrowing and lending constitutes a ‘cost’ for corporate borrowing. This paper demonstrates that in the context of the present UK tax system, this ‘cost’ of borrowing is sufficient to nullify entirely the formerly perceived financial tax benefits of corporate borrowing. We conclude that, at present, corporate borrowing could imply a net disadvantage for the valuation of a company's equity by about 6 or 7% of the debt's market value.     

How Much Do Private Equity Funds Benefit From Debt‐related Tax Shields?

In 2008 the German government enacted a measure designed to curb excessive leverage in LBOs by limiting tax‐deductible interest to 30% of EBITDA. And in the U.S., legislators are currently reviewing several regulatory measures, including limits on tax‐deductible interest, that are intended to reduce the leverage of portfolio companies in U.S. LBO funds. In their recent study of 56 German LBOs transacted after the tax law change in 2008, the authors analyze the importance of debt‐related tax savings and the economic consequences of their reduction for the PE business model. The study begins by confirming that LBO debt tax shields are a material component of LBO purchase prices, contributing as much as 20% of the average estimated total enterprise value. At the same time, however, the study finds that the effects on LBO fund returns of limits to the taxdeductibility of LBO interest payments are likely to be modest, in part because a large portion of the value from expected tax savings is effectively paid for upfront by the private equity firm in the form of higher LBO purchase prices. Moreover, the authors do not expect to see LBO funds change their business model in response to this change in taxdeductibility. Based on their findings, the authors expect neither a significant decline in LBO leverage nor a notable change in the pricing of PE deals. As finance scholars have suggested, there are significant benefits associated with the use of debt that have nothing to do with the tax shield provided by the deductibility of interest. The authors' results provide yet another piece of evidence suggesting that taxes have at most a second‐order effect on corporate financing decisions—and that the gains to private equity come mainly from improvements in operating performance.     

Management Buyout Proposals and inside Information

This paper explores stock price behavior surrounding withdrawn buyout proposals to determine whether managers' proposal announcements reveal any information which is unrelated to the efficiency gains associated with completed buyouts. On average, firms whose managers withdraw buyout proposals do not sustain significantly positive stock price effects unless they receive subsequent acquisition bids. In addition, managers of firms with completed buyouts are no more likely to have access to inside information than managers who withdrew proposals. I interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the notion that inside information commonly motivates management buyout proposals.     

Growth LBOs

Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize.     

Private Equity: Accomplishments and Challenges

The authors provide an overview of the main accomplishments of private equity since the emergence of leveraged buyouts in the 1980s, and of the challenges now facing the industry—challenges that have been encountered before during three major growth waves and two full boom‐and‐bust cycles. In so doing, the authors review a large and growing body of academic studies responding to questions like these:

• (1) How have PE buyout companies performed relative to their public counterparts? And to the extent there have been improvements in operating performance and productivity gains, how have such gains been achieved? What role have PE firms played in this process?
• (2) Especially in light of the large fees and profit shares paid to the PE firms, or GPs, and the significant “control” premiums over market paid to the selling companies, how have the returns to the LPs that provide the bulk of the funding for PE funds compared to the returns earned by the shareholders of comparable public companies?
• (3) Apart from the high fees earned by its GPs, why is PE so controversial? Beyond their effects on productivity and benefits for investors, what are the employment and other social effects of buyouts and PE?
• (4) What are the prospects for future PE returns to their LPs, especially in light of the volume of capital commitments and high purchase multiples that were being paid, at least until the onset of the COVID pandemic? And what role, if any, should PE activity be expected to play in the recovery from the pandemic?

     

西部地区上市公司债务融资效应的实证研究——基于2007-2010年的经验数据

本文选取沪市西部地区53家上市公司作为研究样本,着重研究债务融资的税盾效应与财务杠杆效应。基于样本公司的债务融资现状,通过因子分析、主成分分析与多元回归分析揭示了债务融资效应与各影响因素之间的关联程度及显著水平。结论表明,当总资产息税前利润率大于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应、财务杠杆效应同时增大,进而增强债务融资效应;当总资产息税前利润率小于债务利息率时,提高资产负债率,税盾效应增大,财务杠杆表现为负效应,债务融资效应呈现不确定性。     

The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.     

MEASURING CORPORATE TAX RATES AND TAX INCENTIVES: A NEW APPROACH

Taxes play an important but underemphasized role in the valuation of a company and its projects. For example, the authors estimate that the expected tax benefits from interest deductions by all publicly traded U.S. corporations were responsible for almost $1.4 trillion of their total market value of $12.7 trillion in 1991. In the case of RJR's 1989 leveraged buyout alone, the capitalized value of the interest tax shield amounted to several billion dollars (or about 25%) of the company's market value.
This article argues that, to maximize shareholder wealth, the corporate planning process should include a careful analysis of corporate tax incentives. Using several examples, the authors show how earnings variability and major provisions of the tax code interact to affect a company's expected marginal tax rate. After describing the complexities involved in properly calculating corporate tax rates, the article concludes by describing a simulation method the authors have developed to measure a company's effective marginal tax rate and, hence, its tax incentives to use more leverage (or some other means of reducing taxable income).
In furnishing a method for calculating marginal tax rates with greater accuracy, the authors also provide a clue to resolving the capital structure puzzle discussed in the roundtable at the head of this issue. In particular, their recent research corrects earlier studies in the finance literature by showing that when marginal tax rates are measured before financing (that is, based on income before interest expense is deducted), there is a positive relation between debt usage and tax rates.     

The effect of leverage on the cost of capital of US buyouts

This paper addresses the problem to assess the effect of leverage on the cost of capital for buyout performance analyses. It draws on a unique and proprietary set of data on 133 US buyouts between 1984 and 2004. For each of them, we determine a public market equivalent that matches it with respect to its timing and its systematic risk. We show that under realistic mimicking conditions, the average cost of capital is below the commonly used benchmark S&P 500. Thereby, we control for two important aspects: for the risks taken by lenders in the buyout transactions (which affects the sponsors’ risks), and for the corresponding cost of debt (which lowers the return of the public market equivalent). Only with borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate is the average cost of capital close to the average index return. This finding is particularly important as existing literature on that topic tends to rely on benchmarks without a proper risk-adjustment.     

What Happens During the Private Period?: Evidence from Public‐to‐Private Reverse LBOs

This study provides new evidence on the restructuring activities undertaken by public‐to‐private reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) while owned by private equity firms. The authors' comprehensive sample of public‐to‐private LBOs that return to public ownership through IPOs enables them to observe changes in profitability, valuation, financial structure, operating structure, and cost structure from the time the firms go private through (and after) their emergence through (re‐) IPOs. With their exclusive focus on reverse LBOs involving public‐to‐private deals, the authors reach findings that contradict previous conclusions about RLBOs. At the time of the LBO, the target firms in reverse LBOs are more levered than their peers, pay higher dividends, and are more profitable than their peers. At the same time, however, they appear to have lower market valuations before the buyouts. During the private period, the target firms of reverse LBOs achieve significant increases in employee productivity, asset restructuring, and improved gross margins, while operating with substantially higher levels of debt financing, lower levels of cash and working capital, and greater concentration of equity ownership. After the companies return to public ownership through IPOs, such companies continue to operate with higher leverage and ownership concentration than their publicly traded peers while producing further increases in profitability, resulting in substantial increases in both enterprise and equity valuation. The authors' analysis also shows that higher debt levels from the buyout play an important role in increased enterprise values. The evidence suggests that possible undervaluation as well as expected efficiency gains from restructuring actions are the primary motives for such reverse LBOs.     

The Effect of Taxes on Corporate Financing Decisions: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms

This paper provides additional evidence on the relationship between corporate taxes and debt using panel data on Italian companies. The panel covers 1054 companies for the years 1982–1994.The paper follows the Graham-Shevlin methodology for calculating company specific marginal tax rates (MTR) relying on the non-linearity of corporate tax schedules resulting from company losses and the ensuing tax provisions (carry-forward and backward rules). In the period covered by the panel there were in Italy two taxes on corporate income (IRPEG and ILOR), with different loss carry-forward rules, whose statutory tax rates and tax bases changed several times. For these reasons the simulated MTRs display both cross-sectional and time-series variation.The paper tests whether taxes encourage the use of debt by analysing incremental financing decisions. In order to cope with the endogeneity of the MTR the paper considers two different specifications. The first uses the lagged value of the simulated MTR. The second employs the estimate of before-financing MTR proposed by Graham et al. (1998). Significant cross-sectional tax effects are identified under both specifications whereas time-series variation cannot be identified if due account is taken of firm-fixed tax effects.The paper also investigates whether personal taxes affect corporate financing decisions. The MTR may either overstate or understate the fiscal benefit of debt financing according to whether, at the personal level, interest income is taxed at a rate that is higher or lower than the tax rate on returns from common stocks. Differences in the dividend-payout ratio across companies and several reforms in interest, dividend and capital gains taxation provide sufficient cross-section and time-series variations to identify the effect of personal taxes on debt usage.     

Playing to their strengths? Evidence that specialization in the private equity industry confers competitive advantage

The paper examines whether private equity (PE)-backed buyouts have higher post-buyout operating profitability than comparable companies as a result of the alleged superior governance mechanism of private equity (“The Jensen hypothesis”) and whether relative investment specialisation by industry or stage provides the PE firm with a competitive advantage over its peers (“The advantages-to-specialization hypotheses”). A sample of 122 UK buyouts over the period 1995–2002 and a matched sample of non-PE-backed UK companies are constructed to test the three hypotheses. We find that over the first 3 post-buyout years (i) operating profitability of PE-backed companies is greater than those of comparable companies by 4.5%, consistently with the Jensen hypothesis; (ii) industry specialization of PE firms adds 8.5% to this premium, consistently with the industry-specialization hypothesis; (iii) stage (buyout) specialization does not impact profitability but may provide a spur to growth, inconsistently with the stage-specialization hypothesis. Finally, initial profitability of the PE-backed company plays a major role in post-buyout profitability, suggesting that skill in investment selection and financial engineering techniques may be more important than managerial incentives in generating higher PE company performance.