会计信息真实之程序理性观与结果理性观

本文通过对两份问券调查结果的分析，发现上市公司经理人与投资人对会计信息真实性的看法存在显著的视角差异，前者持会计信息真实的程序理性观，而后者持会计信息真实的结果理性观。从目前我国证券市场的现状来看，投资人处于信息严重不对称的弱势地位，上市公司会计信息失真使投资者蒙受了巨大损失。文章据此认为：对上市公司会计信息生成、审计和披露的监管，应偏重于会计信息真实的结果理性观，以保护投资者利益，降低经理人与投资人之间的信息不对称性。     

A Backward Induction Experiment

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.     

The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well‐defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.     

Backward Induction and the Game-Theoretic Analysis of Chess

This paper scrutinizes various stylized facts related to the minmax theorem for chess. We first point out that, in contrast to the prevalent understanding, chess is actually an infinite game, so that backward induction does not apply in the strict sense. Second, we recall the original argument for the minmax theorem of chess—which is forward rather than backward looking. Then it is shown that, alternatively, the minmax theorem for the infinite version of chess can be reduced to the minmax theorem of the usually employed finite version. The paper concludes with a comment on Zermelo's (1913) nonrepetition theorem. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Implementation by Iterative Dominance and Backward Induction: An Experimental Comparison

We report experimental results on the relative performance of simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. Under the simultaneous version, subjects typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of iterations of dominance. Consequently the unique strategy surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is rarely observed. Under the sequential version, subjects also typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of steps of backward induction. Thus the backward induction outcome is also rarely observed. The sequential version results in fewer observed outcomes corresponding to the predicted outcome than the simultaneous version. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number(s): C72, C92.     

Substantive and procedural uncertainty

Different sources of uncertainty are analysed and a representation of decision-making in principle consistent with behavioural evidence is proposed. The endogenous emergence of innovations, in the forms of unexpected events and novel behaviours is also examined.     

Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining

We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction. Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to “robot” players, but offers to robots are only a little lower. When trained subjects (who quickly learned to do backward induction) bargained with untrained subjects, offers ended up halfway between equilibrium and $2.11. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9.     

从经济理性到生态理性

经济理性为市场经济和工业文明立下过历史性的功劳。当人类的经济规模尚未对生态平衡构成威胁时,经济理性是正确的;当经济规模超出自然界的承受范围,破坏生态平衡时,经济理性就得让位于生态理性。生态理性有更广阔的鸟瞰视野,更高的观控水平,把经济理性作为一个特例包含在自己的体系之中。悠久的中华文明充满生态智慧,党的十七大提出建设生态文明是对全人类的贡献。     

从有限理性到适应性理性

“有限理性之父”西蒙以及行为经济学家卡尼曼等人对人类“理性不及”和偏离理性的非理性行为做过深入系统的描述,并卓有建树,但是他们并未阐释人类决策过程中如何对理性与非理性进行合理有效配置的内在机制。基于此,本文从认知和心智层面,提出了适应性理性的假设命题,探索性地构建了适应性理性理论的解释框架,以一个全新视角,深化了有限理性的思想和内涵,并运用其理论重新阐释了行为决策过程中的认知偏差和简捷启发式的合理性。本文认为人类的经济决策行为同样遵循“心智经济性”的原则。     

Rationality and intertemporal choice

The alleged problems associated with self-control, hyperbolic discounting and other examples of seemingly irrational intertemporal choice are examined in the context of an evolution-based neurobiological model that emphasizes the role of the biological evolution of big brains and language and the cultural evolution of institutions. There is no utility function in the brain; it has no central-planner, in fact, the brain is a self-organized complex system, a decentralized spontaneous order. This spontaneous order is coordinated, much like an economy, by a distributed network that maintains and makes available the discounted net value of various options to decentralized and specialized areas in the brain when making decisions. Further, that decision making is embodied and embedded in the decision making environment. For humans, an important part of that environment is the social environment consisting of institutions and other components of culture. It was, in part, the evolution of this environment that made long-range planning possible. Additionally, it is very often the lack of embedded experience with the environment that leads to what seems to be irrational intertemporal choices. In fact, under close examination the evidence for consistent irrational intertemporal choice is weak.     

Choquet Rationality

Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her “expected” utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81.     

Backward Intergenerational Goods and Endogenous Fertility

This paper characterizes the consequences of introducing the public provision of intergenerational goods to the elderly in a model with endogenous fertility. With exogenous fertility, it has been shown that the government can mandate the first‐best outcome by simply imposing the socially optimal transfer. By contrast, with endogenous fertility, the government can no longer enforce this outcome. This is due, in part, to the effects of mandatory provision on the birth rate. However, taxes may still have a salubrious effect on social welfare as they can eliminate particularly bad equilibria.     

Consumer Rationality and Consumer Sovereignty

Important social benefits of the market system are predicated on the assumption that consumers can effectively pursue their interest in the marketplace. Cause for concern exists to the extent that high consumption expenditures lead to relatively low levels of personal savings in the U.S. To the extent that they do, in fact, over spend, consumers appear to deviate from economic assumptions of rationality. This paper examines four conceptions of rationality (two variants of rational choice theory, institutionalism, and one derived from economic sociology), with a view to evaluating implications for consumer sovereignty under each. By explicitly accounting for differences among individuals, economic sociology appears to offer more realistic policy solutions.     

Rationality without Transitivity

In this article rational choice behavior is investigated without assuming transitivity or completeness of the underlying preferences. These standard properties are replaced by a property concerning dominant alternatives. This permits the existence of preference cycles among alternatives which are dominated, while still ensuring the existence of a rational choice correspondence. We will also realize that some rational choice rules still hold in this context. Further we will see that in equilibrium analysis the existence of a competitive equilibrium follows when transitivity and completeness is replaced by this domination property.     

Rationality of Migration

The paradigm of a rational individual acting on the earnings-enhancing benefits of migration is subjected to statistical scrutiny, using data from Turkey. Results with robust selectivity correction support the rationality hypothesis: Both migrants and nonmigrants chose the option in which they had comparative advantage. However, the estimated gain from moving is negative for a substantial portion of migrants, whereas a minority realize very high returns. This suggests that migration is a lottery: Individuals are willing to invest in a proposition that has a high probability of yielding negative returns because of the potential for a very large payoff.     

对落后地区如何面对技术创新的思考

技术创新是加快经济发展的不竭动力,通过对落后地区如何正确地把握技术创新所带来的挑战和机遇的思考,提出了加快落后地区技术创新的相应对策和措施。     

企业技术多样性、实质性社会责任信息披露与创新扩散

技术多样性是企业创新能力的重要表征,但现有研究对于技术多样性与创新扩散的关系存在争议。对此,区分相关和不相关技术多样性对创新扩散的异质性影响,并检验实质性社会责任信息披露作为一种信号传递机制对上述关系的调节作用。基于2008—2017年中国研发密集型上市企业数据进行实证分析,结果发现：相关技术多样性能够积极影响创新扩散;不相关技术多样性对创新扩散的影响存在滞后效应;实质性社会责任信息披露正向调节不相关技术多样性与创新扩散的关系。结论丰富了创新扩散理论与实证研究,可为企业创新实践提供决策依据。     

企业集团“合并破产”实证研究

两个或两个以上企业集团成员同时或先后破产时常涉及复杂的程序及实体法问题,尤其是当债权人因集团成员营业事务高度交织而利益受损时,法院需在尊重债务人独立人格与维护债权人之公平受偿原则间进行权衡。随着破产理念更新,中国法院对事务高度交织的企业集团的破产处置经历了从一企一案到合并破产的转变,并积累了一些成功经验。不过,鉴于合并破产突破了法人独立人格与有限责任原则,因此,法院仅应在例外情形下适用。而且,除需在理论上准确阐释合并破产外,还应在破产法中明定合并破产具体适用规则。