Volatility, Stabilization and Union Wage-setting: The Effects of Monetary Policy on the 'Natural' Unemployment Rate

In a unionized economy with nominal-wage contracts, the 'natural' (rational-expectations equilibrium) employment level is not invariant with respect to the stabilization rule followed by the monetary authority. This is because alternative monetary policies change the variance of the inflation rate (price level) relatively to the variance of some measure of economic activity (employment level), thereby influencing the trade-off desired by union members between the real wage and the probability of employment. Indeed, a more volatile employment level induces the (risk-neutral) union members to prefer a higher expected real wage.
(J.E.L: E5, J5).     

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

In a bargaining model, we show that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long‐term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short‐term contracts. Therefore, a decrease in the benefit level reduces the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long‐term than with short‐term contracts, thereby creating an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers are shown to change in the same direction.     

International capital and nontraded goods in the long run

The present paper develops the comparative static properties of a small open economy which produces both traded goods and nontraded goods, and is a price taker in the international market for productive capital. Assumptions of full employment, competitive markets, and international mobility of productive cap ital input capture a long run horizon. Comparative static results associated with the wage, labor, and the price of the nontraded good are independent of factor intensity, factor substitution, and demand for the nontraded good. A tax on the traded good and a capital subsidy together raise national income and the real wage.     

Competing wage claims,cost inflation,and capacity utilization

This paper develops a theory of competing wage claims and cost inflation, and attempts to integrate this theory into the core of modern macroeconomic analysis. Specifically, the paper proposes an explanation for wage inertia and wage interdependence based on an application of duopoly theory to labor unions, and incorporates this microeconomic theory of labor union behavior into a macroeconomic general equilibrium model with goods, money, and bonds as well as two kinds of labor. Special emphasis is placed on the interplay between demand and cost factors in the inflation process and on the implications of wage competition among labor unions for the relationship between inflation and unemployment in the short and long run.     

Productivity Shocks and Real Effective Exchange Rates

This paper provides new insights into the relationship between exchange rates and productivity developments for European Economies. We focus on the question whether productivity changes have a long‐run impact on real effective exchange rates for a large number of European economies. Focusing on a sample period running from 1995 until 2013, we adopt a cointegrated vector autoregressive approach and distinguish between long‐run equilibrium, short‐run dynamics and long‐run impact of shocks. Our findings show that for several industrialized economies, real effective exchange rates and labor productivity are not related over the long‐run. A possible explanation for this result is that wage developments do not reflect increases in labor productivity to a large degree, which prevents a transmission to the real effective exchange rate through the price channel. The results for Central and Eastern European Countries are more encouraging since a positive impact of labor productivity on real effective exchange rate is frequently observed.     

A simple macro model for a small open economy facing a binding external constraint (Chile)

In this paper a Keynesian macroeconomic model for a small open economy is used, which describes the functioning of the real part of the economy in the short run when facing a dominant external restriction. The main conclusions of this paper are: (1) In the Chilean case, a devaluation has a contractionary impact in the short run, i.e., a 10% real devaluation produces a 3.4% drop on the level of output. The non-fulfilment of the Marshall-Lerner condition accounts for only 30% of the output contraction, while the remaining 70% corresponds to the decline in consumption that is induced by the reduction in real wages. (2) When the economy has an external deficit, the adequate combination of exchange and fiscal policies to restore the Balance of Payments equilibrium which minimizes the decline of output depends on the magnitude of the devaluation. Thus, an ‘over-shooting’ in the exchange rate, together with a contractionary fiscal policy, would produce an unnecessarily deflationary impact in the short run. (3) The Chilean empirical evidence shows that when there is a dominant external constraint, the magnitude of the short run trade-off between real wages and employment is not very acute. The short-run elasticity of employment with respect to the real wage is 0.34.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Who is afraid of capital mobility? on taxation of labor income and the level of public services in an open economy

This paper deals with the effects of international capital mobility on the taxation of labor income and on the size of the public sector. It employs a model of the labor market where national trade unions set the wage level in their country and national governments set the tax rate of a proportional labor-income tax. The tax revenues are used to finance a public good and unemployment benefits. In this model, competition between the national trade unions caused by international capital mobility leads to full employment, and the governments supply the public good on the first best level. As no unemployment benefits have to be financed, the tax on labor income may decline with the introduction of capital mobility. These tax cuts may even overcompensate the unions for the wage decline.     

INDUSTRY DYNAMICS AND THE MINIMUM WAGE: A PUTTY‐CLAY APPROACH

We document two new findings about the industry‐level response to minimum wage hikes. First, restaurant exit and entry both rise following a hike. Second, there is no change in employment among continuing restaurants. We develop a model of industry dynamics based on putty‐clay technology that is consistent with these findings. In the model, continuing restaurants cannot change employment, and thus industry‐level adjustment occurs gradually through exit of labor‐intensive restaurants and entry of capital‐intensive restaurants. Interestingly, the putty‐clay model matches the small estimated short‐run disemployment effect of the minimum wage found in other studies, but produces a larger long‐run disemployment effect.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

LABOR SUPPLY FACTORS AND ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS

We propose a new Vector Autoregressive identification scheme that enables us to disentangle labor supply shocks from wage bargaining shocks. Identification is achieved by imposing sign restrictions on the responses of the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate to the two shocks. According to our analysis on United States data over the period 1985–2014, labor supply shocks and wage bargaining shocks are important drivers of output and unemployment both in the short run and in the long run. These results suggest that identification strategies used in estimated new Keynesian models to disentangle labor market shocks may be misguided.     

The trade-off between real wages and employment in an open economy (Belgium)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we discuss the nature and quantitative order of magnitude of the trade-off between real wages and employment in the small open economy Belgium. Second, we draw policy conclusions from our positive analysis, and compare income policies with alternative approaches to employment stimulation (including shorter working hours and currency depreciation).To study the trade-off between real wages and employment, we treat external balance as a binding constraint on demand management. An exogenous increase in real wages, affecting adversely the competitiveness of domestic producers on the export and import markets, impairs external balance. The impact of the wage increase on output and employment is evaluated through the reduction in domestic demand required to restore external balance.At the empirical level, we endeavour to evaluate separately the influence on exports and imports of domestic costs at unchanged capacity levels, and of capacity levels themselves. And we endeavour to evaluate the influence of real wages on capacity levels through scrapping and investment. All evaluations rely on the foreign trade equations of econometric models of the Belgian economy.The conclusions from our empirical investigation are first that estimates of the trade-off between real wages and employment in Belgium are subject to considerable imprecision; second that the short-run elasticity of employment with respect to real wages keeping capacity constant is probably quite small (like -0.2), and definitely less than unity in absolute value; third that the corresponding medium-run elasticity taking into account capacity adjustments is probably sizeable (like -2), and definitely larger than unity in absolute value; and fourth that exchange rate adjustments might not make too much difference, in either the short run or the medium run.Turning to a discussion of policy, we shall argue that these conclusions give support to a policy of constant real labour incomes, of comprehensive efforts to redistribute work through shorter working hours or related schemes, and of selective efforts to slow down capacity scrapping.     

Competition and the capital-labor conflict

This paper analyzes the distributional effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition. The focus is on the interaction between imperfect competition in product markets and bargaining in the labor market. The main result is that, while a uniform intensification of product market competition increases employment, it may cause real wages to fall, in the short run as well as in the long run. This is especially likely if labor market regulations are favorable to workers. Therefore, product market and labor market regulations tend to reinforce each other politically, and compensatory fiscal transfers may be needed in order to enact employment-enhancing deregulation policies.     

Employment cycles, low income work and the dynamic impact of wage regulations. A macro perspective

In this paper we investigate, against the background of Goodwin??s (1967) growth cycle model, a dual labor market economy and the consequences of introducing an unemployment benefit system and minimum wages in the second labor market and a maximum wage barrier in the first one. In the framework with free ??hiring?? and firing?? in the both labor markets we show (a) that in fact maximum real wages in the first labor market not only reduce the volatility of this labor market, but also provide global stability to the system dynamics if they are locally explosive, and (b) that larger fluctuations in employment can be made (at least partially) socially acceptable through a (workfare oriented) unemployment benefit system augmented by minimum wage in the low income segment of the labor market.     

GROWTH AND VARIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT INCOME TAX REVENUES: IS TAX BASE DIVERSIFICATION A GOOD IDEA FOR SCHOOL FINANCING?

School districts in Ohio have the option of diversifying their revenue base by adopting income taxes. Using a panel of Ohio school districts that adopted a local income tax from 1990 to 2008, we find that revenues are procyclical and fluctuate only mildly. The estimated short‐ and long‐run income elasticity of school district income tax revenues is 1.05 and 1.04, respectively. We also find that the school district tax base fully adjusts to its long‐run equilibrium within 2 years. Finally, we show that school district income tax adoption does not provide more stability to total school district tax revenues in the short or the long run. (JEL H71, H75)     

Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare

This paper analyzes the effect of labor-tax progression on employment and welfare in an economy with a unionized labor market. The government influences wage bargaining through its tax policies. Wages can be reduced by increasing the marginal labor-tax rate. If there are no restrictions on profit taxation, a first-best optimum with full employment is realized; this first-best optimum can always be implemented by a progressive tax schedule. If profit taxation is restricted, unemployment may arise. For this case, we show that the welfare-maximizing degree of tax progression is influenced by a variety of factors, in particular the wage elasticity of labor demand, the distribution of bargaining power, and the existence of unemployment benefits. Examples are given for both progressive and regressive tax structures. Comparative-static analysis reveals that a decline in union bargaining power, an increase in unemployment benefits, and an increase in the overall work force reduce the efficient degree of tax progression.     

Continuity and Change in Australian Wages Policy

Australia shares with several small European economies the characteristic of having a relatively coordinated union movement with the ability to influence real wage levels. This article explores the course of wages policy over the last decade by applying to Australia a model of wage determination originating in Europe, a model which assumes that the union movement can determine the real wage level. The wage level the union movement chooses is influenced by choices it faces between real wage increases and employment growth. The unions are also influenced by the public sector employment generating activity of government. Stagflation in the late 1970s is analysed by hypothesising a misperception by the union movement of the policy options available to government, and a mistrust by government of the unions' willingness to moderate wage increases if employment levels rise rapidly. The model suggests that an accord between unions and government (such as that which has been in place in Australia since 1983) is a way to escape some of these policy dilemmas.     

The dynamic impact of immigration on natives' labor market outcomes: Evidence from Israel

This paper studies the short and medium run impact of highly skilled immigrants from the Former Soviet Union to Israel on natives' wages and employment. If immigrants are relatively good substitutes for native workers, the impact of immigration will be largest immediately upon the immigrants' arrival, and may become smaller as the labor market adjusts to the supply shock. Conversely, if immigrants upon arrival are poor substitutes for natives, the initial effect of immigration is small, and increases over time as immigrants acquire local labor market skills and compete with native workers. We empirically examine these alternative hypotheses using data from Israel between 1989 and 1999.We find that wages of both men and women are negatively correlated with the fraction of immigrants with little local experience in a labor market segment. A 10 percent increase in the share of immigrants lowers natives' wages in the short run by 1–3 percent, but this effect dissolves after 4–7 years. This result is robust to a variety of different segmentations of the labor market, to the inclusion of cohort effects, and to different dynamic structures in the residual term of the wage equation. On the other hand, we do not find any effect of immigration on employment, neither in the short nor in the medium run.     

Shocks and rigidities as determinants of CEE labour markets’ performance

In this article, the impact of real wage, productivity, labour demand and supply shocks on eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies from 1996–2007 is analysed with a panel structural vector error correction model. A set of long‐run restrictions derived from the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used to identify structural shocks, and fluctuations in foreign demand are controlled for. We find that the propagation of shocks on CEE labour markets resembles that found for OECD countries. Labour demand shocks emerge as the main determinant of employment and unemployment variability in the short‐to‐medium run, but wage rigidities were equally important for observed labour market performance, especially in Poland, Czech Republic and Lithuania. We associate these rigidities with collective bargaining, minimum wage, active labour market policies and employment protection legislation.