Resource extraction by cartels facing constraints on cooperation

This paper considers a non-renewable resource cartel facing constraints on cooperation. Although different kinds of constraints are conceivable and some of them are also investigated, the analysis focuses on the case in which cooperation is restricted to sufficiently high quotas. This approach of imposing constraints on cartelization complements papers that assume exogenously when a monopoly ends (in particular Benchekroun, H., Gaudet, G., Van Long, N., 2006. Temporary natural resource cartels. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52, 663–674) in two aspects: an endogenous determination when the cartel breaks up and the consequence that it is impossible to shift resource sales between the two regimes.     

银贸协作瞄准出口

<正> 进入2002年,在中国金融行业和外贸行业出现了一个明显的动向,这就是银行和外贸之间的合作越来越密切。其中,一个明显的目标就是,进一步推动中国的外贸出口不断扩大。携手抵御亚洲金融危机冲击 1998亚洲金融危机发生以来,中国的银贸双方加强密切合作,对抵御金融危机的冲击起到了重要作用。首先,在亚洲金融危机期间,坚持人民币不贬值,我国对亚洲乃至世界经济的稳定和发展做出了巨大贡献,树立了一个负责任大国的良好形象。更重要的是,由于亚洲经济在较短的时间内摆脱危机,恢复增长,我国外经贸发展的外部环境得到了稳定和改善。其次,国家实行稳健的货币政策,人     

Tariff escalation,export shares and economy-wide welfare: A computable general equilibrium approach

The current literature suggests that tariff escalation (TE) lowers the competitiveness of processing sectors. Coffee and cotton are agricultural products that face the problem of TE in developing countries, where we observe low global coffee product export shares but high global cotton textile export shares, posing a question on TE's impact on competitiveness. This paper employs a computable generalised equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach to examine the impact of TE on export shares of processed coffee and cotton textiles. We modify the standard GTAP (global trade analysis project) model to solve for global export shares and simulate the impact of eliminating TE on coffee and cotton to analyse economy-wide trade and welfare implications. Results show that TE has mixed effects on export shares, depending on the initial economic structure. Findings reveal that the elimination of TE on cotton and coffee may generate potential global gains of over US$ 0.7 billion, mainly from the cotton sector. Given the relative size of these sectors in global agriculture, the magnitude of gains is not small. This underlines the need for the policy-makers to examine, address and evaluate the prevalence of TE on a sectoral basis in ongoing WTO negotiations.     

Analyzing exchange rate uncertainty and bilateral export growth in China: A multivariate GARCH-based approach

Dramatic changes to exchange rate policy for the world's largest exporter have arguably ushered in the optimal environment for studying the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade. This study builds on the recent literature by using an extremely general model that measures volatility using the flexible multivariate DCC-GARCH model to analyze the impact exchange rate uncertainty has on bilateral export growth for China's ten largest export markets. All model parameters are estimated simultaneously and lagged values of uncertainty are included for a full year, where significant effects are found. The more general methods potentially overcome issues associated with inefficient two-step methods and the assumption that volatility impacts are close to instantaneous. Using a comprehensive sample that spans 1994–2017, the paper presents evidence that exchange rate uncertainty has no impact on trade with the United States, which strongly contrasts a robust finding of trade deterring impacts for almost all remaining countries. The unifying methodology is also used to analyze nominal uncertainty itself. Here, it is found that Chinese inflation may be a positive contributor to risk in an environment where many exogenous events, such as the Asian currency crisis, are associated with periods of heightened yuan uncertainty.     

The best way of bilateral special economic zone to Sino-Vietnam economic cooperation

The Bilateral Special Economic Zones is a new idea about economic co-operation ways. It is going to be set by both countries with a common boundary for promoting the economic co-operation between two sides. It can be firstly set along the boundary between China and Vietnam. It will promote the economic co-operation between them, but China and ASEAN. It can be set along the Chinese boundary with the neighboring countries and will promote the economic co-operation between the both sides for setting up a better environment around China.     

关税、走私和福利效应

本文旨在通过构建开放经济条件下中国走私的均衡分析框架,以期探求：存在走私实际成本时,走私者行为如何决定,以及引入政府反走私行动、关税税率上升等外生冲击后,走私相关效应如国民福利效应将发生怎样变化？     

Tariff Uniformity and Growth

Theoretical ambiguity exists regarding the potential benefits of adopting a uniform tariff schedule. In this paper, we investigate the empirical evidence on this question. From cross-country growth regressions over the period 1988-97 we find a nonlinear relationship between a country's standard deviation of tariffs and its growth rate. Specifically, we find that countries with either a large degree of tariff uniformity or very little tariff uniformity tended to grow faster over this time period, controlling for other factors.     

Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus

This paper considers a bilateral market with two complementary commodities and gives a rationale for Aumann's paradox. The relationship between the notion of strong stability of a syndicate, i.e., the property that no group of players wants to exit or to enter the syndicate, and the notion of disadvantageous syndicates is summarized in two results. If the two sides of the market are balanced in terms of endowments, every syndicate is strongly stable. If the two sides of the market are not balanced in terms of endowments, then being advantageous, in Aumann's definition, is necessary and sufficient for a syndicate to be strongly stable.     

Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of “market access”, emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.     

Dynamics of technology sharing cartels and industrial structure under a rule of thumb

We analyse the market effects of different degrees of knowledge transfer in a duopoly in which firms act following a rule of thumb. Three regimes are compared: the technology sharing cartels, the duopoly with spillovers, and the proprietary regime. We show the industrial structure evolution of these three regimes under different cost configurations when firms behave myopically, revising their production plan in each period according to the marginal profit previously gained. The analysis is conducted in a discrete setting using numerical simulations of finite difference systems. We show under which conditions knowledge transfer is beneficial to the system and can prevent market monopolisation.     

关税变动与异质性企业进口行为研究

文章以异质性企业理论为基础,验证了不同所有制企业面临关进口关税时的行为差异.研究结果表明,国有企业从进口关税水平下降中获益最多,高生产率、大规模的国有企业更倾向于扩大其进口集约边际;经验越足的外商独资企业进口产品质量越高,并且进口规模的扩大更多来源于集约边际;企业规模越大的中外合资/合作企业进口产品质量越高;集体/私营企业进口产品的质量受进口关税的影响不太明显,扩展边际是其扩大进口规模的主要方向.     

Mergers,cartels and leniency programs: The role of capital stocks

This paper examines the impact of mergers on collusion, depending on the endowment of capital assets among firms. We show that mergers render collusion easier to sustain when an asymmetric capital stock is combined with less-efficient insiders, due to more symmetric conditions and tighter incentive constraints. Moreover, the model allows us to determine an optimal threshold of asymmetry between insiders and outsiders such that mergers have pro-competitive effects; we compare this value with that which would generate perfect symmetry between firms after the merger.     

碳关税的相关理论机制及其经济影响与启示

近年来,全球气候变暖对人类赖以生存的环境形成巨大威胁。为此,美国和法国先后提出了以征收碳关税的方式应对气候变化的主张,引起世界的广泛关注。文章在介绍碳关税提出背景的基础上,分析碳关税的相关理论机制及其经济影响,并概括碳关税问题的主要结论和启示。     

浅议碳关税及其对中国工业化进程的影响

通过对碳关税的提出背景、政策意图的研究,对碳关税的实质及国际影响进行了分析,并且对碳关税对中国工业化道路的选择,以及对中国工业化进程的影响进行了分析.提出碳关税的实质是对本国产业竞争力以及为巩固和加强国际政治话语权而实施的新型贸易保护手段.碳关税政策将对中国的对外贸易以及整体工业化进程产生深远的影响,迫使中国继续加快实施经济增长方式的转变,创新适应目前复杂国际背景的新型工业化道路.     

Tariff strategies and small open economies

In this paper we examine the issue of optimal tariffs for a small economy that trades with a large economy. We define 'small' and 'large' in the sense that the world prices are determined solely by the large country, and, therefore, the small country faces exogenously given world prices. Within this framework it is shown that there exist situations in which the small country has an incentive to behave as a Stackelberg leader by committing itself to a non-zero optimal tariff. Although the small country is unable to directly affect world prices, by pre-committing to a non-zero trade tax it may induce a reduction of the large country's optimal trade tax, thereby indirectly improving its terms of trade and welfare. JEL Classification: F13, F35
Stratégies de droits de douane et petites économies ouvertes. Ce mémoire examine le problème des droits de douane optimaux pour une petite économie qui commerce avec une grande. On définit 'petit' et 'grand' en un sens économique: les prix mondiaux sont déterminés seulement par le grand pays et le petit pays fait face à des prix mondiaux exogènes. A l'intérieur de ce cadre d'analyse, les auteurs montrent qu'il existe des situations dans lesquelles le petit pays est incitéà se conduire en leader à la Stackelberg en s'engageant fermement dans une politique de droit de douane optimal différent de zéro. Même si le petit pays ne peut pas influencer directement les prix mondiaux, en adoptant une politique ferme de droits de douane positifs, il peut amener le grand pays à réduire son niveau de droit de douane optimal, et, ce faisant, améliorer ses propres termes d'échange et son propre niveau de bien-être.     

Declining Industries and Persistent Tariff Protection

The paper uses a political economy framework to explain the empirical observation that trade protection is persistent. The assumptions that are shown to generate endogenous tariff persistence in the model are quite plausible: agents are uncertain about future prices, tariffs are affected by political pressure, and producers of the import–competing good own sector–specific human capital that may be lost if they exit the industry. The model also reveals that, under the conditions listed above, industries decline gradually in response to a price shock even when producers do not face increasing costs of adjustment.     

Tariff,Growth, and Welfare

We develop a two‐country (Home and Foreign) by two‐good (consumption good and investment good) by one factor (capital) endogenous growth model with international knowledge spillover to study the relationship between an import tariff and economic growth and welfare. First, unlike the past literature, we do not need to make an assumption such that the growth rates between countries are identical in a balanced growth path (BGP). Second, we show that there exists a unique and saddle‐point BGP with both countries being incompletely specialized. Third, a higher import tariff on the consumption good in the domestic country may boost (reduce) the rate of economic growth when the foreign (domestic) country has an absolute advantage in the investment good. Finally, a rise in the tariff rate by one country may improve world welfare under some parameter spaces.     

Tariff escalation and invasive species damages

We investigate the interface between trade and damages from invasive species (IS), focusing on escalation in tariffs between raw-input and processed-good markets, and its implication for IS-based damages. The current tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products motivates our analysis. Tariff escalation exacerbates the likelihood of IS introduction by biasing trade flows towards increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that a reduction of tariff escalation, by lowering the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency and reduces IS-based damages, a win-win situation. We also identify policy menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods leading to win-win situations.