Marriage and trust: some lessons from economics

This paper examines the role of marriage as an institution forproviding couples with the confidence to make long-term investmentsin their relationship. No-fault divorce has undermined the notionof marriage as a contract, thereby reducing the security offeredby marriage and promoting opportunism by men. This has weakenedthe bargaining power of wives, both within marriage and whendivorce occurs. Current legal reforms will improve the economicposition of all divorced wives, including those who are primarilyresponsible for the breakdown of their marriage. The latterfeature will encourage opportunism by women and make men lessprepared to invest in their marriage. The paper argues thatthe only way to achieve parity between men and women, and deteropportunism by either sex, is to return to fault-based divorce.Both divorce settlements and the custody of children shoulddepend on preceding marital conduct.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

Intra‐household bargaining power and household expenditure allocation: Evidence from Iran

This article examines the role of intra‐household bargaining power on household expenditure patterns in Iran to see whether women’s empowerment can achieve similar results in Iran as we have seen it achieve in other countries of the world. This study is insightful because it tells us whether Iranian women, who have experienced both economic and noneconomic constraints over many years, can utilize increased power toward economic development. The bargaining power is measured by the sex ratio in the marriage market. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey in Iran, we find that greater bargaining power of women contributes significantly toward greater provision of education and health expenditure within the household, creating a potential for an increase in welfare for the next generation.     

Improving Assessments of Gender Bargaining Power: A Case Study from Bangladesh

Gender bargaining power has entered into mainstream economic theory and public policy. However, common empirical measures are only loosely related to the theoretical concept, and research has not produced consistent results regarding the causal chains underlying women’s empowerment. This study critically examines accepted measures of bargaining power, arguing that participation in specific household decisions is not directly associated with the theoretical concept of bargaining power. The study analyzes the relationship between measures of participation in household decisions and individual and household characteristics thought to contribute to bargaining power. Using Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data on Bangladesh over the period 1999–2011, the study finds that despite the loose relationship of the survey questions to the theoretical construct bargaining power, the decision-making questions provide relatively consistent and theoretically supported measures of this unobservable characteristic. Simple changes in using the measures would contribute to more robust and consistent findings.     

Wives' motives and fertility

This analysis assumes that childhood learning has a strong impact on the measured motivations of adults. This study uses responses among 354 White married women in 1976 to the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Wives' responses to four pictures are expected to mirror the following four typologies: affiliation imagery (AFF), power imagery (POW), power and affiliation imagery (POWAF), and without references to affiliation or power (CULT). CULT is presumed to reflect the motivation of the wife in the average family. Expected relationships between these root motives and fertility are identified. Findings show that families with persuasive affiliative wives allocated more time to child care and had lower family incomes than other families. AFF wives worked fewer hours per week than other wives and allocated more time per child than other wives. Husbands helped them with child care sometimes or often. Households sacrificed material possessions for children. Findings did not support the inference that low income was due to husband's low earnings but did support the inference that low income might be due to the wives' short work week. The logistic model that controls for hours worked per week and number of years at the present job shows that wives were happiest in their marriage, if wives had high power motivation. Family income was a significant determinant of achievement satisfaction and not of affiliation satisfaction. Nerlove's hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between wife's level of education and her taste for children was rejected. The wife's motivation toward her husband was an important factor that impacted on her preference for children and for work and her perceived level of utility. Wives who asserted themselves in socially acceptable situations (high in power motivations) were most likely to report having a happier than average marriage. Both affiliative and persuasive affiliative wives took satisfaction in their children's happiness and achievements.     

Domestic violence and women's autonomy in developing countries: theory and evidence

Abstract This paper sets out a simple non‐cooperative model of resource allocation within the household in developing countries that incorporates domestic violence as a vehicle for enhancing bargaining power. We demonstrate that the extent of domestic violence faced by women is not necessarily declining in their reservation utilities, or necessarily increasing in their spouses’. Using the National Family Health Survey data of India for 1998–99, we isolate the effect of domestic violence on female autonomy, taking into account the possible endogeneity of domestic violence through the choice of appropriate instruments. We provide some evidence for the evolutionary theory of domestic violence, which argues that such violence stems from the jealousy caused by paternity uncertainty in our evolutionary past. The findings have strong policy implications suggesting that it will take more than an improvement in women’s employment options to address the problem of spousal violence.     

A capable wife: couple’s joint decisions on labor supply and family chores

This study investigates how spousal employment status affects personal employment decisions and the division of family chores. We apply Bresnahan and Reiss (J Econom 48(1):57–81, 1991) empirical cooperative game model to estimate household aggregate preference for a dual-earner family, extending their model to identify the individual preferences of husbands and wives by using the share of family chores as an empirical proxy for individual indirect disutilities. Using data from Taiwan, we show that an average household in the sample does not prefer a dual-earner family. The estimates of individual preferences indicate that this aversion comes mainly from the husbands. These results suggest that the gender gap in labor force participation and earnings has reduced at a faster rate than the social norm change toward the role of women in Taiwan.     

Marriage traditions and investment in education: The case of bride kidnapping

The cultural practice of bride kidnapping in Kyrgyzstan may alter the returns to education for young women in an ambiguous direction due to two competing effects. On the one hand, women facing a risk of kidnapping may reduce education investment due to uncertain returns. Alternatively, since kidnapping is less likely to occur while a woman is in school, women may increase education investment to lower their personal risk of being kidnapped into marriage. Understanding how education is affected by kidnapping risk allows us to better anticipate changes in education when the laws are enforced and the risk declines. We develop a two-period utility model to highlight the effects of kidnapping risk on education and to help identify those girls who are most likely to increase their education when faced with positive regional kidnapping risk and thus most likely to reduce education if the risk is eliminated. We test the implications of the theory empirically using the Life in Kyrgyzstan data. Difference-in-difference regression results point to a negative relationship between regional kidnapping rates and education, suggesting that the elimination of kidnapping is likely to induce higher education rates of women in Kyrgyzstan. The results are informative to the literature at the intersection of marriage traditions, women's bargaining power and education attainment.     

The impacts of women's land ownership: Evidence from Vietnam

Women's equal access to and control over economic resources such as land are integral to achieve gender equality and sustainable economic development. This study evaluates the impacts of women's land ownership on various women's and household's outcomes in the context of Vietnam. We discuss the beneficial effects of allowing women to own more land on both women and their families. In particular, there is a positive association between women's land ownership and intra-household bargaining power in various aspects. In particular, the relationship is the strongest for women's autonomy in decisions regarding their children. It is also easier for land-holding women to formally access credit and invest in human capital. We further study the favorable effects of women's land ownership on their families in terms of spending and saving behaviors. Finally, women's land ownership also contributes to household social capital. These findings lend support to the passage and implementation of laws intended to grant women equal rights to the ownership and control over land.     

How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework

Abstract. The paper surveys the Choo and Siow (2006a; CS) marriage matching model and its extensions. CS derives a behavioural marriage‐matching function. The collective model of intra‐household allocations can be integrated into this framework. Spousal labour supplies respond to changing marriage market conditions. Marriage market tightness, the ratio of unmarried type i men to unmarried type j women is a sufficient statistic for marriage market conditions for those types of individuals. The hypothesis that spousal labour supplies vary to equilibrate the marriage market has overidentifying restrictions. The framework extends to a dynamic marriage‐matching environment. Empirically, this paper shows how the famine caused by the great leap forward in Sichuan affected the marital behaviour of famine‐born cohorts. Marriage market tightness is shown to be a useful statistic for summarizing marriage market conditions in the United States. Marriage market conditions in the contemporary United States primarily affect spousal labour force participation rather than hours of work.     

Saving and the intra-household distribution of income: an empirical investigation

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the relationship between household saving and the distribution of income within the household. Various theoretical reasons why the level of saving might depend on the latter are given. Some of these can be rationalized within the usual “unitary” model of household decision but others recognize explicitly that different members of the household may have different preferences about how much to save.Particular attention is paid to saving for retirement since the facts that wives are, on average, younger than their husbands and women have longer life expectancies means that wives typically anticipate a longer retirement period than their husbands. Thus wives may prefer to save more for retirement than their husbands.The empirical analysis uses a sample of Canadian households from five Family Expenditure Surveys. These surveys include measures of financial saving as well saving in retirement accounts. After accounting for many of the other influences on saving (for example: age, household composition, occupation and education levels but not household income) we find some effects of the intra-household distribution of income on savings rates. The parameter estimates suggest that the household saving rate decreases with the share of the wife in household income.     

Household bargaining over fertility: Theory and evidence from Malaysia

We develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible. The model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes. We show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage. If couples bargain with commitment, fertility outcomes take account of both spouses' fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining. If couples bargain without commitment, the influence of each spouse's fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining, and the distribution of bargaining power. We test the models using household data from the Malaysia Family Life Survey. This data set contains information on each spouse's desired fertility level, as well as fertility outcomes. We exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model. The evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment.     

The Saving Behaviour of a Two-person Household

The facts that wives are typically younger than their husbands and that women typically live longer than men imply that wives may have more incentive to save for old age than do husbands. A theoretical model of the determination of household saving and portfolio choice is introduced which takes into account differences in preferences for saving. The most important result is that the level and the composition (portfolio) of saving and the time path of consumption are dependent on the distribution of income within the household.
JEL classification: D 1; D 7     

The labor-force participation of married women in the Soviet Union: a household cross-section analysis

Approximately 80% of women in the Soviet Union ages 15-54 years are employed outside the home. To identify the impact of demographic and economic variables on the high rate of labor force participation among Soviet women, data from an income survey of 1016 2-parent families of emigrants to Israel were analyzed. It was hypothesized that differences in participation rates among Soviet women correspond to differences in other sources of family income, wage rates and market conditions, level of education, and family household conditions, with response to changes in economic variables mediated by the role played by persuasion and social pressure in encouraging women to participate. Overall, 89.3% of the women in the sample were labor force participants. Nonparticipants were, as expected, from families with higher levels of other income. The personal qualifications of nonworking wives were considerably lower than those of working wives, with nonworking wives averaging 9.4 years of schooling compared with 13.2 years for working wives. Offered wages for working wives averaged 69 kopecks/hour in contrast to 40-50 kopecks/hour for nonworking women. A maximum-likelihood functional estimation of participation rates whoed significant coefficients for family income (negative), expected wages and education (positive), and residence in a large city (positive). The coefficients for residence in a medium-sized city, existence of a private plot, presence of nonworking men in the household, occupational status of the husband, and total number of children were insignificant. The supply of hours of work was backward-bending. The results suggest that Soviet women reach the decision to participate in the labor force through consideration of the same factors as their counterparts in nonsocialist countries. The analysis further indicates that, at present levels of fertility and exogenous conditions, the participation rate in the Soviet Union will not decrease. However, policies designed to raise the fertility level, including better facilities for children and more support for women who leave the labor force to raise young children, could ease labor force participation among soviet women.     

Should I stay or should I go? An econometric analysis of retirement decisions by couples

This article analyses retirement decisions from a household perspective, treating the retirement timing of spouses as potentially interdependent choices. To identify the determinants of retirement decisions by couples and the effects of spousal retirement, this research estimates bivariate probit models in a multi-country setting. The results show a significant joint retirement trend: both men and women are more likely to retire if their spouse already has retired. Strong asymmetric behaviours arise by gender though, with high crosscountry heterogeneity, reflecting institutional differences in both pension and public health systems.     

农地分配中的性别平等问题

本文借助于 1 996年对山西农村抽样调查数据的统计分析 ,论证我国农村土地分配中的性别平等虽然在法律上和经济制度上得到保障 ,但是这些制度在细节上的漏洞 ,使离婚妇女缺少地权保障 ,错过村社土地调整机会的婚嫁迁移妇女及其子女暂时无地。这种现象虽然还没有对妇女在家庭内部的谈判地位产生显著影响 ,却足以使她们的家庭陷入贫困。因此 ,有必要在现行土地管理法和政府有关农地承包的规定中添加性别视角。     

MALE AND FEMALE MARRIAGE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING

A collective marriage matching model is estimated and calibrated to quantify the share of returns to schooling that is realized through marriage. The predictions of the model are matched with detailed Danish household data on the relationship between schooling and wage rates, the division of time and goods within the household, and the extent to which men and women sort positively on several traits in marriage. Counterfactual analysis conducted with the model suggests that Danish men and women are earning on the order of half of their returns to schooling through improved marital outcomes.     

Peace in the Household: Gender,Agency, and Villagers' Measures of Marital Quality in Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

Although development studies have emphasized quality of life, the quality of marriage remains uninvestigated. This study challenges the bargaining model by arguing that theories of marital quality, derived from women's voices and subaltern knowledge, should be integral to feminist economic theories of marriage and intrahousehold gender relations. Findings from a longitudinal (1999–2009) ethnographic study of microcredit loanee families in rural Bangladesh reveal that Muslim women believe high marital quality or togetherness leads to peace in the household. This local model of marriage is central to the moral economy of social life. The study identifies eight local measures of marital quality that define what low-income women think a good Muslim husband should be like. The study concludes that the peace-in-the-household model emphasizes the transformation of masculinity as a program strategy that should be implemented in microcredit households in various parts of the world.     

Women's education and marriage decisions: Evidence from China

The faster increase in education among women compared with men has been underexplored. Thus, using Chinese data, we evaluate the impacts of a plausibly exogenous increase in educational attainment on women's marriage decisions. An extra year of education does not change women's decision to marry and leads to a brief delay of 0.12 years in their marriage age on average, which is much smaller than the delay among men. Although more educated women and men both have improved labour market outcomes, which may have increased their patience, men experience larger income growth than women do. Moreover, declining physical attractiveness at least partly explains why the delay is less than 1 year. Overall, the results are more reliable after addressing the endogeneity issue.     

Women's Empowerment and HIV Prevention in Rural Malawi

This study examines the impact of women's empowerment on attitudes toward HIV prevention using the Malawi Diffusion and Ideational Change Project (MDICP), a panel dataset of over 1,200 married women in rural Malawi from 1998 to 2008. Results indicate that an increase in women's bargaining power promotes adequate HIV prevention strategies, namely condom use within marriage and HIV-related spousal communication. Own income, language skills, and awareness of options outside marriage also play an important role. By estimating a constant for each individual in the sample, the analysis controls for the impact individual-specific, nonmeasurable characteristics have on attitudes toward prevention. It captures the impact of HIV campaigns and increases in HIV prevalence over time on prevention behavior by using (regional) time trends. The findings are highly comparable across different econometric specifications and suggest substantial gains from placing greater emphasis on women's empowerment to effectively combat the spread of HIV, particularly in developing countries.