Growth, debt and public infrastructure

This paper presents a closed economy model of endogenous growth driven by capital externalities arising from both private capital and public infrastructure. The model is calibrated to fit data for India, an approximately closed economy. Simulations suggest that fiscal policy certainly matters and the choice of the income taxation rate, the mix of government spending between infrastructure and public consumption goods, and the long-run government debt/GDP ratio can all significantly affect the long-run growth rate. Intertemporal aspects of fiscal policy are also important and the precommitment (time-inconsistent) and non-precommitment policies differ substantially.     

Long-run growth and welfare effects of public policies with distortionary taxation

In a one-sector growth model with infrastructure investment, we study the impact of fiscal policies on growth. The government collects taxes on labor income and profits. The government uses these revenues to purchase infrastructure investment, provide utility enhancing government services, and to provide transfer payments to the households. We show that the balanced growth rate is an increasing function of the percent of government revenues that goes to infrastructure. We find that the growth maximizing mix of taxes depends on the elasticity of substitution between inputs. In particular, with distortionary taxes, the growth maximizing tax rate on capital is higher the lower the elasticity of substitution between private physical capital and public capital. In addition, the growth maximizing size of the government is higher when the elasticity of substitution between public and private inputs is low. We also investigate welfare effects of other public expenditures as well. Depending on the elasticity of substitution in production, the welfare implications of different public policies can be substantial.     

Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods

Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public good, which is considered to be typically underprovided. However, an intervention that is successful in increasing the public good level need not benefit everyone. In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome. Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and non-linear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for relative price effects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small” , or “local” , lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.     

Optimal Growth with Public Capital and Public Services

We characterize optimal economic growth in an endogenous growth model in which production requires public capital (a stock) and public services (a flow) in addition to private capital and labor. We analyze the comparative static effects of changes in the fundamental technological and preference parameters of the model on the optimal values of several variables, such as the optimal rate of growth and the optimal allocation of resources among consumption, the provision of public services, and investment in public and private capital. We show that the general optimal path converges in finite time to the balanced growth optimal path. We relate our paper to important contributions to the existing literature by obtaining them as special cases of our model.     

Effects of an anticipated expansion in international public goods on public capital accumulation

This paper presents a generic model to include public capital accumulation and the services of international public goods provided by a neighbor country. It examines the long-run and short-run responses of private and public capital accumulation in the home country to an anticipated increase in international public goods. It is found that the home economy in effect cuts its public capital stock, but keeps an unchanged private capital stock in the long run when a neighbor commits itself to expanding the stock of public goods in the future. The key factor determining the short-run responses of the home country is the extent to which it will match its government spending with a neighbor country's policy, which is associated with the relative difference between the marginal utility of consumption and that of home public capital affected by an increase in international public goods.     

Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods

We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.     

Voice,exit and local capture in public provision of private goods

We developed a simple model on publicly provided private goods, such as health or education that highlights a vicious cycle faced by many developing countries. When public services are not of high quality due to mismanagement or corruption, the wealthy may switch to private alternatives. Their exit weakens the influence of citizen voice over politicians, since that leaves the poor as the only constituent with a stake in good governance. As the civic control over local governments weakens, government’s concern for social welfare declines even further, leading to more corruption and more corrosion in the quality of public services. Our model shows that establishing institutions (such as local taxation) that spread the costs and benefits of governance across the whole society is crucial for the success of local governments. Empirical results from the Philippines support this hypothesis.     

The government wage bill and private activity

We estimate the macroeconomic effects of public wage expenditures in U.S. data by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. We find that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and private sector employment. Similarly, state and local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant contractionary effects. In a stylized DSGE model we show that the degree of complementarity between public and private goods in the consumption bundle is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity.     

城市公共产品供给决策中的公众参与

实现城市公共产品的有效供给,为城市发展提供良好的基础条件,是提升城市综合发展能力的关键所在。由于缺乏系统完善的公众参与机制,在城市公共产品供给决策领域,存在着公众参与层次较低、公众参与失灵等问题。城市公共产品供给决策中公众参与的作用能否得到实现,离不开公众参与子机制作用的有效发挥。实现城市公共产品供给决策过程和实现过程与公众参与的系统整合,以此构建城市公共产品供给决策中公众参与机制的运作模型。     

Voluntary contributions and local public goods in a federation

This paper considers nonneutral effects of government spending in a federation of multiple jurisdictions. Both government spending and private donations finance local public goods, redistributive programs, that provide transfers for the poor. In the standard model, government spending has no effect on the public goods, as donors reduce their donations one for one in response to an increase in government spending. In a federation, donors of a jurisdiction donate, through federal charities, to help the poor in the jurisdiction and the poor in other jurisdictions as well. Jurisdictions are thus linked through donations. Such linkage influences donors' behavior beyond the traditional crowding-out effect. As a result, government spending has nonneutral effects on the level of public goods.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

Congestible public goods and local indeterminacy: A two-sector endogenous growth model

This paper shows that the congestible public goods can generate local indeterminacy in a two-sector, constant-return human capital enhanced growth model. While the productive public good exerts positive sector-specific externalities, the congestion effect generates negative aggregate externalities. The sector-specific externalities alone arising from productive public goods cannot establish local indeterminacy without the combination of negative externality in a model with social constant return technology. Congestible public good generates local indeterminacy if the degree of productive public good externality and the degree of congestion effect are large enough. The condition for indeterminacy is independent of the factor intensity rankings. The conditions are quantitatively assessed and the required parameter values for the degrees of public good externality and congestion are consistent with the estimated values in existing literature.     

Mergers between local public firms

We consider a country made up of two regions, where each region owns a local public firm and a domestic private one. A national authority decides whether or not to merge the two local public firms. The result depends on whether the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, substitutes or complements. We find that if the two local public firms produce the same good, the national authority is indifferent as to whether to merge or not. When local public firms produce different goods two cases arise. First, if the firms in each region produce homogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms when the goods are complements, independent in demand and weak substitutes. Second, if the firms in each region produce heterogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms only when the goods are close complements. Therefore, there is greater scope for mergers in the former case than in the later.     

The effects of public spending externalities

We conduct a positive analysis on the effects of ‘externalities’ produced by government spending. To this effect, we estimate, using U.S. data, an RBC model with two salient features. First, we allow government consumption to directly affect the marginal utility of consumption. Second, we allow public capital to shift the productivity of private factors. We provide an identification analysis that supports the strategy adopted for estimating the parameters governing these two channels. On one hand, private and government consumption are robustly estimated to be substitute goods. Because of substitutability, labor supply reacts little to a government consumption shock, so the estimated output multiplier is much lower than in models with separabilities. On the other hand, our results point towards public investment being ‘unproductive’.     

The provision of public goods in a growing urban economy

The growth path of a mixed open urban economy is considered. In the private sector profit maximizing firms produce an all-purpose output with labor, capital and public infrastructure. Workers move between the urban area and the rest of the nation so as to increase their real income which is the sum of wages and income derived from the use of the urban infrastructure. The public sector determines infrastructure investments so as to maximize the current value of future per capita felicity. Infrastructure has public good characteristics and is used jointly by firms and workers. The urban growth path is derived and public sector policies are analyzed.     

Public housing units vs. housing vouchers: Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Private contracts for durable local public good provision

This paper presents a model of imperfectly durable local public good provision in a dynamic development framework. The private provision of these goods under contracts between developers and residents of condominium and homeowners' associations is examined. An optimal trajectory of public goods is determined and compared to time consistent contractual trajectories. This comparison is used to explain why developers typically transfer control of maintenance of these goods to residents before the development process ends. The optimal date to transfer control is determined and compared to existing contracts and recommendations in the industry literature. The optimal transfer date is nondecreasing in community size and length of the development process.     

The heterogeneous impact of taxation on economic development: New insights from a panel cointegration approach

In this paper, we study the role of taxation on long-run income performance. In the theoretical part of the study, we develop a stylized model based on Barro (1990), in which income taxation has two contradictory roles in the standard Solow (1956) setup: on the one hand, taxation appropriates resources that would otherwise be used for physical capital accumulation, and on the other, it is the source of government spending, which is used to support private production. In the empirical part of the study, the impact of consumption tax, personal income tax, corporate profit tax and property tax on income is estimated using the common correlated effects (CCE) panel cointegration approach, which allows for cross-sectional dependencies and provides both panel- and country-specific results. The panel findings for 30 OECD countries for the period of 1995–2016 indicate that only consumption tax has a statistically significant negative effect on long-run income. However, because the type and sign of the tax coefficients are heterogeneous for the country-specific results, we conclude that taxation has heterogeneous effects on income.