Does transparency reduce political corruption?

Does a better monitoring of officials' actions (transparency) lower the incidence of corruption? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but raises the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent's favor. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.     

Does financial development reduce corruption?

We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls.     

Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist

This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.     

Anti‐corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality

The anti‐corruption successes of Singapore and Hong Kong have encouraged the establishment of strong, centralized anti‐corruption agencies across the globe. This study charts the emergence of anti‐corruption agencies (ACAs), and then examines recent experiences with these bodies in developing countries. We propose a set of criteria for assessing and explaining their performance. The analysis applies within strict limits to those countries that have established the minimum political, legal, and socio‐economic conditions for effective governance. Where these conditions are in place, success is possible. However, ACAs in poor and badly governed states are generally ineffective, if not actively harmful.     

Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Are financial development and corruption control substitutes in promoting growth?

While financial development and corruption control have been studied extensively, their interaction has not. We develop a simple model in which low corruption and financial development both facilitate the undertaking of productive projects, but act as substitutes in doing so. The substitutability arises because corruption raises the need for liquidity and thus makes financial improvements more potent; conversely, financial underdevelopment makes corruption more onerous and thus raises the gains from reducing it. We test this substitutability by predicting growth, of countries and industries, using measures of financial development, lack of corruption, and a key interaction term. Both approaches point to positive effects from improving either factor, as well as to a substitutability between them. The growth gain associated with moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile in one factor is 0.63–1.68 percentage points higher if the second factor is at the 25th percentile rather than the 75th. The results show robustness to different measures of corruption and financial development and do not appear to be driven by outliers, omitted variables, or other theories of growth and convergence.     

Is corruption a greater burden for registered MSEs? Evidence from Zambia

If corrupt bureaucrats target registered firms, then corruption may discourage registration. Using data from a survey of 4,801 micro and small enterprises (MSEs) in Zambia, this paper looks at whether corruption is a more or less serious problem for registered MSEs. Consistent with earlier studies, the results suggest registered MSEs are more concerned about corruption than unregistered firms are. The paper also proposes two reasons why corruption might affect registered MSEs differently than it affects unregistered firms. We first suggest that registered firms might meet with government officials more often than unregistered firms, giving corrupt officials more opportunities to demand bribes from them, but we also suggest that registered firms might be less vulnerable when officials demand bribes because they are more able to complain about bribe demands. This could offset registered firms' disadvantage because of more frequent meetings. The evidence supports the first, but not the second, hypothesis. Registered firms were more likely to meet with government officials but were not consistently less likely to pay bribes when they did meet with them.     

The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.     

Is corruption grease,grit or a gamble? Corruption increases variance of productivity across countries

The effect of corruption on economic growth has attracted interest in empirical development economics. The conventional view of corruption as impediment for growth has been challenged by the ‘grease-on-the-wheels’ hypothesis. We take a new perspective on the issue and suggest corruption as macro risk, referred to as a ‘gamble’ hypothesis. Using cross-country data and two alternative indicators of corruption, we find corruption to be a significant driver of heteroscedasticity in total productivity. This supports the new gamble hypothesis. We also note some misleading interpretations in the previously published frontier applications. To avoid these shortcomings, we apply a flexible semi-nonparametric estimator.     

Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem. We would like to thank Charles Noussair and the participants of the Experimental Economics Workshop (2006) at the University of Melbourne for their comments. Daniel Piccinin and Revy Sjahrial have provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the World Bank for their financial assistance.     

Is corruption in China “out of control”? A comparison with the US in historical perspective

This paper compares corruption in China over the past 15 years with corruption in the US between 1870 and 1930, periods that are roughly comparable in terms of real income per capita. Corruption indicators for both countries and both periods are constructed by tracking corruption news in prominent US newspapers. Several robustness checks confirm the reliability of the constructed corruption indices for both countries. The comparison indicates that corruption in the US in the early 1870s, when its real income per capita was about $2800 (in 2005 dollars), was 7–9 times higher than China’s corruption level in 1996, the corresponding year in terms of income per capita. By the time the US reached $7500 in 1928, approximately equivalent to China’s real income per capita in 2009, corruption was similar in both countries. The findings imply that, while corruption in China is an issue that merits attention, it is not at alarmingly high levels, compared to the US historical experience. In addition, the paper articulates a theoretical framework within which the relationship between corruption and economic development can be understood. The model is used to explain the “life-cycle” of corruption in the development process–rising at the early stages of development, and declining after modernization has taken place. Hence, as China continues its development process, corruption will likely decline.     

Does the evidence on corruption depend on how it is measured? Results from a cross-country study on microdata sets

While much of the existing literature on corruption looks at the effect of corruption on macro variables such as growth rates and income distribution, this study provides a departure by focussing on victims of corruption by using microdata to compare civilian and business corruption. This study finds that businesses face a stronger incidence of bribe demands than individuals. Though there are several differences between the determinants of the two forms of bribe victimization, there are also some similarities. Policies to combat corruption need to take into account both the differences and the similarities.