个人住房"假按揭"贷款若干法律问题探讨

本文首先根据“假按揭”中有关合同签字的真伪以及银行是否知情对“假按揭”进行了分类 ,分析了各类型“假按揭”借款合同的法律效力和当事各方的民事和刑事责任。作者认为 :对于有借款人真实签名的“假按揭”借款合同而言 ,根据银行对“假按揭”情形是否明知 ,借款合同应分别属于有效合同和效力未定的合同。在法律责任方面 ,开发商和借款人应对银行贷款承担连带清偿责任。但由于目前我国的《刑法》对贷款诈骗打击不力 ,只能在特定的情形之下才能追究开发商和借款人的刑事责任。最后 ,作者就商业银行可以采取的预防和救济措施以及《刑法》关于“贷款诈骗罪”的完善等提出了相应的建议。     

识"假"与认"真"

今年来,工商银行湖南省桃源县支行把一些假币经过整理,配上如何识别等文字说明后,以宣传专栏的形式在各个储蓄所展出,让群众通过识别对比,了解掌握一些常用的假币识别方法.这一做法,受到群众的欢迎.     

问诊“假按揭”

近年来，个人住房贷款业务有了长足的发展，对支持居民购房和促进房地产市场发展起到了积极的推动作用。但是，随着开办时间的推移和业务量的增加，个人住房贷款风险逐步显现，尤其是“假按揭”成为个人住房贷款不良率上升的主要原因和社会关注的焦点。目前，“假按揭”尚无明确的定义和认定依据，相关法律法规不够健全，导致“假按揭”的识别、定性、风险控制和惩处面临诸多困难和问题。本文通过大量案例分析，归纳了“假按揭”的表现形式、形成原因和风险隐患，开出了防治“假按揭”的“药方”。     

假按揭的九种情形

随着房地产业的繁华,按揭的情况也多种多样,有些发展商为了快速获得资金或有些人为了某种目的,假按揭情况也屡见不鲜。我们通过探讨各种假按揭的情形,分析假按揭的背景、目的、特征和危害性,     

开发商假按揭风险的防范

所谓“假按揭”个人住房货款是指不以真实的购买住房为目的，开发商以本单位职工及其他关系人冒充客户作为购房人，或是开发商虚拟若干购房人，以这些购房人的名义与其签订虚假的购房合同．再以这些购房人申请按揭贷款，从而套取银行资金。这样．开发商能够尽快“销售完”房屋收回投资，乃至实现获利。     

对假按揭的法律思考

案情：2002年6月22日，原审原、被告签订《购房抵押贷款合同》，约定被告以座落在本市洪山区东湖工业园东湖路108号第A幢9号房为抵押物向原告申请购房抵押贷款21万元，贷款期限10年，贷款月利率4．65‰。原告办妥抵押登记后，于2002年7月5日向被告发放了贷款21万元。但被告未依时供款，仅归还了部分借款本息，截止2003年8月11日，尚有贷款204719．75元未还。2003年8月原告起诉被告，要求归还借款本金及利息。     

“假按揭”及其法律责任

近年来,在我国房地产市场迅猛发展的大背景下,各种类型的"假按揭"贷款乱象丛生,使之成为监管当局高度关注的"四假"骗贷形式之一.假按揭贷款这一房地产信贷市场的顽症,既助长了房地产市场的非良性发展,又加大了银行业经营风险,甚至干扰了有关房地产市场调控政策的贯彻落实.     

如何识别假个人住房按揭贷款

近年来,为骗取银行信贷资金的虚假个人住房按揭贷款日渐猖獗,在个别地方其程度令人触目惊心.     

如何识别个人购房假按揭

为进一步规范个人购房贷款业务管理,提高各行对假按揭的有效识别与风险防范能力,总行对近年来下发的防范个人购房假按揭相关规章制度进行了梳理,并印发了中国农业银行防范个人购房假按揭有关规定。现将主要内容刊发于此,供读者学习参考。     

个人住房贷款假按揭风险分析及对策

个人住房按揭贷款是目前商业银行最为重要的信贷业务品种之一。随着该项业务的急速扩张和发展，风险也在日益凸显。在按揭业务各环节中，涉及发展商(房地产开发企业)、银行、业主、抵押登记机关等多个主体，相互之间构成了多重法律关系。复杂的法律关系使按揭业务的风险来源于诸多因     

Fixed-Rate Endowment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a contingent claims framework for valuing the the default and prepayment embedded options in certain British fixed-rate endowment mortgages, with a (capped) mortgage indemnity guarantee (MIG). This methodology provides a template for the borrower, lender, and insurer to compare mortgage terms, including the fairness of contract rates, arrangement fees, prepayment penalties, any MIG premiums required, and co-insurance exposure. With empirical inputs, this model may eventually be useful as a mark-to-value proxy for all parties, as expected parameters change (especially interest rate and house price levels, and expected future volatilities), for purposes of determining valued added accounting, appropriate reserves, and indeed for setting premiums and business drivers. Fixed-rate endowment mortgages differ from fixed-rate repayment mortgages primarily because, in the event of early termination, the amount owed by the borrower is a function of the evolution of the term structure of interest rates, whereas for a repayment mortgage it is pre-determined. We compare endownment and repayment mortgages for different levels of loan-to-value ratios, interest rate and house price volatilities.     

Mortgage defaults

A life-cycle model is developed in which households face income and house-price risk and buy houses with mortgages. This model, which accounts for key features in U.S. data, is used as a laboratory for prudential policy. Recourse mortgages increase the cost of default but also lower equity and increase payments. The effect on default is nonmonotonic. Loan-to-value (LTV) limits increase equity and lower the default rate, with negligible effects on housing demand. Combining recourse mortgages and LTV limits reduces the default rate while boosting housing demand. Together, they also prevent spikes in default after large declines in aggregate house prices.     

Mortgage convexity

Most home mortgages in the United States are fixed-rate loans with an embedded prepayment option. When long-term rates decline, the effective duration of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) falls due to heightened refinancing expectations. I show that these changes in MBS duration function as large-scale shocks to the quantity of interest rate risk that must be borne by professional bond investors. I develop a simple model in which the risk tolerance of bond investors is limited in the short run, so these fluctuations in MBS duration generate significant variation in bond risk premia. Specifically, bond risk premia are high when aggregate MBS duration is high. The model offers an explanation for why long-term rates could appear to be excessively sensitive to movements in short rates and explains how changes in MBS duration act as a positive-feedback mechanism that amplifies interest rate volatility. I find strong support for these predictions in the time series of US government bond returns.     

Mortgage timing

We study how the term structure of interest rates relates to mortgage choice at both household and aggregate levels. A simple utility framework of mortgage choice points to the long-term bond risk premium as distinct from the yield spread and the long yield as a theoretical determinant of mortgage choice: when the bond risk premium is high, fixed-rate mortgage payments are high, making adjustable-rate mortgages more attractive. We confirm empirically that the bulk of the time variation in both aggregate and loan-level mortgage choice can be explained by time variation in the bond risk premium, whether bond risk premia are measured using forecasters’ data, a vector autoregressive (VAR) term structure model, or a simple household decision rule based on adaptive expectations. The household decision rule moves in lock-step with mortgage choice, lending credibility to a theory of strategic mortgage timing by households.     

银行房产抵押贷款债权保障问题的对策——从法经济学角度对《合同法》第286条及其“司法解释”的进一步思考

针对我国房地产市场上严重存在的拖欠工程款问题,为了更好的保护建筑工人劳动报酬不受非法侵害,我国在制定<合同法>时,对此作了专门的规定来解决这个问题,这就是<中华人民共和国合同法>第286条(以下简称"第286条"):"发包人未按照约定支付价款的,承包人可以催告发包人在合理的期限内支付价款.发包人逾期不支付的,除按照建设工程的性质不宜折价、拍卖的以外,承包人可以与发包人协议将该工程折价,也可以申请人民法院将该工程依法拍卖.     

Credit Counseling and Mortgage Termination by Low-Income Households

Published research on credit counseling and mortgage termination is surprisingly scarce, despite substantial growth in this industry. While the purpose of counseling is to assist low-income borrowers to improve their handling of debt and thereby reduce default, counseling may also improve the borrowers understanding of their financial position and thus induce optimal mortgage termination. Using a competing-risks framework, we study the effects on default and prepayment of a counseling program implemented in several Midwest states. We find weak evidence of that the default hazard was lower for graduates of the counseling program, but that their default behavior was more optimal. The prepayment hazard was higher for counseled borrowers, but their prepayment behavior was not more optimal. Overall, counseling seems to affect the lenders profits, but the net effect should be evaluated both in terms of prepayment and default.     

固定利率住房抵押贷款违约行为及其定价研究

固定利率住房抵押贷款的信用风险主要是违约风险,基于理性期权的定价模型往往会低估借款人的违约概率.通过分析违约成本及非理性违约因素,可以确定借款人违约时贷款机构收回的现金流,得到固定利率住房抵押贷款定价的期望值模型,并得出模型的求解方法.     

典当:枯木逢春

一度绝迹 典当,是一个古老的行业,堪称金融业的鼻祖,迄今已有1700余年的历史了. 新中国建立后,典当行一度绝迹.1987年12月,四川成都开办了新中国第一家典当行--华茂典当服务商社,率先恢复了古老的典当行.自此,开办典当行之风大兴,大有席卷全国之势,最盛时的1993年全国各地开设了3000多家典当行,几经沉浮,如今尚存1000余家.这其中的大起大落,也与对典当行定位的认识不清、把握不准有关.     

Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis

Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.     

动产抵押的新拓展:枣庄活体畜禽抵押贷款案例

加大对畜牧业的信贷投入、缓解融资困境已成为调整农村产业结构、促进农村经济发展的重要内容.枣庄市峄城区农联社创办了"活体畜禽抵押"贷款新模式,为破解畜禽养殖企业融资困境提供了一条新途径.