Retirement income adequacy: good news or bad?

Estimating replacement rate targets, and using them to assess the current state of retirement savings adequacy, has been the focus of much attention and analysis. Building on his earlier work published in Benefits Quarterly, the author conceptually defines retirement income adequacy, estimates replacement rate targets and reviews research on the current state of baby boomers' retirement savings. He concludes that, despite existing data limitations, researchers have made considerable strides in recent years in thinking about saving for retirement and the adequacy of workers' preparation for it. These advances suggest that singular rules of thumb for replacement rates are naive and that estimates should take into account the unforeseen risks that individuals face.     

Do acquirers disclose good news or withhold bad news when they finance their acquisitions using equity?

Companies that use their own stock to finance acquisitions have incentives to increase their market values prior to the acquisition. This study examines whether such companies mislead investors by issuing overly optimistic forecasts of future earnings (“deception by commission”) or by withholding bad news about future earnings (“deception by omission”). We compare the management forecasts of acquiring firms in a pre-acquisition period (days −90 to −30 before the acquisition announcement) and a post-acquisition period (days +30 to +90 after the acquisition is completed). We show that, when acquisitions are financed using stock, companies are not more likely to issue overly optimistic earnings forecasts during the pre-acquisition period compared with the post-acquisition period. However, these same acquirers are more likely to withhold impending bad news about future earnings. Consistent with litigation having an asymmetric effect on disclosure incentives, our findings suggest that deception by omission occurs more often than deception by commission.     

Callable or convertible debt? The role of debt overhang and covenants

We analyze what role debt overhang and covenants have in a manager’s choice between issuing callable or convertible debt when a firm needs to issue a substantial amount of debt. Callable bonds provide a higher coupon in exchange for a repurchase option. Convertible bonds offer bondholders the option to exchange debt to equity. Using a dynamic capital structure model with investment choice, we find that callable debt implies a larger debt overhang friction, and for highly leveraged firms convertible debt is preferred. Moreover, if outstanding bonds have net-worth covenants attached, callable bonds are more likely to be issued. Our empirical findings support the theory.     

Long-term negative fund alpha: Is it caused by bad skill or bad luck?

This paper examines the sources of long-term negative fund alpha. We compare the actual loser funds with a control group of bootstrapped loser funds. We find that the returns of the two fund groups are co-integrated, and that they are similar in market risk exposure, alpha consistency, portfolio holdings, and GARCH volatility. The test results show that long-term negative fund alpha occurs due to bad luck rather than to bad skill.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.     

When does attention matter? The effect of investor attention on stock market volatility around news releases

We empirically investigate how retail and institutional investor attention is related to the way stock markets process information. With a focus on 360 US stocks in the S&P 500 universe, our results show that higher retail investors’ attention around news releases increases the post-announcement stock return volatility, whereas institutional investor attention has a small but negative impact on volatility on days following news releases on average over the cross-section of companies. These findings are in line with the hypotheses that attention of retail investors slows price-adjustments to new information and attention of institutional investors results in the opposite reaction. We show that these effects are heterogeneous in the type of news and the topic of the information being released. A portfolio allocation application highlights that these results are not only statistically significant but also sizeable in economic terms and can lead to an overperformance as large as dozens of basis points.     

The maturity effect of stock index futures: Speculation or carry arbitrage?

Using the implementation of trading restrictions on CSI 300 index futures market as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper examines the maturity effect of stock index futures and its determinants. The results show that the maturity effect changes from weakly positive to significantly negative after trading restrictions are implemented. We find that the change in the maturity effect is rooted in the speculative effect, which is measured by the time pattern of price sensitivity to information, while there is a lack of support for the carry arbitrage effect on the maturity effect of index futures. Our findings provide an opportunity to better understand volatility dynamics in the equity futures market.     

Too much of a good thing? A theory of short-term debt as a sorting device

This paper shows that the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt financing can be used to sort insolvent firms out of financial markets when their solvency risk is private information. Notwithstanding this sorting role of short-term debt, unregulated financial firms tend to choose an inefficiently short debt maturity structure. This inefficiency arises for two reasons. First, by issuing more short-term debt, low-risk firms reduce their expected funding costs. This leads to a misalignment of private and social incentives as firms fail to fully internalize the social costs of becoming illiquid. Second, while the sorting role of short-term debt is reflected in a decline of long-term interest rates when more short-term debt is issued, creditors’ inability to observe firms’ solvency risk leads to an excessive reduction of long-term interest rates. This further distorts firms’ funding choice towards short-term debt.     

The effect of major customer concentration on firm profitability: competitive or collaborative?

We test two potential hypotheses regarding the effects of major customer concentration on firm profitability. Under the collaboration hypothesis, customer power facilitates collaboration, and both the supplier firm and its major customers obtain benefits. Under the competition hypothesis, customer power results in rent extraction, and the major customers benefit at the expense of the supplier firm. We document that major customer concentration is negatively associated with the supplier firm’s profitability but positively associated with the major customers’ profitability. We demonstrate that these effects weaken as the supplier firm’s own power grows over its relationship with major customers, supporting the competition hypothesis. We carefully reconcile our results with prior studies’ findings that focus only on the supplier firm’s profitability and identify their research design and interpretation problems. We obtain similar inferences in a setting of major customers’ horizontal mergers and when we use an alternative measure of major customer power.

     

The real effect of banking crises: Finance or asset allocation effects? Some international evidence

This paper analyzes whether the decline in economic growth that follows a banking crisis occurs because of a reduction in the amount of credit available (finance effect) or a worsening in the allocation of investable resources (asset allocation effect). We use a sample of more than 2500 industrial firms in 18 developed and developing countries that experienced 19 systemic banking crises between 1989 and 2007. The results indicate that banking crises negatively affect firms’ intangible investments, which intensifies the economic downturn. The negative growth effect produced by the worsening of the investment allocation is stronger in countries with highly developed financial systems and institutions.     

Mutual supervision or conspiracy? The incentive effect of multiple large shareholders on audit quality requirements

Multiple large shareholders may choose to mutual supervise or conspire, thereby affecting the firm's strategy and transactional operations. This paper examines the impact of firms with multiple large shareholders on demand for high-quality audits. Compared with firms with a single large shareholder, firms with multiple large shareholders increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring a Big Four accounting firm. After a series of robustness checks, this result holds. Furthermore, we find that the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder tends to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The absolute controlling and non-controlling shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. The state-owned firms and large firms with multiple large shareholders tend to increase audit cost and increase the probability of hiring the Big Four. This paper helps to enrich the research on external audit supervision and moral hazard research from the perspective of ownership structure.     

Investor induced contagion during the banking and European sovereign debt crisis of 2007–2012: Wealth effect or portfolio rebalancing?

This study investigates the way a crisis spreads within a country and across borders by testing the investor induced contagion hypothesis through the liquidity channel on stock-bond relationships of the US and five European countries before and during the global banking and European sovereign debt crisis of 2007–2012. We provide evidence consistent with the wealth effect as a source of contagion for the majority of countries. Nevertheless, we uncover evidence of investor induced contagion sourced by the portfolio rebalancing effect for correlations involving Spanish and Italian bonds during the debt crisis. Further, we find that tight (narrow) credit spreads reduce (magnify) the wealth and portfolio rebalancing effects, which are offset by the opposite effects of risk aversion amongst investors, a dynamic that is not restricted to crisis periods.     

Does adopting good corporate governance impact the cost of intermediated and non‐intermediated debt?

This study examines the impact of good corporate governance practices on the reported cost of debt for Australian listed companies. Prior research has established that governance lowers the cost of non‐intermediated debt ( Sengupta, 1998 ; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003 ; Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al., 2006 ). We extend this analysis to the Australian corporate debt market which is dominated by intermediated or privately held debt. Our findings are consistent with the prior work and shows that increased corporate governance lowers cost of debt. However, when we split the sample companies into intermediated and non‐intermediated debt sub‐samples, we find this result only holds for the non‐intermediated debt sub‐sample. Furthermore, we find that small companies that adopt better corporate governance practices do not benefit through lower cost of debt. This raises questions about the merits of universal adoption of costly governance practices.     

Too much of a good incentive? The case of executive stock options

Using a utility-maximization framework, I show that the incentive to increase stock price does not always increase as more options are granted. Keeping the total cost of his compensation fixed, granting more options creates greater incentives to increase stock price only if option wealth does not exceed a certain fraction of total wealth. Beyond this critical level, granting more options actually reduces incentive effects and becomes counterproductive. In addition, stock options also create incentive to reduce (increase) idiosyncratic (systematic) risk. These incentive effects are sensitive to the choice of exercise price.     

Are the benefits of debt declining? The decreasing propensity of firms to be adequately levered

We observe a persistent increase in the percentage of firms with little or no debt in their capital structure over the last three decades. The fraction of firms with less than five percent debt in their capital structure increases from 14.01 percent in 1977 to 34.42 percent in 2010 while the percentage of all-equity firms increases 200 percent over the same period. We find that even after controlling for firm- and industry-specific variables that are relevant to capital structure policy, there is a deficiency in firms' propensity to be levered. Additionally, the deficiency is increasing over time and by 2010 the percent of firms that are nearly all-equity is twice the predicted level. Our findings are robust to different methodologies, specifications, and time periods. Overall, these results suggest that the well-documented benefits of leverage are less valuable over the sample period and that the determinants of firms' capital structure decisions have evolved since the 1970s.     

Is small beautiful? The resilience of small banks during the European debt crisis

We examine the lending behaviour of small and large banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Relative to large banks, small banks are less pro-cyclical in that they exhibit more stable lending growth across credit expansion and contraction periods. In peripheral countries, the portfolio rebalancing of small banks towards higher public debt (substitution effect) does not appear to cause a reduction of their lending to the private sector. Instead, the level of public debt seems to provide a liquidity buffer that influences bank-specific loan growth positively (complementarity effect), particularly during market-wide lending contractions. Our findings show that for small peripheral banks the substitution effect found in the literature can coexist with a complementarity effect when public debt grows faster than private loans. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulatory treatment of public debt in banks and supports incentives embedded in new banking regulation that penalise bank size.     

What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis,the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline

What went wrong? Why did seemingly rational, forward-looking bond investors continue to purchase Puerto Rican debt with only a modest risk premium? Why did financial markets fail to exercise market discipline and restrict capital flows to Puerto Rico?This paper examines the hypothesis that investors believed Puerto Rican debt was implicitly insured by the U.S. government by studying a rare situation where this “Treasury Put” was extinguished. The expectation of a federal bailout was perfectly reasonable given past behavior by the federal government. Evaluating the Treasury Put hypothesis with a minimal set of assumptions is possible given three unique features of the economic environment. The key feature is an exogenous “seismic shock” – the non-bailout of the city of Detroit in 2013 that effectively extinguished the Treasury Put, estimated in this paper as 350 basis points. Institutional reforms that would eliminate the Treasury Put are considered, but none are found satisfactory. How to extinguish the Treasury Put on an ongoing basis in a democratic society remains an open question.     

Is it all about awareness? The normalization of coastal risk

Coastal risk is already high in several parts of the world and is expected to be amplified by climate change, which makes it necessary to outline effective risk management strategies. Risk managers assume that increasing awareness of coastal risk is the key to public support and endorsement of risk management strategies – an assumption that underlies a common worldview on the public understanding of science, which has been named the deficit model. We argue that the effects of awareness are not as straightforward. In particular, awareness of coastal hazards might not lead to more technically accurate risk perceptions. Based on research on risk perception normalization, we explored the hypothesis that coastal risk awareness reduces coastal risk perception – in particular the perceived likelihood of occurrence of coastal hazards – through its effect on reliance on protective measures to prevent risk. Individuals can rely on protective measures, even when those are not effective, as a positive illusion to reduce risk perception. This effect might be stronger for higher probability hazards and for permanent residents of costal zones. Data from 410 individuals living in coastal zones corroborated most of our expectations. Global results demonstrated a risk normalization effect mediated by reliance on current measures. Additional analyses made clear that this effect occurred in 2 of the 5 high-probability hazards (flood and storm), and not in the low-probability hazard (tsunami). Normalization might be more likely among high-probability hazards which entail catastrophic and immediate impacts. This effect was also found among permanent residents, but not among temporary residents. Results imply that coastal risk management might benefit from (a) taking risk perception normalization effects into account, (b) tailoring strategies for permanent and temporary residents and (c) promoting a higher public engagement, which would facilitate a more adaptive and effective coping with coastal risk than the use of positive illusions.