Discretionary accruals: signalling or earnings management in Australia?

We investigate the signalling effect of discretionary accruals (DAC). Although we find that discretionary accruals are insignificantly related to contemporaneous stock returns, we uncover that income‐increasing discretionary accruals of GAAP‐complying growth firms are significantly and positively related to contemporaneous stock returns. Furthermore, we find that this positive effect is stronger among firms with better corporate governance mechanisms, such as Board of Directors Independence, Audit Committee Independence and Large Shareholders’ Ownership. In addition to contemporaneous stock returns, we also find similar results with the future increase in dividends. Our findings are consistent with the argument that corporate governance can enhance the signalling effect of reported earnings of GAAP‐complying growth firms.     

How do stock-for-stock acquirers manage earnings? The accruals feature of real earnings management

This paper investigates whether stock-for-stock acquirers undertake real activities to manage earnings before merger announcements. Our results show that stock-for-stock acquirers present unusually high levels of credit sales and overproduction in the quarter immediately before the merger announcement. We also find that the accruals feature of real earnings management can explain the stock-for-stock acquirers’ high discretionary current accruals. In addition, stock-for-stock acquirer firms that accelerate their credit sales experience subsequent market underperformance. Overall, we provide a novel insight into the accruals feature of real earnings management.     

Does religiosity enhance the quality of management earnings forecasts?

This study investigates whether firms located in areas with higher levels of religiosity disclose higher-quality management earnings forecasts than do other firms. Using a US sample of 4,655 firm-year observations over the period 2001 to 2014, we find that firms headquartered in counties with higher proportions of religious adherents issue earnings forecasts that are less optimistically biased and that the effect of religiosity is concentrated in firms with weak monitoring mechanisms. We also find that religiosity mitigates pessimistic bias in management earnings forecasts, but only for those issued by firms operating in low litigation industries. This result suggests that when the litigation risk is high, both ethicality and risk aversion are at work and their competing effects likely offset each other. Additionally, we document that forecasts issued by firms in more religious areas trigger stronger stock price reactions than those issued by other firms and that the effect is limited to forecasts containing optimistic bias. Overall, our results show that religiosity enhances the quality of management earnings forecasts, but the effect varies based on different conditions.     

Does confucianism influence corporate earnings management?

This paper investigates the effect of Confucianism on corporate earnings management. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2017, we find that corporate earnings management is negatively associated with the popularity of Confucianism. Our findings also reveal that the effect of Confucianism is particularly strong among firms characterized with weaker internal control and external supervision or located in areas with lower level of marketization. Our findings shed important light on how culture improves the quality of financial reporting in emerging markets.     

Do auditors react to real earnings management?

Prior research has documented an association between audit effort and real earnings management [REM]. Specifically, audit report lags have been shown to be positively associated with REM. We investigate the auditor and firm characteristics underlying this association. Our results indicate that overall, REM is associated with longer abnormal audit report lags [ARLs]. We find, however, that this association is driven largely by non-accelerated filers. This result holds for both suspect firms (those firms just meeting earnings benchmarks) and non-suspect firms, for specialist as well as non-specialist auditors, and for profit as well as loss firms. Together our results indicate that when auditors are not constrained by the time pressure of accelerated filing, encountering REM is associated with greater audit effort. Our results may indicate, however, that with respect to accelerated filers, abnormal ARLs may be an imperfect proxy for additional effort. These results have implications for both future research and for the impact of accelerated filing deadlines on audit quality.     

Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

Do management EPS forecasts allow returns to reflect future earnings? Implications for the continuation of management’s quarterly earnings guidance

Using 18,253 firm-year observations from 1998 through 2003, we build on literature suggesting that more informative disclosures allow returns to better reflect future earnings and test whether management earnings per share forecasts and their characteristics influence the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). We find that FERCs are greater for forecasting firms and when forecasts are more frequent or precise. We suggest that more frequent and more precise forecasts assist investors in better predicting future earnings. Importantly, we find that quarterly and short-term forecasts incrementally increase the association between returns and future earnings beyond annual and long-term forecasts; thus, even short-term, quarterly forecasts allow investors to form better expectations about future earnings. This suggests a benefit of quarterly earnings forecasts possibly overlooked in recommendations from the United States Chamber of Commerce, CFA Institute, Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, and The Conference Board to eliminate quarterly earnings guidance.     

Are banks using hidden reserves to beat earnings benchmarks? Evidence from Germany

Section 340f of the German Commercial Code allows banks to provision against the special risks inherent to the banking business by building hidden reserves. Beyond risk provisioning, these reserves are implicitly accepted as an earnings management device. By analyzing financial statements of German banks for the period 1997–2009, we see these hidden reserves being used to (1) avoid a negative net income, (2) avoid a drop in net income compared to the previous year, (3) avoid a shortfall in net income compared to a peer group, and (4) reduce the variability of banks’ net income over time. Our analysis also shows that if bank managers are unable to reach the targets as set out in (1)–(3), they are more inclined to keep the hidden reserves for use in future periods.     

Are all management earnings forecasts created equal? Expectations management versus communication

Recent studies associate management earnings forecasts (MEFs) with expectations management. These studies, however, neither provide evidence on the extent and scope of expectations management through MEFs nor consider alternative incentives for issuing MEFs. Consequently, existing evidence does not help regulators assess whether MEFs effectively facilitate communication with investors. We investigate to what extent managers exploit their earnings forecasts as a tool of expectations management or as a communication device. By examining relations among MEFs, analysts?? forecasts, and actual earnings, we classify MEFs into three incentive categories: (1) expectations management, (2) communication, and (3) other incentives. We find that a significant proportion (approximately 45%) of MEFs is issued to convey accurate earnings information to the market (that is, communication incentive). We also find that the fraction of MEFs for the expectations-management incentive increases post-Regulation Fair Disclosure. The evidence from examination of the various managerial motives for each incentive category supports our classification. Additional analysis using alternative classifications based on bad/good news and pessimistic/optimistic forecasts reveals that our proposed classification of MEFs works better in defining expectations management than these other classifications. This implies that more caution is warranted in defining expectations management when investigating the association between managerial motives and incentives for issuing MEFs.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Changes in accounting estimates: An update of priors or an earnings management strategy of “last resort”?

Evidence from prior research is mixed about whether accounting estimate changes are strategically motivated, on average, or whether they reflect new or updated information. To interpret this difference, we investigate, by category of material changes in accounting estimates, the association between estimate changes and subsequent restatements. We also explore the determinants of both income-increasing and income-decreasing estimate changes for different categories of estimate changes. We find that the motivations for and the determinants of estimate changes depend on the type of change and on whether the changes in estimates are income-increasing or income-decreasing. Overall, we conclude that when companies are motivated to bias earnings and they cannot do so by manipulating other within generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) accruals, they sometimes resort to using estimate changes. Our more detailed investigation of estimate changes at the account level suggests a more nuanced view of the determinants of changes in accounting estimates. We develop a more complete model of the determinants of changes in accounting estimates than those used in this emerging literature, which should be of interest to accounting academics, regulators, audit practitioners and audit committee members.     

Earnings management in domestic versus multinational firms: discussion of “Where do firms manage earnings?”

Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew examine the geographical location of earnings management within US multinational firms. The paper addresses an interesting topic and partially fills a gap in the literature. This discussion presents additional empirical evidence on issues related to the research question raised by Dyreng et al. In particular, the discussion provides answers to the following preliminary questions: do US multinational firms manage earnings differently from domestic firms? If so, to what extent are they different? Surprisingly, these issues have been overlooked by prior studies. Indeed, the results below show that US multinational firms manage earnings less than domestic companies. The discussion also raises a number of additional questions on earnings management in multinational firms and calls for further research on the topic.     

Are insiders equal? Evidence from earnings management in closely held East Asian firms

In analyzing newly collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East Asian economies, we contribute to international accounting research by providing evidence on earnings management in insider-controlled firms in this region. We find that family-controlled firms engage in less (more) accrual-based (real) earnings management than other insider-controlled firms. Our analysis suggests that controlling families, unlike other types of ultimate owners, tend to substitute real earnings management for accrual-based earnings management. To help empirically clarify the role that two incentives (entrenchment versus signaling) play in driving the substitution between real and accruals-based earnings management, we examine their valuation impact and find that both types negatively affect the future valuation of family firms. In another set of results consistent with expectations, we document that country-level investor protection and firm external financing demand shape the practice of earnings management in family-controlled firms.     

Does job mismatch affect wage earnings among business and management graduates in Vietnam?

This paper investigates the wage penalty resulting from horizontal job mismatch among wage earners with university degrees in the fields of business and management. The study utilizes pooled cross-sectional data from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS) in 2018, 2019 and 2020 in Vietnam. We employ instrumental variable (IV) estimators to address the potential endogeneity of job mismatch. Estimates from the ordinary least square (OLS) and IV methods show that job mismatch has a negative effect on wage earnings and that the penalty for such mismatches is nearly double for men than for women. Also, for mismatched graduates in the private sector, the wage penalty is nearly triple what it is for those in the public sector. Notably, we find that the wage penalty is substantial for those under 50, but less so for those over 50. This suggests that education-specific skills can be substituted by work experience to some extent.     

Connecting earnings management to the real World:What happens in the black box of the boardroom?

This British Accounting & Finance Association (BAFA) distinguished academic 2020 plenary address marries the researcher's two main research areas – financial reporting and corporate governance. Like Vivien Beattie (BAFA 2011 distinguished academic), the researcher commenced in the positivist tradition but was increasingly drawn to more qualitative, interdisciplinary perspectives, influencing the paper's positioning.“Accounting choice”, “income smoothing”, “earnings management”, and “earnings manipulation” are terms frequently used in the academic literature. This paper reviews these terms, highlighting the resonances and dissonances between them, and attempts to reconcile varied perspectives in the prior literature. The paper critiques taken-for-granted assumptions underlying this stream of research. The paper then examines prior earnings management research using alternative methodologies to deepen understanding of the four terms in praxis (best practice in practice). The paper reviews prior research on boards of directors using alternative methodologies to those adopted in mainstream corporate governance research, to provide a menu of opportunities to research earnings management inside the “black box” of the boardroom, including proposed research questions for future research. The paper concludes by considering the implications for policymakers and standard setters.     

How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management

The article reviews the recent academic research literature on earnings management (EM) with a view to identifying research themes and results of interest to users and preparers of financial statements, accounting standard setters, and others with responsibility for ensuring that companies provide financial information to shareholders that can be relied upon. Hopefully students of accounting with an interest in exploring the EM literature will find that the article provides a useful framework. The literature on this topic is vast, and it is not possible to cover every article in detail. I provide an impressionistic survey that highlights examples of specific research themes and methods that regularly appear in the literature. Most of the examples are chosen from the literature published since 2000, although I do also highlight a few methodological contributions that appeared earlier. It is inevitable that the selection of articles reflects to some extent my personal interests and biases (intentional or otherwise). Thus, I wish to acknowledge that I owe a very substantial intellectual debt to the insights and contributions of the many uncited authors of a literature that spans over 40 years in over 20 accounting and finance journals.     

Strategic timing of earnings announcements?

Using firm‐specific regressions, I show that earnings response coefficient differ across firms. However, there is no evidence of differential earnings response coefficient to a certain earnings announcement time. By switching to a different announcement time from its preferred time, a firm does not gain a softer market reaction. I compare research results from a firm‐specific method and from a pooled time‐series and cross‐sectional method and demonstrate that they differ significantly due to large heterogeneity across firms. I suggest that researchers should adopt a firm‐specific approach to avoid misleading results and to achieve improved estimations.     

Do facilitation payments affect earnings management? Evidence from China

This study examines whether facilitation payments drive managers to manipulate earnings, thus weakening financial disclosure transparency. I find economically and statistically significant evidence that facilitation payments relate positively to earnings management levels in China. The impact of facilitation payments on earnings management is more pronounced when firms have relatively weak political power, less effective external monitoring, fewer growth options, and when firms are located in regions that have less efficient juridical systems. Finally, the findings are strengthened by a set of additional tests to mitigate the endogeneity problem: a difference-in-differences estimation that exploits China’s anti-corruption campaign as the exogenous shock, a dynamic analysis, an instrumental variable approach, and a Heckman analysis to adjust for selection bias. This study contributes to debates regarding corruption and transparency from a micro-economic perspective.     

Does an item change trigger earnings management? Evidence from asset disposal income in China

We explore a unique regulatory change in 2017 in China that requires firms to move the non-current assets disposal income in the income statement from below the line of operating income to above it. We find that firms that have incentives to avoid losses conduct upward earnings management using the non-current assets disposal income after the regulatory change. We also find that this earnings management behaviour is more pronounced for firms in the growth and decline stages, and for firms with weak market competition power. In addition, such behaviour damages firm’s operating performance and innovation in the next year.     

Discussion of “equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting”

Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs.