STOCK PRICE AND DEGREE OF NEGLECT AS DETERMINANTS OF STOCK RETURNS

In prior research the neglected firm effect persists even after controlling for firm size. Several recent studies show that the size effect is a stock price effect. In the present study we investigate whether excess returns on neglected stocks are a manifestation of a stock price effect. Although material evidence supporting an independent neglected firm effect is still found, results are much weaker than in prior studies. Examining a large sample of New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange stocks from 1977 to 1988, we find that both January and non-January months do not have a statistically significant neglect effect after controlling for a price effect.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF MARKET BID ASK SPREADS ON THE AUSTRALIAN STOCK EXCHANGE: CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Prior research into the cost of trading on the Australian Stock Exchange has identified brokerage fees and the bid-ask spread as significant elements of total transaction costs. While an enormous volume of research has examined the determinants of spreads in US markets, no work has so far addressed the issue for the Australian market-place. Given the importance of spreads as a transaction cost, this work redresses this imbalance and at the same time provides evidence on whether alternative market structures underlying different exchanges give rise to differences in the determinants of spreads. Using prior US research as our benchmark, our results suggest that notwithstanding microstructure differences between the Australian and US exchanges, there are three fundamental determinants of spreads that transcend differences in the market-places. These are the level of trading activity, price volatility and stock price levels. Together these three factors account for up to 94% of the total cross-sectional variation in percentage bid ask spreads on the ASX.     

MODELS OF STOCK MARKET PREDICTABILITY

I briefly review the success of past studies purporting to explain equity valuations and predict future equity returns. The Campbell‐Shiller mean reversion models are contrasted with an expanded version of the so‐called Federal Reserve model. At least from 1970 to 2003, Federal Reserve–type models did somewhat better at predicting long‐horizon returns than did a mean reversion model based on dividend yields and price‐earnings multiples. However, timing investment strategies based on any of these prediction models do no better than a buy‐and‐hold strategy. Although some predictability of returns exists, there is no evidence of any systematic inefficiency that would enable investors to earn excess returns.     

RETURN INTERVAL,FIRM SIZE AND SYSTEMATIC RISK ON THE DUTCH STOCK MARKET

In this paper we investigate the behavior of betas of 50 Dutch firms as a function of the return measurement interval. We find beta estimates measured from different intervals differ significantly from each other. As the sample mainly contains stocks that are relatively thin compared to the index, beta estimates from short intervals are on average lower than those obtained from longer intervals. The results further indicate that there exists some variability in the beta coefficients for each interval length. Betas depend on the manner daily prices are juxtaposed to calculate the returns. A way to account for this variability is to average the different betas for each interval length. Asymptotic betas are also computed to show the appropriateness of this method. Finally we show that the size effect is reduced when the interval length is increased, although it remains statistically significant.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF DIVIDEND INCREASES ON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY: THE EVIDENCE FROM THE OPTIONS MARKET

This paper examines the impact of the announcements of dividend increases on the volatility of underlying stock returns implied by option prices, and analyses whether the impact is related to the label associated with the dividend increase. The results suggest that the announcements of labelled dividend increases are accompanied by a decrease in implied volatility, while the announcements of unlabelled increases in dividends are associated with no change in implied volatility. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that signal implicit in the announcements of dividend increases provides noisy information about the firm's volatility.     

ON THE RATIONALITY OF COMMON STOCK RETURN VOLATILITY

This paper derives the relationship between the population unconditional variance of common stock returns and the variance of expected returns conditional on a well-specified information set. As a consequence, a lower bound is obtained for the variance of common stock returns. The sample counterpart of this bound is then empirically tested against the sample variance of returns. The paper's main conclusion can be stated as follows: the observed volatility of real (inflation-adjusted) common stock returns is not “irrationally” large. The paper admits of this conclusion because the point estimate of the lower-bound variance derived in this model is actually larger than the point estimate of common stock return volatility. However, since these point estimates are found to have a statistically insignificant difference, equality of the two variances cannot be ruled out. Hence, “rationality” of common stock returns—as implied by a utility-based valuation conditional on a specified information set—cannot be rejected.     

STOCK MARKET CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL VIBRANCY

We define areas with strong geographic ties to powerful politicians as politically vibrant and show that they are characterized by greater value-relevant information generation and symptomatic of equity market segmentation. Political vibrancy entails greater levels of local bias and local comovement and has two important return predictability implications. First, it enhances local institutions’ informational advantages; their trades’ ability to forecast local stock returns exceeds that of nonlocal institutions. Second, in support of the view that information diffuses slowly into prices, stock returns of firms from politically vibrant areas predict returns of similar firms in other areas.     

STOCK MARKET PERCEPTION OF INDUSTRIAL FIRM BANKRUPTCY

The objectives of this study are to determine (1) when the stock market first perceives the impending bankruptcy of a potentially bankrupt firm and (2) what firm-specific factors explain the interval between the perception time and the eventual date of bankruptcy (i.e., market lead time). A computational methodology based on the Hillmer-Yu technique is used to determine the month in which a structural change in the mean and variance of monthly stock return occurs for a potentially bankrupt firm. This parametric change month or the “market perception time” is computed for a sample of 47 industrial firms. The range of market lead times cautions against the common assumption of a uniform event period in event studies. The lead time interval (for both the mean and variance of monthly market return) of poteintially bankrupt firms is found to be positively related to the firm's earnings per share at the time of stock market perception of eventual bankruptcy. Neither the firm's asset size nor systematic risk appear to be significant indicators of lead time interval. Also, change in investment at market perception time is positively related to percentage change in the market lead times. This suggests that innovations in the investment variable are a source of new information to the security market in assesing the probability of future bankruptcy of a firm.