Valuing the Defeasance Option in Securitized Commercial Mortgages

To protect the interests of investors, commercial mortgage loans pooled for the issuance of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) have restrictive covenants that discourage the borrower from refinancing. Such restrictions limit the borrower's ability to access any accumulated equity. The predominant means of accessing this equity today is defeasance. By defeasing a loan, the borrower substitutes the commercial mortgage with U.S. Treasury or agency obligations whose payments match those of the defeased mortgage. Therefore, defeasance is an exchange option whereby the borrower gives up the portfolio of Treasury or agency securities and in return receives the market value of the commercial mortgage plus the liquidity benefits arising from accessing the accumulated equity in the underlying property. The value of the option to defease is shown to depend critically on the rate of return that can be earned on the released equity, prevailing interest rate conditions, as well as the option's contractual features.     

Privatized Default Risk and Real Estate Recessions: The U.K. Mortgage Market

A mortgage pricing model is developed when a borrower goes through a series of distress states, including delinquency, long-term nonpayment and ultimate default. These steps are sequential, and depend on prices and alternatives faced by the borrower. The multistate default model is applied to the mortgage market in the United Kingdom. As a byproduct, a pricing structure for the U.K. endowment mortgage, which combines a good and a life insurance policy, is developed. Income and liquidity constraints are shown to affect the decision to keep a mortgage current in different states of distress. Solvent borrowers may thus keep their mortgages current, even when equity is negative.     

Real Estate Investment Trusts, Small Stocks and Bid-ask Spreads

This study examines the liquidity of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as measured by their bid-ask spread. We find that REIT spreads have increased over the period 1986–1990, are inversely related to market capitalization, and are similar in magnitude to spreads on other stocks of comparable size. Analysis of variance tests indicate that REIT spreads are similar across equity, mortgage and hybrid asset types. Multivariate regression results indicate that market capitalization is the primary determinant of REIT bid-ask spreads, and spreads are larger for National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) REITs than for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) REITs. The regression results also indicate that spreads are lower for equity REITs than for mortgage or hybrid REITs, and are inversely related to the fraction of the REIT's shares held by institutional investors. The similarity between REIT spreads and those of other common stocks holds in both bull and bear real estate markets and suggests that, from a liquidity perspective, REITs are similar to other common stocks.     

Savings and Loan Demand for Liquid Assets: Theory,Evidence and Implications for Policy*

In this study a model of liquid asset management for individual savings and loan associations is developed. The model combines features of portfolio theory and inventory theory and is used to draw hypotheses on the relationship between the demand for excess liquidity and a variety of independent variables. Pooled cross section-time series equations are estimated for the demand for excess liquidity of 198 S & Ls over the period 1974–1978. In addition to conclusions on the role of individual variables, the estimated equations reveal that the FHLBB can affect the portfolios of some, but not all, S & Ls. This implies that FHLBB liquidity policy can have an effect on the mortgage market.     

Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market

Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently, when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. In this article, I examine 1989–2007 loan‐level reverse mortgage data and conduct three sets of analyses to better understand the demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. First, I study the ZIP code characteristics correlated with reverse mortgage originations. Second, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Third, I investigate the reasons why the reverse mortgage market experienced substantial growth in the mid‐2000s. Combining the reverse mortgage data with county‐level house price data, I find that higher house prices lead to more reverse mortgage originations. Specifically, the increases in house prices account for about one‐third of the overall growth in the reverse mortgage market from 2003 to 2007.     

Residential Mortgage Markets: Current Developments and Future Prospects

Historical developments as well as current innovations have generated significant changes in the structure and operation of the residential mortgage market. General economic stability, a low inflation rate, growth of savings and loan associations, and strong consumer demand marked the fifteen-year period immediately following World War II. In contrast, the decade of the sixties was characterized by increased competition in the mortgage market, a series of credit crunches, and increased governmental activity. In reaction to these and related developments, current innovations affecting the mortgage market focus on design of new mortgage instruments, improvements in market efficiency, and reform of financial institutions. If history is a guide, it suggests that the residential mortgage market responds flexibly to adverse conditions.     

Mortgage Choice†

Mortgage choice refers to a set of problems faced by a homeowner that includes the choice of a loan-to-value ratio, the refinancing and default decisions, and the choice of mortgage instrument. This paper reviews much of the literature that has been written on the topic. It begins with a listing of the major stylized facts the literature seeks to explain. Models used to explain mortgage choice are categorized and discussed. It is argued that the relatively simple certainty model that incorporates liquidity constraints seems capable of explaining some of the stylized facts, but is unable to explain some others. The paper concludes with a discussion of three policy questions that require a better understanding of mortgage choice before they can be answered. The paper is based upon the author's Presidential Address to the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, which was delivered in Atlanta, Georgia on December 29, 1989.     

Housing Finance in a Stochastic Economy: Contract Pricing and Choice

An empirical analysis of macroeconomic time series from the mortgage, housing, capital and labor markets is based on life-cycle consumption and mortgage option pricing considerations. Vector autoregression techniques characterize the long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics of the mortgage market as it relates to the other sectoral markets. A simultaneous-equations model characterizes the partial equilibrium in the differentiated products market for fixed- and adjustablerate mortgage contracts. The empirical results reveal the impacts that market conditions have on mortgage volumes and prices, and they generally support the implications of the consumption and pricing theories.     

How Does the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) Influence Mortgage‐Backed Securities (MBS) Yields and U.S. Mortgage Rates?

We conduct an empirical analysis of the Federal Reserve's large‐scale asset purchases (LSAPs) on mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) yields and mortgage rates. We estimate a cointergrated, error‐correction model that links Federal Reserve securities purchases and stocks of Treasury and MBS securities to equilibrium MBS yields and mortgage rates. The Federal Reserve's accumulation of MBS and Treasury securities lowered MBS yields and mortgage rates by more than what would have been suggested by changes in market expectations alone, suggesting that portfolio rebalancing effects of LSAPs are an important consideration for monetary policy transmission. Our estimates also suggest that the Federal Reserve must hold a substantial market share of agency MBS or of Treasury securities to significantly lower MBS yields and in turn significantly lower mortgage rates.     

The Borrower's Perceived Risk in Mortgage Choice

We investigate how borrowers perceive the risk in the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) versus fixed rate mortgage (FRM) choice. We develop a mortgage choice model where the coefficient on the long‐term bond risk premium is conditional on the borrower's perceived risk. We show that the perceived risk fluctuates over time according to the short‐term interest rate level and housing market conditions. We find that when the short‐term rate level is high (low), the borrowers perceive low (high) risk of a short‐term rate rise, thus opting for ARMs (FRMs). Also, during a down housing market they become more risk‐averse perceiving higher risk in choosing ARMs. The perceived risk level alters the borrowers’ sensitivity to the long‐term bond risk premium.     

The Integration of Mortgage Markets and Capital Markets

In this paper, we develop a model to predict the impact of deregulation in the form of relaxing interest rate control on the integration between the mortgage credit market and the general credit market. The model is tested through the examination of the long-term Granger-like equilibrium relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates in the pre-1980 regulated vs. the post-1980 deregulated periods. It is shown that the level of regulation, in the form of targeting general interest rate levels, contributes to the segmentation of the mortgage market from the capital market. To test this model, we compare the relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates around 1980 where major control on interest rate levels in capital markets was lifted. Using Engle and Granger's procedure to overcome the estimation problem from nonstationarity in the interest rate series, we are able to find that the two interest rates were cointegrated after 1980 but not before. More importantly, it appears that the two markets were already integrated before the full development of the secondary mortgage markets between 1984 and 1987. Therefore, we conclude that the bulk of the integration between the mortgage and capital markets was completed as a result of the removal of interest rate controls around 1980, in contrast with previous studies that find integration occurred during the mid-1980s primarily as a result of the rapid development of the secondary mortgage markets.     

Do Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds Explain Returns on REITs?

The monthly returns on equity and mortgage real estate investment trusts (REITs) are analyzed over the period July 1976 to December 1992. The results indicate that risk premiums on equity REITs are significantly related to risk premiums on a market portfolio of stocks as well as to the returns on mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market equity factors in common stock returns. Mortgage REIT risk premiums are significantly related to the three stock market factors and two bond market factors in returns. Also, mortgage REIT shares underperform by an average of 6.8% per year.     

Transaction Costs, Suboptimal Termination and Default Probabilities

The same option-based methodology now commonly used to value mortgages and their termination features also can be applied to calculate the probabilities that mortgage default will occur. This paper pursues that idea, and furthermore, enriches the idealized option-based approach by introducing both transaction costs and "suboptimal" termination. These latter features capture the individual considerations that cause a mortgage holder's actions to differ from what rationality would indicate based solely on the market value of the mortgage. These features are of considerable importance if the results of options-based models are to be made comparable to those calculations of default probabilities occurring in the empirical literature.     

Evaluating the Costs of Increased Lending in Low and Negative Growth Local Housing Markets

The literatures on default and the evaluation of low downpayment mortgage programs are extended by showing within an options pricing framework how differences in expected price appreciation trends across housing markets can influence default and, thereby, the cost of programs designed to increase mortgage liquidity. An equilibrium mortgage rate reflecting the risk premium required to compensate for expected default-related losses is endogenously determined within the model. Evaluating the entire process by which program losses arise strictly within a rigorous asset pricing framework has potentially important implications for policy evaluation, as the estimated present value of program losses in declining markets where expected default is high is quite sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. The implications of increased lending in low and negative price appreciation local markets are also investigated.     

A Tale of Two Tensions: Balancing Access to Credit and Credit Risk in Mortgage Underwriting

Over the years 2000–2007, mortgage market underwriting conditions eased in response to public policy demands for increased homeownership. This easing of acceptable credit risk in order to accommodate increased access to credit, when coupled with the unanticipated house price declines during the Great Recession, resulted in substantial increases in delinquencies and foreclosures. The response to this mortgage market crisis led to myriad changes in the industry, including tightened underwriting standards and new market regulations. The result is a growing concern that credit standards are now too tight, restricting the recovery of the housing market. Faced with this history, policy analysts, regulators and industry participants have been forced to consider how best to balance the tension inherent in managing mortgage credit risk without unduly restricting access to credit. Our research is unique in providing explicit consideration of this trade‐off in the context of mortgage underwriting. Using recent mortgage market data, we explore whether modern automated underwriting systems (AUS) can be used to extend credit to borrowers responsibly, with a particular focus on target populations that include minorities and those with low and moderate incomes. We find that modern AUS do offer a potentially valuable tool for balancing the tensions of extending credit at acceptable risks, either by using scorecards that mix through‐the‐cycle and stress scorecard approaches or by adjusting the cutpoint—more relaxed cutpoints allow for higher levels of default while providing more access, tighter cutpoints accept fewer borrowers while allowing less credit risk.     

Dynamic Credit Rationing in the Home Mortgage Market

In this study a model of dynamic credit rationing in the home mortgage market by a profit-maximizing financial institution is developed.
In the 1960s and 1970s it was widely believed that credit rationing was very important in the mortgage market. The recent deregulation and innovation in financial markets is belived to have resulted in a significant weakening of these availability effects. For the model developed it is shown that deposit diversification, such as the introduction of money market accounts in 1978, would tend to reduce the amount of any dynamic credit rationing that was occurring.     

Mortgage Markets and Inter-Regional Differences in Conventional Mortgage Terms

One of the purposes of the secondary mortgage market is to move funds from areas of capital surplus to areas of capital shortage. If mortgage funds move freely throughout the economy then the price of mortgage funds (the terms of the mortgage) should be the same everywhere. Thus, if the secondary mortgage market is efficient, mortgage terms should show less geographic variation after the secondary market began in 1970 than they showed before. In this paper, the efficiency of the market is tested in two stages. In the first, the average terms of mortgage loans in 1968 and 1978 are examined to determine whether they became more homogeneous after the secondary market was begun. In the second stage, the terms are modeled as a function of region, year by region interaction variables, foreclosure rates, the usury ceiling and the average cost of funds. This model is estimated and analyzed using a multivariate multiple regression technique.     

Interest Rate Risk, Residential Mortgages and Financial Futures Markets

Residential mortgage markets in both the United States and Canada have recently been dominated by instruments such as variable-rate and short-term rollover mortgages which require borrowers to assume a greater burden of interest rate risk. An outstanding question is whether this approach to risk allocation is Pareto optimal or whether there are other more effective methods of dealing with the risk created by interest rate volatility. This study examines the potential for shifting this risk from the mortgage market to the financial futures market. After considering the rationale for expecting that neither mortgage borrowers nor lenders wish to absorb the high levels of risk present in the existing financial environment, this study discusses the hedging of interest rate risk through financial futures markets. Empirical tests are then performed to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. futures markets for hedging positions from the U.S. mortgage market. These results indicate that the interest rate risk inherent in residential mortgages can be substantially shifted through one or more positions in the existing futures contracts and long-term, fixed-rate mortgages may still be financially feasible under conditions of interest rate volatility.     

The Effects of Securitization on Mortgage Market Yields: A Cointegration Analysis

Securitization of the residential mortgage market has completely transformed the process of financing home loans in the U.S. over the last two decades. We examine the effects of securitization on yield spreads in the primary mortgage market. Cointegration techniques are employed to test the relationship between the increasing volume of mortgage securities over time and the yield spread on mortgage loan rates. We find that a 10% increase in the level of mortgage securitization as a proportion of total mortgage originations decreases yield spreads on home loans by as much as 20 basis points. Other results indicate that, while prepayment speed has a significant effect on mortgage yield spreads, default risk does not. We conclude that securitization of the residential mortgage market plays an important role in decreasing the cost of home loans.     

Estimation of Mortgage Defaults Using Disaggregate Loan History Data

This paper addresses, theoretically and empirically, the structure of influences affecting the default option in mortgage contracts. A formal theoretical model recognizes that a number of loan and non-loan related effects beyond equity in the unit could influence the default decision. These include 1) payment levels relative to income, which could displace other investment opportunities or cause a need for borrowing or sale to meet mortgage obligations; 2) current and expected neighborhood and housing market conditions, in particular the expected relative rate of appreciation of the unit and the relative cost of homeownership; 3) economic conditions; 4) wealth; 5) borrower characteristics proxying for variability in income or "crisis" events; as well as 6) transactions costs incurred upon default. Estimates of the model making use of a micro-level sample of individual loan histories over a twelve year period, supplemented by longitudinal census and economic information, find a number of these "other" effects important. Simulations find several of them to dominate the equity effect on default and to help explain why some households with zero or negative equity may not default, while others with positive equity may. The implications of these results for appropriate specification of the pricing model describing the default option and for appropriate underwriting of AMIs are noted.