正规金融与非正规金融:机制、效率与实证挑战

正规金融与非正规金融的定位和关系,不仅是重要的学术问题,也是影响间接金融体系改革方向的关键。本文从机制视角建立学理框架,从信息和履约两个基础维度,讨论正规金融与非正规金融的相对效率及决定因素,并通过系统梳理相关文献,指出现有实证研究的成果与挑战;进而结合中国特征,讨论如何提高正规金融与非正规金融的效率,最后提出未来研究方向。本文认为,正规金融与非正规金融因信息和履约机制不同而各有其独立存在价值,其相对效率取决于不同经济发展阶段的社会网络基础和征信、法律体系,现有实证文献对两者作用的分歧主要源于分类、样本局限和内生性处理。本文从机制视角进行分析,体现了正规金融和非正规金融的金融属性,为探索相关领域学术研究和政策制定提供启示。     

Formal Water Markets: Why, When, and How to Introduce Tradable Water Rights

In most countries the state owns the water resources and thehydraulic infrastructure, and public officials decide who getsthe water, how it is to be used, and how much will be chargedfor it. But costly inefficiencies in the supply and use of watersupport a shift from government provision to a market-basedapproach that is more effective and less wasteful. Markets can allow rapid changes in allocation in response tochanging demands for water and can stimulate investment andemployment as investors are assured of access to secure suppliesof water. Because of water's unique characteristics, such marketsdo not work everywhere; nor do they resolve all water-relatedissues. By designing appropriate water laws and regulationsand by strengthening private and public institutions to administerthem, formal water markets can effectively address rising demandsfor groundwater and for water found in rivers, lakes, and canals.Lessons from Chile's experience demonstrate that formal watermarkets can improve the economic efficiency of water use andstimulate investment.      

Institutions,Informal Economy,and Economic Development

Using cross-national panel data, we examine the evolution of the informal economy through the course of economic development. Borrowing from previously published informal economy estimates for 141 countries over the period 1984-2009 and using panel data estimation techniques, we investigate the relationship between informal economy and the level of economic development, proxied by gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Our findings suggest that institutional quality strongly interacts with this relationship. Specifically, we find that a higher GDP per capita is associated with a larger informal sector size in countries where the institutional quality is low. The opposite is true in countries with good institutions. These results are also in line with a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model.     

Financial Constraints,Institutions, and Firm Productivity: Evidence from China

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates whether Chinese firms utilize trade credit as an alternative financial intermediation to alleviate financial constraints, and whether trade credit matters for firm productivity. The results show that trade credit significantly affects firm productivity in private and foreign-owned firms but not state-owned enterprises, indicating that trade credit is an efficient financial intermediation for non-state firms. Second, trade credit better helps firms that have severe financial constraints grow. Third, the mechanism of trade credit and TFP is by the substitution effect of cash flow, the smoothing effect of working capital and the drive of innovation. Finally, the impact of trade credit on productivity is driven by the regions under a more institutionally developed environment.     

The Bridge between Informal Finance and Formal Finance

农业融资是一个世界性难题。巴西CPR工具（葡萄牙语：Cedula de Produto Rural,英文：Rural Product Note,产品出售凭证）是一种“以产量控制发行量”的发行机制,既帮助农业生产者获得资金支持,又规范和引导了民间融资发展,还丰富了农村金融市场产品。巴西CPR工具的制度设计对我国解决农民贷款难和规范民间融资发展,具有重要的借鉴和启示意义。     

正规金融与民间金融的对接研究——以浙江省为例

基于监管法律的角度,我国金融体系可分为两部分,一是受国家监管和金融法规约束的正规金融;二是游离于国家监管和金融法规约束的民间金融。目前,正规金融和民间金融并列存在,交互发展。文章分析了正规金融与民间金融对接的前提条件与基本路径,认为可以通过合理、合法的政策引导,实现民间金融与正规金融的有效对接。     

中小企业在正规和非正规金融市场融资的理论研究

本文提出了一个在正规与非正规金融市场同时存在的情况下,中小企业在非正规金融市场融资的利率与正规金融市场融资的规模如何决定的理论模型.他们在分别确定各自的利率和信贷规模时进行非合作博弈.在均衡时正规金融市场的价格与非正规金融市场的有效价格相等.在完全替代的金融市场条件下,如果正规金融机构利率降低,正规金融机构放款量会增加,这会导致对非正规金融机构信贷需求的减少,从而降低非正规金融机构的利率,最终降低非正规金融机构的收入,增加中小企业的利润.     

Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from Belgian Firms

In Belgium, financial and industrial groupings play a crucial role in the accumulation and allocation of capital in the economy. In this paper, it is hypothesized that Belgian firms for which investment is partly financed on an internal capital market, will not be subject to financing constraints to the same extent as firms which have to borrow from banks. Moreover, it is hypothesized that firms belonging to a group, transfer internal surpluses of funds to other group members by investing in financial assets. An empirical analysis confirms the first hypothesis, but rejects the second hypothesis.     

SME Financing in Emerging Markets: Firm Characteristics,Banking Structure and Institutions

Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey indicator database, we investigate (1) how firm characteristics affect financing of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in emerging markets; (2) how cross-country differences in the banking sector affect SME financing; and (3) how financing of SMEs is influenced by economic development and institutions. Our findings confirm that younger and smaller firms in nonmanufacturing sectors consistently face severe financing obstacles/constraints and rely heavily on internal financing. Moreover, the availability of credit information and the bank concentration ratio, as well as economic development and the institutional environment, can significantly affect SME financing, and access to external financing in particular.     

农村金融市场两部门关系--访法国国家科学院研究员裴天士

法国国家科学院研究员Thierry Pairault先生(中文名裴天士)是享誉欧洲学界的中国通,其阅读的中国史料之多,甚至超过很多中国学者;其所在研究所的许多中国史料,不少是国内都无法找到的。近些年,裴天士先生主要从事中国现当代微观经济的研究,微观到中国东南沿海和台湾地区民间标会每一张会单的解读,以及由妇女私房钱的历史变迁看中国的经济社会关系变化等。裴天士先生掌握大量农村的民间金融和历史史料,其观点可以帮助我们从另外一个角度看待农村的民间金融及其两部门的关系。     

The Effects of Formal and Informal Contracting in Credit Availability

This paper investigates how the use of collateral (formal contracting), along with the market power of banks (which facilitates relational contracts), affects the availability of credit for business firms. Using loan data from the Spanish Credit Register, we show that the average credit quality of borrowers in a provincial market decreases with market concentration and the availability of collateral. Additionally, the marginal effect of each variable decreases with the higher values of the other variable. We also find that credit line interest rates increase with the availability of collateral, although the increase is lower for banks operating in more concentrated credit markets. Therefore, market power (relations) and collateral (formal contracting) act as substitutes to increase the availability of bank finance under asymmetric information.     

非正规金融与正规金融协同性的实证分析:温州案例

许多实证研究表明,非正规金融与正规金融具有相互影响、相互补充、相互协作的关系.本文把这种关系定义为协同性.本文通过对民间金融发达的温州市的个案研究,证明了非正规金融与正规金融具有显著的协同性关系.这种关系不仅体现在对中小企业资金来源的供给结构上,还表现在利率变化与融资规模上.在此基础上,对这种协同性关系进行了理论归纳,最后是结论:要给非正规金融必要的制度空间;完善这种协同性关键是要发挥民间金融市场化的机制,避免政府直接干预;还须考虑金融生态环境因素的影响.     

Who Blinks in Volatile Markets,Individuals or Institutions?

We investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and returns of firms on days when the absolute value of the market's return is two percent or more. We find that a firm's abnormal return on these days is related to the percentage of institutional ownership, that there is abnormally high turnover in the firm's shares on these days, and that this abnormal turnover is significantly related to the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with positive feedback herding behavior on the part of some institutions, particularly mutual and pension funds.     

On the Implications of the Internet for Insurance Markets and Institutions

By most accounts, the Internet and related advances in information technology significantly affect financial services in general and insurance markets and institutions in particular. Coupled with other important trends such as globalization and regulatory reform, these changes are forcing far‐reaching changes upon the insurance industry and making it more competitive. This article focuses specifically on the implications of the Internet for insurance markets and institutions. The conventional wisdom that the Internet constitutes a sufficient condition for the disintermediation of traditional insurance distribution networks is called into question. To the extent that the Internet reduces transaction costs, it will create opportunities for new intermediaries as well as for existing ones. It will also influence product design, in some cases making it economically attractive to unbundle and repackage various forms of coverage. By removing entry barriers and reducing insurance costs, the Internet will also provide a private market solution to a major insurance regulatory concern—enhancing insurance affordability and availability.     

Formal and Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution: Comparative Evidence from Indonesia and the United States

Economic theory and recent empirical work suggest that whenformal regulation of pollution is absent or less than 100 percenteffective, affected communities are often able to negotiateabatement from plants in their vicinity through "informal regulation."Using a model of equilibrium pollution, this article confirmsthe existence of significant informal regulation for unregulatedpollutants in both Indonesia and the United States as well asfor regulated pollutants in the United States. Combining plant-leveldata with community data in both countries, regressions revealthat even after controlling for traditional economic variablessuch as output levels and input prices as well as for plantcharacteristics such as industrial sector and age, the per capitaincome of affected communities significantly affects pollutionintensities. Higher-income communities win significantly loweremissions in both countries and for both unregulated and regulatedpollutants in the United States, presumably because income affectsboth preferences for environmental quality and the ability tobring pressure on polluting factories.     

Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance

This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ('liquidity') and negative ('crowding') externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a 'market of last resort' can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.     

Testing for Mean-Variance Spanning with Short Sales Constraints and Transaction Costs: The Case of Emerging Markets

We propose regression-based tests for mean-variance spanning in the case where investors face market frictions such as short sales constraints and transaction costs. We test whether U.S. investors can extend their efficient set by investing in emerging markets when accounting for such frictions. For the period after the major liberalizations in the emerging markets, we find strong evidence for diversification benefits when market frictions are excluded, but this evidence disappears when investors face short sales constraints or small transaction costs. Although simulations suggest that there is a possible small-sample bias, this bias appears to be too small to affect our conclusions.