Incentivizing resilience in financial networks

When banks extend loans to each other, they generate a negative externality in the form of systemic risk. They create a network of interbank exposures by which they expose other banks to potential insolvency cascades. In this paper, we show how a regulator can use information about the financial network to devise a transaction-specific tax based on a network centrality measure that captures systemic importance. Since different transactions have different impact on creating systemic risk, they are taxed differently. We call this tax a systemic risk tax (SRT). We use an equilibrium concept inspired by the matching markets literature to show analytically that this SRT induces a unique equilibrium matching of lenders and borrowers that is systemic-risk efficient, i.e. it minimizes systemic risk given a certain transaction volume. On the other hand, we show that without this SRT multiple equilibrium matchings exist, which are generally inefficient. This allows the regulator to effectively stimulate a ‘rewiring’ of the equilibrium interbank network so as to make it more resilient to insolvency cascades, without sacrificing transaction volume. Moreover, we show that a standard financial transaction tax (e.g. a Tobin-like tax) has no impact on reshaping the equilibrium financial network because it taxes all transactions indiscriminately. A Tobin-like tax is indeed shown to have a limited effect on reducing systemic risk while it decreases transaction volume.     

Agent-based financial markets and New Keynesian macroeconomics: a synthesis

We combine a simple agent-based model of financial markets and a New Keynesian macroeconomic model with bounded rationality via two straightforward channels. The result is a macroeconomic model that allows for the endogenous development of business cycles and stock price bubbles. We show that market sentiments exert important influence on the macroeconomy: Impulse-response functions of macroeconomic variables become more volatile which makes the effect of a given shock hard to predict. We also analyze the impact of different types of financial transaction taxes that are currently debated among policy makers (FTT, FAT, progressive FAT) and find that such taxes are well suited to stabilize the economy and raise funds from the financial sector as a contribution to the enormous costs created during the recent crisis. Our simulations suggest that the FTT leads to higher tax revenues and better stabilization results then the FAT. However, the FTT might also create huge distortion if set too high, a threat which the FAT does not imply.     

Does a ‘financial transaction tax’ drive out information mirages? An experimental analysis

Motivated by the debate over the economic implications of financial transaction taxes, the present study involved a thorough investigation of the impact of such taxes on a financial market of the type described by Camerer and Weigelt (J Bus 64:463–493, 1991), whereby noise traders are unaware of whether privileged information is fluctuating in the market. Two treatment conditions were opposed to a baseline condition in which no tax was levied. The two treatment conditions imposed a transaction tax equal to 0.5% and 1% of each transaction’s market value, respectively. The findings show that: (1) the introduction of a tax did not affect the occurrence of a mirage, (2) the introduction of a tax did not improve market efficiency and (3) the introduction of a tax did not reduce the number of transactions.

     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

Convex incentives in financial markets: an agent-based analysis

We investigate whether convex incentive contracts are a source of instability of financial markets as indicated by the results of a continuous double-auction asset market experiment performed by Holmen et al. (J Econ Dyn Control 40:179–194, 2014). We develop a model to replicate the setting of the experiment and perform an agent-based simulation where agents have linear or convex incentives. Extending the simulation by varying features of actual asset markets that were not studied in the experiment, our main results show that increasing the number of convex incentive contracts increases prices and volatility and decreases market liquidity, measured both as bid–ask spreads and volumes. We also observe that the influence of risk aversion on traders’ decisions decreases when there are convex contracts and that increasing the differences in initial wealth among the traders has similar effects as increasing number of convex incentive contracts.     

Managing Discretionary Accruals and Book‐Tax Differences in Anticipation of Tax Rate Increases: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how firms manage their earnings to trade off various incentives when tax rates increase. We hypothesize and find that firms generally choose to manage their taxable income upward in a book‐tax non‐conforming manner rather than in a book‐tax conforming manner before a tax rate increment, which in turn reduces the detection risk of aggressive financial reporting. These results suggest that firms give more weight to tax incentives and tax audit or regulatory inspection risks than to boosting financial reporting income in tax management. However, when firms have higher book management incentives or lower tunneling incentives (i.e., non‐state‐owned enterprises), we find that they manage their taxable income and book income upward together (i.e., in a book‐tax conforming manner), whereas their counterparts (i.e., state‐owned enterprises) do not. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the interplay of tax, tunneling and financial reporting incentives in influencing tax management strategies. The findings from our paper should also help government and regulators understand more about firms’ reactions to tax rate increases.     

Transaction costs, capital-gains taxes, and housing demand

The paper considers the effect of transaction costs—particularly in the form of capital-gains taxes—on the aggregate demand for owner-occupied housing. The framework is an overlapping-generations model, where consumers can avoid the transaction costs (taxes) by keeping the same house for both periods of life. The first part of the paper analyzes the consumer's choice problem. It distinguishes between costs that are fixed irrespective of the size of the house bought or sold, and costs such as capital-gains taxes that are related to the house value. It is shown that higher transaction costs have lock-in effects, inducing consumers to keep the same house for both periods. Also it is found that under a wide variety of circumstances the amount of housing demanded will increase as the household is being locked in. Finally, the paper looks at the effects on aggregate demand from an increase in capital-gains taxes. It is shown that an increased rate of taxation decreases demand for low tax rates. But for high tax rates, when lock-in effects become important, one generally gets the opposite effect; high tax rates tend to increase housing demand.     

International business cycles and risk sharing with uncertainty shocks and recursive preferences

This paper analyzes the effects of output volatility shocks on the dynamics of consumption, trade flows and the real exchange rate, in a two-country, two-good world with consumption home bias, recursive preferences, and complete financial markets. When the risk aversion coefficient exceeds the inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity, then an exogenous rise in a country׳s output volatility triggers a wealth transfer to that country, to compensate for the greater riskiness of the country׳s output stream. This risk sharing transfer raises the country׳s consumption, lowers its trade balance and appreciates its real exchange rate. In the recursive preferences framework here, volatility shocks account for a non-negligible share of the fluctuations of net exports, net foreign assets and the real exchange rate. These shocks help to explain the high empirical volatility of the real exchange rate and the disconnect between relative consumption and the real exchange rate.     

出口退税、汇率调整与出口企业的最优销量——基于相互市场古诺模型的分析

文章利用冰山假说把国内税率、出口退税率以及汇率政策因素纳入存在多个国内与外国企业的相互市场古诺模型,分析了以国内税、出口退税与汇率为核心的策略性贸易政策对出口企业利润最大化的最优出口销量与国内销售的影响,并且以这种比较静态分析为基础,对各种单一政策与多项政策组合的调整效力进行排序。这些分析得出如下的结论:就单一政策的调整效力而言,出口退税优于国内税收与汇率政策;就政策组合的调整效力而言,出口退税与国内税组合优于国内税与汇率的组合。     

Relative risk aversion and the transmission of financial crises

We study how investor behavior affects the transmission of financial crises. If investors exhibit decreasing relative risk aversion, then negative wealth shocks increase the risk premium required to hold risky assets. We integrate this into a second generation model of currency crises which allows for contagion through changes in fundamentals. Investor behavior can be a transmission channel of financial crises, as changes in risk premia increase the coverage ratio and makes the defense of a peg less attractive for the policy maker. The feedback effect of the risk premia on the probability of devaluation also makes multiple equilibria more likely. The possible stabilization effects of capital controls and a Tobin tax on the international transmission of financial crises are also studied.     

Property Tax and Housing Returns

This paper evaluates the effects of property tax on housing. While land tax and capital gains tax are widely used for curbing hoarding of land and speculation, its effectiveness is inconclusive. The imposition of a capital gains tax will impair the liquidity of property transaction, lower the rate of return on property investment, and reduce revenue from land sales which represents an important tax resource for the communities. This paper shows that a capital gains tax is capitalized into housing prices. Individuals tend to postpone the purchase of houses because of transaction taxes. Using an impulse response function, we show that a transaction tax has a dynamic negative impact on housing returns. While this paper focuses on Hong kong, for the purpose of comparison Singapore and Taiwan are also discussed.     

Uncertain tax rules and futures hedging

This paper considers the optimal futures hedging decision under uncertain tax treatment. If the Corn Products (CP) rule applies, gains or losses from futures trading can offset business gains or losses. However, under the Arkansas Best (AB) doctrine, offsetting is not allowed. We show that the risk neutral firm will not trade futures contracts if the probability the CP rule prevails is small. When the probability is sufficiently large, the firm will assume an underhedge. A risk averse firm is likely to trade, even if the AB rule prevails. As long as the CP ruling is not a sure thing, the firm will engage in underhedge. The effects of average business profits, the volatility of business profits, and risk aversion on the optimal futures position are provided. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Model uncertainty and intertemporal tax smoothing

In this paper we examine how model uncertainty due to the preference for robustness (RB) affects optimal taxation and the evolution of debt in the Barro tax-smoothing model (1979). We first study how the government spending shocks are absorbed in the short run by varying taxes or through debt under RB. Furthermore, we show that introducing RB improves the model׳s predictions by generating (i) the observed relative volatility of the changes in tax rates to government spending, (ii) the observed comovement between government deficits and spending, and (iii) more consistent behavior of government budget deficits in the U.S. economy. Finally, we show that RB can also improve the model׳s predictions in the presence of multiple shocks.     

Using difference equations to find optimal tax structures on the SugarScape

The use of equations to describe agent-based model dynamics allows access to mathematical theory that is not otherwise available. In particular, equation models can be effective at solving optimization problems—that is, problems concerning how an agent-based model can be most effectively steered into a particular state. In order to illustrate this strategy, we describe a modified version of the well-known SugarScape model and implement taxation. The optimization problem is to determine tax structures that minimize deaths but maximize tax income. Tax rates are dependent upon the amount of sugar available in a particular region; the rates change over time. A system of discrete difference equations is built to capture agent-based model dynamics. The equations are shown to capture the dynamics very well both with and without taxation. A multi-objective optimization technique known as Pareto optimization is then used to solve the problem. Rather than focusing on a cost function in which the two objectives are assigned weights, Pareto optimization is a heuristic method that determines a suite of solutions, each of which is optimal depending on the priorities of the researcher. In this case, Pareto optimization allows analysis of the tradeoff between taxes collected and deaths caused by taxation. The strategies contained here serve as a framework for a broad class of models.     

Trade openness,financial openness,and macroeconomic volatility

This paper develops a new model of an open economy for a study of macroeconomic dynamics under different degrees of trade and financial openness. The model is estimated using quarterly data on the Chinese economy over the period 2005Q3-2020Q4 and then applied to analyze how macroeconomic volatility varies with trade and financial openness in several representative settings. We find that the impacts on macroeconomic volatility of trade openness and financial openness depend on the nature of the underlying shocks and a moderate degree of trade openness, together with a high degree of financial openness, yield the optimal welfare results in most cases. These results highlight that the effects of trade and financial openness on macroeconomic volatility differ in various situations and that their interactions can lead to different welfare results.     

关于完善我国证券交易印花税的思考

随着我国证券业的发展和证券市场的扩大,证券交易印花税作为国家对资本市场进行调控的重要手段发挥了极其重要的作用。但是,证券交易印花税税率的频繁调整使得我国证券市场具有浓厚的行政干预特点,这与我国市场经济改革是不相适宜的,也不利于我国资本市场的健康发展。笔者认为,应当从全面完善证券税收法律体系、对证券的发行和流通环节分别开征印花税和证券交易税、将征税范围扩展到全部证券交易品种、实行差别税率并开征差异性证券交易税、以资本利得税逐步取代证券交易印花税等方面改进和完善我国证券交易印花税制度。     

Rationalizing investors’ choices

Assuming that agents’ preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance, we show how the Expected Utility paradigm can rationalize all optimal investment choices: the optimal investment strategy in any behavioral law-invariant (state-independent) setting corresponds to the optimum for an expected utility maximizer with an explicitly derived concave non-decreasing utility function. This result enables us to infer the utility and risk aversion of agents from their investment choice in a non-parametric way. We relate the property of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) to distributional properties of the terminal wealth and of the financial market. Specifically, we show that DARA is equivalent to a demand for a terminal wealth that has more spread than the opposite of the log pricing kernel at the investment horizon.     

Estimating the sensitivity of state tax revenue to cyclical and wealth effects

In this study, we estimate the elasticities of alternative sources of state tax revenue relative to the economy, as measured by GSP, and to wealth, as measured by the S&P500. Next, efficient tax frontiers are estimated for each state by minimizing the standard deviation, given the current average growth rate of revenues. It is shown how states could attain the same expected growth rate of tax revenues with less volatility by modifying the composition of their existing tax structures. In most cases, corporate income taxes are found to reduce efficiency due to their high volatility without a correspondingly high growth rate.     

Steuern und Risikobereitschaft in Modellen irreversibler Investitionen

This paper provides an overview of the literature on the influence of taxation on investment behavior under uncertainty, especially under the real options paradigm. We analyze the impact of taxation on risk-taking under irreversibility. Extending the existing literature we integrate a simple tax system into a real option model. Under irreversibility and risk neutrality, raising the tax rate can either increase or reduce risk-taking. Referring to combinations of volatility and tax rate it is possible to identify conditions for an unambiguous influence of taxes on risk-taking. Numerical simulations indicate that raising the tax rate increases risk-taking under low volatility. Implementing a final withholding tax on capital income tends to reduce risky investment. Our findings confirm the well-known results under certainty and extend them with respect to uncertainty, irreversibility, and risk-taking.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.