Postwar monetary policy

Summary Monetary policy has played an active role in Dutch postwar economic policy. Essentially, it has sought to contribute to balanced economic growth by controlling the money supplyM ₂ in relation to national income. Policy measures extend to all sources of money creation-viz. bank credit, public sector finance and the balance of payments - and are predominantly of the quantitative type. This is reflected, among other things, in medium-term targets for the structure and outcome of the balance of payments and the size and coverage of the public sector's borrowing requirement. Internationally, the Netherlands favour and participate in stable exchange rate systems. This has not led to serious conflicts with domestic monetary objectives until the seventies, when excessive easing of monetary conditions had to be accepted temporarily.     

科研开发活动的有偿性与增值税的计征问题——从一个案说起

本文通过案例分析了科研开发中有关费用的性质,指出开发成果不是销售货物,国家在征收增值税时应给予政策上的优惠。     

The political economy of American monetary policy

Conclusion This thought-provoking volume should be read by any monetary economist who cares about trying to understand Fed policy. In light of the continuing trend toward constructing economic theories that tell more and more about less and less, cynics may have come to believe that the economics profession does not value research about real-world issues such as monetary policymaking. The contributions to this volume provide hard evidence that a sizable part of the profession continues to pursue policy-related questions.     

Domestication of monetary policy

The article touches upon the issue of the independence of monetary policy, the impossible trinity, and the exchange-rate policy. It has been shown that independent monetary policy is possible and estimates of the limits of its independency have been given.     

Transparency in monetary policy

The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the notion that complete transparency is socially desirable. Here it is pointed out that the conclusion critically depends on an asymmetric modelling of stochastic preferences. The paper also reviews the pros and cons of revealing individual voting. A conclusion is that secrecy is to be prefered in monetary unions in order to shield governors from pressure by home governments. Presidential Address presented at the Fifty-Third International Atlantic Economic Conference, March 13–17, 2002, Paris, France.     

Uncertainty and monetary policy

The experience of monetary policy making in an uncertain environmenthas encouraged increased attention to the concept of model uncertainty,that is, uncertainty as to which is the best model. A particulardifficulty has been the need to operationalise the concept inorder to yield definitive policy recommendations. If this typeof uncertainty is unquantifiable, then a policy rule determinedby a single model may not in fact be the best approach; pluralismof method and the exercise of judgement offer a potential solution.A rigorous foundation for such an approach is available in Keynes'sphilosophical analysis of decision making under uncertainty.It is concluded that more analytical attention needs to be devotedto agents’ own model uncertainty, and to judgement. Butultimately the scope for synthesis between the model uncertaintyand Keynes uncertainty approaches rests on whether or not thesubject matter is such that knowledge of it is best representedby one formal model.     

Bank competition and monetary policy

There is an apparent theoretical discrepancy between the effects of monetary policy shocks on economies with differently competitive banking sectors. We employ cross-country data to investigate this hypothesis with two different approaches. First, using aggregate data we analyze the correlation between two indices: (i) a cumulative impulse response function providing an index of the effect of monetary policy shocks; and (ii) Panzar and Rosse's H-statistic as an index of the state of bank competition. Second, using disaggregated data we regress bank lending on the interaction of bank competition and monetary policy shocks. The first approach does not provide any evidence of a relationship between monetary policy shocks and bank competition. However, the second approach suggests that competition in the banking industry leads to smaller monetary policy effects on bank lending.     

Market discipline and monetary policy

The effects of forward looking expectations of future inflationon equilibrium inflation and interest rates are examined withinan imperfect information framework. Expectations of future inflationaffect equilibrium in a manner similar to an increase in thecentral bank's weight on future social welfare, making it morelikely an opportunistic central bank will actually deliver onits announced inflation targets, and output expansions can ariseeven if the central banker is revealed to be a low inflationtype. The model also illustrates the channels through whichinflation scares raise current real interest rates.     

The money supply mechanism and monetary policy in China

One of the main difficulties of analyzing the macroeconomic condition in The People's Republic of China is the lack of information of its money supply mechanism. The present paper tries to provide a systematical analysis of the Chinese money supply process from both the theoretical and empirical points of view. It shows that the economic reform in the 1980s caused profound changes in the structure of the banking system in the following ways, (a) The establishment of the central bank paved the foundation of the money creation process through the monetary base and a multiplier effect, (b) Consequently, the money supply and credit condition are controlled, at least partially, by economic instruments such as the monetary base, required reserve ratio, and interest rates, (c) The old money supply system is far from being phased out yet. As a matter of fact, it is the mixture of a central bank system and an administrative command driven centrally planned system that constitutes the money supply mechanism with the “Chinese characteristics”. The successes and failures of the monetary policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflect the central bank's ability to control the macroeconomic condition of the economy. They also indicate that at the beginning of the 1990s, after a decade of economic reforms, the money supply mechanism in China is still, by and large, controlled by the central government through administrative orders rather than economic leverages.     

Asset price inflation and monetary policy

It is crucial that central banks and regulatory authorities be aware of effects of asset price inflation on the stability of the financial system. Lending activity based on asset collateral during the boom is hazardous to the health of lenders when the boom collapses. One way that authorities can curb the distortion of lenders' portfolios during asset price booms is to have in place capital requirements that increase with the growth of credit extensions collateralized by assets whose prices have escalated. If financial institutions avoid this pitfall, their soundness will not be impaired when assets backing loans fall in value. Rather than trying to gauge the effects of asset prices on core inflation, central banks may be better advised to be alert to the weakening of financial balance sheets in the aftermath of a fall in value of asset collateral backing loans.William S. Vickery Distinguished Address presented at the Fifty-Fourth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Washington, D.C., October 10–13, 2002.     

Was ECB's monetary policy optimal?

Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000–01. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of the U.S. Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards core inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.     

Towards improved monetary policy in Indonesia

Indonesia's depreciation vastly exceeded that of all other countries hit by the Asian crisis. Indonesia also experienced far higher inflation. This paper argues that there is a close medium to long-term relationship between money growth and inflation in Indonesia, and that this has not been greatly disturbed by the crisis. It argues that the country's disappointing performance in relation to maintaining the value of the rupiah can be explained by the central bank's failure to sterilise the monetary impact on base money of its last-resort lending to the banks. The fundamental lesson is that Bank Indonesia would be well advised to adopt slow and steady growth of base money as the nominal anchor for monetary policy, now that the pre-crisis policy of slow and steady depreciation of the rupiah has been abandoned.     

The recent failure of U.S. monetary policy

Summary The very slow growth of the broad money supply has been a primary source of U.S. economic weakness in 1990 through 1992. The velocity link between M2 and the subsequent level of nominal GDP has not declined. But changes in bank reserves brought about by open market operations have had much less effect onM2 than the Fed anticipated for two reasons: (1) reserve requirements now apply to only a small fraction of totalM2; and (2) the new bank capital requirements limit some banks ability to lend. The Federal Reserve failed to appreciate the importance of these conditions and misjudged the strength of the monetary policy stimulus that it was providing.Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Sixth Tinbergen Lecture delivered on October 2, 1992, in The Hague for the Royal Netherlands Economic Association.