Market share, cost-based dumping, and anti-dumping policy

This paper studies the occurrence of dumping and the implications of anti-dumping duties in a deterministic price-setting two-period duopoly model for differentiated products. When current market shares matter for future demand, cost-based dumping can be profitable. Dumping thus arises as a form of investment in market shares. This might trigger the application of anti-dumping law. We further show that correctly anticipated duties do not necessarily hinder firms from selling below costs. The mere existence of anti-dumping law, however, significantly changes the structure of the game, leading to higher first-period prices for both firms. JEL Classification: F12, F13
Parts de marché, dumping défini par les coûts, et politiques anti-dumping. Ce mémoire étudie le phénomène de dumping et les implications des droits compensatoires anti-dumping dans un modèle de duopole de produits différenciés dans un cadre de deux périodes où le processus de définition des prix est déterministe. Quand la nature présente des parts de marché a des cons´equences sur la demande future, le dumping défini par les coûts peut être profitable. Dans ce cas, le dumping émerge en tant que forme d'investissement dans le renforcement des parts de marché. Voilà qui peut déclencher l'application de la loi anti-dumping. On montre que des droits compensatoires correctement anticipés n'empêchent pas nécessairement les entreprises de vendre à des prix plus bas que leurs coûts. Cependant, le seul fait de l'existence de la loi anti-dumping modifie substantiellement la structure du jeu et conduit les deux entreprises àétablir des prix plus élevés dans la première période.     

浅析产业损害与倾销、反倾销的关系

本文认为造成产业损害的原因不仅仅是限在贸易领域,而产业损害不仅仅是现实的损害,还应该包括潜在的产业损害威胁以及对建立国内产业造成的实质阻碍。当作为反倾销摩擦中的"受害者"——进口国时,应冷静分析倾销原因,综合考虑整个产业的短期和长期利益,最终采取适当手段应对;对于国外歧视性反倾销,国家应充分利用WTO赋予的权利,必要时启动争端解决机制。     

Equilibrium under price controls with endogenous transactions costs

In this paper we present an equilibrium model for an exchange economy with fixed prices and endogenously determined search or transactions costs. Given the fixed prices, endogenously determined equilibrium buying and selling prices (which include transactions costs) result. These costs occur on either the demand or supply side of each market, but not both. We see an eventual application of this approach to an evaluation of welfare costs of either economy-wide wage and price controls, or sector-specific price controls such as energy. In the final section we present some simple numerical examples which illustrate the approach.     

Equilibrium dynamics in discrete-time endogenous growth models with social constant returns

The existing literature establishes possibilities of local determinacy and dynamic indeterminacy in continuous-time two-sector models of endogenous growth with social constant returns. The necessary and sufficient condition for local determinacy is that the factor intensity rankings of the two sectors are consistent in the private/physical and social/value sense. The necessary and sufficient condition for dynamic indeterminacy is that the final (consumable) good sector is human (pure) capital intensive in the private sense but physical (consumable) capital intensive in the social sense. This paper re-examines the dynamic properties in a discrete-time endogenous growth framework and finds that conventional propositions obtained in continuous time need not be valid. It is shown that the established necessary and sufficient conditions on factor intensity rankings for local determinacy and dynamic indeterminacy are neither sufficient nor necessary, as the magnitudes of time preference and capital depreciation rates both play essential roles. We have benefitted from discussion with Robert Becker, Eric Bond, Michael Kaganovich, Karl Shell and participants of the Midwest Macroeconomic Conference in Chicago and the Midwest Economic Theory and International Trade Meetings at Indiana University. The fourth author acknowledges financial support from the Institute of Economics and Business Administration of Kobe University and the Institute of Economic Research of Kyoto University to enable this international collaboration.     

我国反倾销对策的研究

改革开放后,我国对外贸易发展较快,欧美等西方发达国家为保护国内市场和考虑到某些政治利益,频繁运用反倾销措施来限制中国产品进入,对华反倾销调查不断。面对新形势,我们必须积极采取应对措施:转变政府职能;提高企业竞争能力;增强反倾销应诉的法律意识;重视学习研究国外竞争对手和市场。     

Regulatory compliance with nonlinear penalties

Previous work has shown that, when firms choose only partial compliance with a regulatory standard, tightening the standard may drive firms' behavior in the wrong direction. This note explores the potential of nonlinear penalty functions to move behavior in the socially desired direction when standards are tightened without raising the total penalty.     

Tariffs versus anti-dumping duties

Tariffs and anti-dumping duties are two important tools used to protect industries from foreign competition and to generate revenue. While the two tools have been studied extensively in separate contexts, little is known about their comparative effects. This paper compares their effects on prices, profits, government revenue, industry protection, and welfare in a two-country framework where a dominant firm in one country exports to the other inhabited by an oligopoly. Conditions under which one tool dominates the other for a given criterion are provided.     

Selecting a unique competitive equilibrium with default penalties

The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default subject to penalties results in a construction of a simple mechanism for selecting a unique competitive equilibrium. We consider economies for which a common credit money can be applied to uniquely select each of the competitive equilibria with suitable default penalties. We identify two classes of such economies.     

积极应对国外对华反倾销

改革开放以来，我国对外贸易不断增长，国际贸易地位日益提升。“九五”期间我国货物出口年均增长10.9%，进口年均增长11.3%，大大超过同期世界贸易额的增长速度，我国在世界货物贸易中的排名已由1995年第11位上升到了2000年的第7位，但在同时，国际上一些国家尤其是西方国家频频指控我国出口商品倾销，并将我国的出口商品作为反倾销的主要目标，成为我国企业参与国际竞争的严重障碍，因此，了解和掌握有关国际贸易的反倾销理论和法规，研究分析国外对华反倾销的现状及原因，对于消除我国对外贸易障碍，参与国际竞争，具有重要的现实意义。     

反倾销应诉的集体行动研究——行业协会克服"搭便车"机制的思考

本文针时我国企业在反倾销共同应诉中的不合作或者“搭使车”问题，试图探讨行业协会作为一种治理机制，如何提供或设计一种有效的制度安排（如俱乐部规范），把一群相互依存的企业组织起来，并通过自主性努力克服不合作或“搭便车”，以取得长期的共同利益的实现。     

On the spread and impact of anti-dumping

In this paper two key costs of AD protection are documented. First, once AD has been adopted, countries often have a difficult time restraining its use. In recent years \'new' users have accounted for half of the overall world total. Many of the heaviest AD users are countries who did not even have an AD statute a decade ago. Second, I will show that that, on average, AD duties cause the value of imports to fall by 30–50 per cent. I find that trade falls by almost as much for settled cases as for those that result in duties. I also find that, even for those cases that are rejected, imports fall. JEL Classification: F13
A propos de la généralisation et de l'impact des mesures anti-dumping. Ce mémoire souligne deux coûts importants des mesures de protection anti-dumping (AD). D'abord, une fois la mesure en place, les pays ont souvent de grandes difficultés à en restreindre l'usage. Au cours des années récentes, les "nouveaux" utilisateurs de ces mesures comptent pour la moitié de l'activité AD dans le monde. Et plusieurs des pays qui en font un usage intensif n'avaient pas de loi AD il y a une décennie. Ensuite, en moyenne, les droits de douane AD entraînent une chute des importations de l'ordre de 30%à 50%. Et le commerce chute de presque autant pour les cas où il y a résolution du problème que pour ceux où un tarif de rétorsion est imposé. Fait intéressant, il appert que les importations chutent même dans les cas où la plainte est rejetée.     

Equilibrium with nonconvex technologies

Summary We provide an elementary proof of the existence of equilibrium in a general equilibrium model allowing for non-convex production sets. It is shown that when firms follow upper hemicontinuous and convex-valued pricing rules with bounded losses, a price vector and an allocation exist, such that all agents are in equilibrium and all markets clear.The existence result presented in this paper is a particular case of that one in Bonnisseau & Cornet (1988, Th. 2.1). In this respect our contribution consists of presenting an alternative proof which turns-out to be simpler and more intuitive.Thanks are due to Carmen Herrero and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Financial support from theDirection General de Investigación Cientiflca y Ténica, under project PS89–0066, is gratefully acknowledged.     

应对反倾销的方法与技巧

自从1979年欧盟对中国糖精发起首例倾销指控以来，到目前已有28个国家对中国企业进行了391起反倾销、反补贴、保障措施的案件调查，涉及4000多种商品，位居全球之首。尤其近年来，一些国际组织和国家对中国商品反倾销起诉更是大幅增加，从去年至今年上半年就发生了53起，还有10起在立案中，而且在这些反倾销诉讼案中，中国企业输多胜少，给国内相关企业造成了严重的冲击。我们知道，一旦倾销罪名成立，企业将被征收高额的反倾销税，被迫退出进口国市场。“城门失火，殃及池鱼”，与相关企业有业务往来的企业也会受到很大的影响，甚至有生存…     

Contracts with endogenous information

I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy two dimensional versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function conditions, a first-order approach is justified. Under the same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agent's informational rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.     

Bargaining with endogenous information

This paper analyses information acquisition in ultimatum bargaining with common values. Because of an endogenous lemons problem the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non-monotonic in the information cost. The mere possibility of information acquisition can cause no trade although the agents maintain symmetric information in equilibrium and the gain from trade is common knowledge. The agent responding to a take-it-or-leave-it offer may capture some or even the full trading surplus in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The implications for sequential bargaining are discussed.     

Group-contests with endogenous claims

Before group members individually decide their efforts in a contest to set a policy, groups are allowed to make some concessions to their opponent by choosing a less controversial policy to lobby for. When valuations over the set of policies follow a linear function, we show that concessions are never profitable when the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero but they are when it is of difference form. Surprisingly, concessions might be detrimental for the members of the group that does not make them. Comparing this situation with another where efforts are decided collectively at a group level allows us to identify the effect of positive externalities of effort as the key cause of this damage.     

Equilibrium with limited-recourse collateralized loans

We address a general equilibrium model with limited-recourse collateralized loans and securitization of debts. Each borrower is required to pledge physical collateral, and bankruptcy is filed against him if claims are not fully honored. Moreover, agents have a positive amount of wealth exempt from garnishment and, for at least a fraction of them, commodities used as collateral are desirable. In this context, equilibrium exists for any continuous garnishment rule and multiple types of reimbursement mechanisms.     

Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes

In the presence of utility penalties, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes. Harsh utility penalties may induce effective payments over collateral recollection values. In this event, loans can be larger than collateral costs and Ponzi schemes become possible.     

Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements

The present note analyzes the simultaneous ascending-bid auction with arbitrarily many asymmetric bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.We would like to thank seminar participants at UC Davis, in particular Klaus Nehring and Louis Makowski for comments. Financial support by the Alexander–von–Humboldt Foundation through a Feodor–Lynen grant and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB Transregio 15, “Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems” is gratefully acknowledged.     

Equilibrium with arbitrary market structure

Summary. Fifty years ago Arrow [1] introduced contingent commodities and Debreu [4] observed that this reinterpretation of a commodity was enough to apply the existing general equilibrium theory to uncertainty and time. This interpretation of general equilibrium theory is the Arrow-Debreu model. The complete market predicted by this theory is clearly unrealistic, and Radner [10] formulated and proved existence of equilibrium in a multiperiod model with incomplete markets.In this paper the Radner result is extended. Radner assumed a specific structure of markets, independence of preferences, indifference of preferences, and total and transitive preferences. All of these assumptions are dropped here. We - like Radner - keep assumptions implying compactness.Received: 17 April 2003, Revised: 26 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D52, D40.