契约不完全一定导致投资无效率吗?——一个带有不对称信息的敲竹杠模型

经典的不完全契约理论认为,契约不完全会导致专用性人力资本投资的无效率。但是这难以解释现实中大量存在的雇员进行有效率投资的现象。通过在一个经典的敲竹杠模型中引入重复博弈和关于投资者能力的不对称信息,本文证明:契约不完全一定会导致敲竹杠,但是敲竹杠未必妨碍专用性人力资本投资效率。本文刻画了三类完美贝叶斯均衡(PBE):好的声誉使高能者在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资,并且使低能者退出市场;中性的声誉使高能者和低能者都在第一期做出社会最优的专用性人力资本投资;而坏的声誉使高能者和低能者都退出市场。本文还表明,在动态环境下产权仍然是重要的。     

基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

非人力资产所有权与企业的边界——企业理论研究之二

产权理论是第一个关于不完全合约和企业合并的正式模型 ,其核心内涵是在不完全合约和潜伏着“敲竹杠”问题的环境中 ,非人力资产所有权如何影响交易参与人的关系专用性投资。通过考察该理论的基本假设和概念框架发现 ,它不能对企业边界的决定提供恰当的和充分的解释。企业不仅仅是解决“敲竹杠”问题的机制 ,合并也不是解决“敲竹杠”问题的惟一途径。     

专用性人力资本投资研究现状及简要述评

文章阐述了近50余年来学术界关于专用性人力资本投资的研究现状,集中论述了专用性人力资本投资与企业竞争优势、员工流动性之间关系以及专用性人力资本投资中的“敲竹杠”问题,在归纳总结研究现状的基础上做了一些简要述评。     

专用性人力资本与非正式制度激励

自主创新是国防科技工业发展的灵魂,但发现和创新不可能是无源之水、无本之木.自主创新需要坚实基础,这个坚实基础就是国防科技专用性人力资本的投资水平.然而,由于专用性投资固有的“套牢”和“敲竹杠”问题,员工一般自发进行专用性人力资本投资量总是不足,这一点可以从相对较高的国防科技人才流动率上窥豹一斑.文章通过构建国防科技专用性人力资本投资的“囚徒困境”模型,说明了国防科技专用性人力资本自主性投资不足的现状,并针对此现状,分析了非正式制度的基本功能,剖析了非正式制度对于国防科技专用性人力资本投资的激励机理,最终得出结论:在国防科技工业组织内,构建积极向上的合作性的非正式制度,不失为激励理性的国防科技人员积极投身于自身专用性人力资本的一个好办法.     

人力资本专用性对企业培训投资的影响

人力资本按其专用程度可以划分为通用性人力资本、准专用性人力资本和专用性人力资本。人力资本的专用程度影响着企业和雇员投资于人力资本培训的意愿及其投资量的大小。文章在分析企业和雇员各自培训投资的成本、风险和收益的基础上提出了一些促进双方投资于人力资本培训的建议     

雇佣合约、嵌入性过程控制与企业专用性人力资本投资——以GL集团为例

本文通过GL集团的案例,探讨了企业进行专用性入力资本投资的两种可行途径：一是雇佣合约框架内的专用性人力资本投资模式;二是嵌入性过程控制的专用性人力资本投资模式。前者以雇佣合约为前提,主要采用市场通行的“市场招聘＋人才改造”的形式。后者则是以“或有雇佣合约”为基础,其核心是采用某种方式对学校的人力资本生产过程（教育活动）施加某种控制或影响,进而将企业专用性入力资本生产过程嵌入到通用性入力资本的生产过程中。对这两种投资途径的研究．尤其是对后一种投资途径的研究．丰富和深化了对于专用性入力资本投资与企业合约之间逻辑关系的理解。     

不完全契约理论:一个综述

标准的契约理论或委托-代理理论假定契约是完全的,然而现实中的契约是不完全的。契约的不完全会导致事前的最优契约失效,当事人在面临被“敲竹杠”的风险时会做出无效率的专用性投资。经济学家们在研究如何最大程度地减少由于契约不完全所导致的效率损失时,发展了一个新兴的不完全契约理论。本文以一个基本模型为基点,围绕专用性投资效率问题,从司法干预、赔偿、治理结构、产权以及履约等多个视角,全面地介绍了不完全契约理论的产生、发展、应用以及面临的挑战和未来的前景。     

风险投资中的分阶段投资:一个人力资本的视角

文章通过一个套牢模型分析了在创业者的人力资本专有性向专用性转化过程中,风险资本家和创业者之间"双边承诺"问题的产生,解释了分阶段投资解决这一问题的作用机理.文章认为分阶段投资及与其配合的时间期权和非竞争条款本质上是相互关系专用性投资,合约双方通过相互专用性投资来"捆住"自己的手脚来取信于对方,以解决双边承诺问题,并得出以下结论:非人力资本专用性越强,每一阶段投资量越少;人力资本专用性越强,阶段投资量规模越大;分阶段投资中,每一阶段的投资额是递增的;阶段投资规模与预期收益增量正相关;分阶段投资通常有时间期权和非竞争条款与其配合,起到了在创业者人力资本投资前启动风险资本家投资的作用.     

不确定性环境对军事人力资本专用性投资的影响

文章以美国退役军人二次就业调查数据为基础,分析探讨了不确定环境与军事人力资本专用性投资两者之间的关系,指出过高或过低的不确定性都会导致军事人力资本专用性投资不足。因此,加强军事人力资本专用性投资需要将不确定性保持在一个相对合理的水平上。     

敲竹杠问题的本质及其解决方法

不完全契约理论认为,由于当事人的有限理性和事后机会主义行为导致敲竹杠发生;完全契约理论则认为,不完全契约理论存在契约不完全性外生化和有限理性假设矛盾等缺点,且不可验证性也不会阻碍有效的投资行为。不完全契约理论引入复杂性与参考点等概念说明,即使在完全理性条件下也可能产生敲竹杠问题,从而内生化了契约的不完全性。交易成本经济学从纵向一体化、产权理论从产权分配、关系契约理论从声誉博弈、完全契约理论从履约理论等角度提出了解决敲竹杠问题的方法。     

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.     

Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? Experimental evidence

In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to Hart and Moore?s (2008) recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points.     

Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan

Commitment failure lies at the core of incomplete contract theory, yet its quantitative significance has rarely been assessed. Using detailed plot-level data from rural Pakistan, we find that non-contractible investment is underprovided on tenanted land, even after controlling for the endogeneity of leasing decisions. Our evidence also indicates that moral hazard in investment effort alone cannot explain this inefficiency. Instead, imperfect commitment appears to be the driving mechanism, since even plots taken on fixed rent contracts where all the rent is paid upfront receive lower investment than owner-cultivated plots. We further show that a considerable portion of the variation in tenancy duration, and hence in the security of tenure, is due to heterogeneity across landlords. One interpretation of this finding is that landlord reputation is important in mitigating hold-up.     

Electricity demand estimation using proxy variables: some reservations

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of asymmetric information upon labour market decisions. First, in the face of uncertainty concerning person-specific information, self-selection employment contracts develop which induce ‘sorting’ within the labour market. Second, we show the existence of a smaller share in investment in specific human capital for those who accept the self-selection contract relative to those who refuse such contracts. Thus, the earnings of those who accept such contracts are less responsive to changes in specific human capital than the earnings of those who refuse these contracts. Third, we applied the model to the market for professional teachers in British Columbia, Canada. The results of the empirical tests were shown to be consistent with the hypotheses proposed. In addition, once we controlled for the level of and the distribution to human capital the Public–Independent earnings differential fell from 64.3% to 23.9%.     

Sunk capital,unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data

In this paper we study the hold-up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex-post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference-in-difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of OECD countries during the period 1980–2000. We find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries. We refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold-up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration, while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold-up problem. Our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power.