Twenty-five Years after Kramer: An Assessment of Economic Retrospective Voting based upon Improved Estimates of Income and Unemployment

Several studies in economics have derived estimates of economic activity in the years prior to World War II that differ significantly from official statistics. In this paper we examine the possibility that the impact of economic retrospective voting upon congressional election outcomes has been at least partially obscured by shortcomings in the official data series. To that end we re-estimate various specifications of the basic Kramer model with these revised measures of income and unemployment. Although the effect of changes in real per capita income does not depend much upon which particular income series we used, the observed impact of unemployment doubles in size when the new estimates of historical unemployment rates made by Romer (1986b) and by Darby (1976) are used. Although the evidence is less than definitive, the results of our analyses also lend credence to the proposition that economic conditions have a greater impact upon congressional voting in on-year elections than in off years, and that the incumbent party is bound to suffer a midterm penalty.     

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.     

Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

A class of voting procedures based on repeated ballots and elimination of one candidate in each round is shown to always induce an outcome in the top cycle and is thus Condorcet consistent, when voters behave strategically. This is an important class as it covers multi-stage, sequential elimination extensions of all standard one-shot voting rules (with the exception of negative voting), the same one-shot rules that would fail Condorcet consistency. The necessity of repeated ballots and sequential elimination are demonstrated by further showing that Condorcet consistency would fail in all standard voting rules that violate one or both of these conditions.     

Analysing voting behaviour in the United States banking sector through eigenvalue decomposition

Using data about votes emitted by funds in corporate meetings held by US banks from 2003 to 2013, we propose a novel approach based on eigenvalue decomposition to address the issue of communality in voting decisions. Our results indicate that there is a main underlying feature that contributes to explain this voting behaviour. Also, a dimensionality reduction could be accomplished so that a subset of the original data can replicate the sample. These findings confirm that there may be a sort of homogeneous or systematic component when it comes to explain the voting pattern into the banking industry.     

Minority voting and long-term decisions

In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.     

Rational Abstention and the Congressional Vote Choice

Research on voting, particularly on legislative behavior, tends to focus on the choices of those casting ballots. Yet, intuitively, abstentions and vote choice should be jointly determined. As such, the relevance of participation depends upon both the extent to which it can be explained by the costs and the benefits of voting and on the nature of the interactions between participation and preferences. To this end, we provide a framework for explaining roll call behavior that simultaneously considers legislators' decisions about whether and how to vote. Application to roll call voting in the 104th Congress finds that abstention and voting choices are integrated; our approach generates sensible and substantively important results which yield important insights into legislative behavior and public policy.     

Operational complexity of foreign innovation projects and the inter-organisational alliance in the biopharmaceutical industry in China

Contrary to the perceived assumption that operational complexity of innovation projects predicts operations inside the organisation, we propose the opposite argument that operational complexity of foreign innovation projects increases the inter-organisational alliance formation. The evidence from the clinical trials innovation projects in the biopharmaceutical sector supports the operational complexity-alliance (OCA) proposition in China at three levels: institutional (legal and cultural), technological (purpose and methodology) and dispositional (organisation type and its experience). Institutional complexity shows that the legal difference between the home and host country positively predicts the inter-organisational alliance. Similarly, in national cultural differences, power distance, uncertainty and long-term orientation support the OCA proposition. Technological complexity reveals that explorative purpose and complex methodologies support the OCA proposition. The organisation’s disposition reveals that the industrial firm predicts the inter-organisational alliance more than the non-industrial organisation does. Concerning the organisation’s experience, it negatively predicts the inter-organisational alliance. Therefore, it appears that organisational discretion from the operational complexities leads to the structural change to reduce the cost of operations through externalisation rather than internalisation.     

Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?

We investigate whether letting people vote for multiple candidates would yield policy moderation. We do so in a setting that takes three key features of elections into account, namely, strategic voting, endogenous candidacy and policy motivation on the part of the candidates. We consider two classes of voting rules. One class consists of the voting rules where each voter casts several equally-weighed votes for the different candidates. The other class consists of the voting rules where each voter rank-orders the candidates. We identify conditions under which these voting rules yield policy moderation. We also show that these voting rules may yield policy extremism instead of policy moderation if one (or several) of the conditions is not satisfied! Finally, we find that amongst these voting rules the extent of policy moderation is maximal under the Borda Count if we consider only equilibria where all candidates are serious contenders. However, this result does not carry over to spoiler equilibria, where Approval Voting can yield more moderate policy outcomes than the Borda Count.     

国外组织复杂性研究述评

现代科技飞速发展,组织所面临的环境日益动荡与复杂,与此相应的组织复杂性问题成为组织无法回避的一个命题.一方面组织复杂性使组织具有发动及维持多重行为的能力,使组织具备适应日益复杂和动荡环境的弹性;另一方面组织复杂性对组织也会产生负面影响.因此,正确的认识和管理组织复杂性,对组织的生存与发展具有重要意义.从组织复杂性的内涵、类型;形成原因、测量以及应对策略五个角度对国外组织复杂性的相关研究成果进行概述,并作简要评论.通过梳理发现,组织复杂性研究呈现出逐渐深化和多样化的态势.     

Exit polls,turnout, and bandwagon voting: Evidence from a natural experiment

We exploit a voting reform in France to estimate the causal effect of exit poll information on turnout and bandwagon voting. Before the change in legislation, individuals in some French overseas territories voted after the election result had already been made public via exit poll information from mainland France. We estimate that knowing the exit poll information decreases voter turnout by about 11 percentage points. Our study is the first clean empirical design outside of the laboratory to demonstrate the effect of such knowledge on voter turnout. Furthermore, we find that exit poll information significantly increases bandwagon voting; that is, voters who choose to turn out are more likely to vote for the expected winner.     

Bankruptcy voting process and corporate reorganization

This study investigates the main legal determinants of corporate reorganization use. Three legal aspects of bankruptcy voting process were examined, such as the voting right of secured creditors (1), bankruptcy voting rule (2), and court's legal right to overrule creditors’ decision (3). Using a sample of 20 countries, our estimations confirm that granting a voting right to secured lenders tends to be associated with more corporate reorganizations. Secured creditors’ voting right may send a signal about firm's capacity to recover from financial distress. Such signal can encourage unsecured creditors to support the reorganization plan.     

To bid or not to bid: That is the question: Public procurement,project complexity and corruption

The main aim of this study is to improve our comprehension of the role played by project complexity and institutional quality as possible drivers of the choice between open auctions and negotiations in a sample of Italian municipalities. Controlling for project characteristics, for observed and unobserved heterogeneity at municipality level, our main results suggest that projects that are more complex are more likely to be procured with negotiated procedures. On average, a rise in the project complexity index from the 25th to the 75th percentile of its distribution increases the probability of procuring the project with a negotiated procedure by about 6%–8%. However, our results also suggest that the impact of complexity might be more relevant in the case of projects procured by municipalities located in provinces characterized by low levels of corruption. Moreover, we also find that complex projects are associated to longer delays in their execution, larger rebates and to higher probabilities to be awarded to local firms.     

Minority representation, election method, and policy influence

Recently a number of legal scholars have advocated jurisdiction-wide cumulative voting as a mechanism to promote minority representation. Among other benefits, they claim minority representatives will have greater policy influence if they are elected in at-large contests rather than from single-member districts. We test this proposition by estimating the deter-minants of minority hiring practices. We find increases in the proportion of black representatives on a city council are positively correlated with the percentage of black police recruits. However, holding constant black representation, the impact of black councilors on municipal hiring is enhanced when councilors are elected at-large rather than by district.     

Non-consequentialist voting

Standard theory assumes that voters’ preferences over actions (voting) are induced by their preferences over electoral outcomes (policies, candidates). But voters may also have non-consequentialist (NC) motivations: they may care about how they vote even if it does not affect the outcome. When the likelihood of being pivotal is small, NC motivations can dominate voting behavior. To examine the prevalence of NC motivations, we design an experiment that exogenously varies the probability of being pivotal yet holds constant other features of the decision environment. We find a significant effect, consistent with at least 12.5 percent of subjects being motivated by NC concerns.     

The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

We consider collective choice from two alternatives. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers, and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences. An environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives. In many environments, the majority voting rule maximizes agents? ex-ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant-strategy implementable choice rules. But in some environments where the agents? utilities are stochastically correlated, other dominant-strategy choice rules are better for all agents. If utilities are stochastically independent across agents, majority voting is ex-ante optimal among all anonymous and incentive-compatible rules. We also compare rules from an interim-viewpoint.     

Did political constraints bind during transition?Evidence from Czech elections, 1990–20021

Many theoretical models of transition are driven by the assumption that economic decision making is subject to political constraints. In this paper we test whether the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of economic reform influenced voting behaviour in the first five national elections in the Czech Republic. We propose that voters, taking stock of endowments from the planning era, could predict whether they would become winners or losers of transition. Using survey data we measure the degree to which regions were ‘not afraid’ or ‘afraid’ of economic reform in 1990. We define the former as potential ‘winners’ who should vote for pro‐reform parties and the latter as potential ‘losers’ who should support left‐wing parties. Using election results and economic indicators at the regional level, we demonstrate that there is persistence in support for pro‐reform and communist parties which is driven by prospective voting based on initial conditions in 1990. We find that regional unemployment rates in 2002 are good predictors of voting patterns in 1990 and provide empirical evidence that political constraints bind during transition.     

Monetary integration in the ex‐Soviet Union: A ‘union of four’?*

The governments of four ex‐Soviet countries recently discussed forming a currency union. To examine the economic feasibility of this proposition, we use conventional techniques and show that the arrangement is likely to find it difficult to handle the lack of structural symmetry, the asymmetric pattern of shocks, and the lack of market flexibility among the potential participants. Moreover, the union would be a unilateral one. It would require an unusual degree of political commitment to survive. Nonetheless, there are some subtleties in the timing and pattern of mutual dependence between Russia and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent in Belarus, which may reduce the strain from a currency union in those countries. Otherwise, the black market will have to provide the necessary market flexibility.     

Central banks' voting records,the financial crisis and future monetary policy

We examine whether central banks' voting records help predict the future course of monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, controlling for financial market expectations. Unlike previous research, we first examine the period of the global financial crisis, characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and second, examine the predictive power of voting records over longer time horizons, i.e., the next monetary policy meeting and beyond. We find that voting records predict the policy rate set at the next meeting in all central banks that are recognized as independent. In some central banks, voting records are found—before, but not during, the financial crisis—to be informative about monetary policy at even more distant time horizons.     

A note on the interactions among monetary policy,the tax structure and equilibrium output

The proposition that the level of real income is independent of the money stock, originally discussed by quantity theorists, is currently being debated in terms of the rational expectations hypothesis. In this paper, we consider the interactions among monetary policy, the tax structure, and the supply side of the economy and show a potentially important qualification to this proposition. Further, we argue that the impact of monetary policy on output may be perverse.     

Fully sincere voting

In a general social choice framework where the requirement of strategy-proofness may not be sensible, we call a social choice rule fully sincere if it never gives any individual an incentive to vote for a less-preferred alternative over a more-preferred one and provides an incentive to vote for an alternative if and only if it is preferred to the default option that would result from abstaining. If the social choice rule can depend only on the number of votes that each alternative receives, those rules satisfying full sincerity are convex combinations of the rule that chooses each alternative with probability equal to the proportion of the vote it receives and an arbitrary rule that ignores voters' preferences. We note a sense in which the natural probabilistic analog of approval voting is the fully sincere rule that allows voters maximal flexibility in expressing their preferences and gives these preferences maximal weight.