Are legacy airline mergers pro- or anti-competitive? Evidence from recent U.S. airline mergers

Due to a series of recent mergers, the number of legacy airlines in the United States has decreased from six to three. We conduct a comprehensive investigation of the effect on fares and output of these legacy airline mergers to determine whether the mergers have had an overall pro-competitive or anti-competitive effect on consumers. Our difference-in-differences regression analysis shows that these mergers have been pro-competitive, with no significant adverse effect on nominal fares and with significant increases in passenger traffic as well as capacity. Taken together, the results indicate that the recent legacy mergers were pro-competitive.     

The Impact of Mergers on Quality Provision: Evidence from the Airline Industry

We examine how mergers affect quality provision by analyzing five U.S. airline mergers, focusing on on‐time performance (OTP). We find that airline mergers have minimal negative impacts on OTP, and likely result in long‐run improvements due to efficiencies. Importantly, we show that this finding is not driven by post‐merger changes in price that could affect OTP. Consequently, at least in the case of airlines, policymakers should not, as a rule, fear the negative quality effects of mergers.     

Estimating Differential Dynamic Merger Effects on Market Structure and Entry in Related Markets

The U.S. and EU merger guidelines emphasize “ease of entry” arguments but little is known about the dynamic impact of realized mergers on market structure. This study provides insights on this topic with the use of detailed firm-level data on the memory chip market. Our estimation results provide evidence for differential merger effects on market structure. These effects depend on whether the mergers are dominated by market-power or efficiency gains. While efficiency-dominated mergers cause exit, market-power-dominated mergers attract entrants, and these effects are increasing over time. We also find that market-power mergers have a larger effect on entry than efficiency mergers have on exit. Our results show that mergers can reduce the number of potential entrants into related product markets and serve as an instrument to “reduce the likelihood of entry”.

     

Does competition increase quality? Evidence from the US airline industry

This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.     

Should competition authorities care about conglomerate mergers?

Mergers and acquisitions may change competition even when they do not affect market structure, a case known as conglomerate mergers. In this paper, we explore a wave of acquisitions of higher education institutions by educational groups in Brazil, which allows us to disentangle the effects of conglomerate mergers and of horizontal mergers on price, quantity, and quality indicators. Our findings show that multiunit organizations are able to increase some quality indicators. As for the effect on price and quantity, results are different. For conglomerate mergers, we estimated an increase in the number of freshmen and tuition fees, whereas for acquisitions that lead to horizontal concentration there is no increase in quantity, just in prices. Also these effects are larger the smaller the market share of the acquired HEI. On the whole, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that multiunit operations increase efficiency, but only conglomerate mergers tend to pass those gains on to consumers. Results also indicate that greater caution should be taken in market extension mergers when the acquired firm has a clear dominant position.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Chinese listed companies: A principal–principal perspective

Chinese listed firms have gained the world’s attention with several ambitious, high-profile cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In most of these deals, the Chinese government is the largest shareholder of the acquiring firms. As such, it may be the case that the Chinese government pushes through such deals even though they are not in the best interests of minority shareholders, giving rise to principal–principal conflicts. Along these lines, we hypothesize that increased government ownership in the acquiring firm will be associated with investors viewing a cross-border merger deal in less favorable terms. In addition, we hypothesize that environmental complexity will moderate this negative relationship. We test our hypotheses with a sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions involving Chinese firms from 2000 to 2008. We find support for the main hypothesis, that is, that investors are indeed skeptical of cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals when the government is the majority owner (i.e., principal–principal conflicts). However, we find no support for the moderating effect. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners and suggest future research directions.     

金融危机下中国药企的海外并购

2008年的金融危机席卷全球，关于在金融危机中中国制药企业怎样通过海外并购来进军海外做大做强，已经成为当下迫切需要研究的问题。本文对中国药企海外并购的必要性及可行性进行了深入分析，归纳了中国药企在金融危机下的海外兼并中的关键问题，在此基础上提出相应对策、     

Policy Implications of the Effects of Concentration and Multimarket Contact in China’s Airline Market

Unlike many other mergers in developed countries, which might have been assessed and their effects estimated by antitrust authorities before being granted antitrust immunity, the airline mergers that swept China’s airline industry in 2002 occurred with no antitrust challenge. These mergers provide the opportunity to study important market power issues in China’s airline markets. Given that increased concentration and multimarket contact are the main legacies of an airline merger, the effects of mergers on these variables can raise the potential for the exercise of market power. However, an examination of the period 2002–2004 during which the Chinese airline mergers occurred shows that the resulting increased concentration and enhanced multimarket contact did not have important consequences for airfares in Chinese city-pair markets. The presence of Hainan Airlines appears to have played an important role in suppressing the airfares charged by China Eastern and China Southern.     

Market Structure after Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from the Banking Industry

Antitrust agencies use measures of market structure to evaluate the likely competitive effects of proposed mergers, but little is known about how measures of market structure change over time, particularly after consummation of mergers and acquisitions. This paper analyzes the changes in market structure 3 and 5 years after mergers in the US banking industry. Our analysis suggests that concentration decreases and the number of banks increases in banking markets where mergers resulted in high concentration levels. In markets where the level of concentration changed by a relatively large amount, our findings are more ambiguous, as the level of concentration decreases, but no effect is found on the number of competitors.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Efficiency and Firm Ownership: Some New Evidence

The paper investigates the effect of state ownership on efficiency of firmsusing an econometric model that allows for the separation of technical from allocative efficiency in adynamic setting. The estimation results, based on a sample of international airlines, suggest that state ownershipis associated with lower technical and allocative efficiency. State ownership's effect on technical efficiencyis mainly a dynamic one – lowering the rate of cost decline, whereas its effect on allocativeefficiency is static – raising the level of costs. Thus lower technical, rather than allocative, efficiency isthe main reason for state-owned firms to be less efficient than their private counterparts.     

Merger policy greatly simplified: Building on keyes

This comment urges a recognition of the fact that the main goal of antitrust, as revealed in a century of consequences, is not economic efficiency or consumer protection but the dispersion of power and decision-making in the business world. Building on Lucile S. Keyes' proposal for improving merger guidelines, it argues that the “true” aims of merger policy can be more efficiently pursued by disallowing all mergers involving very large firms that cannot be justified on efficiency grounds and ignoring mergers involving all other firms.     

Comment on “Merger Policy in the United States”

This paper comments briefly on a merger policy article by Dennis Mueller. It concurs with Mueller's judgment that X-efficiency consequences are of crucial relevance in developing a sound antitrust policy toward mergers. It agrees also that firms proposing mergers overstepping structural guidelines should be permitted an efficiencies defense, but it stresses the difficulties of making ex ante efficiency predictions.     

Industry costs and consolidation: efficiency gains and mergers in the U.S. railroad industry

Since partial deregulation in 1980, there has been a massive consolidation of firms in the U.S. railroad industry premised largely on efficiency gains. We estimate a cost function and use it to calculate cost effects for specific mergers and for all mergers at the industry level from 1983–2003. Our central results are that consolidation in the railroad industry accounts for about an 11.4 percent reduction in industry costs (more than $4 Billion in 1992 prices), and that while there are tremendous differences across mergers with respect to the direction, level, timing, and source of cost impacts, most mergers result in cost savings.     

Research notes and communications management objectives in mergers and acquisitions

A taxonomy of managerial goals in mergers and acquisitions is developed through a cluster analysis of data from interviews with merger and acquisition practitioners. These clusters of objectives overlap with some objectives cited for mergers and acquisitions in the academic literature, but the correspondence is not complete. Further analysis shows that different types of mergers and acquisitions are characterized by different managerial objectives. The implications of this research for the development of a contingency model of the relationship between managerial objectives and mergers and acquisitions are discussed.     

Mergers and synergy: Lessons from contemporary telecommunications history

Using contemporary historical data, the analysis reported in this article has evaluated the impact of the various mergers of the local exchange companies that took place between 1988 and 2001 on financial performance. Performance was measured using an important metric normally used to measure synergies of firms undergoing mergers. The analysis has revealed that the relative cash flow variable for firms worsened after mergers. If the synergy motive had been primary in influencing merger decisions, and also approvals, then the past mergers approved led to decreased performance levels and corresponding welfare losses for American consumers; thus, the mergers of communications common carriers were not in the interest of the public, the shareholders and customers. On the other hand, given the negative outcomes, views that the quiet life, hubris or a quest for possible market power motivated the mergers could be discarded. The lessons of such contemporary historical analysis have suggested that antitrust oppositions to contemporary telecommunications sector mergers may have basis in fact and salient evidence.     

U.S. merger policy and the 1992 Merger Guidelines

This article reviews the empirical evidence regarding the effects of mergers on corporate efficiency. In light of this evidence it then evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. merger policy as articulated in the 1992 Guidelines of the Department of Justice. It argues that the 1992 Guidelines and the U.S. Government's policies toward business more generally over the past 12 years have been characterized by a bias for bigness. It concludes that this bias will only be eliminated when government authorities in charge of merger policy recognize that many mergers lower economic efficiency and design and enforce their policies accordingly.     

Merger efficiency gains: Evidence from a large transport merger in france

Many industries are seeing an increase in concentration, leading to a discussion on the effectiveness of horizontal merger enforcement. The policy debate shows that one of the key arguments put forward when supporting potential mergers is the possibility of realization of merger efficiency gains, specifically in the transport industry. Yet, there exists little empirical evidence on the actual effects of realized mergers on cost efficiencies. We exploit a large and highly debated merger that took place in the French transport industry to evaluate whether a merger between two major transport groups may give rise to merger efficiency gains. We exploit the industry setting to employ a difference-in-differences methodology evaluating the effect of the merger on operating costs of merging transport groups. Our results show that, no matter the specification considered, we cannot conclude that the merger resulted in any merger specific efficiency gains for the merging parties. Our study relies on the use of several control groups and is robust to a great number of robustness checks as well as to the introduction of heterogeneous treatment effects, depending on the identity of the merging party, as well as the closeness of competition of local operators. Overall, our study contributes to a growing number of case studies undertaken by economists that can help determine whether horizontal merger policy is being properly enforced.     

Mergers,coordinated effects and efficiency in the Portuguese non-life insurance industry

We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firm-level data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms' demand curves are not very elastic. Firms' technologies exhibit scale and scope economies and high cost efficiency scores. We find that, for the period following the mergers, there is no evidence of: (i) an increase in market power through coordinated behavior, or (ii) changes in cost efficiency levels. In addition, social welfare increased.     

Firm-specific time preferences and postmerger firm performance

This study investigates the role of firm-level discount factors in evaluating the impact of mergers on market outcomes. Discount factors reflect time preferences for future cash flows and are used to determine the present value of investment projects such as mergers. Firm-specific discount factors imply that firms may attach different present values to mergers. We elicit firm-specific time preferences and identify firms’ discount factors using firm-specific production data while building on the existence of learning-by-doing in the semiconductor industry. Our estimation results show that firm-specific discount factors explain firms’ production decisions. We also find that firms’ discount factors and merger acquisition strategies explain heterogeneous merger outcomes. Our results show that acquiring firms characterized by low discount factors (impatient firms) are highly efficient and merge with highly efficient and innovative firms. Impatient acquirers achieve relatively higher efficiency gains in the short run than patient acquirers and adopt acquisition strategies that put more weight on achieving instant efficiency gains. In contrast, patient acquirers are least efficient and merge with firms that are larger than themselves. Patient acquirers place more value on achieving efficiency gains in the more distant future.