The impact of regulating mobile termination rates and MNO-MVNO relationships on retail prices

A mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) provides mobile telecommunication services by eluding the constraints of the radio communication infrastructure and establishing an agreement with a hosting network operator (HNO) for the use of its spectrum. Thus, MVNOs offer a wide range of mobile services and directly compete with every mobile network operator (MNO). This paper studies the economic justifications for potential regulatory intervention that defines the level of mobile termination rates (MTRs) and negotiations and agreements among MVNOs and HNOs. The results show that symmetric MTR reduction leads to competition growth among operators, forcing every operator to reduce retail prices and, consequently, to enhancing consumer welfare. The paper also finds that a collaborative strategy adopted by an HNO and an MVNO is advantageous for both and induces a reduction in retail prices, thus weakening other MNOs.     

Flex cars and competition in fuel retail markets

We study how the diffusion of flex (bi-fuel) cars affected competition on ethanol and gasoline retail markets. We propose a model of price competition in which the two fuels become closer substitutes as flex cars penetration grows. We use a large panel of weekly prices at the station level to show that fuel prices and margins have fallen in response to this change. This finding is evidence of market power in fuel retail and indicates that innovations that increase consumer choice benefit even those who choose not to adopt them.     

The impact of regulation on the retail prices in fixed-line telephony across the European Union

This paper estimates reduced-form models for incumbent prices in the fixed telecommunications industry using data for European Union (EU) countries from 1998 to 2002. The regulation of fixed-line telephony has a significant impact on prices for residential consumers. Liberalization of the telecommunications industry decreased retail prices by about 8.2%. The introduction of carrier pre-selection and number portability had a negative impact on price levels. The estimation results also suggest that a 1% decrease in termination charges on the incumbent network led on average to a 0.17% decrease in the cost of usage basket for residential consumers. Furthermore, in the pricing regressions for incumbent local and national calls at peak and off-peak times interconnection charges are significant only in the estimation of national peak prices. A 1% decrease in single transit interconnection charges on the incumbent network led to a 0.31% decrease in incumbent national prices at peak times, as calculated for the average prices in the EU in 2002.     

Link between termination rates and retail prices in Namibia,Kenya and South Africa

This paper analyses the link between mobile termination rate reductions and retail prices. It draws on in-depth case studies of South Africa, Namibia and Kenya where regulators have reduced termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operator. To varying degrees these have all led to lower retail prices and significant market expansion. While retail prices in both Namibia and Kenya dropped following substantial termination rate reductions, the South African case demonstrates that termination rate reductions are not always passed on to consumers as is hoped by such regulatory interventions. In South Africa, it was only after the second reduction in March 2012 that smaller operators were able to reduce their off-net prices to a level that could tempt the subscribers to dominant operators to switch. All the case studies confirm nevertheless that retail prices do not go up in response to termination rates going down as contended by dominant mobile operators around the world. This is in contrast to a body of literature stating that termination rates and mobile retail prices constitute a two-sided market and that termination rate reductions will lead to a so-called “waterbed effect”.     

Strategic entry and potential competition: Evidence from compressed gas fuel retail

We provide novel evidence on the effect of the threat of potential competition on the timing of entry in a new and growing industry. Exploiting a change in regulation in the Italian retail fuel market that generates exogenous variation in the number of potential entrants in the emerging Compressed Natural Gas segment, we show that markets with a higher number of potential entrants witness speedier entry decisions. We document that this result is likely driven by an increase in the incentives to preempt the market due to heightened risk of being anticipated by competitors.     

全国各省(市、区)及中心城市汽柴油批发及零售价格表

根据《国家发展改革委关于提高国内成品油价格的通知》（发改电[2009]172号）,从2009年6月1日零时起,国内市场汽柴油价格统一上调400元/吨。《通知》主要内容如下：1）供军队及新疆生产建设兵团、国家储备用汽、柴油（标准品）价格分别上调至6130元／吨和5390元／吨。     

全国各省(市、区)及中心城市汽柴油批发及零售价格表

根据《国家发展改革委关于降低成品油价格的通知》(发改电[2009]214号),从2009年7月29日零时起,国内市场汽油、柴油价格统一下调220元/吨。《通知》主要内容如下:1)供军队及新疆生产建设兵团、国家储备用的汽柴油(标准品,下同)价格分别调整至6510元/吨和5770元/吨。2)供铁道部等专项用户的汽柴油最高价格分别调整至6910元/吨和6170元/吨,其中供林业、农垦用汽柴油价格仍暂按供军队用油价格执行。非标准品最高供应价格由成品油生产经营企业按照国家规定的品质比率确定。3)对符合资质的民营批发企业最高供应价格按最高零售限价扣减400元/吨确定。当市场零售价格降低时,供应价格要相应降低,保持价差不小于400元/吨。4)等额下调各地汽柴油最高零售限价(具体见下表)。成品油零售企业可在不超过汽柴油最高零售价格的前提下,自主制定具体零售价格。5)在配送条件下,批零差价不得小于300元/吨,最高批发价按最高零售价格扣减300元/吨确定;合同未约定配送的,最高批发价格由各省(区、市)价格主管部门在300元/吨的基础上,再考虑运杂费因素确定。当市场零售价格降低时,批发价格也要相应降低,保持批零价差不小于300元...     

全国各省(市、区)及中心城市汽柴油批发及零售价格表

编者按:根据<国家发展改革委关于提高成品油价格的通知>(发改电[2009]238号),从2009年9月2日零时起,国内市场汽柴油价格统一上调300元/吨.<通知>主要内容如下:1)供军队及新疆生产建设兵团、国家储备用的汽油、柴油(标准品,下同)价格分别调整至6810元/吨和16070元/吨.     

全国各省市区及中心城市汽柴油批发及零售价格表

自2008年7月份以来,国际原油价格在创出147美元/桶的历史新高后开始高台跳水,截至12月中旬,国际主要原油价格已经跌至40美元/桶附近,绝对跌幅超过70%。同时,国内油品市场供求关系发生逆转,出现了严重的供过于求的现象。因此,在燃油税改革方案（2009年1月1日起正式实施）明确以后,国家发展和改革委员会自2008年12月19日起大幅下调国内成品油价格（考虑了燃油税增加的因素）。     

油价走势

国际市场主要原油现货平均价格表 单位:美元/桶 WTI 布伦特 迪 拜 米纳斯 塔皮斯辛 塔大 庆 胜 利2000年30.5028.6326.3628.9729.9528.2928.9728.882001年25.8924.4522.7724.1025.3523.2324.0222.222002年26.1025.0123.7325.6825.7224.6725.5023.782002年10月28.8727.5726.3229.7527.9027.8729.1626.652002年11月26.3024.0823.3128.2826.9226.4527.7125.282002年12月29.6128.8325.8132.7630.3830.9032.2330.402003年1月33.1431.3228.0232.3731.9531.6232.3430.682003年2月35.6032.7129.9831.943…     

The antitrust implications of electronic business-to-business marketplaces

Electronic marketplaces (e-marketplaces) allow networks of buyers and sellers to conduct business online and to exchange information more efficiently using Internet technology. Despite the benefits that e-marketplaces potentially afford firms, concerns have been raised that these markets may damage competition and potentially violate antitrust laws. This study considers the antitrust legislation related to e-marketplaces and examines the possible antitrust concerns that they raise. Potentially anticompetitive features of e-marketplaces are examined and guidance for firm conduct when creating or participating in an e-marketplace is offered.     

An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts

Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. Such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We apply a new test to an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the “tied” market has homogeneous goods. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.     

An antitrust analysis of non-profit hospital mergers

This paper considers such issues involved in non-profit hospital mergers as relevant product and geographic markets and the impacts of mergers on competition. The roles of non-price competition, entry barriers, and merger-generated efficiencies are considered. Close attention is given to the relevance of the Justice Department Merger guideline to the hospital industry. Through detailed examination of four litigated or challenged cases, the geographic market is shown to depend upon particular medical services. Outpatient services are found to comprise a separate market from inpatient hospital services, and non-profit status is determined to warrant the usual antitrust merger treatment.     

全国各省市区及中心城市汽柴油批发及零售价格表

编者按:国家发展和改革委员会继2008年12月19日大幅下调国内成品油价格后,2009年1月15日再次小幅下调国内成品油价格.主要内容如下:1)供军队及新疆生产建设兵团、林业、农垦、国家储备用的汽、柴油(标准品)价格分别下调140元/吨和160元/吨,至5440元/吨和4810元/吨.2)对供专项用户和民营批发企业用的汽柴油实行最高供应限价,分别为5840元/吨和5210元/吨,并要求对供符合资质的民营批发企业的汽、柴油价格与最高零售限价的价差不低于400元/吨.     

Optimal antitrust policy under different regimes of fines

This paper shows how antitrust laws against price-fixing can be enforced efficiently in the presence of asymmetric information between the authorities and the industry, and under different regimes of pecuniary punishment. We consider two regimes of fines that are often used in practice. The first involves a fine based on revenues of the industry while the second is related to the damage caused to consumers. The analysis shows that since investigation is costly, it is optimal from a welfare point of view to tolerate some degree of collusion in both cases. Comparing the deterrence levels, we show that no regime is a priori better than the other. In addition, we show that for industries where the possibilities of collusion are small, the first system dominates the second in terms of efficiency. Conversely, for high possibilities of collusion, the second system is better.     

开设玩具零售店的几个问题

社会经济和文化的不断发展,消费者对儿童消费愈加重视,同时,国内玩具企业纷纷转战内销市场,使得儿童玩具市场日益火爆。而目前,国内玩具产能巨大,却缺乏足够的销售渠道和平台,这也给广大从业者带来了商机。然而,玩具产品与其他消费品不司,如何开设一家零售店,或是打造一个零售品牌确实需要下点功夫。玩具与普通消费品不同,投资者应有很好的眼光,在快乐中淘金。