The Dynamics of Industry Concentration for U.S. Micro and Macro Brewers

In this update we document the changes in industry concentration of macro and micro brewers in the U.S. brewing industry since 1970. Technological change and the continued success of Anheuser–Busch forced the macro brewers into a war-of-attrition game and contributed to rising concentration in the macro sector of the industry. Homogenization of the beer produced by macro brewers, changes in local demand conditions, and a more favorable regulatory environment created profitable niches in many local markets for micro brewery beer, and entry into this sector occurred at a phenomenal rate from 1977 to 1998. Consistent with several models of industry dynamics, over-exuberance led to a shakeout as the number of micro breweries fell by over 16% from 1998 to 2002.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Little Fish in a Big Pond: Legitimacy Transfer,Authenticity, and Factors of Peripheral Firm Entry and Growth in the Market Center

Research summary : How do peripheral firms compete and secure future growth? Building on literature in strategy and organizational theory, we test a model of peripheral entry and growth in the mainstream market segment. Using data from 289 craft breweries over 11 years, we find evidence that niche producers are increasingly entering the mainstream market and competing with market‐center firms. We identify two mechanisms contributing to these actions: legitimacy transfer and cognitive claims of authenticity. As hypothesized, imitation of niche products by macro breweries facilitates craft beer entry into mainstream markets. Moreover, two authenticity‐based identity codes are found to reliably influence craft brewery growth: a local identity (i.e., operating in one's local market) and a product proliferator identity (i.e., offering a more diverse set of products) . Managerial summary : How can small niche firms compete with larger, more established organizations? By examining the rapidly expanding craft beer industry, this study explores how craft breweries are able to both enter the market space of these larger competitors and secure sustained patterns of growth. Specifically, we highlight two factors influencing the success of craft breweries. First, as major beer producers mimic niche products (i.e., faux craft beer), smaller niche firms are allowed to enter the market by exposing the typical consumer to the tastes of craft beer. Second, craft breweries enjoy increased success if they (a) emphasize the local elements of their company, and/or (b) offer a larger number of products . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Low‐Price Guarantees Guarantee Low Prices? Evidence from Competition between Amazon and Big‐Box Stores

It has long been understood in theory that price‐match guarantees can be anticompetitive, but to date, scant empirical evidence is available outside of some narrow markets. This paper broadens the scope of empirical analysis, studying a wide range of products sold on a national online market. Using an algorithm that extracts data from charts, I obtain a novel source of data from online price trackers. I examine prices of goods sold on Amazon before and after two big‐box stores (Target and Best Buy) announced a guarantee to match Amazon's prices. Employing both difference‐in‐difference and regression‐discontinuity approaches, I robustly estimate a positive causal effect of six percentage points. The effect was heterogeneous, with larger price increases for initially lower‐priced items. My results support anticompetitive theories which predict price increases for Amazon, a firm that did not adopt the guarantee, and are consistent with plausible mechanisms for the heterogeneous impact.     

Estimating Market Power in the US Copper Industry

Before 1978, most of the domestic copper production in the US and an important share of imports were traded at a price set by the major US producers. At the same time, the rest of the world was trading copper at prices determined in auction markets. This two-price system ended in 1978, when the largest US producers began using the Comex price of refined copper as a benchmark for setting their prices. Using this regime shift, I empirically test the competitive behavior of the US copper industry before 1978. The results show that copper prices were close to the levels predicted by a competitive model of the industry.     

Estimation of the Effects of New Brands on Incumbents’ Profits and Consumer Welfare: The U.S. Processed Cheese Market Case

I estimate the effects of new brands on market competition and consumer welfare in the U.S. processed cheese market. I find that an observed increase in consumer welfare was attributable mainly to an increase in the number of brands in the sample market, while the price effect, which measures welfare change caused by adding new brands to existing brands, decreased welfare as the prices of the existing brands increased in a large portion of sample markets. The price increase was most pronounced among the introducers existing brands. I also find that the data used in the paper identify a significant enhancement of consumer welfare as a result of the change in product characteristics provided by new brands even if a large portion of welfare gain is explained by the assumption on the error term in the utility function.JEL classification: D40, D60, L13, L66, H20     

Exclusive territories and performance dimensions in industrial distribution channels

There are two main approaches to studying vertical restraints in distribution channels: the anti-competitive and the efficiency approach. This article sets out to analyze the effects of exclusive territories agreements on performance levels in the distribution channel by proposing a number of hypotheses based upon these two approaches and by testing them with paired data from a sample of 116 manufacturer-dealer relationships from the Spanish industrial market. Results show that manufacturers and dealers perceive higher role performance levels in their partners in relationships characterized by exclusive territories. In a similar way, both manufacturers and dealers obtain higher levels of business performance in exclusive territories relationships, but we found no support for a direct effect of this vertical restraint on business performance. Instead, this effect is completely mediated by the higher levels of role performance associated with the exclusive territories agreement. Thus, empirical findings suggest that the economic outcomes achieved in ET relationships are due not to the presence of monopoly rents, but rather to the better role performance of the participants.     

The effect of air traffic delays on airline prices

A legislative change in takeoff and landing restrictions at LaGuardia Airport provides an opportunity to study the effect of an exogenous shock to product quality on prices in the airline industry. I test how the price response varies with the degree of competition in the market. I find that prices fall by $1.42 on average for each additional minute of flight delay, and that the price response is substantially larger in more competitive markets.     

Double Marginalization and Privatization in Liquor Retailing

The purpose of this paper is to examine the price andstore count predictions of the spatial and non-spatialmodels of vertical integration between an upstreammonopolist and a downstream monopolisticallycompetitive retail industry using data from Alberta'srecently privatized liquor retailing industry. Thisindustry, which had been a government owned monopoly,became monopolistically competitive underprivatization. The models predict that verticaldisintegration will lead to higher retail prices andan increase in the store count in markets that cansupport multiple stores. Both predictions aresupported by liquor store count and price data.     

Market Structure and the Pricing of Electricity and Natural Gas

US Electricity and natural gas markets have traditionally been serviced by one of two market structures. In some markets, electricity and natural gas are sold by a regulated dual-product monopolist, while in other markets, electricity and natural gas are sold by separate regulated single-product monopolies. I analyze whether electricity and natural gas prices depend on the market structure and compare these results to the predictions of a number of theories. The results are most consistent with the political economy theories suggesting that regulators respond to interest group activity.     

Divestiture requirements as a tool for competition policy: A case from the Swedish beer market

We investigate the effect of divestitures on prices and welfare following the Carlsberg–Pripps merger in the Swedish beer market. Both difference-in-difference estimation and simulations using a random coefficients logit model suggest that divestitures are important for dampening price increases. Prices of divested brands fall by around 3% and the predicted price increase for Carlsberg falls from 3 to 1.6% as a result of the divestitures. To guide practice on divestitures, we investigate the role of the recipient and the number and characteristics of the divested products by simulating post-merger outcomes for all relevant cases. We find that in this setting with large multiproduct firms, the competition authority's most effective means to dampen adverse post-merger outcomes are to aim for a small recipient firm and attain a large number of divested products. Enforcing larger divestitures in terms of market share and raising the average cross-price elasticity between the merging parties' divested and retained products strengthen the dampening effect further.     

The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance

This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings.     

Beer Advertising and Marketing Update: Structure,Conduct, and Social Costs

Beer advertising is a topic that has frequently attracted the attention of industrial organization economists. This update reviews major events, data trends, and research for each of three issues: (1) the importance of advertising and product differentiation for structural change in the brewing industry; (2) the manner and extent to which brewers can strategically alter market shares using advertising; and (3) the social costs of beer advertising and marketing, including advertising bans, targeting of underage youth, and recent changes in the three-tier system of alcohol distribution. Major legal decisions pertaining to commercial speech and other regulations also are discussed.JEL Classifications: L66, L13, M37     

PRICE COMPETITION IN U.S. BREWING*

This study utilizes a brand‐level dataset that captures a unique natural experiment, a 100% increase in the excise tax, to evaluate different pricing models in the U.S. beer industry. To assess the plausibility of different models, the increase in marginal cost resulting from the tax increase is exploited: observed prices in the post‐increase period are compared to the prices that should be observed under various pricing models. Three types of models are analyzed: Bertrand‐Nash, leadership, and collusion. Results indicate that extreme cases of collusion can be confidently ruled out while several models may explain the observed prices equally well.     

Dynamic oligopoly pricing: Evidence from the airline industry

We explore how pricing dynamics in the European airline industry vary with the competitive environment and with customer heterogeneity. We document three main findings. First, the rate at which prices increase towards the scheduled departure date is significantly reduced in more competitive markets. Second, the sensitivity of the intertemporal slope to competition increases in the heterogeneity of the customer base. Third, ex-ante predictable advance purchase discounts account for 83 percent of within-flight dispersion in prices and for 17 percent of cross-market variation in pricing dynamics.     

Exclusive Contracts And Market Power: Evidence From Ocean Shipping

There is a substantial theoretical literature on the potential effects of loyalty contracts, but relatively little empirical work. We employ the event study methodology to examine the competitive effects of exclusionary contracts in the ocean shipping industry, where they were the subject of an extended legal and political struggle. We find that some of the most important events in this conflict caused significant changes in shipping firms' stock returns, indicating exclusive contracts increased their profits. We then examine the effect of these events on net exporting industries' stock returns, and provide evidence that these contracts contributed to carriers' market power.     

Measuring unilateral effects in partial horizontal acquisitions

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest, by competition agencies, in assessing the competitive effects of partial acquisitions. We propose an empirical structural methodology to examine quantitatively the unilateral impact of partial horizontal acquisitions. The acquisitions may be direct or indirect, and may or may not correspond to control. The proposed methodology simulates the effects on prices, market shares, firm profits and consumer welfare. It can deal with differentiated product industries and nest full mergers as a special case. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.     

The industry context of strategy,structure and performance: The U.K. brewing industry

This paper is concerned with identifying influences on the competitive performance of companies involved in the U.K. brewing industry. It seeks to identify key strategic characteristics, relate these to company performance and move towards an explanation of the influences that emerge as influencing competitive standing. It argues that diversification strategies must be studied as an aspect of industry structure, and shows that more focused, limited diversification and regional brewing strategies may be preferable in the context of the U.K. brewing industry. The research findings conflict with those of many previous studies which research the diversification strategies of primarily large firms (both in the U.S. and the U.K.) drawn from across-industry samples (e.g. the Fortune 500 firms) and which identify superior performance for related diversification strategies. The study therefore provides support for the hypothesis that there is an optimum level of diversification within an industry which balances economies of scope and diseconomies of organizational scale. In the context of the U.K. brewing industry the traditional single or dominant business brewers seem to have found the strategy which matches firms effectively with the important characteristics of industry structure.     

Market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets

Using cross-section data on a national sample of city-pair markets for rail freight, I examine correlations between prices, quantities, and the number of single-line and interline firms serving markets. I estimate the reduced form of a structural model in which rail rates and quantities depend on the number of firms. I find that rates increase as the number of firms serving the market falls, and quantities shipped rise as the number of firms falls. The result is consistent with market power for rail freight shippers that causes markups to rise when fewer firms serve the market, and is not consistent with other explanations of the relationship between number of firms and rates and quantities. Interline shipment is much more costly than single-line, suggesting that mergers may be desirable even if they exacerbate market power problems.     

Comparing the resource‐based and relational views: knowledge transfer and spillover in vertical alliances

We compare resource‐based and relational perspectives to examine competitive advantages within the context of vertical learning alliances. Previous research has shown that through such alliances suppliers acquire knowledge to forge new capabilities and attain performance improvements. We ask whether such improvements are exclusive to the learning partnership, or are available in other average partnerships of this supplier. We posit that the extent to which such performance improvements are partnership exclusive depends on whether the newly forged capabilities lie entirely within the supplier firm's boundaries, or at the learning dyad level. As such, we untie two forms of performance improvements arising from learning dyads. While the resource‐based view helps explain the performance gains learning suppliers deploy across average partners, the relational view reveals the additional performance edge that remains exclusive to the learning partnership. Based on empirical evidence from a survey of 253 suppliers to the equipment industry, we find that partnership exclusive performance (i.e., ‘relational performance’), the true source of learning dyads' competitive advantage, is a function of suppliers acquiring know‐how within the dyad, developing dyad‐specific assets and capabilities, and structuring buyer‐supplier relational governance mechanisms. We discuss implications for research and practice. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.