Horizontal concentration and anticompetitive behavior in the central Canadian cement industry: testing arbitrage cost hypotheses

Consider a market with a small number of firms attempting to collude. If they successfully act as a dominant firm, they will raise price. This in turn will expand output by any fringe firms and thus reduce the market share of the colluding group. Thus, higher prices will decrease concentration over time. Here we test this hypothesis, using a modification of Spiller and Huang (1986) and data from the post-1974 Toronto cement market. The weight of the evidence indicates that market price has a negative effect on concentration, implying that the firms in this market act, with significant though limited, success as a cartel.     

Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants,consequences, and prevention

We experimentally investigate the determinants of post-cartel tacit collusion (PCTC), the effects of PCTC on market outcomes, and potential policy measures aimed at its prevention. PCTC occurs robustly with or without fines or leniency and is determined both by collusive price hysteresis and learning about cartel partners’ characteristics and strategies. As a result, it is also strongly related to the preceding cartel success. PCTC generates a downward bias in the estimated cartel overcharges. This threatens the effectiveness of deterrence induced by private damage litigation and fines imposed on colluding firms based on the overcharge. This bias further increases with preceding cartel stability such that especially more stable sets of colluding firms may be deterred less when PCTC is present. Rematching colluding subjects with strangers within a session prevents PCTC. This indicates that barring colluding managers from their posts could help impede PCTC in the field.     

Symbiotic production: The case of telecommunication pricing

In this paper we analyze a generalization of vertical monopolies in which monopoly suppliers trade essential inputs with one another. The most obvious applications of the model, which we call symbiotic production, are to postal and telecommunications services. We show how producers can use per-unit tariffs to achieve cooperative outcomes without colluding directly over consumer prices. We then show the firms have an incentive to collude in the setting of tariffs but that suchcollusion will lower consumer prices. This assumes that the suppliers are otherwise unfettered. In contrast, if the constituent monopolies are regulated, we show that collusion enables the firms to completely undo the restraints of regulation. The model has important policy implications for the international telecommunications market.     

Predation and network based price discrimination in Chile

This paper uses a model of strategic interaction among firms –that set discriminatory and nonlinear prices– in addition to public information on prices of the plans marketed by the three major mobile phone companies, to assess the extent to which on-net/off-net price differentials in the plans they offered could represent predatory practices in the mobile telephony market in Chile. The results show that the largest companies offered a few plans with an off-net/on-net price differential larger than what a competitive theoretical model predicts. This larger differential is consistent with the notion of predation defined by Hoernig (2007) as reducing a competitor's profits. Despite the fact that these plans were a small fraction of all the plans mobile phone firms offered, they were recently banned by the antitrust authority because of their potential anticompetitive effects.     

Did victories in certification contests affect the survival of organizations in the American automobile industry during 1895–1912? A replication study

Research summary: We successfully replicate the highly influential study: “The social construction of reputation…,”(Rao, 1994 ) which reports that cumulative victories in certification contests are negatively associated with firm failure. The replication is robust to the inclusion of additional controls. As in the original, tests of whether the theory is most powerful under higher uncertainty are not supported. Further, placing second, third, or merely participating in races also negatively predicts firm failure, and there is insufficient information in the data to tease out the importance of these predictors versus race victories. We discuss the assumptions under which the evidence can be interpreted as supportive of a more general argument of “loose coupling”, where affiliation with certification contests reduces firm failure. Managerial summary: We successfully replicate a study that related victories in races to the survival of early automobile firms. This result was interpreted as evidence that rank‐order certification contests legitimized firms and led to survival. We then demonstrate that there is insufficient information to tease out the relative importance of victories, as opposed to placing second, third, or merely participating in predicting survival. Our result is consistent with an argument that affiliation with certification contests, not only winning them, increases a firm's chances of survival. It is also consistent with an argument that firms with better quality automobiles won races and survived. An implication of our work is that there is insufficient evidence to determine if firms in new industries should expend finite resources on participation in certification contests or improvement of product quality.     

Stochastic market sharing, partial communication and collusion

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive private signals of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a substitute for communication in low demand states. Partial communication in high demand states is sufficient to achieve the most collusive, full communication outcome and strictly dominates partial communication in low demand states. Communication in high demand states allows firms to coordinate their pricing, choose the most efficient uninformed price and avoid price wars. I demonstrate that under some conditions consumers are better off with communication among colluding firms.     

Personnel Decisions,Wage Profiles and Investment in Firms

An investment model where firms mitigate adverse hold‐up effects using hiring and personnel policies is theoretically investigated and empirically scrutinized. While no evidence for the prediction of differing worker characteristics, other than gender, across firms is found, demand (firm) side factors are evident in the hiring process. Evidence on other personnel policies is consistent with theory, which predicts firms with high‐investment expenditures resist unions, utilize more temporary and shift‐time workers and conduct more multitask training. Wages in high‐investment firms are higher, more sensitive to unemployment and experience variables that exhibit greater effects than in low‐investment firms.     

What do they know? The effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance

This article contributes to the literature on board effectiveness by being perhaps the first to systematically examine how the nature of outside directors' prior experience, and resulting expertise, will influence the performance of a focal firm's strategic initiatives. Our theoretical model is grounded in the psychological literature on expertise and its role in group decision making effectiveness. We focus on outside director expertise in acquisition decision making, and its implications for the performance of the acquisitions of a focal firm. Our conceptual framework indicates that directors will develop expertise in making particular kinds of acquisition decisions (e.g., related or unrelated acquisitions or acquisitions in specific industries or product markets) through their past experiences at other firms with decisions about those specific types of acquisitions, and we predict that this experience and expertise will have positive effects on the performance of a focal firm's acquisitions. We extend our theoretical model to consider the conditions under which relevant director experience will prove most beneficial. Our model predicts that outside director acquisition expertise will deliver the greatest benefits when the focal firm's board is independent from management. We find empirical support for all of our hypotheses. In considering how and when director experience and resulting expertise may influence the performance of corporate acquisitions, our theory and results help to highlight a potential second main focus for research on the long‐standing question of what factors render boards of directors effective. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

COMPETITION AND DISCLOSURE*

There are many laws that require sellers to disclose private information about the quality of their products. But the theoretical justification for these laws is not obvious: economic theory predicts that a seller will voluntarily disclose such quality information, however unfavorable, as long as it is costless to do so. Here we show that competitive pressures between firms can undermine this full disclosure result, and explain why it may be the case that only high‐quality firms choose to disclose. In this setting, mandatory disclosure laws can promote competition and raise consumer surplus at the expense of firm profits, potentially increasing the efficiency of the market.     

How capital structure influences diversification performance: A transaction cost perspective

Extant theories agree that debt should inhibit diversification but predict opposing performance consequences. While agency theory predicts that debt should lead to higher performance for diversifying firms, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that more debt will lead to lower performance for firms expanding into new markets. Our empirical tests on a large sample of Japanese firms support TCE by showing that firms accrue higher returns from leveraging their resources and capabilities into new markets when managers are shielded from the rigors of the market governance of debt, particularly bond debt. Furthermore, we find that the detrimental effects of debt are exacerbated for R&D intensive firms and that debt is not necessarily harmful to firms that are either contracting or managing a stable portfolio of markets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&;D Duopoly

This note considers the paper of Poyago-Theotoky (1999) on strategic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers (i.e., complete sharing of information).      

The Impact of Product Market Competition on Employment Determination in Unionised and Non-Unionised Firms: Firm Level Evidence for the U.K.

In this paper we investigate the effect of increasedcompetition on employment inunionised andnon-unionised firms. We model product and labourmarket imperfections, and their interactions, in Nashequilibrium. The model predicts that employment lossin unionised firms in the face of increasedcompetition will be lower compared with non-unionisedfirms. This paradoxical outcome results from anoffsetting beneficial employment effect ofcompetition, which eliminates wage mark-ups inunionised firms. We find empirical support for thetheoretical prediction using U.K. firm level data overthe period 1985–1989.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.     

Investigating the implications of business and culture on the behaviour of customers of international firms

For many years international firms have been leveraging from the consistent growth rate of the Indian economy and, considering forecasts, will continue to do so in the future. This study identifies factors that influence the behaviour of business customers of international firms in emerging markets such as India. Based on the extant literature and in-depth personal interviews with practitioners, combined with a field survey, the authors have tried to understand the impact these factors have on the behaviour of business customers of international firms. The data were useful for testing the model developed using regression analysis and were found to be significant. The model demonstrates that the behaviour of local firms as customers of international firms in emerging markets is governed by factors such as business risk and a propensity to business sustainability. The model will be useful for international firms who wish to operate in emerging markets through local business firms that seek to associate with international firms.     

MARKET POWER AND PRICE MOVEMENTS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE*

This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly‐pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly‐pricing model.     

Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments

We consider a dynamic homogeneous oligopoly in which firms set prices repeatedly. Theory predicts that short-run price commitments increase profits and may lead to less price stability. The experiments that we conducted provide support for the first effect and against the second effect when a random ending rule is applied. When a fixed ending rule is applied, we find no significant impact of short-run price commitments on profits and price stability.     

Whole vs. shared ownership of foreign affiliates

This paper studies why multinational firms often share ownership of a foreign affiliate with a local partner even in the absence of government restrictions on ownership. We show that shared ownership may arise, if (i) the partner owns assets that are potentially important for the investment project, and (ii) the value of these assets is private information. In this context shared ownership acts as a screening device. Our model predicts that the multinational's ownership share is increasing in its productivity, with the most productive multinationals choosing not to rely on a foreign partner at all. This prediction is shown to be consistent with data on the ownership choices of Japanese multinationals.     

Output flexibility—A competitive advantage for small firms

We explore three theoretical perspectives that look at output flexibility as a competitive advantage for small firms as was initially described by Stigler (1939). First, small firms are more willing to fluctuate their output. As a result: second, small firms can trade cost inefficiency with volume flexibility to increase their profits; third, output flexibility is a more viable source of competitive advantage in volatile and capital-intensive industries, and less viable in profitable industries. Indeed, the empirical analysis of over 3000 companies representing 83 industries during the 1979-87 time period supports our theoretical perspectives. Future research directions that combine firm flexibility and other strategic dimensions are discussed in the context of providing a general strategic framework for small firms competing against large ones.     

The effect of own-firm and other-firm experience on foreign direct investment survival in the United States, 1987–92

We argue that foreign firms operating in a host country generate information spillovers that have potential value for later foreign direct investment. We test two predictions. First, we expect foreign direct investments by firms with experience in a host country to be more likely to survive than investments made by first-time entrants. Second, foreign direct investments will be more likely to survive the greater the foreign presence in the target industry at the time of investment, subject to two contingencies. The first contingency is that the relationship will be weak or nonexistent among firms with no experience in the host country, because these firms have difficulty evaluating and taking advantage of the information spillovers. The second contingency is that the presence of other foreign firms will not affect investment survival among firms that already have a presence in the target industry and undertake expansion. These firms already possess general information about the target industries and are unlikely to gain additional benefit from information spillovers. We find supportive evidence based on the survival to 1992 among 354 U.S. investments undertaken by foreign firms in manufacturing industries during 1987. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.