A lattice approach for pricing convertible bond asset swaps with market risk and counterparty risk

This paper proposes a new lattice framework for valuing convertible bonds (CBs) and asset swaps on CBs (CBASs) with market risk and counterparty risk, where interest rate is assumed to follow a mean-reverting square root process. The reduced-form approach is generalized to include a constant elasticity of variance (CEV) process for equity price prior to default. In order to approximate the CEV process while taking into account stochastic interest rate and the correlation between stock price and interest rate, I first propose a transform that is uncorrelated with interest rate, and then construct a new lattice method which can ensure the validity of branching probabilities for all nodes. The lattice framework performs properly when it is used to value European call options. Based on the empirical results in Duffie et al. (J. Fin. Econ. 83(3): 635-665, 2007) and Jankowitsch et al. (J. Bank. Fin. 32(7): 1269-1285, 2008), a novel default intensity process is constructed which is specified as a function of time, stock price, and interest rate. When valuing the asset swaps, the counterparty risk is taken into consideration. Based on the results of the numerical experiments, the impacts of different parameters on the prices of CBs and CBASs are explained.     

制度压力感知与官员独董辞职--基于“中组部18号文”的实证研究

现有文献发现,官员特征(如官员的任期、异地交流、更替等)对地方经济增长和公司财务行为有重要影响,但是由于不易准确度量及缺少恰当的研究情境,对官员对制度压力的感知情况考察不足。作为外生的政策冲击,“中组部18号文”的颁布及施行提供了难得的研究机会。使用手工搜集的自“中组部18号文”发布以来的官员独董辞职数据,本文从制度压力感知的角度,考察了官员行政级别、公司产权性质和地区政治强度对官员独董辞职时间早晚的影响。研究发现：行政级别越高、国有控股上市公司以及上市公司所属地区政治强度越大的官员独董,对制度压力的感知越深刻、越敏锐,辞职时间也就越早。可见,企业经营者需要深入思考政治关联的不确定性和脆弱性,认清其可能存在的潜在风险。此外,文章还考察了外部治理环境对官员独董辞职行为特征的调节效应,并且发现,良好的外部治理环境有助于提升政策的执行效率。