Incentive efficient risk sharing in a settlement mechanism

The purpose of this paper is to address a question concerning risk management in continuing, multi-party, contractual, clearing and settlement arrangements through which large-value payments are typically made. We are particularly interested in the issues of incentive compatibility when a third party possesses a private information concerning the riskiness of transfers being made. If a third party possesses private information that would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of that party to the settlement risk affect the quality of information that the party chooses to provide? In this paper, we address this question by analyzing a specific class of parametric environments of a schematic, formal, model of a settlement arrangement or a payment network.     

Credit policies,macroeconomic stability and welfare: The case of China

Using a new Keynesian DSGE model with credit constraints, we study the impact on macroeconomic volatility of a macroprudential credit policy of the type implemented by the Central Bank of China. We find that the countercyclical credit policy plays a non-negligible role in stabilizing the real economy, and that this effect is distinctly more pronounced when credit conditions are looser. By means of a second-order approximation method, we show that the macroprudential credit policy can significantly boost welfare, benefiting the entrepreneurial sector more than the household sector. The results can yield insights for the institutional and policy setting of China and other emerging countries.     

Understanding china's economic performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the fanners; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized.

The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the “innovative” non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.

Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known.     

Last bank standing: What do I gain if you fail?

Banks attitude towards speculative lending is typically regarded as the result of trading-off the short-term gains from risk-taking against the risk of loss of charter value. We study the trade-off between stability and competition in a dynamic setting where charter value depends on future market competition. Promoting the takeover of failed banks by solvent institutions results in greater market concentration and larger rents for the surviving incumbents. This converts banks’ speculative lending decisions into strategic substitutes, granting an additional incentive to remain solvent. Entry policy may subsequently serve to fine-tune the trade-off between competition and stability.     

Market‐Based Measures of Monetary Policy Expectations and Their Evolution Since the Introduction of the Euro

The paper considers the relation between monetary policy expectations and financial markets in the case of Europe. A number of money market instruments are compared, with the result that the 1‐month forward interest rates extracted from the Libor yield curve has the best prediction power of the future monetary policy path. These forward rates have been used to study the evolution of market expectations regarding the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The sharp increases and the following decreases in interest rates during 2000–2001 have reduced the predictive power of money market instruments, but smoother management of interest rates and better communication from the ECB has helped to improve the forecasting power of money market instruments.     

Forecasting ECB monetary policy: Accuracy is a matter of geography

Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-country, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual context. How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and to anticipate monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB)? Using a database of surveys of professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences in forecast accuracy, and show that these have important repercussions on market behaviour. Explaining the differences in forecast accuracy, we provide evidence that they are partly related to geography and clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic conditions. In large part this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models.     

CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR CAUSED BY BANK CAPITAL

This paper develops a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks, a portion of which may be constrained by capital adequacy requirements and the remainder of which may not, in order to examine what effects the capital requirements and bank capital induce in the macroeconomy. Applying the parameterized expectations algorithm, the model economy shows that binding bank capital constraints induce the financial accelerator, the hump‐shaped dynamic behaviour of output, and ineffectuality of monetary policy, and that all the results are derived from the individual banks’ cross‐sectional asymmetric responses that are consistent with the empirical evidence.     

On policymakers’ loss functions and the evaluation of early warning systems: Comment

Sarlin (2013) suggests that if a loss function approach is chosen to derive the optimal threshold for financial crisis early warning indicators, the loss function specification should explicitly take into account the unconditional sample crisis probability. In this comment we argue that this approach is not robust to small perturbations of the preference parameter and is not easy to use for policy purposes. We suggest therefore to continue using a simpler loss function specification.     

Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy under Abenomics

In this paper, I investigate the causes of the recent sharp response of the yen and Japanese stock prices to the discussion of, and the subsequent implementation of bold monetary easing by the Bank of Japan as demanded by Prime Minister Abe. I present statistical evidence that the response of the two asset prices have indeed been unusually large relative to the past experience with nonconventional monetary policy (NCM) even after allowance is given for the rise in global economic activity and asset prices. I also point out that the rally has been led by speculative trading by foreign investors, while domestic investors have largely stayed on the sidelines. I discuss possible reasons for such foreign investor behavior. Simply put, the unprecedented political pressure raised hopes of the adoption of bold measures by the Bank of Japan. I discuss, however, the possibility that the room for further action by the Bank is quite limited apart from what might be called a targeted helicopter drop of money. I also point out the possibility that investor behavior may have not been based on economic fundamentals. The asset price volatility since April 2013 is interpreted in the light of such discussions.     

Why do bank loans react with a delay to shifts in interest rates? A bank capital explanation

We advance an explanation for the delay in the response of the volume of bank loans to innovations in monetary policy. Capital requirements may effectively tie the evolution of bank credit to the evolution of bank equity. By uncovering a new mechanism by which shifts in interest rates affect the profitability of the banking sector, and in turn its equity, we find that the resulting movements in the amount of aggregate loans are consistent with the regularities observed in the data.     

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON‐TRADITIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES: THE CASE OF THE BANK OF JAPAN*

This paper summarizes non‐traditional monetary policy measures adopted by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) during the last 2 decades and by other G7 central banks since the start of the current global financial turmoil and analyses the effectiveness of such measures. The paper begins with a typology of policies usable near the zero lower bound on interest rates. They are: (i) forward guidance of future policy rates; (ii) targeted asset purchases; and (iii) quantitative easing. Using this typology, I review the measures adopted by the BOJ and other central banks. I then offer a news analysis of the effects of the measures adopted by the BOJ on asset prices, comparing them with those adopted by the Fed. Many of the measures, with the exception of strategy (iii), are shown to have moved asset prices in the expected directions. Another exception is that most of the monetary easing measures failed to weaken the yen. Despite some effects on asset prices, however, the measures have failed to stop the deflationary trend of the Japanese economy clearly. I discuss some possible reasons for this and more general implications for monetary policy.