财政支出及其结构的经济效应:国外研究评述

作为宏观经济调控的重要手段,财政支出及其结构的经济效应历来备受瞩目。近年来,该领域的研究文献众多,主要集中在财政支出及其结构对经济增长、居民消费、私人投资和收入分配的影响。本文回顾了从理论分析到实证研究的最新文献,发现上述四个方面的研究结论分歧甚至冲突明显,理论基础、研究方法和数据来源等方面的差异是造成结论分歧的主要原因。今后的财政支出及其结构经济效应研究应该更加关注作用机制、经济环境差异、非线性效应、微观视角和政治因素。     

A general framework for the analysis of fiscal equalisation systems

This paper shows that, despite the existing diversity of models of fiscal equalisation, there is a common underlying structure that links all of them. To this end, a framework of analysis sufficiently general so as to encompass the main schemes present in the literature is developed. This allows to uncover the common features of these schemes and to identify more readily the origin and nature of their differences. The formal approach is complemented with a numerical simulation of the models considered. The paper also shows the usefulness of the approach for reform policy and suggests two new models.JEL Classification: H2, H7I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions to a previous draft of this article.     

财政支出差异性对创业活动的激励效应分析

经济新常态下,创业是推动中国经济发展、改善民生的重要途径。创业过程的风险性、不确定性及正外部性需要政府给予积极支持。基于2007-2015年中国内地30个省市（除西藏外）数据,运用动态面板模型,考察地区财政支出和创业活动的关系。研究结果表明：财政支出规模对创业活动数量及创业活动质量具有滞后的积极作用;财政支出规模的滞后效应源于财政支出结构的滞后效应,不同财政支出结构对创业活动质量影响的差异较大;同时,创新是提升创业活动质量的重要手段。因此,政府应积极支持“大众创业、万众创新”,各地区财政创业扶持资金应该从规模和结构上进行调整,重点优化有利于创新的支出结构,为创业提供良好的公共环境。     

Fiscal consolidation by intergovernmental transfers cuts? The unpleasant effect on expenditure arrears

For the period 2003–2014, we investigate unexplored effects of fiscal consolidation in decentralized public finance on a large dataset of Italian municipalities. Based on a simple, realistic theoretical model, we show that municipalities increase arrears on committed investment expenditure as a response to intergovernmental transfer cuts. Then, we test our predictions controlling for potential sources of endogeneity, and find that a reduction in intergovernmental transfers causes a significant increase in arrears, in addition to other common adjustments to local fiscal policies (e.g., tax revenues). Our results highlight a perverse effect of fiscal consolidation packages implemented by centrally imposed fiscal restraints.     

Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth

We study the effects of commonly used cross-country transfer programs on uncoordinated national environmental policies, economic growth and natural resources in a federal economy. Natural resources are a federation-wide public good. In each member country, production degrades the environment, but clean-up policy can improve it. Clean-up policy is financed by taxes on polluting firms’ output and cross-country redistributive transfers. We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium among national governments. Transfer policies that lead to higher pollution taxes make existence harder, and are harmful not only to growth but also to the environment. The best way to improve environmental quality is to implement a taxation system that stimulates growth and broadens tax bases to finance national clean-up policies.     

Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility

This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.     

What level of decentralization is better in an environmental context? An application to water policies

This paper analyses the optimal division of environmental policymaking functions among the different levels of government. Using fiscal federalism theory, we identify the most appropriate level of decentralization in each case. The paper focuses on water resources policies, with an application to Spanish regions during the 1996–2001 period. A simulation allows the implementation of more efficient policies in the context of water resources. The results of the empirical exercise show that a decentralized scenario is preferred under strong differences among preferences.      

Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare

This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline, as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a “minimum winning coalition” of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed.     

分权体制下的民主参与、政府响应程度和公共品供需偏差

文章考察了当前背景下政府对地方民众公共品需求偏好的响应能力,利用1998～2008年期间的公共支出样本值测算了中国地方公共支出偏差指数,并引入不同选区人大代表指标作为民主参与的工具变量,以此体现政府响应能力。实证结果发现,财政分权、民主参与和公共品供需偏差三个变量之间存在着显著的内生关联;分权体制导致了政府公共品供给扭曲,而民主参与则部分抵消了公共品供需偏差。     

中国式财政分权的解释逻辑:从理论述评到实践推演

本文采取文献述评的形式梳理了分权、财政分权与财政联邦制的一般理论,并结合当代中国财政体制改革的实践,对中国式财政分权的称谓和特征进行了解析。对于能否用中国式财政分权来解释从财政包干制时期的财力分散走向分税制时期的财力集中的现实,本文在理论与实践层面予以了阐述,指出虽然当代中国践行的是分权化的财政体制改革,但是政治集权体制下的财政分权却塑造了地方财政自治权和中央财政控制权同向增加的特色。     

财政教育支出区域配置的差异对经济增长的影响

本文在梳理区域经济结构中有关教育的理论基础上,实证分析了我国财政教育支出区域配置对区域经济增长的作用.得到如下结论:财政教育支出对我国各省区、直辖市经济增长均有正面影响;但作用力度并不相同.由截距项体现的非教育因素对经济增长的影响,在各省区、直辖市之间表现的差异性也非常大.另外教育支出和非教育支出两个因素对同一省(或区、直辖市)的作用也表现出很大的差异性.     

财政支农支出与农民收入增长关系研究

文章利用1985-2009年我国财政支农支出与农民收入相关数据,对我国财政支农支出与农民收入增长关系进行协整分析及Granger因果关系检验,得出两者存在长期均衡关系,基于此,提出了增加农民收入、促进经济发展的相关对策建议。     

均等化转移支付与地方财政支出结构

本文通过一个均等化转移支付条件下的地方财政支出决策模型,对地方财政支出选择中的各种基本因素作了简单分析,并利用分税制改革以来的省级面板数据,检验了地方财政资金再分配地位与地方公共支出结构的关系特征。实证分析发现:我国目前的转移支付制度不仅会带来地方财政支出的粘蝇纸效应;而且地方政府的财力改善后,还可能通过调整现有的财政支出结构,偏离转移支付的基本公共服务均等化目标,即存在地方财政支出的可替换效应;分区域的分析还表明,越是经济欠发达的财政资金净流入地区,地方政府对基本建设、行政管理支出项目的诉求越强烈。本文的研究意味着在地区间财政分配制度改革过程中,不仅要规范转移支付资金的分配程序,更重要的是应强化地方财政决策的监督机制。     

Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.     

Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview

The emerging economic federations of the European Union, Russia, and South Africa, along with the established federations in Australia, Canada, and the United States, confront the task of designing the institutions for federal fiscal policy. This paper reviews the literature on the design of tax policy in federalist economies. We conclude that taxation by lower level governments can lead to significant economic inefficiencies and inequities. The usual ‘assignment’ view of federalis recommends central government policies — for example, resident-based taxation or grants-in-aid — to correct these failures. These recommendations assume that the central government will act as a benevolent social planner. The ‘political economy’ view of federalism suggests that this assumption is in error and that additional federalist institutions must be considered. Alternative legislative structures and constitutional rules are considered.