Suppliers capability and price analysis chart

To remain competitive in customer-oriented economics, the major parties in the supply chain should be integrated and managed effectively to respond to customer needs. Thus, the efficiency of the entire supply chain is a main concern, and is determined by the members of that supply chain. Partner selection thus becomes one of the key steps in supply chain construction. Given buyer–supplier information asymmetry, obtaining complete information from suppliers is difficult, since some supplier attributes cannot be definitely and quantitatively measured. This study establishes a suppliers capability and price analysis chart (SCPAC) focused on the case where the specification limits are symmetric about the target for evaluating supplier performance which applies the process incapability index C_pp introduced by Greenwich and Jahr-Schaffrath (International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management 12 (1995) 58) to measure supplier quality performance and the price index I_p is proposed here to display the difference between budget and component price. Practitioners can instantly and visually obtain information based on the locations of suppliers and price indices on SCPAC. SCPAC also provides clear directions for quality improvement, such as process accuracy and precision. SCPAC thus is an effective and efficient method for evaluating suppliers, which can simplify supplier evaluation, facilitate their effective visual selection, and provide insights into the process situation of suppliers who can become technological innovation partners.     

An optimization approach to business buyer choice sets: How many suppliers should be included?

In many new or repeat purchasing situations, business buyers must decide how many suppliers to consider (a “choice set”) in determining which supplier(s) to actually buy from or contract with. This paper develops an optimization approach to determining the size of the choice set, taking into consideration buyer utility and search and evaluation costs. A theoretical model is developed for both one-time and repeat purchase situations. The model is estimated using empirical data received from bids received for procurement auctions. In these auctions, suppliers provide bids for steel pipe based on two product attributes (price and delivery time). Model sensitivity to small changes in parameters is also tested.     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

Technological Incompatibility, Endogenous Switching Costs and Lock-in

Systems are goods comprising of durables that are sequentially updated with complements. With sequential purchases, if suppliers produce incompatible brands, consumers who upgrade systems with complements of a different brand must replace the durables they own. Thus, the price of these durables is an endogenous switching cost. The paper deals with the concern that firms may use incompatibility to create consumer's switching costs to reduce competition in aftermarkets. However, it shows that, with homogenous durables, and small costs of reaching compatibility, endogenous switching costs increase intertemporal price competition to the extent that producers prefer to have compatible technologies.     

Auctions for Split-Award Contracts

The buyer of a homogeneous input divides his input requirements into two contracts that are awarded to different suppliers. He uses a sequential second-price auction to award a primary and a secondary contract. With a fixed number of suppliers the buyer pays a higher expected price than with a sole-source auction. The premium paid to the winner of the secondary contract must also be paid to the winner of the primary contract as an opportunity cost. When entry is endogenous, we identify the conditions under which a secondary contract can increase the number of suppliers and lower the expected price.     

Price competition when three are few and four are many

I examine price competition in a market for a homogeneous good when consumers observe prices subject to a random shock (perception error). When firms have symmetric costs, there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, which is symmetric. When there are up to three sellers in the market, the sellers extract the entire consumer surplus. However, with at least four firms, assuming that the marginal cost is sufficiently low relative to consumers’ valuation, both consumers and producers may enjoy a positive surplus. The marginal-cost pricing is never observed in an equilibrium with finitely many firms. Potential policy implications are discussed.     

Determining the Maximum Hourly Demand of Natural Gas for Large Suppliers

This article deals with the determination of the maximum hourly energy consumption of large (municipal) natural gas suppliers using the Monte Carlo simulation method. To ensure an adequate supply for all their customers, suppliers need to purchase capacities in geological storage systems. If, due to cost considerations or inaccurate predictions, the chosen capacities are smaller than the actual consumption, additional costs are incurred for the procurement of short-term quantities of gas, e.g. from the balancing energy market. It is therefore necessary to formulate and solve an optimisation problem, which is done as described in the following by means of a simulation after modelling all required quantity values and price data. The aim is to minimise the structure costs—i.e. the fixed capacity costs and the variable balancing energy costs—by selecting the most appropriate hourly energy supply level. Since the selection of the storage capacity generally has far-reaching financial implications, the statistics-based simulation method described in the following is intended to provide the companies concerned with a reliable basis for decision-making.     

The medical community's opposition to organ markets: Ethics or economics?

A severe shortage of cadaveric human organs for transplantation exists in the U.S. The obvious cause of this shortage is our current public policy which proscribes payment for such organs. Support for this policy and opposition to the formation of organ markets has been quite strong among transplant suppliers (both hospital and physician groups). This paper critically evaluates the ethical arguments advanced to buttress this policy position and presents an alternative economic explanation based upon profit-maximizing behavior. The model we develop is based upon monopsony in organ procurement with a kinked (and possibly discontinuous) organ supply function.     

Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information

We explore how asymmetric information affects task assignment between a manufacturer and its supplier when tasks are horizontally differentiated, and when the comparative advantage in terms of marginal costs differs during the production process. We show that the manufacturer over-outsources to a generalist supplier and under-outsources to a specialist supplier depending on its level of efficiency. The presence of countervailing incentives drives these results. When the manufacturer’s internal costs are sufficiently low, it can externalize some of its best tasks and internalize its worst tasks. These two distortions simultaneously affect the contract offered to the generalist supplier.     

Distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty

When suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain, they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer. This paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts, each of which consists of a mixture of constant per-unit wholesale prices, buy-back arrangements, and post sale payments contingent on sales made, such as revenue sharing or buybacks. We show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly, thereby generating the supplier's preferred inventory configuration and price distribution. We extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly, demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution, given the choices of its rival. Distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers' standpoint, even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty, and, given the perfect competition among distributors, all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers. Thus, suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand, and without the need to control dealer actions in detail. In particular, suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices, but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion.     

Structuring and contracting in competing supply chains

This paper considers two competing supply chains, each with multiple upstream suppliers producing complementary products and selling to a single buyer (e.g., assembler or retailer), who then sells the finished assembled product to a market that involves both demand uncertainty and competition. Our main research questions focus on what supply chain structure (integration vs. decentralization) and which contracting strategy a business should choose. We find that supply chains that decentralize perform better under strong market competition (i.e., high degree of product substitution between supply chains). However, when a large number of suppliers exist, supply chains that integrate perform better. When decentralized structures are used for both supply chains, a consignment with revenue sharing contract generally outperforms a wholesale price contract from the downstream retailer's point of view. Interestingly, for a supplier, a wholesale price contract, which pushes all demand risks to the downstream retailer, might not be preferred. For the entire supply chain, one contract strategy can outperform another depending on the degree of competition, the cost share of the buyer, and the number of suppliers.     

The Structure of Hiring Costs in Germany: Evidence from Firm‐Level Data

This paper analyzes the structure of hiring costs of skilled workers in Germany. Using detailed and representative firm‐level data on recruitment and adaptation costs of new hires, we find that average hiring costs amount to more than 8 weeks of wage payments (€4700). The structure of hiring costs is convex, as an increase in the number of hires by 1 percent increases hiring costs by 1.3 percent. We find moderate effects of labor market institutions on the magnitude but none on the structure of hiring costs. Furthermore, we provide evidence in favor of monopsony power in the German labor market.     

Die Ökonomik nichtlinearer Tarife am Beispiel Bahnstrom

Nonlinear tariffs such as quantity discounts are common in infrastructure industries. One reason is that nonlinear tariffs enhance efficiency compared to linear pricing schemes. An example is the nonlinear tariff for the all-inclusive 16,7-Hz Traction Power Supply. Linear tariffs would lead to inefficiently high total costs and to inefficiently low utilization of the infrastructure. In fact, both a perfectly informed price regulation and competition would imply nonlinear tariffs. Finally, all market participants, suppliers and consumers, can in principle benefit from nonlinear tariffs.     

The licensing dilemma: understanding the determinants of the rate of technology licensing

The licensing of technology entails a trade‐off: licensing payments net of transaction costs (revenue effect) must be balanced against the lower price–cost margin and/or reduced market share implied by increased competition (profit dissipation effect) from the licensee. We argue that the presence of multiple technology holders, which compete in the market for technology, changes such a trade‐off and triggers more aggressive licensing behavior. To test our theory, we analyze technology licensing by large chemical firms during the period 1986–96 for 107 chemical products. We find that the rate of technology licensing displays an inverted U‐shaped relationship with the number of potential technology suppliers and is negatively related to the licensor's market share and to the degree of technology‐specific product differentiation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Collusion and leadership

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader. In case of pure Bertrand competition, price leadership restores the scope for (perfect) collusion in markets where collusion would not be sustainable otherwise. When firms face asymmetric costs or offer differentiated products, price leadership can also enhance the profitability of collusion—in case of asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm must act as the leader. Finally, such leadership is less effective in case of Cournot competition since, following an aggressive deviation by the leader, the follower would rather limit its own output, making it more difficult to punish the deviation. Still, quantity leadership may enhance collusion when it is already somewhat effective in a simultaneous move setting.     

供应商技术研发决策行为的演化博弈分析——基于技术外部性的视角

供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术？以此问题为基点,本文运用演化博弈论,在共性技术外部性、外部性引发价格战及政府干预治理情形下对供应商技术研发决策行为进行分析。研究发现：共性技术外部性的存在使得博弈演化稳定于由选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡;在外部性引发价格战情形下,当外部性较强时,零部件降价幅度越大,供应商越倾向于选择研发专用技术,反之,当外部性较弱时供应商越倾向于选择研发共性技术;当考虑外部干预治理时,政府价格干预效果依该行为所引致的市场额外需求降低状况,而政府补偿干预有效引导着供应商选择共性技术研发策略。     

考虑营销成本的库存与运输联合优化三阶段决策模型研究

一般来说,个体最优和整体最优是不一致的,二者之间存在着偏差,这一偏差就是分散优化带来的效率损失。库存与运输联合优化（ITIO）将物流系统中的库存控制和运输管理融合到一个大问题中,去寻求这一联合问题而非单个问题的最优解决方案,可以最优化整个配送系统的运营成本。本文在考虑营销成本条件下,建立ITIO三阶段决策模型,并求解分析模型性质。研究表明：ITIO零售价和营销成本与需求的营销成本弹性、零售商订购成本、供应商生产启动成本、供应商生产成本、运输固定成本和运输可变成本正相关;与需求函数的价格弹性和订货批量负相关;当订购数量相同时,零售商单独优化的营销成本大于ITIO联合优化的营销成本。     

Unimodality of price-setting newsvendor's objective function with multiplicative demand and its applications

We present a general solution framework for the price-setting newsvendor problem with a multiplicative stochastic demand. Under mild assumptions, such as increasing price elasticity on the mean demand function and increasing generalized failure rate on the distribution of the random factor, we first prove that both the profit function with respect to price and its derived function with respect to order quantity are quasi-concave. Three applications are then studied under our solution framework: (1) We consider a wholesale price only contract by which a manufacturer sets a wholesale price and a newsvendor determines an order quantity and the retail price, and show that the manufacturer's profit function is unimodal with respect to retailing price or stocking factor under certain conditions. (2) We consider a newsvendor problem in which the demand depends on both the retail price and the level of sales effort, and the cost exerting the sales effort is proportional to the order quantity; we prove that there exists a unique pair of price and sales-effort levels that maximize the total profit. This result is established under a set of mild assumptions on the demand and cost functions. (3) We identify a property in the single-period profit function that satisfies Condition 1 of Huh and Janakiraman (2008), which in turn guarantees the optimality of (s, S) policy for an infinite stationary dynamic inventory-price control system with lost sales and fixed order costs. Finally, the unimodality of the newsvendor problem with a general stochastic and price-sensitive demand is studied.     

Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity-constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We show that consumers may benefit from price discrimination whereas the firms make the same profits as with uniform pricing. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis.     

Price authority and information sharing with competing supply chains

We characterize the degree of price discretion that two competing manufacturers grant their retailers in a framework where demand is uncertain and privately observed by the retailers, while manufacturers only learn it probabilistically. In contrast with the consolidated vertical contracting literature, we assume that manufacturers cannot use monetary incentives to align the retailers’ incentives to pass on their unverifiable distribution costs to consumers. Our objective is to study how, in this context, an information-sharing agreement according to which manufacturers share their demand information affects prices, profits and consumer surplus. While equilibria with full price delegation never exist, regardless of whether manufacturers share information, partial delegation equilibria may exist with and without the exchange of information. These equilibria feature binding price caps (list prices) that prevent retailers from passing on their distribution costs to consumers, and are more likely to occur when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they do not share this information. Manufacturers profit from exchanging demand information when products are sufficiently differentiated, and retailers’ distribution costs are high enough. Yet, expected prices are unambiguously lower when manufacturers exchange demand information than when they don’t, making the information exchange beneficial to consumers.