The Promise and Pitfalls of Restructuring Network Industries

Abstract. This paper examines the competitive effects of reorganizing a network industry's vertical structure. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential pitfalls of restructuring integrated network industries are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment and (iii) vertical foreclosure. The paper studies the net effect of restructuring on retail prices and cost‐reducing investment and discusses policy implications.     

间接税改革的宏观经济效应:一般均衡分析

建立一个研究中国整体经济的可计算一般均衡(CGE)模型.对我国现行税制间接税税率调整,间接税向直接税转化,间接税调整对储蓄、投资的影响等措施的宏观经济效应进行分析,提出一些可供选择的税收政策改革方案.在此基础上,指出了本CGE模型的局限与改进方向.     

Competing back for foreign direct investment

This paper studies policy competition for foreign direct investment between host and home countries. Three results have been obtained. First, policy competition does not change the attractiveness of any country as a location for investment. Second, as a result, policy competition does not change regional welfare. Lastly, the equilibrium policy could be either a subsidy or a tax.     

The impact of infrastructure and service-based competition on the deployment of next generation access networks: Recent evidence from the European member states

This work identifies the most important determinants of next generation access (NGA) network deployment, using data from the EU27 member states for the years 2005–2011. Our results indicate that the more service-based competition is pronounced the more negative is the impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure from broadband cable and mobile affects NGA deployment in an inverted U-shaped manner. We further find that there are severe adjustment costs and stickiness towards the desired long-term level of NGA infrastructure. It appears that the approach of the European Commission to force service-based competition via cost-based access regulation will not elicit the huge new investment needed for a comprehensive NGA roll-out.     

PRIVATIZATION AND EFFICIENCY GAIN IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED OLIGOPOLY WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS*

This paper examines two policy instruments, privatization of the domestic public firm and imposition of a tariff on foreign private firms in an international mixed oligopolistic model with asymmetric costs. It first demonstrates that different orders of moves of firms will imply different government decisions on optimal tariff and on privatization policy. Following Hamilton and Slutsky (1990 ), this paper then uses an extended game to discuss endogenous roles. It indicates that the efficiency gain that highlights the importance of foreign competition is crucial in determining the welfare improving privatization policy. Moreover, the endogenous equilibria are associated with different government decisions on privatization.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.     

寻求更有效的财政政策——中国宏观经济分析

宏观财政政策是一种公共物品 ,其有效性的标准是 ,在实现政府利益的同时 ,能够增进社会的福利。面临通货紧缩 ,政府将继续实施以财政政策为主导的扩张性宏观政策 ,在财政支出空间有限的情况下 ,就要选择能够作大投资乘数 ,提高市场效率的措施 ;同时要考虑调整税制结构 ,改变对投资征高税的税制 ,逐步变生产型增值税为收入型增值税和消费型增值税 ,并通过把内资企业税负降至外资企业的水平 ,一方面提高企业的利润预期 ,另一方面 ,消除税负不公 ,提高社会经济效率和减少资本外流 ;在运用国债政策时 ,既要重视国债的发行和使用 ,更要重视国债的交易和流通 ,推进我国金融市场的发育和功能的发挥以及促进公用事业的企业化 ,转换资源配置方式 ,从政府配置转向市场配置 ,从集中配置转向分散配置。总之 ,在体制转轨时期 ,推行一种与市场化改革相结合的财政政策 ,把短期的政策操作和长期的制度调整结合起来 ,实现政策和体制联动。     

Innovation,licensing, and price vs. quantity competition

In this paper, we develop a differentiated duopoly model with endogenous cost-reducing R&D and review the argument on welfare effect of price and quantity competition in the presence of technology licensing. We show that, with licensing, the standard conclusion on duopoly (Singh and Vives, 1984) is completely reversed. Cournot competition induces lower R&D investment than Bertrand competition does. Moreover, Cournot competition leads to lower prices, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus and higher social welfare than Bertrand competition.     

BERTRAND Vs. COURNOT COMPETITION WITH UPSTREAM FIRM INVESTMENT

This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot competition in a vertical structure in which the upstream firm sets the input price and makes R&D investments. We show that from the downstream firms’ point of view, Cournot competition has the advantage of a more monopolistic effect, leading to the setting of a higher price, but has the disadvantage of inducing a lower incentive for the upstream firm to invest. On the other hand, Bertrand competition has the advantage of providing a greater incentive for the upstream firm to invest but has the disadvantage of a more competitive effect, leading to the setting of a lower price. Our main findings are as follows. First, R&D investment level is greater under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Second, from the standpoint of the upstream firm and industry, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot competition. Third, from the standpoint of the downstream firms, Bertrand competition is more efficient than Cournot when investment is sufficiently efficient and products are sufficiently differentiated.     

Tax cuts and enterprises’ R&D intensity: Evidence from a natural experiment in China

This paper studies the impact of tax cuts on enterprises’ R&D intensity. We use a natural experiment involving China’s business tax changing to value-added tax (“BT to VAT”) to identify any causality. The results reveal that this tax reform has prompted enterprises to increase their research and development (R&D) investment. Specifically, a stronger ability to transfer tax, results in this change having a more significant promotional effect on enterprises’ R&D intensity. Further analysis demonstrates that firms with different ownership types and in different industries respond differently to the “BT to VAT” policy. Our findings are only significant for non-state-owned and other modern service enterprises. This paper provides a theoretical and empirical basis for detailed analyses of the effects of “BT to VAT” policy, particularly the government’s subsequent improvement to the tax reform policy, to further stimulate enterprise investments in R&D as well as industrial upgrading.     

税收负担的结构性失衡与调整——基于结构性减税视角

当前我国税收负担结构失衡现象比较突出:在中观层面表现为税收负担的税种结构失衡、产业结构失衡、地区结构失衡;在微观层面表现为不同类型企业的税收负担失衡、各收入阶层居民的税收负担失衡。结构性减税与税收负担结构具有内在关联性:实施结构性减税是基于税负结构失衡的现实所作出的理性政策选择;同时,结构性减税的基本特征也使其具有调整税负结构的功能。今后,结构性减税应将税收负担结构合理化作为政策目标,通过全面推进"营改增"改革、实行综合与分类相结合的个人所得税制、稳步推进房产税改革等一揽子政策措施,积极调整税收负担结构,使其更加公平合理。     

Supply-Side Economics of Germany's Year 2000 Tax Reform: A Quantitative Assessment

Abstract. The paper provides an assessment of supply‐side economics following Germany's year 2000 tax reform. Investigated are a corporate tax cut, deteriorating depreciation allowances and imputation rules, and a private income tax cut. For this purpose, a neoclassical growth model is augmented by various fiscal policy parameters and endogenous corporate finance and calibrated with German data. The model is used to evaluate consequences of Germany's tax reform on production, firm finance and leverage, investment, consumption and welfare of a representative household.     

市场开放、地方财税竞争与产业结构调整*——基于我国省级面板数据的实证研究

平衡“稳增长”与“调结构”的关键与核心在于“供给侧结构性改革”的产业结构优化形成方面。本文系统分析了市场开放与地方财税竞争对产业结构调整的影响机制,并采用2003—2014年中国29个省、市、自治区面板数据进行了实证检验。结果显示：市场开放显著推进了产业结构调整,但国际市场开放和国内市场开放作用力的大小存在地区差异,东部地区国内市场开放的作用力更大,中部与西部地区则相反。地方财税竞争一方面有利于产业结构高级化,另一方面抑制了产业结构合理化。本文进一步考察发现,地方财税竞争会削弱市场开放对产业结构合理化促进的效力。产业结构转型过程中存在“拉弗效应”,结构性减税只要与产业结构调整方向保持一致,就能在增加财税收入的同时优化产业结构。地方财政支出在一定程度上推动了产业结构高级化,但是,其中的经济建设性支出会扭曲资源配置,抑制产业结构合理化。地方税收政策对产业结构调整存在显著的结构效应,所得税相比商品税更趋于优化产业结构。这些研究结论对于深化市场开放、矫正地方政府竞争行为、实施财税体制改革等具有重要的政策启示。     

Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy

The paper analyzes environmental tax policy reform using a competitive model of world trade that includes production‐generated environmental damage (pollution) and trade tariffs. The authors examine the feasibility of Pareto‐improving multilateral reforms of environmental taxes, and show that any environmental tax reform that is mutually welfare‐improving when compensating lump‐sum transfers are assumed is also welfare‐improving when a suitable tariff reform (but no transfers) is combined with the tax changes. Several specific reform proposals are developed. These results expand the feasible set of mutually improving policy proposals for international policy initiatives.     

The role of infrastructure investment and factor productivity in international tax competition

In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity.     

China’s value-added tax reform,firm behavior and performance

China reformed value-added tax (VAT) by removing investment from the tax base in northeastern provinces in 2004, which is a “natural experiment” of its tax system. Using difference-in-differences method, this paper for the first time investigates the impact of VAT reform on China firms’ fixed asset investment, employment behavior, innovative activities, and productivity, and furthermore discusses the impact of firm behavior on industrial structural upgrade and employment with a firm-level panel data of large and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises in China. We find that VAT reform significantly promotes firms’ fixed asset investment, and increases firms’ capital-labor ratio and productivity; while enhancement of firms’ productivity is mainly achieved by means of substituting labor with capital, rather than independent technology innovation; meanwhile, VAT reform distinctly decreases employment. Our findings have essential policy implications on the extension of VAT reform in the entire China.     

Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries

The present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure. We demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications. The key variables in our analysis are intra-regional trade costs, differences in market size, and minimum wages.     

财政分权、地方政府投资和区域经济增长——基于双固定效应模型的实证分析

改革开放后,地方政府转变为独立的经济利益主体,成为推动我国经济增长动力源之一。以中部地区为分析样本,运用双固定效应模型,实证研究了地方政府投资对经济增长的影响。研究结果显示,1994年的财政分税制改革后,中部六省的地方政府投资有力的推动了地方经济的增长,但是这种效应并不明显,这与政府投资的投资价值取向和标准有关。针对这一分析提出了优化地方政府投资行为的政策建议。     

Corporate tax policy and heterogeneous firm innovation: Evidence from a developing country

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the causality of corporate tax policy on firm innovation in a developing country. We exploit the China’s 2006 corporate income tax base reform to integrate the tax system between foreign-invested and state/collective-controlled firms as a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences strategy documents a positive effect of corporate tax deduction on firm patenting. The effect is particularly significant if a firm is of larger size or locates in eastern provinces. We also examine possible channels behind the findings, including changes in R&D and capital investment, intangible assets, financial constraints, and new product sales.     

Globalization, Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization

Trade integration and the increasing mobility of firms have raised the need for international coordination in corporate tax. In this paper, we study the ability of fiscal equalization to avoid the misallocation of capital across asymmetric countries arising from tax competition. Such a reform respects the principle according to which the tax decision is entirely left up to the nation and links nations engaged in strategic tax policy by transfers. We use a model of trade and location where firms produce under imperfect competition. Our analysis suggests that falling trade costs increase the distortion created by tax competition in the international allocation of production. However, we show that fiscal equalization based on differences in tax revenues or tax base can implement a more efficient tax wedge and spatial allocation of the tax base.