Collusion between two-sided platforms

We study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two-sided platforms and show that they depend on whether collusion occurs on both sides or a single side of the market, and whether users single-home or multi-home. Our most striking result is that one-sided collusion leads to lower (resp. higher) prices on the collusive (resp. competitive) side if the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive and sufficiently strong. One-sided collusion may, therefore, benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the competitive side. Our findings have implications regarding cartel detection and damages actions.     

The role of online platforms for media markets — Two-dimensional spatial competition in a two-sided market

We analyze the market for online and offline media in a model of two-dimensional spatial competition where media outlets sell content and advertising space. Consumer preferences are distributed along the style and type of news coverage where the distance costs may vary across dimensions. For integrated provision of online and offline platforms we show that entering the online market reduces average profits and may even constitute a prisoner's dilemma. Specialized provision may yield polarization in the style and type dimensions. This is in contrast to the maximum–minimum differentiation result previously established in the literature on multidimensional horizontal competition. We show that maximal differentiation in both dimensions occurs due to the discrete nature of the type dimension and asymmetric advertising markets.     

Information and two-sided platform profits

We study the effect of different levels of information on two-sided platform profits—under monopoly and competition. One side (developers) is always informed about all prices and therefore forms responsive expectations. In contrast, we allow the other side (users) to be uninformed about prices charged to developers and to hold passive expectations. We show that platforms with more market power (monopoly) prefer facing more informed users. In contrast, platforms with less market power (i.e., facing more intense competition) have the opposite preference: they derive higher profits when users are less informed. The main reason is that price information leads user expectations to be more responsive and therefore amplifies the effect of price reductions. Platforms with more market power benefit because higher responsiveness leads to demand increases, which they are able to capture fully. Competing platforms are affected negatively because more information intensifies price competition.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets

A common feature in two-sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other. We show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand. The most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price. Full participation of the high-elasticity, low-price side of the market attracts the other side. As this side is less price elastic, the platform is able to extract high prices.     

A two-sided model of paid peering

Internet users have suffered collateral damage in tussles over paid peering between large ISPs and large content providers. Paid peering is a relationship where two networks exchange traffic with payment, which provides direct access to each other’s customers without having to pay a third party to carry that traffic for them. The issue will arise again when the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considers a new net neutrality order.We first consider the effect of paid peering on broadband prices. We adopt a two-sided market model in which an ISP maximizes profit by setting broadband prices and a paid peering price. We analytically derive the profit-maximizing prices, and show that they satisfy a generalization of the well-known Lerner rule. Our result shows that paid peering fees reduce the premium plan price, increase the video streaming price and the total price for premium tier customers who subscribe to video streaming services; however, the ISP passes on to its customers only a portion of the revenue from paid peering. ISP profit increases but video streaming profit decreases as an ISP moves from settlement-free peering to paid peering price.We next consider the effect of paid peering on consumer surplus. We find that consumer surplus is a uni-modal function of the paid peering fee. The paid peering fee that maximizes consumer surplus depends on elasticities of demand for broadband and for video streaming. However, consumer surplus is maximized when paid peering fees are significantly lower than those that maximize ISP profit. However, it does not follow that settlement-free peering is always the policy that maximizes consumer surplus. The peering price depends critically on the incremental ISP cost per video streaming subscriber; at different costs, it can be negative, zero, or positive.     

Inter-firm price coordination in a two-sided market

In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own profit and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint profits in the TV industry be. We also show that joint profits may be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple fixed fee rather than a two-part tariff.     

Seller curation in platforms

This article explores why market platforms do not expel low-quality sellers when screening costs are minimal. I model a platform market with consumer search. The presence of low-quality sellers reduces search intensity, softening competition between sellers and increasing the equilibrium market price. The platform admits some low-quality sellers if competition between sellers is intense. Recommending a high-quality seller and this form of search obfuscation are complementary strategies. The low-quality sellers enable the recommended seller to attract many consumers at a high price and the effect of the recommendation is strengthened as low-quality sellers become more adept at imitating high-quality sellers.     

Device-funded vs ad-funded platforms

We analyze device-funded and ad-funded platforms with differentiated ecosystems supporting apps provided under monopolistic competition. The incentives of a device-funded platform in investing in app curation, introducing its own apps and setting commissions on in-app purchases of external apps are largely aligned with those of consumers, while this is not necessarily the case for the ad-funded platform. In particular, consumers gain from a positive commission set by the device-funded platform because this implies a lower price of the device, and the platform’s apps are introduced and priced internalizing the impact on consumer welfare, perfectly in models of horizontal differentiation and partially in models of vertical differentiation.     

Value networks and two-sided markets of Internet content delivery

The volume and importance of content is increasing in the Internet, whereas the ability of the Internet architecture to scale to the growing demand for transport capacity is uncertain. Even though the natural growth in the demand continues, the growth in traffic volumes can be limited by reducing unnecessary content copying and redundant transportation of the same content. Information-centric networking (ICN), featuring globally unique naming of content and optimized in-network caching, has been suggested as a potential future solution to significantly reduce unnecessary traffic, but its economic feasibility has not been widely studied. This paper evaluates the economic feasibility of ICN by using the two-sided markets theory to analyze four Internet content delivery models: the client-server model, content delivery network (CDN) model, peer-to-peer model and ICN model. Value networks and two-sided markets of these content delivery models are identified in the process. The results suggest that content providers can be willing to pay for the lower delay of content delivery in ICN, if ICN can solve its coordination problems related to cost-allocation, contracting, quality of service guarantees, and content usage statistics. These incentive challenges are essentially the same as in-network web caching originally faced and could not overcome. Internet access providers may also consider investing in the deployment of ICN due to reduced interconnection costs. However, the ICN model may require a revenue-creating business model to make it more attractive to Internet access providers than the CDN model that provides similar cost savings.     

Market segmentation on dating platforms

Individuals from two populations seek matchmaking services from competing dating websites. Each population is heterogeneous along an objective quality rank and matched couples experience disutility if there are incompatibilities in their quality ranks. Individuals in the populations care also about other traits that they wish their partner to possess. They are more likely to find a partner possessing such traits, the bigger the population served by the website. We investigate whether price competition can lead to segmentation of the two populations. We find that segmentation arises, only if compatibility in quality is relatively important to individuals in comparison to the importance of matching with high quality partners and in comparison to cross network externalities. At the market equilibrium, too many men and women patronize the website that matches high quality individuals. Allowing websites to price discriminate between men and women reduces social welfare.     

Pricing distortions in multi-sided platforms

We consider the reasons why a monopoly multi-sided platform may price differently from a social planner. The existing literature has focused only on the classical market power distortion and a distortion in the spirit of Spence. We show two additional distortions appear in the presence of cross-group network effects, which we call the displacement distortion and the scale distortion. We show conditions under which the displacement distortion exactly offsets the Spence distortion, and provide an example in which the total of these different distortions results in monopoly prices per user that are lower than the social planner’s on both sides. Our results have implications for regulatory policy, which we briefly discuss.     

Information disclosure in optimal auctions

This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valuation of a good to be sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online advertising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the optimal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information provided increases with the number of potential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distribution of a bidder’s expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly) affects the reserve price. We show that as the number of bidders increases, the optimal reserve price becomes more restrictive.     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Gun-ownership disclosure and localized home prices

This article examines how the disclosure of local gun-ownership information affects property values. Using the sudden disclosure of a gun-ownership map in two New York counties, we explore how home sellers respond to this exogenous information shock. Our results show that an additional permit holder in the neighborhood leads to a 1% decrease in housing prices after the disclosure. This effect is highly localized in that property values are only negatively impacted by gun-permit holders within 0.1 mi of the focal property. These findings highlight the negative effect of the disclosure of gun-ownership information on localized home prices.     

How firms respond to mandatory information disclosure

Mandatory information disclosure regulations seek to create institutional pressure to spur performance improvement. By examining how organizational characteristics moderate establishments' responses to a prominent environmental information disclosure program, we provide among the first empirical evidence characterizing heterogeneous responses by those mandated to disclose information. We find particularly rapid improvement among establishments located close to their headquarters and among establishments with proximate siblings, especially when the proximate siblings are in the same industry. Large establishments improve more slowly than small establishments in sparse regions, but both groups perform similarly in dense regions, suggesting that density mitigates the power of large establishments to resist institutional pressures. Finally, establishments owned by private firms outperform those owned by public firms. We highlight implications for institutional theory, managers, and policymakers. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

ICT platforms and regulatory concerns in Europe

The rise of platforms in ICT markets invites a reappraisal of regulatory frameworks and practices. As platforms originating in entirely different sectors increasingly compete directly against each other, regulators ought to address platform competition issues regardless of their sector of origin, and taking into account the specificities of two-sided or multi-sided market business models. This paper identifies different types of such business models in ICT markets. It offers an exploration of a number of specific concerns that may arise related to specific platform types, and points at a number of instruments available to regulators to address these concerns.     

Regulating prices in two-sided markets: The waterbed experience in mobile telephony

The distinguishing feature of two-sided markets is that the pricing structure, that is, the relative prices charged to each side, matters. Regulators need to understand and account for the interdependence of prices in both sides. Some interventions that lower the prices on one side can result in higher prices on the other side of such markets. This article reviews the recent literature analyzing this waterbed phenomenon in mobile telephony and draws some more general lessons for policy interventions in two-sided markets.     

An Asymmetric Oligopolist can Improve Welfare by Raising Price

We demonstrate that, in Bertrand/Cournot equilibrium, a firm with a relatively small market share may improve social welfare by raising its price. This could be because the price increase can mitigate an output-structure distortion: if there are two goods which have the same marginal cost, then, under some conditions, the good in higher demand (the efficient good) will have a higher markup rate than the other good (the inefficient good). This suggests that the output structure is distorted in favor of the inefficient good, since the higher markup rate of the efficient good should lead to a considerable increase in demand for the inefficient good.