共查询到11条相似文献，搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Akira Okada 《The Japanese Economic Review》2015,66(1):1-32
Based on recent developments in non‐cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, I present basic results of the random‐proposer model and apply them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labour market. I discuss extensions to cooperative games with externalities and incomplete information. Next, I consider the enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re‐examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation from the viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution. 相似文献
2.
In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The electoral process is illicitly influenced by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables us to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with a moderate level of fraud while, with higher levels of electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of “agents” voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied. 相似文献
3.
Sean Horan 《Theoretical Economics》2021,16(1):235-274
Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so-called Euro–Latin and Anglo–American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features—history-independence and persistence—are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas. 相似文献
4.
Transparent decision‐making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else would there be the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision‐making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre‐meetings away from the public eye. Transparency does not improve accountability, but it might improve the decision. 相似文献
5.
We examine differences in behavior between subjects interacting with a member of either the same or different identity group in both a centipede game and a series of stag hunt games. We find evidence that subjects interacting with outgroup members are more likely to behave as though best-responding to uniform randomization of the partner. We conclude that group identity not only affects player׳s social preferences, as identified in earlier research, but also affects the decision making process, independent of changes in the utility function. 相似文献
6.
We provide empirical evidence for Tullock's claim (Tullock (1967, 1981)) that many of the problems known from social choice literature do not show up in practice. In particular, even though theoretically the use of different voting rules can lead to very different outcomes, there appears to be rather high consensus among voting rules when applied to real-world preference data. In addition, the famous and widely studied problem of majority cycles seems to be of little significance in practice. In this study, based on data collected in an online-survey in connection with the 2015 parliament election in the Austrian federal state of Styria, we confirm these findings to a high degree. Our analysis is based on an approach using a nonparametric bootstrap and includes various forms of evaluative voting (which has recently received increasing attention). 相似文献
7.
We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin‐monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation. Evidence monotonicity is also sufficient for implementation in economic environments. In some settings, such as when agents have small preferences for honesty, any social choice function is evidence‐monotonic. Additional characterizations are obtained for hard evidence. We discuss the relationship between the implementation problem where evidence provision is voluntary and a hypothetical problem where evidence can be chosen by the planner as part of an extended outcome space. 相似文献
8.
The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win the tug-of-war causes a greater reduction in bidding than either a decrease in the prize or greater impatience despite all three having the same predicted effect. These findings have implications both for theorists and practitioners. 相似文献
9.
This paper investigates trust behavior in situations where decision‐makers are large groups and the decision mechanism is collective. Theories from behavioral economics and psychology suggest that trust in such situations may differ from interindividual trust. The experimental results here reveal a large difference in trust but not in trustworthiness between the individual and collective setting. Furthermore, a field experiment captures the determinants of collective trust behavior among two Swedish cohorts. Beliefs about the other group and one's own group are strongly associated with collective trustworthiness and trust behavior. 相似文献
10.
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasilinear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free‐riding‐proof core (FRP‐core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP‐core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP‐core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition‐proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim et al. 1987) of a dynamic game with players' participation decisions followed by a common agency game of public goods provision. We illustrate various properties of the FRP‐core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated. 相似文献
11.
《Theoretical Economics》2017,12(1):211-247
We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. We show that a well known result for tournaments, namely that the successive procedure is (weakly) more manipulable than the amendment procedure at any given preference profile, extends to arbitrary majority quotas. Moreover, our characterizations of the attainable outcomes for arbitrary quotas allow us to compare the possibilities for manipulation across different quotas. It turns out that the simple majority quota maximizes the domain of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable, but at the same time neither the simple majority quota nor any other quota uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation once this becomes possible. Hence, quite surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation. 相似文献