IMF conditionality supports revenue collection: is it just tax rates?

This article examines if the observed favourable impact of conditionality in IMF programmes on revenue performance arises from changes in tax rates. It does so by studying the experience of 126 low- and middle-income countries during 1993–2013. When changes in tax rates are controlled for, the impact of revenue conditionality (and especially conditionality on revenue administration reform) not only remains strong on value-added tax collection but also, in contrast to earlier results, it contributes to significant improvements in income tax collection.     

Reconsidering central bank independence

In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality.     

An independent central bank faced with elected governments

The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.     

中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀--来自中国的实证检验

本文就中国人民银行独立性、收入不平等对通货膨胀的影响机制进行了分析探讨.我们引入中央银行目标函数,对中央银行独立性、收入不平等与通货膨胀间的作用机制进行了模型推理分析.而后我们整合了转型国家中央银行独立性的测度方法,并用此方法对中国人民银行的独立性进行了详细测定.最后,通过计量分析检验了以下结论:收入不平等是引致通货膨胀的一个经验性因素;中央银行独立性越强,越能有效抑制收入不平等引起的通货膨胀.     

On the origin and rise of central bank independence in West Germany∗

Abstract

This paper investigates the (re-)establishment of central banking in West Germany after 1945 and the history of the Bundesbank Act of 1957. The main focus is on the early emphasis on central bank independence, which at the time represented a German peculiarity. The paper inquires whether contemporary German economic thought may have provided a theoretical case for this peculiar tradition and scrutinizes the political calculus that motivated some key actors in the play. Contrary to conventional wisdom, important contradictions between the postulate of central bank independence and Ordoliberalism are identified.

JEL Classification Codes: B22, B31, E50     

美国缘何反对国际货币基金组织扩大援助贷款规模

20世纪90年代以来，发展中国家成了国际金融危机的多发中心(尽管危机的源头不一定全在这些国家)，危机不仅给发展中国家带来了巨大的经济损失，也给整个国际经济环境增添了许多变数，因此，国际金融体系的重构，尤其是国际货币基金组织(IMF)改革问题，便成了近20年来国际社会普遍关心的话题。在IMF贷款问题上，主张取消IMF的长期贷款业务，不主张扩大国际金融危机救助规模，是目前美国的主流观点。由于美国是当今国际金融体系中的“霸主”，其意见将直接左右着国际金融体制的改革走向，所以美国在国际金融机构改革上的一些观点值得发展中国家关注。     

中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析

文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。     

国家助学贷款存在的问题及对策建议

国家助学贷款实行以来帮助了很多贫困学生,但是在实施的过程中也产生了许多问题。如国家助学贷款与“五金”结构失衡;其政策性目标与商业化经营相冲突;财政的有限分担机制使商业银行无法出清风险;贷款制度主要要素的规定不够科学;贷款驱动机制不合理;贷款运行机制不健全等。解决国家助学贷款在现实中存在的主要问题,应建立个人信用评价体系;优化国家助学贷款结构;建立将一般助学贷款与国家助学贷款相结合的体系以及建立政策性银行并使其成为国家助学贷款的供给主体。     

The election cycle in the inflation bias: evidence from the G-7 countries

This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.     

Labour unions and global bank loan market

This article attempts to collect a data set of labour unions in global 500 biggest banks and investigate whether labour unions of banks influence the designing of bank loan contracts. We use global syndicate loan market to examine this issue. For simplicity, banks with and without labour unions are referred to as ‘unionized banks’ and ‘nonunionized banks’, respectively. We find that unionized banks tend to loosen their lending standard in the bank loan contract: unionized banks are more likely to charge lower loan spread and favourable nonprice terms compared with nonunionized banks. Hence, our results support that unionized banks tend to lend more loans to reduce the negative effect of labour unions.     

Communication and performance in Bank–Fund joint participation

In this paper I relate Bank–Fund performance to their willingness (or ability) to communicate. I find evidence that a Bank–Fund simultaneous loan is associated to an increase in economic growth and that such effect is diminished by factors preventing full communication, such as the degree of Bank-Fund competition and the salience of informational asymmetries. Politically motivated loans seem—at least to some extent—stimulate more IMF–WB interaction, which turns out to be associated to a better country’s performance.