Shifting from pay-as-you-go to individual retirement accounts: A path to a sustainable pension system

With aging demographics and generous pension programs, the sustainability of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system has been often questioned and has motivated policymakers to enact reforms in many countries. Although mandatory funded Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) appear to be a solution to this unsustainable system, existing reforms usually take place within the PAYG system by reducing pension benefits. This paper evaluates the effects of PAYG reforms as well as reforms that switch to the IRA system. Our analysis shows that PAYG reforms outperform IRA reforms in many aspects. In fact, PAYG reforms achieve higher GDP and yield higher welfare in the long run. The transition to the steady state is also found to be less volatile for PAYG reforms. While PAYG generally places a larger burden on future generations, the positive welfare effect of cross-subsidization dominates the welfare loss. Our findings may explain why pension reform is a controversial issue in most countries and why we rarely observe a shift to the IRA system.     

Pension,possible phaseout,and endogenous fertility in general equilibrium

The rich literature on Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG)-type pensions provides a notion that when pension return is dominated by the market return, generally it is impossible to phase pension out without hurting any generation. We show that PAYG pensions can indeed be phased out in a much richer framework where fertility is endogenous and general equilibrium effects are present. Interestingly, the factor that helps us to phase the pension out in a Pareto way is hidden in the structure of PAYG pension itself. Individualistic agents fail to recognize the benefits of their fertility decision on these programs and, therefore, end up in an allocation that is strictly dominated by the allocations that internalize this externality. Exploiting this positive externality, competitive economy can improve its allocations and can reach the planner's steady-state in finite time where each generation secures as much utility as in the competitive equilibrium. Clearly, it is possible to transition in a Pareto way to an economy either with no pension or with pensions whose return is not dominated by market return.     

How Well Does the Australian Aged Pension Provide Social Insurance?

Social security plays an essential role in an economy, but if designed incorrectly, it can distort individuals' labour supply and savings behaviour. We explore how well the Australian means‐tested pension system provides social insurance by changing the settings of the system and calculating the impact on welfare. In order to exclude trivial welfare gains, we keep the cost of the programmes constant. We find that the means‐tested pension system is welfare reducing, but does provide a better outcome than a PAYG system of equivalent cost. We also find that if the benefit amount is held constant, and hence the cost of the pension programme is allowed to vary, a taper rate of 1.0 is optimal. However, once we hold the cost of the programme constant, a universal benefit scheme provides the best welfare outcome.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Optimal social security tax with myopic agents

Myopic agents lack the foresight to save for their own old age. It is generally believed that correcting myopia is a rationale for a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system. This view has been supported by existing literature showing that the optimal PAYG social security tax should increase when people are more myopic. In this paper we obtain new results opposed to the traditional view. By establishing a very standard general equilibrium OLG model with myopic agents and endogenized marginal product of capital, we show that the optimal social security tax should be lower when people are more myopic. Our numerical analysis also shows that the welfare cost of the social security tax increases with people's degree of myopia. These results suggest that correcting myopia is not a clear rationale for the PAYG social security.     

Social Security Systems,Human Capital,and Growth in a Small Open Economy

We consider a small open economy in which the level of public education funding is determined by popular vote. We show that growth can be enhanced by the introduction of pay‐as‐you‐go pensions even if the growth rate of aggregate wages falls short of the interest rate. The reason is that the pay‐as‐you‐go (PAYG) system allows future retirees to partially internalize positive externalities of public education due to the positive effect of higher future labor productivity on their pension benefits. The majority support for education funding will be especially strong when the PAYG benefit formula is flat, i.e., progressively redistributive. If a flat benefit PAYG pension system is in place then the economy will achieve the highest growth rate relative to the alternative pension system designs. While such PAYG pension system may be opposed by the majority of working individuals due to inferior returns to their pension contributions relative to a funded scheme, it is likely to be politically sustained by a coalition of older individuals and lower income workers.     

PENSION FUNDING IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY

This paper analyzes the effects of pension funding for a small open economy in which wages are subject to bargaining. Using an overlapping-generations framework, we show that a reform away from a Pay-As-You-Go towards a funded pension system will be Pareto improving only if the reform results in a reduction in the steady-state unemployment rate. However, the reduction in the unemployment rate is by no means warranted: although for pension systems which involve a limited amount of intra-generational redistribution this is likely, for systems displaying a high degree of intra-generational redistribution the unemployment rate may well rise thus preventing the realization of welfare gains.     

Why Sweden's pension reform was able to be successfully implemented

Governments that do not reform pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems will eventually face a pension crisis. In a democracy, reforms require majority support. The problem is that pension reform requires today's generation to bear the burden to avoid burdening tomorrow's generation. Sweden recently passed pension legislation that specifies a gradual transition from a public defined-benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. Why was Sweden successful in reforming its pension system? We find that a political economy perspective helps to answer this question: there are more winners who would vote in favour of the reform than non-winners who would vote against it. When comparing the net effect (present value of expected benefits minus present value of remaining contributions) of the new and old systems, contributions of the working generation (age < 53) are reduced by more than their expected benefits.     

中国传统文化信念、人力资本积累与家庭养老保障机制

本文首先构建一个人力资本积累模型,考察传统文化信念驱动下的家庭养老保障机制以及社会养老保障制度对家庭养老和人力资本投资行为进而对经济增长的影响。分析表明,传统文化信念将后代人力资本积累与父代养老保障有机地联系起来,提供了一种很好的家庭养老保障和人力资本内生积累机制;现收现付型社会养老保障制度不利于人力资本积累和经济增长。其次,本文以我国现实数据为基础进行实证研究,得到结论是社会养老保障制度对我国人力资本积累和经济增长具有明显的抑制作用,而家庭养老保障机制的良好运转则有助于更好地促进人力资本积累和经济增长。因此,我国在致力于完善社会养老保障制度的同时,决不能忽视家庭养老保障机制的作用与培育。     

现收现付制与人口老龄化关系定量分析

中国目前的养老保险和医疗保险实行的是基金积累制为主的筹资模式。按照有关文献的解释 ,这是因为中国正面临着人口迅速老龄化的压力 ,现收现付制不能有效应对人口老龄化 ,而基金积累制则不存在这一问题。本文构造了一个模型 ,详细分析了现收现付制与人口老龄化的关系 ,给出人口老龄化是否导致现收现付制发生支付危机的定量判别条件 ,并根据人口学相关理论和人口资料预测了 2 0 0 1— 2 0 60年中国人口老龄化趋势 ,从而检验了人口老龄化是否引发现收现付制的支付危机 ,同时给出了现收现付制度下养老金缴费率和人均养老金水平增长率的确定原则。     

Temptation and social security in a dynastic framework

We investigate welfare and aggregate implications of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system in a dynastic framework in which individuals have self-control problems. The presence of self-control problems induces individuals to save less because of their urge for temptation towards current consumption. Individuals' efforts to balance between the short-term urge for temptation and the long-term commitment for consumption smoothing result in self-control costs. In this environment PAYG social security works as a self-control cost reducing device. In contrast, the presence of altruism induces individuals to save more. This in turn mitigates the adverse effects of self-control problems and PAYG social security on savings but magnifies the self-control costs. We find that in our environment the adverse welfare effects of a PAYG system are further mitigated relative to the environments that incorporate altruism and self control issues separately. However, the level of mitigation is quite modest.     

Pension Reform during the Demographic Transition

The aim of this paper is to quantify the welfare effects of some currently discussed pension reform proposals in Germany. The analysis is based on an extended overlapping-generations model which accounts for intra-generational heterogeneity, rising life expectancy and declining fertility. Given a baseline path of the economy under the existing unfunded pension system, the model calculates the macroeconomic impact as well as the distributional and efficiency effects of various pension reform measures aimed at reducing the level of the future unfunded pension system. Simulations reveal that pension reforms cannot be evaluated solely in terms of inter- and intra-generational equity. Substantial efficiency gains or losses might arise if the linkage between contributions and benefits is improved or weakened.     

论降低缴费率对养老金给付的影响——基于现收现付制度的视角

在现收现付制中,当前养老金缴费的减少对养老金的给付不一定有消极的影响。由于养老金的给付水平取决于资本份额的分配和跨主观贴现因子,利用简化的戴蒙德的叠代模型证明,当生产资本权重较高和主观贴现因子较低时,当前年轻一代缴费率的减少会提高养老金的给付水平。     

Who cares about the day after tomorrow? Pension issues when households are myopic or time inconsistent

Pension economics has traditionally guided pension policy with the help of formal models based on individuals who think in a life‐cycle context with perfect foresight, full information, and in a time‐consistent manner. Associated macro models were mostly based on a single country. This paper sheds light on several aspects of pension economics when these assumptions do not hold using—to our knowledge—the first multi‐country model of procrastinating households. Our focus is on the interaction between the share of procrastinators in a country, the speed and extent of population aging, and the size of an existing PAYG‐DB pension system. Starting from the insight that procrastination reduces the volume of savings, we focus on three questions that are particularly relevant for the quickly aging Asian economies: What are the consequences for the balance between pay‐as‐you‐go and fully funded pension systems? Where will retirement savings be invested in a globally linked world with very different pension systems and demographics? How large are global spillover effects of pension reforms in one region for the other regions in the world?     

Ageing,fertility, and growth

This paper analyses the interaction between human capital accumulation, fertility, and labour participation of families in the presence of technology shocks. Altruistic families spend time on the education of their children to increase their level of human capital. Compensating transfers through negative bequests are blocked by an active bequest constraint. Productivity shocks increase the opportunity costs of children and may cause a drop in fertility, which results in population ageing. We investigate the effects of ageing on allocation and welfare in the presence of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system.     

中国养老保险体系改革的福利经济学分析

本文用一个福利经济学框架推导出在社会福利最大化目标下现收现付制和基金制混合的养老保险体系的最优混合比率 ,模型中考虑了收入分配的因素 ,模型对过往研究中已有的结论进行了扩展 ,显示当一国的工资增长率和人口增长率之和大于投资报酬率 ,或者 ,当收入差距较大时 ,采用现收现付制有益于整个社会福利的改善。用这一框架分析中国的养老保险体系 ,并结合中国养老保险体系改革的特点 ,得出的结论是在当前及今后相当长的时间内 ,以现收现付制为主的体系可以作为中国养老保险体系的选择。文章进一步分析了现收现付制在中国持续运行的空间及其面临的挑战 ,指出这一制度的可持续运行最终取决于劳动生产率和产出的水平及增长     

Tax distortions in Sweden and the United States

We calculate the welfare costs of distortionary taxation (including inflation) in models calibrated for the United States and Sweden. The welfare costs are calculated using comparative steady state as well as dynamic analysis, where we take the costs of transition from the distorted to the optimal steady state into account. We also calculate the welfare costs of adding stochastic fluctuations. Our main finding is that the total welfare costs of the distortionary taxes including the distortionary effects of inflation are about five times higher in Sweden than in the United States. Meanwhile, stochastic fluctuations in policy turn out to have a relatively small impact on welfare.     

人口老龄化、养老金与国际资本流动： 影响机制与实证研究*

本文详细梳理了人口老龄化对国际资本流动的影响机制，并利用1993-2012年98个国家或地区的面板数据实证分析其相关关系，同时验证了以养老金为中介变量的影响机制。研究发现：人口老龄化主要通过资本-劳动比率和经常账户余额影响国际资本流动；不管是中高收入和中低收入国家，人口老龄化程度越高，资本越倾向流出；随着实行现收现付（PAYG）养老制度国家的深入改革，作为资金池的养老金规模逐渐扩大，其对外投资活动也越活跃。     

Collective Annuities and Redistribution

This paper studies the role of alternative pension systems that offer collective annuities. The defining characteristic of collective annuities is that they do not depend on an individual's survival probabilities. We show that such a system may be welfare improving (with a utilitarian social welfare function) even when private annuity markets are perfect and when life expectancy and earning abilities are positively correlated (i.e., in a setting that is  a priori  biased against collective annuities). We first concentrate on linear pension systems and contrast two schemes: a pure contributory (Bismarckian) pension and a flat rate (Beveridgean) pension. We show that the case for collective annuities is stronger when they are associated with a flat pension system. Then we analyze nonlinear pension schemes. We show that the solution can be implemented by a pension scheme associated with annuities that reflect some degree of "collectiveness." Unlike under pure collective annuities, benefits do depend on life expectancy but to a lesser degree than with actuarially fair private annuities. In other words, the impact of survival probabilities is mitigated rather than completely neutralized.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.