Mergers between local public firms

We consider a country made up of two regions, where each region owns a local public firm and a domestic private one. A national authority decides whether or not to merge the two local public firms. The result depends on whether the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, substitutes or complements. We find that if the two local public firms produce the same good, the national authority is indifferent as to whether to merge or not. When local public firms produce different goods two cases arise. First, if the firms in each region produce homogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms when the goods are complements, independent in demand and weak substitutes. Second, if the firms in each region produce heterogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms only when the goods are close complements. Therefore, there is greater scope for mergers in the former case than in the later.     

Voluntary contributions to multiple public goods in a production economy with widespread externalities

In a production economy, multiple public goods are produced by firms in competitive markets, and provided by the government together with contributions from consumers. There are widespread externalities: all consumers’ consumption and contributions and all firms’ production enter into utility functions. Public goods can be imperfect substitutes or complements, and they can be local public goods or club goods. Zero bounds that require consumers to make nonnegative contributions complicate the differentiable approach. Applying the transversality theorem for smooth economies in a regular parameterization, we obtain the existence of equilibrium in such an economy, and generically equilibria are regular and locally unique.     

不同质产品市场Stackelberg博弈模型

一个不同质产品市场中，两企业只能选择产量或价格中的一个为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争，没有生产能力限制。均衡结果为产品可替代（互补）时，领头企业和尾随企业都将选择产量（价格）为决策变量，存在“先动优势”。     

STABILIZATION WITH WAGE INDEXATION AND EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY

Abstract. This survey examines the role of wage indexation and exchange rate policy in dampening fluctuations in output around its target level. It is demonstrated that the appropriate choice for wage indexation and exchange rate flexibility is highly sensitive to the nature and the relative importance of the shocks impinging upon the economy, as well as to the relevant parameters in the economy. Moreover, the question of the desired flexibility of the exchange rate should be studied in the context of wage indexation, and vice versa. This interdependence raises the possibility of both policies being complements or substitutes to each other depending on the number of shocks that perturb the economy.     

Competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information

This paper studies the existence of a competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information. There are two agents involved in the trading of the risky assets: an “informed” trader and an “ordinary” trader. The market is competitive and the ordinary agent can infer the insider information from the price dynamics of the risky assets. The insider information is considered to be the total supply of the risky assets. The definition of market equilibrium is based on the law of supply-demand as described by a rational expectations equilibrium of the Grossman and Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 70:393–408, 1980) model. We show that equilibrium can be attained by linear dynamics of an admissible price process of the risky assets for a given linear supply dynamics.      

The global LeChatelier Principle and multimarket equilibria

LeChatelier (Comptes Rendus 99:786, 1884) and LeChatelier (Ann Mines 13(2):157, 1888) proposed that the adjustment of a physical system to a disturbance in its equilibrium was smaller as constraints are added to the adjustment process. Samuelson (Econometrica 28:368–379, 1960) showed that this Principle applied to a stable multimarket equilibrium for the case that all commodities are gross substitutes. We note that the Principle also applies to the stable equilibria of markets for which commodities can also be gross complements as formulated by Morishima (Osaka Econ Pap 1:101–113, 1952). Further, the Morishima and gross substitute cases are the only cases to which the Principle can apply, based only upon the stability hypothesis and a specification of the gross substitute/complement relations among commodities. We show that the Milgrom and Shannon (Econometrica 62:157–180, 1994) single crossing conditions specified for monotone comparative statics can be configured appropriate to the Morishima case to give global conditions for the LeChatelier Principle to apply to a multimarket equilibrium.     

Formal control and social control in domestic and international buyer–supplier relationships

Focusing on long-term buyer–supplier relationships, this article addresses two questions: (1) What are the antecedents that lead to the adoption of formal control, social control, or both? (2) What is the nature of the relationship between formal control and social control - are they substitutes or complements? We develop a model to investigate the impact of the length of cooperation and institutionalization on the use of control mechanisms. Further, we argue that in China, formal control and social control may be substitutes in domestic buyer–supplier relationships, but they may be complements in international relationships. Survey data collected nationwide with executives in 380 domestic and 200 international buyer–supplier relationships in China are used to test our hypotheses.     

Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts

This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.     

First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

The politics and economics of decentralization

This paper analyzes a simple general equilibrium model with local public goods subject to exclusion and crowding. In general, no competitive equilibrium exists for such models. However, in this paper we study a four-person example, satisfying assumptions formulated in a paper by McGuire [Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions, J. Political Econ.82, 112–132 (1974)], in which a competitive equilibrium does exist. This example demonstrates that the model is capable of generating realistic implications regarding stratification of jurisdictions, the decision to subdivide or consolidate jurisdictions, reliance on exclusionary zoning, and the use of revenue sharing.     

碳标识和环境标志

国际标准化组织环境管理标准化技术委员会（ISO/TC 207）自1998年以来先后发布了环境标志、生命周期评价等一系列有关环境管理的国际标准。近年来,为积极应对气候变化,该委员会又针对温室气体管理陆续制定了组织和项目层面温室气体排放以及产品碳足迹方面的国际标准。＂碳排放＂、＂碳标识＂、＂低碳技术＂和＂低碳发展＂等新概念、新政策正在成为世界各国环境管理专家和学者密切关注的议题。文章对环境标志和碳标识的内在关联进行了比较,分析了我国碳标识制度的发展趋势,并提出未来寻求环境标志和碳标识联合实施的策略和建议。     

Productivity drivers and market dynamics in the Spanish first division football league

This paper analyses efficiency drivers of a representative sample of Spanish football clubs by means of the two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA) procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson (J Econ, 136:31–64, 2007). In the first stage, the technical efficiency of football clubs is estimated using a bootstrapped DEA model in order to establish which of them are the most efficient; the ranking is based on total productivity in the period 1996–2004. In the second stage, the Simar and Wilson (J Econ, 136:31–64, 2007) procedure is used to bootstrap the DEA scores with a truncated bootstrapped regression. Policy implications of the main findings are also considered.     

The impact of the number of sellers on quantal response equilibrium predictions in Bertrand oligopolies

This paper studies how increasing the number of sellers in a Bertrand oligopoly with homogenous goods affects the equilibrium price level predicted by logistic quantal response equilibrium (LQRE) and power‐function QRE (PQRE). We show that increasing the number of sellers reduces the average posted price in a PQRE, but can increase the average posted price in an LQRE. Our results indicate that the comparative‐static predictions of QRE (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ Behav, 10, 6–38) are not necessarily robust to changes of the quantal response function.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Neighborhood amenities: An economic analysis

A spatial model of household and firm demand and supply of market goods is developed. Housing and neighborhood amenity markets are explicitly considered in deriving market equilibrium. The equilibrium relationships are empirically investigated, yielding important insights into the functioning of the urban economy. Attention is focused on externalities involved in neighborhood markets and the simultaneous determination of housing and amenity market equilibrium. The effect of neighborhood amenities on household equilibrium is of a major magnitude and effects of “externality” variables on both housing and amenity equilibrium are substantiated. The degree of neighborhood homogeneity and the extent of government programs aimed at neighborhood development are found to have significant impacts on housing and amenity markets.     

Welfare-improving cooperation with a consumer-friendly multiproduct corporation

We consider a multiproduct corporation that adopts consumer-friendly activities and cooperates with single-plant firms for improving welfare. We show that full cooperation is socially beneficial if products are strong complements, whereas partial cooperation with higher consumer-friendly activities is beneficial if products are substitutes. We also examine a sequential choice game of endogenous cooperation in which the multiproduct corporation can induce (partial or full) cooperation and show that our findings are still consistent at equilibrium. We finally compare different ownership of the single-plant firms and find that foreign ownership decreases the benefits of cooperation.     

Restrictions on outward portfolio investment and domestic equity markets

Governments sometimes impose restrictions on local investors which effectively prevent them from purchasing overseas equities. Reasons for doing this, from the government's point of view, would include increasing the availability of risk capital to local companies and lowering its costs. The paper analyses this argument in terms of modern portfolio theory. It is shown that, under certain circumstances, domestic equities and overseas equities may be complements rather than substitutes. In this case the effect of the restrictions would be to lower prices on the domestic stock exchange and to raise the cost of risk capital to local companies. Indications are given of the circumstances in which this effect is likely to occur. Policy makers who are not aware of the risk-spreading motives which underly much international portfolio investment in equities are likely to overstimate the benefits to local industry from forcing local equity investors to keep their funds at home.     

论促进陕西体育用品制造业发展的科技政策

体育用品制造业是陕西体育产业的核心内容,促进陕西体育用品制造业的发展,必须走依靠科技政策推动的科学之路。现代社会视域下的体育用品制造业,面临高科技性、高舒适性、高安全性等诸多要求,这决定了陕西体育用品制造业在发展过程中,需要激励型科技政策来支撑其走自主研发、品牌战略之路,需要强制型科技政策来约束其走环境保护、节约能源之路。     

The advantage of avoiding the Armington assumption in multi-region models

Most computable general equilibrium models that describe interactions between multiple regions employ the so-called Armington assumption that goods that are produced in different regions are imperfect substitutes for each other. The paper describes an alternative algorithm based on the assumption of perfect substitutability that accommodates the observation that each region produces all traded goods. For models with many regions and less-that-perfectly mobile factors, the alternative algorithm greatly reduces convergence time. The algorithm is illustrated by comparing two static multi-region models of the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia, with and without the Armington assumption. The model without the Armington assumption is then extended to a dynamic 51-region model with agents that have perfect foresight over 6 periods.