Inertia and Discrimination in the California State Civil Service

Analysis of the California State Civil Service indicates that its occupational wage structure is very stable. Salaries established in 1931 continue to influence current wages, over 60 years later, even while controlling for market wages. This results from the California Civil Service's policy of maintaining the relative wage structure that was established initially in 1931 despite conflicting market wages. Because the California Civil Service explicitly lowered salaries for female-dominated jobs when it established its initial salary structure, these jobs remained underpaid by $1.6 billion from 1973 to 1993. These findings support notions of wage rigidity and fairness in efficiency wage and institutional labor market theories.     

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

Our study provides the first national analysis of the labour market implications of workers who are licensed by any agency of the government in the USA. Using a specially designed Gallup survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans, we provide an analysis of the influence of this form of occupational regulation. We find that 29 per cent of the workforce is required to hold a licence, which is a higher percentage than that found in other studies that rely on state‐level occupational licensing data or single states. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a licence. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a licence requirement than are non‐union or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions — that is about 15 per cent — and that being both licensed and in a union can increase wages by more than 24 per cent. However, unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.     

Oligopsonistic Cats and Dogs

This paper examines strategic investment behaviour when firms have oligopsony power in the input market. Focusing on the labour market, we study how a firm’s labour supply augmenting investment affects the equilibrium when oligopsonistic firms set wages. Relative to a non-strategic benchmark, optimal investment strategies involve boosting investment that leads rival employers to cut wages, but involves cutting back on investment that causes the latter to increase their wages. Implications of existing labour market policies for strategic investment are also discussed. Finally, the model is generalised to nest wage and employment competition and is extended to include other types of investment.     

Wages Councils: Was There a Case for Abolition?

The 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act removed the remaining minimum wage protection for some 2.5 million low paid workers by abolishing the last 26 UK Wages Councils. The Government's case for abolition rested on three key arguments: (1) minimum wages do little to alleviate poverty since most covered workers do not live in poor households; (2) when in operation, minimum wages reduced employment in covered industries; (3) the problems of poverty that the wages councils were set up to deal with in 1909 are not relevant in today's labour market. In this paper we address each of these points in turn. We find that: (a) 50 per cent of families with at least one earner being paid wages council rates come from the poorest 20 per cent of families; (b) the existing evidence suggests that abolishing the Wages Councils is unlikely to create jobs; (c) the widening earnings distribution in the UK means that low pay is an increasingly important determinant of poverty. If anything, there appears to be an increasing need for minimum wage legislation in the UK.     

Firm‐Size Wage Gaps along the Formal‐Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often called the “firm‐size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using microlevel data from Turkey, we document a new stylized fact: The firm‐size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two‐stage wage‐posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well‐defined subgame‐perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two explanations. First, taxes on formal employment generate a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm‐size wage gaps. The second explanation features a market‐based framework with strategic interactions. Relative to small firms, large firms typically post higher wages for both formal and informal jobs. A high‐wage formal job attracts a larger pool of applicants than a high‐wage informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, allows the firm to somewhat lower the initial wage offer, while this second‐round effect is negligible for informal jobs. As a result, size differentials are lower in formal jobs than informal jobs. We argue that the observed patterns in the use of social connections in job search and heterogeneity in job preferences can be used to justify the validity of this second mechanism.     

Wages and the Labour Market

In contrast to the traditions of social science, the argument made here is that wage structures are not to be explained by reference to an underlying economic or social rationale through which they contribute to the efficient or smooth functioning of an economy or society. Theories of wages have overstressed coherence and functionality and underplayed conflict and contradictions and the scope for discretionary, random or opportunistic decisions. Wage structures have been held partially in check in the past by institutional and social processes which linked wages across the labour market. Many of these processes, from industry-level pay bargaining to concepts of fair wages, 'going rates' or the family wage, have disintegrated in the 1980s and 1990s. More attention needs to be paid to the role of wages in the redistribution of resources and to the need to re-regulate the labour market.     

Instruments of adjustment in recession: The case of R and D personnel

This paper examines the implications for the management of the stock of labour under recession conditions. First a labour market model which contrasts that model with a 'normal' commodity market is developed. A central feature of a labour market model is that it is characterised by wage fix-employment flex policies due in no small part to the 'peculiarities' of the commodity labour. Secondly, we examine how following falls in revenues, wages and employment are brought back into alignment with product market conditions. We find that policies on the management of labour under these conditions are product market driven but with attention being paid to both objective business variables, such as markets, products, revenues, labour costs and productivity and more subjective elements such as the firm's 'reputation' as a 'good' employer. These two possibly conflicting elements are reconciled by policies using 'instruments of adjustment' to reduce and restructure the labour stock while holding wage levels relatively fixed.     

Wage Structure and Dynamics in the Electronics Industry

This study analyzes wage patterns over time among California electronics employers. While the range of wages paid is substantial, employers on average make only small departures from market wage that are not pervasive across occupations or persistent across time. Employers appear able to change employment levels without affecting wages. Internal wage relativities also appear flexible. Differences between administered wage scales and actual wages paid are used to distinguish wage policy from market outcomes.     

One Hundred Years of British Minimum Wage Legislation

The Trade Boards Act 1909 was a landmark in the development of minimum wage regulation in Britain and around the world. Although their powers were limited, the trade boards had immediate and tangible effects in terms of raising living standards, and over time they became a core part of the system of state support for collective wage determination. While influential overseas, the wages councils (as the trade boards became after 1945) were eventually seen as providing only a partial solution to the problem of low pay. In the 1980s, their powers were reduced under the influence of deregulatory labour market policies, prior to their abolition in 1993. The British national minimum wage ('NMW'), which was introduced in 1998, despite appearances, is not a universal national minimum of the kind which the Webbs and other Fabian writers argued for a century ago. Notwithstanding a growing consensus that the supposed negative economic effects of the minimum wage have not been borne out by the experience of the NMW, public policy has yet to take fully on board its potential benefits, including the reduction of social costs and the promotion of social partnership.     

Dental Hygiene Regulation and Access to Oral Healthcare: Assessing the Variation across the US States

Regulations in many US states prevent dental hygienists (DHs) from fulfilling their potential to improve oral healthcare. Wing et al. found that stringent practice regulations lower DH wages and reduce access to care. We add licensure regulations to the analysis and estimate the simultaneous effect of licensure and practice restrictions on the DH labour market and access to care. The results are consistent with licensure restrictions reducing employment, practice restrictions reducing wages, and wage and employment rates jointly influencing the prevalence of dental office visits. These results suggest that in order to significantly improve access to oral healthcare, states need to consider how their entry and practice regulations interact to influence outcomes.     

Where the Grass Is Greener: Voluntary Turnover and Wage Premiums

Standard economic and compensation theories suggest that voluntary turnover should decline when a firm pays wages that are higher than those of its competitors. Turnover behavior in the State of California's Civil Service, however, does not support this prediction. Using a fixed-effects estimator to control for job-specific characteristics, I find that the wages California pays relative to those of its competitors has little or no effect on turnover. In addition, estimates of the elasticity of turnover with respect to alternative wages indicate that higher wage rates do not pay for themselves through lower turnover costs. Instead, the absolute wage level and wage growth have large effects. In other words, it appears that workers are less likely to quit jobs that pay high wages and have larger wage increases no matter how their wages compare with those paid by other employers.     

Occupational Regulation in the European Union: Coverage and Wage Effects

We present the first EU‐wide study on the prevalence and labour market impact of occupational regulation in the European Union. Drawing on a new EU Survey of Regulated Occupations, we find that licensing affects about 22 per cent of workers in the European Union, although there is significant variability across member states and occupations. On average, licensing is associated with a 4 per cent higher hourly wage. Using decomposition techniques we show that rent capture accounts for one‐third of this effect and the remainder is attributed to signalling. We find considerable heterogeneity in the wage gains by occupation and level of educational attainment. Finally, occupational licensing increases wage inequality. After accounting for composition effects, licensing increases the standard deviation of wages by about 0.02 log points.     

Compensating Wage Differentials versus Efficiency Wages: An Empirical Study of Job Autonomy and Wages

Efficiency wage theory as incorporated in the shirking model predicts that firms may substitute wage premiums for costly monitoring. This means that wage premiums should be expected for loosely monitored workers. By regarding extensive monitoring as a lack of job autonomy, efficiency wage theory predicts a positive relation between autonomy and wages. The theory of compensating wage differentials, however, predicts a negative relation between autonomy and wages. When workers prefer autonomous jobs, employers have to offer higher wages for less autonomous jobs in order to recruit labor.
Swedish micro data are analyzed in order to examine the predictions of these theories. A proxy for the monitoring problem of the firm measures workers' possibilities of effort variation. Since this proxy is autonomy, it enables us to test the two rival hypotheses on the relation between job autonomy and wages. We find a positive relation in the private sector as predicted by the efficiency wage hypotheses and a negative relation in the case of the public sector, which accords with the theory of compensating wage differentials.     

Workforce Composition and Individual Wages — An Employer–Employee Data Analysis

The study analyses the impact of workforce composition and employee isolation — based on age, gender and citizenship — on entry wages of new employment relationships in German firms using employer–employee data. We allow for heterogeneous effects across distinct groups of workers and include worker and firm fixed effects to account for selection effects and unobserved heterogeneity. The results point to a negative impact of gender and age diversity for males and females, natives and foreigners and workers across the skill spectrum. Only for high-skilled workers, the negative effect of gender diversity is not statistically significant. Females receive, in addition, relatively low entry wages in establishments with a rather old workforce. With regard to the relative position, mainly gender isolation tends to exert an important influence on entry wages. The effect is positive only for females. In contrast, we estimate significant negative wage effects for males, natives, medium- and high-skilled workers. An international background of a firm's workforce and cultural isolation do not appear to generally affect entry wages.     

IT jobs: opportunities for all?

This paper examines the opportunities for the unemployed to access information technology jobs. Based on original research, it indicates that, despite initial expectations about an expanding sector of high skill, high wage jobs, recent developments indicate a tight labour market, which has created barriers to these jobs for the unemployed.     

Zero Hours Contracts and Their Growth

This article studies the prevalence and nature of zero hours contracts (ZHCs) in the UK labour market. It is widely argued that the headline count of ZHC workers based on the Labour Force Survey historically underestimated the number of workers in ZHC jobs. Here, we argue that this likely continues to be the case, particularly if one considers other, similar, no-guaranteed-hours jobs alongside ZHCs. ZHC jobs and workers are heterogeneous, but ZHCs have become increasingly concentrated among young workers, full-time students, migrants, black and minority ethnic workers, in personal service and elementary occupations, and in the distribution, accommodation and restaurant sector over time. Compared to other forms of employment, median wages in ZHC jobs have also fallen. The most common prior labour market state for ZHC workers is non-ZHC employment, particularly part-time employment, with part of the reported growth in ZHCs driven by reclassification of existing employment relationships. Finally, we show that growth in public awareness of ZHCs contributed substantially to recent growth in reported ZHCs, particularly over the period 2013/14.     

Being a woman in an ICT job: an analysis of the gender pay gap and discrimination in Spain

Despite policy initiatives aimed at promoting female access to jobs, the information and communication technology (ICT) professions have traditionally been largely monopolised by men. Segregation, gendered stereotypes and environmental factors have a clear impact on educational and professional choices, as well as on working conditions. The spread of ICT to all economic activities has meant that ICT specialists are now to be found everywhere, not only in the ICT sector where many stereotypes related to technical jobs persist. This work aims to analyse the gender wage gap and discrimination in ICT professions, with the emphasis on how working in an ICT-intensive industry might affect that situation. The study uses the Spanish Earning Structure Survey data for 2014, and applies wage decomposition techniques to the wage distribution. The results show that female ICT professionals face unfavorable working conditions, especially in highly qualified jobs and in ICT-intensive industries.     

Meritocracy in America: Wages Within and Across Occupations

In The Bell Curve , Herrnstein and Murray argue that the U.S. economy is a meritocracy in which differences in wages (including differences across race and gender) are explained by differences in cognitive ability. In this article we test their claim for wages conditional on occupation using a simultaneous model of occupation choice and wage determination. Our results contradict Herrnstein and Murray's claim that the U.S. labor market operates only on meritocratic principles.     

Not for the Profit,But for the Training? Gender Differences in Training in the For-Profit and Non-Profit Sectors

In this article, we use Canadian-linked employer–employee data to examine gender differences in receiving firm-sponsored training. We find that women in the for-profit sector are less likely to receive classroom training and receive fewer classroom training courses. However, we find the opposite in the non-profit sector, where women are more likely to receive both classroom and on-the-job training, and also receive more classroom training courses. We show that women's worse training opportunities in the for-profit sector mainly operate within workplaces. We find no evidence that gender gaps in training in the for-profit sector are driven by lower probabilities of accepting training offers, child or family commitments, weaker labour market attachment or worker self-selection. We also find that gender differences in expected changes in wages and training opportunities between the two sectors can explain a large portion of women's higher probability of employment in the non-profit sector. Finally, decomposition results suggest that part of the gender wage gap in the for-profit sector, which is twice as large as in the non-profit sector, can be explained by gender differences in training.     

The Structure of the Wage Gap for Temporary Workers: Evidence from Australian Panel Data

This study uses panel data for Australia to estimate the wage differential between workers in temporary jobs and workers in permanent jobs. It is the first study to use unconditional quantile regression methods in combination with fixed effects to examine how this gap varies over the entire wage distribution. While the wages of fixed‐term contract workers are found to be similar to those of permanent workers, low‐paid casual workers experience a wage penalty and high‐paid casual workers a wage premium compared to their permanent counterparts. Temporary agency workers also usually receive a wage premium, which is particularly large for the most well paid.