How Should the Graduate Economics Core be Changed?

The authors present suggestions by graduate students from a range of economics departments for improving the first-year core sequence in economics. The students identified a number of elements that should be added to the core: more training in building microeconomic models, a discussion of the methodological foundations of model-building, more emphasis on institutions to motivate and contextualize macroeconomic models, and greater focus on econometric practice rather than theory. The authors hope that these suggestions will encourage departments to take a fresh look at the content of the first-year core.     

Should They Stay or Should They Go? Attitudes Towards Immigration in Europe

This paper examines the main determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration in Europe. Our results suggest that both economic and non‐economic variables shape attitudes towards immigration, but the relative importance of these factors depends crucially on the race/ethnicity of the arriving immigrants. While fears over labour market competition are more likely to shape attitudes towards the arrival of same race immigrants, more exposure to immigrants reduces opposition towards the arrival of different race immigrants. These findings persist after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics, and after exploiting the data to allow for cohort‐specific effects.     

Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard

An income-contingent loan scheme can at best replicate the allocation brought about by a scholarship scheme financed by a graduate tax, and only on condition that there is nothing to stop the policy maker from using tuition fees as if they were taxes. If that is not possible, even the best loan scheme will exclude some well-qualified school leaver from university. Even if individual study effort is observable, but more so if it is not, it is not socially desirable that all students should specialize in the subjects that promise the highest graduate earnings.     

Can Capital Income Taxes Survive? And Should They?

The article surveys some main results in the theory of capitalincome taxation in the open economy; reviews recent trends ininternational taxation and discusses alternative blueprintsfor fundamental capital income tax reform from the perspectiveof an open economy faced with growing mobility of capital incometax bases. (JEL code: H21, H25)     

Inflation targeting: Should it be modeled as an instrument rule or a targeting rule?

The paper discusses how current inflation targeting should be modeled, and argues that it is better represented as a commitment to a targeting rule (a rule specifying operational objectives for monetary policy or a condition for the target variables), than as a commitment to a simple instrument rule (like a Taylor rule).     

Should Welfare Administration be Centralized or Decentralized? Evidence from a Policy Experiment

The 2005 reform of the German welfare system introduced two competing organizational models for welfare administration. In most districts, a centralized organization was established where local welfare agencies are bound to central directives. At the same time, 69 districts were allowed to opt for a decentralized organization. We evaluate the relative success of both types in terms of integrating welfare recipients into employment. Compared to centralized organization, decentralized organization has a negative effect on employment chances of males. For women, no significant effect is found. These findings are robust to the inclusion of aspects of internal organization common to both types of agencies.     

Public-private partnerships in micro-finance: Should NGO involvement be restricted?

This paper examines public–private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e. the NGO, is a motivated agent. We find that whenever the project is neither too productive, nor too unproductive, reducing such distortion requires unbundling borrower selection and project implementation, with the NGO being involved in borrower selection only. Further, we compare and contrast two alternative credit delivery mechanisms, the linkage mechanism (which is the focus of this paper), with the ‘Grameen’ one.     

Can Non-point Phosphorus Emissions from Agriculture be Regulated Efficiently Using Input-Output Taxes?

In many parts of Europe and North America, phosphorus loss from cultivated fields is threatening natural ecosystems. Though there are similarities to other non-point agricultural emissions like nitrogen that have been studied extensively, phosphorus is often characterized by the presence of large stocking capacities for phosphorus in farm soils and long time-lags between applications and emission. This makes it important to understand the dynamics of the phosphorus emission problem when designing regulatory systems. Using a model that reflects these dynamics, we evaluate alternative regulatory systems. Depending on the proportions of different types of farms in the agricultural sector, we find that an input-output tax system can be the core element of a close to efficient regulatory policy.     

Modelling internal devaluation experiences in Europe: Rational or learning agents?

In this paper we study the experiences of wage and price mark-up adjustments (internal devaluation) in Germany (in the decade up to 2009) and Spain (in the 5-year after 2009) within the framework of the ECB’s New Multi-Country Model (NMCM). The NMCM works both in a rational expectation environment and in a learning environment. We show that a learning environment (where agents take time to adapt to the new situation) appears well suited to capture the gradual wage and price adjustment of Germany and Spain. By contrast a rational expectation model appears more appropriate to describe the abrupt wage adjustment which took place in the Baltic States in 2008–09. The two environments appear to reflect the institutional differences between Germany and Spain on the one-hand and the Baltic States on the other hand. Moreover, in the learning environment, GDP and employment gains are delayed with respect to a rational expectation setting, but they are more long-lasting.     

Skill-Specific rather than General Education: A Reason for US–Europe Growth Differences?

In this paper, we develop a model of technology adoption and economic growth in which households optimally obtain either a concept-based, general education or a skill-specific, vocational education. General education is costly to obtain, but enables workers to operate new production technologies. Firms weigh the cost of adopting and operating new technologies against increased profits and optimally choose the level of adoption. We show that an economy whose policies favor vocational education will grow slower in equilibrium than one that favors general education. More importantly, the gap between their growth rates will increase with the growth rate of available technology. By characterizing the optimal Ramsey education policy we also demonstrate that the optimal subsidy for general education increases with the growth rate of available technology. Our theory suggests that European education policies that favored specialized, vocational education might have worked well, both in terms of growth rates and welfare, during the 1960s and 1970s when available technologies changed slowly. However, in the information age of the 1980s and 1990s when new technologies emerged at a more rapid pace, they might have contributed to an increased growth gap relative to the United States.     

Should Bangladesh Export to Countries with Better Institutional or Comparatively Similar Institutional Form?

Using panel data for the years 2006–2015, this study empirically investigates the effect of rule of law as an institution on Bangladesh's exports to 28 European Union countries (EU28) based on gravity model analysis. Two-step econometric results suggest that institutional rule of law is strongly associated with Bangladesh's exports, and institutional quality provides evidence of this significant effect. Furthermore, exports of Bangladesh are driven by economic size, market size, and the real exchange rate as well as rule of law. These results are suggestive of an important joint role for both trade and institutions in the long run.     

Public–private wage differentials in Turkey: public policy or market dynamics?

We evaluate public–private sector wage differentials by gender in Turkey between the years 2005 and 2013. Using micro data from Household Labor Force Surveys we find a positive premium for low wage earners and a penalty of working in the public sector at the higher end of the distribution. Although the penalty has not disappeared, the price effect has increased at both ends of the distribution. The increase at the lower tail is attributed to a higher price effect in the public sector, whereas at the higher tail it has been a result of a relatively uneven wage increase in the private sector along the distribution, rather than an explicit public wage policy.     

Education and the Public Goods Type of Social Capital: Are the Well Educated Free Riding in the Provision of Public Goods?

In the previous literature, education has been found to promote the individual’s investment in social capital. However, little is known about its effect on the public goods type of social capital as many of the studies have used generalized measures of social capital. Using survey data from Japan with information on participation in neighborhood associations and community activities, we find that individuals with higher education are no more likely than those with compulsory minimum education to invest in the public goods type of social capital. Nor do we find evidence that the more educated free ride on the less educated in the provision of public goods.     

Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access

This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while selling policy favors maximizes total contributions. Imposing a binding contribution limit makes it more likely that the politician sells access, which can improve expected constituent welfare. However, a contribution limit distorts the signals associated with the contributions, which tends to result in worse policy. Alternatively, a tax on political contributions can ensure that the politician sells access without distorting his information. Therefore, from the viewpoint of a representative constituent, a tax on contributions is strictly preferred to a contribution limit or no reform. The politician, however, may prefer regulation in the form of a contribution limit, even when a tax is better for the constituent.     

Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

The New Keynesian Phillips curve in Europe: does it fit or does it fail?

The canonical New Keynesian Phillips curve specifies inflation as the present-value of future real marginal costs. This paper exploits projections of future real marginal costs generated by VAR models to assess the model’s ability to match the behavior of actual inflation in the Euro area. The model fits the data well at first sight. A set of bias-corrected bootstrapped confidence bands, however, reveals that this result is consistent with both a well fitting and a failing model. These findings also hold for the hybrid version of the Phillips curve.