商业银行管理层股票期权激励：特征及其影响因素--基于美国银行业的实证研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文以1996～2005年间美国43家代表性商业银行和98家制造业企业为样本,实证分析了商业银行管理层股票期权补偿激励的特征和影响因素。结果表明:商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿比例的变化呈现出先升后降的倒U型趋势,商业银行管理层股票期权补偿占总报酬补偿的比例显著地低于制造业的这一比例;管理层股票期权补偿与商业银行成长机会、外部董事比例存在着显著的正相关关系,而与杠杆比率呈显著负相关;资产规模、管理层股票补偿对股票期权补偿水平的影响为负,但不显著;行业管制与管理层股票期权补偿费用的会计处理方法对银行业股票期权补偿有显著的影响。     

股票期权激励计划介绍及对公司业绩影响

近年来,大多数的上市的企业都进行了股权分置改革,上市的企业实行股票期权激励计划的数量上升.因为实施股票期权激励计划可以解决经营权和代理权利益不完全一致的问题,笔者先假设实施此激励计划可以对公司业绩产生正面的影响,进而用实证分析法来验证股票期权激励计划对公司业绩的影响.本文以高层管理层的持股比例为解释变量,公司业绩为被解释变量,采用Eviews软件的回归分析对2012年的40家样本公司的数据进行处理和运算,验证股票期权激励计划对公司业绩的正面影响.     

创业板公司管理层股票期权激励机制探究

在半强势市场条件下,创业板公司管理层现有的期权激励机制有名无实。本文以国内创业板公司对管理层实施的股票期权激励制度为研究对象,对影响股票期权激励的因素进行分析,借助股票期权和其他金融工具的有效组合,提出一些改善我国创业板公司股票期权激励现状的措施。     

创业板公司管理层股票期权激励机制探究

在半强势市场务件下,创业板公司管理层现有的期权激励机制有名无实.本文以国内创业板公司对管理层实施的股票期权激励制度为研究对象,对影响股票期权激励的因素进行分析,借助股票期权和其他金融工具的有效组合,提出一些改善我国创业板公司股票期权激励现状的措施.     

股票期权授予日前的股价操纵行为研究

近年来,我国上市公司管理层股票期权激励现象日益普遍。本文选取55支在2008年至2010年公布股票期权激励计划草案摘要的样本公司进行研究,结果发现,在全样本下,我国实施管理层股权激励计划的上市公司,其股票期权授予日前30个交易日的累积非正常收益率并非显著为负;但如果只关注那些在公布前的窗口期内报出过财报的公司,结果显著。     

基于相对EVA的股票期权激励模式研究

股票期权的激励作用受股市有效性的影响很大 ,股市的弱式有效性削弱了期权的激励作用。本文引入业绩评价指标EVA和相对绩效评价方法 ,将经理人的激励报酬和业绩贡献、行业分类指数的变动联系在一起 ,并剔除了外部系统因素对经理人激励报酬的影响。在此基础上 ,设计了基于相对EVA的股票期权激励模式 ,在一定程度上解决了股票期权计划实施中股市价格出现失真的问题 ,对推动股票期权在我国的进一步实施进行了探讨。     

期权会计发展：国际比较与启示

经理股票期权（Executive Stock Options，简称ESO）起源于20世纪50年代的美国，是一种创新的长期激励机制，在西方国家以股票期权制度为主的薪酬体系基本取代了传统的年薪加奖金的报酬制度。安然事件后，期权会计准则成为社会关注的焦点，批评者认为管理层大量滥用期权，以及允许期权成本在实现后才作为税后利润的冲减项而不进入公司收益的冲减项，帮助公司管理层大量获利和隐藏了巨额亏损。严峻的现实推动了会计准则界决心进行改革，以应对来自学术界、投资者和分析师的批评。     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

实行股票期权应以完善公司治理为前提

本文结合股票期权与公司治理关系的现代观点,从委托代理的框架出发,分析股票期权激励机制的内在机理和完善的公司治理机制对股票期权实施的重大意义,并进而寻求报酬性股票期权存在和发展的合理性解释。     

IRC Section 162(m) and the law of unintended consequences

In 1993, Section 162(m) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code was passed into law with the intent to reign in outsized executive compensation by eliminating the tax-deductibility of executive compensation above $1 million unless the excess compensation was performance-based. An unintended consequence of the legislation was that executives' total compensation actually increased in the post-1993 period, largely due to a dramatic increase in employee stock options. Employee stock options have unintended consequences of their own. The economic value of stock options may be influenced by executive decision-making when the options are valued using the Black-Scholes model or some variant thereof. Our findings suggests an unintended consequence that executives used their discretion to positively impact the performance-based component of their compensation through actions increasing share price volatility and reducing dividend yields, assumptions implicit in option valuation models.     

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino Executives

I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.     

The impact of the market portfolio on the valuation,incentives and optimality of executive stock options

This paper examines the effect on valuation and incentives of allowing executives receiving options to trade on the market portfolio. We propose a continuous time utility maximization model to value stock and option compensation from the executive's perspective. The executive may invest non-option wealth in the market and riskless asset but not in the company stock itself, leaving them subject to firm-specific risk for incentive?purposes. Since the executive is risk averse, this unhedgeable firm risk leads them to place less value on the options than their cost to the company.

By distinguishing between these two types of risks, we are able to examine the effect of stock volatility, firm-specific risk and market risk on the value to the executive. In particular, options do not give incentive to increase total risk, but rather to increase the proportion of market relative to firm-specific risk, so executives prefer high beta companies. The paper also examines the relationship between risk and incentives, and finds firm-specific risk decreases incentives whilst market risk may decrease incentives depending on other parameters. The model supports the use of stock rather than options if the company can adjust cash pay when granting stock-based compensation.     

Executive risk incentives,product market competition,and R&D

Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Valuing executive stock options: performance hurdles, early exercise and stochastic volatility

Accounting standards require companies to assess the fair value of any stock options granted to executives and employees. We develop a model for accurately valuing executive and employee stock options, focusing on performance hurdles, early exercise and uncertain volatility. We apply the model in two case studies and show that properly computed fair values can be significantly lower than traditional Black–Scholes values. We then explore the implications for pay-for-performance sensitivity and the design of effective share-based incentive schemes. We find that performance hurdles can require a much greater fraction of total compensation to be a fixed salary, if pre-existing incentive levels are to be maintained.     

The role of equity compensation in reducing inefficient investment in labor

We investigate whether equity compensation incentivizes executives to make efficient labor investment decisions. In doing so, we examine the extent to which stock options and restricted stock differentially influence labor investment decisions. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that stock options exacerbate, while restricted stock mitigates, inefficient labor investment. The effect of stock options (restricted stock) are weaker (stronger) for financially constrained firms. Our results are robust to alternative proxies for inefficient labor investment and when addressing a range of endogeneity concerns. Our research demonstrates that stock options and restricted stock matter in executives' labor investment decisions, but in different ways. Our findings have implications for future research, suggesting that stock options and restricted stock need to be separately considered when examining the impact equity compensation has on capital or investment decision making; and for executive remuneration practice.     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

The Subjective Valuation of Indexed Stock Options and Their Incentive Effects

We analyze the potential role of indexed stock options in future pay‐for‐performance executive compensation contracts. We present a unified framework for index‐linked stock options, discuss their incentive effects, argue that indexation schemes based on the capital‐asset pricing model (CAPM) are the most suitable for executive compensation, and derive a subjective pricing model for the class of CAPM‐based indexed stock options. Contrary to earlier work, executives would not be motivated to take on investment projects with high idiosyncratic risk once their lack of wealth diversification and degree of risk aversion are factored into the analysis.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).