The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?

This study measures the size of private benefits of control (PBC) and explores the impact of ownership structure and board independence on controlling shareholders?? tunneling. Using data of Chinese listed companies between 2003 and 2006, we find that the average size of PBC, as measured by the price premium of block share transactions, is approximately 10.66% in Chinese listed companies. Also, firms with more independent directors on the board and firms with multiple large shareholders have a smaller size of PBC. Therefore, they experience a lower level of expropriation of minority investors by controlling shareholders. We particularly find evidence of a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between controlling shareholders?? PBC and their cash flow rights. On the left half of the nonlinear U-shaped curve, consistent with the interest-alignment effect of increased ownership concentration, increased cash flow rights appear to be effective in reducing controlling shareholders?? tunneling. However, on the right half, increased cash flow rights would exacerbate controlling shareholders?? expropriation of minority investors, which is the entrenchment effect of increased ownership concentration.     

Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance,financial diversification,and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006

Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non‐duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy

This study considers an important aspect of corporate governance: the relationship between cash flow rights and dividend payout policy of listed family firms in Taiwan, an economy characterized by a predominance of family-controlled firms. Dividend payout levels are important because they are crucial to governing the firm and managing its investments. The empirical results show that at a low level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the threat to lose control at any time makes controlling families claim more in dividends. This yields a positive relationship between dividend payout and the cash flow rights of controlling families at this level. Meanwhile, at a moderate level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, the entrenchment effect becomes more robust and creates a negative relationship with dividend payout. Finally, at the very highest level of controlling families’ cash flow rights, excessive firm-specific risk again helps to again create a positive relationship. This nonmonotonic relationship between controlling family cash flow rights and dividend payout also holds for financially mature firms that have a high earned to contributed capital mix.     

高管薪酬激励、产权性质与企业绩效——基于股权集中度的调节效应

本文以高管薪酬激励为视角,将高管薪酬激励、股权集中度与企业绩效放在一个统一的分析框架下,以产权性质为依据,收集了 2007~2015 年国有企业与民营企业的面板数据,分别实证检验了高管薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系,以及股权集中度是否在其中发挥调节作用。研究发现：高管薪酬激励对企业绩效有显著的促进作用,并且国有企业中的促进作用要强于民营企业;股权集中度在国有企业中对于高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的关系有显著的负向调节作用,而在民营企业中不存在显著调节作用。     

房地产上市公司股权激励对绩效影响的实证分析

关于股权激励与公司绩效的关系至今尚无定论。而对于特定行业的研究更是少之又少。为此,本文选取了2007～2009年在上海证券交易所上市的房地产公司为样本,分别探讨了高管持股比例,第一大股东持股比例以及股权集中度与公司绩效的关系。通过对三年的数据进行回归分析,结果表明高管持股比例,第一大股东持股比例以及股权集中度与公司绩效都成非正相关关系。在对房地产行业进行分析之前,为了突出差异性,本文先对整个上市公司三者关系进行分析。最后,针对股权激励存在的问题提出几点建议。     

投资者法律保护、所有权结构与困境公司高层管理人员变更

在投资者法律保护较差的国家里,集中所有权结构被看成是能够替代投资者法律保护,有效发挥公司治理作用的机制。本文以2000—2004年上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所152家ST公司为样本,实证检验当公司已陷入困境、被特别处理的情况下,集中所有权结构对公司高层管理人员变更产生的积极影响。实证结果表明,大股东持股比例与公司高层管理人员变更之间存在显著的正相关关系,不同的大股东持股比例对高层管理人员变更产生不同的影响作用。检验证据支持了LaPorta等人(2000)提出的关于投资者法律保护与公司治理的主流理论。     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies

The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market‐to‐book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

"一股独大"悖论:中国证券市场的经验证据

目前对于中国证券市场诸多问题的探讨大多集中于“一股独大”，似乎其是“万恶之源”。本文采用主成分分析和多元回归的统计方法，系统分析了股权集中程度、第一大股东性质与综合业绩的相关关系。本文发现：股权集中度与综合业绩存在正相关关系，第一大股东为国有行政性单位的上市公司较第一大股东为非行政性单位的上市公司的综合业绩要差。鉴于本文的经验证据与现行主流观点相左，所以有“悖论”之称。针对这一“悖论”，本文给出了两个解释。     

Creating shareholder value via collaborative innovation: the role of industry and resource alignment in knowledge exploration

Collaborative innovation provides firms with a privileged opportunity to perform exploration in an externally oriented mode. The central challenges in exploration via collaborative innovation lie in the selection of relevant partners and in gaining access to potentially valuable external knowledge that the focal firm lacks. This article focuses on two aspects of inter-organizational alignment that affect knowledge differences and may thus help explaining the shareholder value implications arising from collaborative innovation: industry and resource alignment. Relying on data covering 97 bilateral collaborative innovations (194 innovation partners) in R&D intensive high-technology industries, we used event study methodology and follow-up hierarchical regression analyses to test our conceptual framework. With regard to industry alignment, results suggest that investors value greater industry distance between collaborating partners, especially when the partner firm provides high-level R&D resources. Furthermore, the results show a positive effect of supplementary resource alignment (i.e., a focal firm's R&D resources are supplemented by a partner firm's R&D resources) and, notably, a negative effect of complementary resource alignment (i.e., a focal firm's R&D resources are complemented by a partner firm's marketing resources) on investors' valuation of the collaboration's expected future performance. They, thus, contribute to research on shareholder value implications of collaborative innovation. From a managerial perspective, the study provides a better understanding of partner selection and shows how managers should position a collaboration to signal the shareholder value-creating potential to investors.     

The impact of SME internationalization on innovation: The mediating role of market and entrepreneurial orientation

In today's highly competitive global environment, even small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need to make product and process innovations in order to outperform the competition and satisfy global customers. Investigating the success factors of innovation performance has become critical for the survival and competitiveness of SMEs. The aim of this study is to explore the impact of the degree of internationalization (DoI) on innovation performance through the mediating factors of market and entrepreneurial orientation in the context of emerging-market SMEs. We tested our model and hypotheses with 235 SMEs in the United Arab Emirates, which is an emerging market. The results obtained from partial least squares estimates indicate that the degree of internationalization positively affects innovation performance and, more importantly, that this relationship is indirect and fully mediated by market and entrepreneurial orientation for SMEs. These results shed light on the mechanism of the effect of DoI on innovation performance in the emerging-market SME context.     

技术创新的资源与激励的不匹配性及其治理

中国不同所有权工业在技术创新的资源配置和创新激励的配置上具有明显的不匹配性,这对技术创新绩效差异有重要的影响。本文提出了技术创新双重约束模式,认为中国工业技术创新的企业治理约束和资源配置约束是决定技术创新绩效的根本力量,据此解释了技术创新不匹配性的产生机理。因此,建立技术创新资源要素配置与激励匹配的制度体制是提高企业和产业的技术创新绩效的根本途径。     

国有控股、最高决策者激励与公司绩效

国内研究认为股权结构、董事会和高管激励对公司绩效有影响，而上市公司“国有一股独大”的国情使前两者不会有实质性作用；对于后者的研究则忽略了最高决策者在公司中的重要性。本文以1993—2002年数据为样本，研究国有股代理人(董事长和总经理)激励对公司绩效的影响。发现董事长是公司最高决策者，除政治激励能显著改善绩效外，最高决策者金钱激励、国有股权性质、两职合一、债权人治理等都和绩效没有显著关系；意味着只有将政治激励所附带的财富效用降低到一定程度，金钱激励才可能成为有效治理机制。     

经理管理防御研究综述

经理管理防御起源于内部人所有权与公司业绩之间关系的研究。从20世纪70年代起,国内外学者从不同的角度对经理管理防御进行了研究,对国内外不同学者不同视角的文章进行梳理,希望对未来的研究提供帮助。     

When to Use Loose or Tight Alliance Networks for Innovation? Empirical Evidence

This study examines the impact of different degrees of organizational coupling among the members of innovation alliance project networks on the commercial performance of collaborative innovations. Specifically, we study how type of innovation (modular vs. architectural innovation) moderates this relationship. Using data from 664 product innovation networks from five different industries in the United States, we find that the degree of organizational coupling among innovation network members significantly affects the commercial performance of collaborative innovations and that the type of innovation has a significant moderating effect. More specifically, the impact on commercial innovation performance of organizational coupling is positive for modular innovations and negative for architectural innovations.     

Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

Extensive studies of the organizational slack–performance relationship offer mixed findings in developed economies while little research attends to transition economies. Replicating and extending earlier work by Tan and Peng (2003), this study examines the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China and focuses on the moderating effects of firm ownership and competitive intensity. Empirical findings based on longitudinal data from 60,945 firms during 1998–2002 suggest that the impact of organizational slack on performance is stronger for private enterprises than for SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. Furthermore, industry competitive intensity positively moderates the effect of organizational slack on performance. In a three-way interaction effect, the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the organizational slack–performance relationship is weaker in SOEs than in private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.     

Ownership structure and innovation: An emerging market perspective

Considerable attention has been focused on the ways in which emerging market firms can obtain and mobilize the knowledge and resources required for innovation. Innovation is a particular challenge in emerging markets because of inadequate external institutions. In this study, we focus on the importance of ownership structure, and in particular on ownership type diversity and ownership concentration. Using transaction cost and agency theories embedded in an emerging market context, we argue that ownership structure provides an important mechanism by which firms can assemble and direct the resources necessary for innovation in the context of inadequate external institutions. Specifically, we hypothesize that ownership type diversity improves innovation performance and that increasing ownership concentration has the same effect, but only up to a point. Using a panel dataset of 487 and 475 Chinese listed companies during 2004–2005 and 2005–2006 respectively, we find supportive empirical evidence for our hypotheses. Our findings also suggest that ownership type diversity is a more important factor in explaining innovation performance than ownership concentration, although most of the extant literature focuses on the latter.     

市场化进程 控股股东与现金股利政策研究综述

首先梳理了国外有关现金股利政策的一些最新研究文献,并结合当前我国经济和社会发展的地区间的不平衡,探讨了市场化进程与控股股东对现金股利政策的影响,并提出了今后研究的一些方向。     

创新要素流动视角下企业技术并购的创新绩效研究

本文利用沪深A股2009~2019年间的技术并购数据,实证检验技术并购中资金要素流出即现金支付和技术要素流入,即目标企业创新能力对企业创新绩效的影响,以及静态创新要素企业自由现金流和技术存量的调节作用。研究表明:技术并购中现金支付对企业当年创新投入具有挤出效应,对企业当年和次年的创新产出均具有负向影响;目标企业创新能力对企业创新投入无影响,对创新产出具有显著的正向促进作用。企业自由现金流对现金支付的挤出效应具有缓解作用,技术存量能进一步促进目标企业创新能力对企业创新产出的正向影响。