Coexistence of nonprofit, for-profit and public sector institutions

If nonprofit organizations are superior institutions in resolving informational asymmetry and resulting contract failure, why do nonprofit (NPs), for-profit (FPs) and government/public institutions (GPs) survive in the same industry? This article explicitly models the nonconvex budget set for the consumer that arises through the juxtaposition of the inefficiencies and contract failures that occur in the three sectors. Because the consumer is willing to trade quality for efficiency and price, varying market shares for NPs, FPs and GPs can exist in the same industry. The theory offered complements the functionalist explanation of the existence of nonprofits advanced by Weisbrod and Hansmann using a micro-analysis.     

Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

Government size,government debt and globalization

This article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt. Using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries, it finds that globalization reduces government size and debt. In terms of components of globalization, government size is found to increase with trade openness but decreases with financial, social and political globalization. On the other hand, government debt increases with financial and trade openness but decreases with social and political globalization. The evidence is robust to different estimation methods and different samples. Our data also indicate unidirectional causality running from globalization measures to government size and debt.     

Fractionalization and the size of government

I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. These results hold even if a poor group forms a majority. Using a panel constructed from US micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

Centralization and the size of government in Canada

The determinants of the growth of government in Canada over the period 1926–90 are examined. Of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector's share of GDP. Unlike other studies using time-series data, the effect of decentralization toward the provincial/state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately. Empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government.     

Economic performance,government size,and institutional quality

This paper studies the empirical link between government size, institutions and economic activity using a panel of 140 countries over 40 years. Our results, robust under different econometric techniques, show mostly a negative effect of government size on output, while institutional quality has generally a positive impact. Moreover, the detrimental effect of government size on economic activity is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional quality on output increases with smaller government sizes.     

Decentralization and regional government size in Spain

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn??t reject the ??Leviathan?? hypothesis and neither does the ??common pool?? hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the ??Wallis???? hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power.     

市场诱致、政府推动与金融结构变迁

金融结构变迁的动因可归结为市场诱致和政府推动.市场诱致金融结构变迁是因为金融结构对经济发展的响应、金融企业追逐利润的本性和竞争淘汰机制的存在,政府推动是因实现"追赶战略"和克服"市场失灵"而介入金融结构变迁.从微观角度看.市场力量诱致金融结构变迁通过投资者对金融产品的选择得以实现,金融产品之间的马歇尔需求交叉弹性决定了金融结构变迁的强度;政府力量通过制度结构变迁对单个金融企业的激励和抑制效应推动金融结构变迁.     

The size and composition of government expenditure

This paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure. The purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification, to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories, and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude. Using Government Financial Statistics data from the IMF covering over 100 countries from 1970–2000, I look at cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure (such as defense, education, health care) and different levels of government (central, and local). Among other results, I find a new explanation for Wagner's Law, widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures, that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk, and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance.     

Membership size in the educable cooperative facing uncertain demand

This article explicitly incorporates layoff and hiring costs into a discretetime dynamic model with stationary demand uncertainty, in which managers in a cooperative learn something about the demand process over time, and anticipate learning something about that process. It is shown how the opportunity to learn affects initial membership size and how the knowledge gained induces changes in membership, as well as how risk preferences impact on membership size at any point in time.     

Optimal size of the government: the role of the elasticity of substitution

This paper analyzes the optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with productive public services. Government expenditure, which may be subject to different degrees of congestion, is financed by distortionary income taxation. The standard result on the equality between the growth-maximizing, welfare-maximizing and first-best income tax rates holds if and only if production is Cobb–Douglas or there is proportional congestion. With non-proportional (or in the absence of) congestion, the first-best income tax is lower than the (second-best) welfare-maximizing income tax which, in turn, is lower than the growth-maximizing income tax if the elasticity of substitution is below unity. Under mild conditions these relations are reversed if the elasticity of substitution is above unity. Intuition on these results is also provided.     

Employment changes, the structure of adjustment costs, and plant size

In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants.     

世界各国政府绩效审计变迁:理论和来自各国的经验证据

本文以制度变迁理论为理论基础,结合世界各国经济发展的经验证据,提出并验证绩效审计变迁的五个假说:(1)一国技术水平高低与其是否开展绩效审计成正相关;(2)人均国民收入与绩效审计变迁正相关;(3)高等教育水平与一国政府审计部门开展绩效审计正相关;(4)财政总支出占G D P的百分比重与绩效审计变迁正相关;(5)交通发达程度与一国开展绩效审计正相关。结果假设(1)、(4)和(5)得到证实;假设(2)、(3)被拒绝。     

Trade and product market policies in upstream sectors and productivity in downstream sectors: Firm-level evidence from China

This paper explores the heterogeneous productivity impact of trade, product market and financial market policies over the last decade in China. The paper makes a critical distinction between downstream and upstream industries, focusing on the indirect effects of regulation in upstream industries on firm performance in downstream manufacturing industries. We identify the differential effect of these policies on firm productivity growth depending on how far incumbents are relative to the technological frontier. Trade and product market reforms are found to deliver stronger gains for firms that are closer to the industry-level technological frontier, while the reverse holds for financial market reforms. The key conclusion that can be derived from the empirical analysis is that further product, trade and financial market reforms would bring substantial gains in China and could therefore speed up the convergence process. Taken at face value, the empirical estimates would imply that aligning product, trade and financial market regulation to the average level observed in OECD countries would bring aggregate manufacturing productivity gains of respectively 9%, 3% and 6.5% after 5 years.     

Welfare-improving changes in size distributions of income

We address the question: given a parameterised welfare function defined over income (via utility), for what values of the parameters do observed changes in U.K. income distribution, over time or as a result of taxes and benefits, constitute an improvement?     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Marx, Marxism and the cooperative movement

This paper has a dual aim: first, to draw attention to a numberof passages in which Marx explicitly extolled the cooperativemovement and thereby confute the wrong but widely held assumptionthat Marx was inimical to the market and rejected cooperationas a production mode even for the transition period; second,to argue that the continuing neglect of Marxists both of thecooperative movement and of the passages from Marx (and Engels)that present a system of producer cooperatives as a new productionmode can be traced back in part to the late emergence of aneconomic theory of producer cooperatives.     

Government policy in the formal and informal sectors

The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms' choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz's (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc.) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. The welfare gains from policy reforms are on average 1.2% (measured in terms of consumption) for OECD countries. I also find that the welfare gains from reducing regulation are on average 2.1%. Finally, performing a similar decomposition to that of Hall and Jones (1999), I find that distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.