Coexistence of nonprofit, for-profit and public sector institutions

If nonprofit organizations are superior institutions in resolving informational asymmetry and resulting contract failure, why do nonprofit (NPs), for-profit (FPs) and government/public institutions (GPs) survive in the same industry? This article explicitly models the nonconvex budget set for the consumer that arises through the juxtaposition of the inefficiencies and contract failures that occur in the three sectors. Because the consumer is willing to trade quality for efficiency and price, varying market shares for NPs, FPs and GPs can exist in the same industry. The theory offered complements the functionalist explanation of the existence of nonprofits advanced by Weisbrod and Hansmann using a micro-analysis.     

Managerial compensation and incentives in for-profit and nonprofit hospitals

Differential economic behavior of for-profit and nonprofit institutionscan be manifest in both output and input markets. When behaviorin output markets is difficult to observe, behavior in inputmarkets can be useful proxies. We examine monetary compensationand its composition between base salary and bonus, and the associatedincentive structures, in the U.S. hospital industry. Our datapermit controlling for interinstitutional differences in thescope and complexity of jobs having the same titles, as wellas differences in organization size and other variables. Wefind (1) total monetary compensation for the two top executivejobs is substantially higher in the for-profit sector; and (2)the composition of compensation as between base salary and bonusdiffers materially across forms of organization, bonuses beingabsolutely and relatively greater in the for-profit sector.Particularly noteworthy is the finding that for-profit hospitalsutilize compensation mechanisms that, by involving larger contingentcomponents, provide stronger incentives - greater rewards -as compared with nonprofit hospitals, for performance that ismore easily monitored. While our findings are consistent withmore than one model of comparative organizations differ in theirgoals and, hence, in the kinds of managers they demand and thereward structures they offer. Nonprofit organizations may pursueobjectives that reflect greater concern about collective goodsor other outputs that are more difficult to measure and reward.Alternatively, nonprofits, confronted by a nondistribution constrainton the payout of profit to managers, may lack incentives forefficiency, and so may pursue other goals such as a quiet life.Such differential objective functions, together with the differentialconstraints on the distribution of profit to managers, havetwo kinds of implications. (1) Nonprofit and for-profit organizationsmay attract different kinds of managers, especially at the toplevels, because nonprofits prefer working for a nonprofit organizationand, hence, may offer a lower supply price to them. (2) Thetwo types of organizations can be expected to offer differentialcomposition of compensation as between base salary and performance-basedbonus, providing different incentives for managers. Our analysisis positive in character, the goal being to identify systematicdifferences in organization behavior.     

Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit,governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry

Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations.     

Firm size,sectors and countries as sources of variety in innovation

This paper aims at providing a comprehensive empirical appraisal of the nature, extent and sources of variety in innovation in industry across Europe. The results presented in the empirical section of this paper are based on a unique database (SIEPI) containing data drawn by the second Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) for 10 countries, 22 manufacturing sectors and three firm-size classes. This database has allowed us to look beyond the sectoral aggregate statistics provided by Eurostat and explore in detail the differences in innovation processes both within and across European countries and manufacturing industries. Further, the SIEPI database has been used to identify the determinants of the variety in innovation across Europe. In particular, the analysis focuses on the relative importance of sector-specific, context-specific and firm-size factors in driving firms’ innovative behaviours and performances.     

Government size,government debt and globalization

This article empirically investigates the effect of globalization on government size and debt. Using panel heterogeneous cointegration techniques to a panel of developing and developed countries, it finds that globalization reduces government size and debt. In terms of components of globalization, government size is found to increase with trade openness but decreases with financial, social and political globalization. On the other hand, government debt increases with financial and trade openness but decreases with social and political globalization. The evidence is robust to different estimation methods and different samples. Our data also indicate unidirectional causality running from globalization measures to government size and debt.     

Fractionalization and the size of government

I study the effect of voters with a group-based social conscience. Voters care more about the well-being of those belonging to their own group than the rest of the population. Within a model of political tax determination, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduce the support for redistribution. Whereas within group inequality increases support for redistribution, inequality between groups has the opposite effect. These results hold even if a poor group forms a majority. Using a panel constructed from US micro data, I find support for the hypothesis that within race inequality increases redistribution while between race inequality decreases redistribution.     

Fiscal federalism,jurisdictional competition,and the size of government

Fiscal federalism is commonly held to reduce the size of government, but how does it do so: through shrinking the welfare state, cutting government consumption, or reducing public investment? This paper examines tax competition under fiscal federalism through the lens of imperfect competition theory, derives new empirical implications from different theories of fiscal federalism, and tests those hypotheses with new variables and data. Cross-national statistical results show that jurisdictional competition under fiscal federalism is associated with reductions in the administrative expense of government but not the size of the welfare state. Moreover, the apparent impact of fiscal federalism with a high degree of jurisdictional competition is larger than that estimated in previous research. Once the models have been appropriately specified, the United States is no longer an outlier among high-income democracies on either government consumption or social spending. Close examination of the data reveals that some fiscally federal systems better approximate a “market-preserving model” and others a “capital-privileging” or “state-corroding” model.     

Centralization and the size of government in Canada

The determinants of the growth of government in Canada over the period 1926–90 are examined. Of particular interest is whether changes in the degree of centralization have affected the public sector's share of GDP. Unlike other studies using time-series data, the effect of decentralization toward the provincial/state and toward the local levels of government are measured separately. Empirical estimates provide strong support for the conclusion that citizen mobility acts as an important constraint on the growth of government.     

Openness,country size,and government size: Additional evidence from a large cross-country panel

A body of influential research has suggested that there is a negative association between country size and government size and between country size and openness, and these may account for the positive association between openness and government size. Estimation of several models from 41-year panel data for over 150 countries indicates that while pooled OLS estimates support the foregoing scenario, when cross-country heterogeneity is taken into consideration through the fixed-effects format, there is little evidence of a negative association of country size with either government size or openness. Therefore, it does not seem likely that positive association between openness and government size arises due to the mediating role of country size.     

Economic performance,government size,and institutional quality

This paper studies the empirical link between government size, institutions and economic activity using a panel of 140 countries over 40 years. Our results, robust under different econometric techniques, show mostly a negative effect of government size on output, while institutional quality has generally a positive impact. Moreover, the detrimental effect of government size on economic activity is stronger the lower institutional quality, and the positive effect of institutional quality on output increases with smaller government sizes.     

制度变迁中的个人、企业和政府

个人、企业和政府是市场经济运行中三个不同的行为主体,有着各自的目标函数。本文通过论述三个行为主体目标函数的一致性与冲突性,试图从制度变迁的路径中揭示出行为主体相互作用或相互博弈的经济学问题。一、市场经济条件下行为主体目标函数的一致性在市场经济条件下,个人的目标函数是收入最大化,企业的目标函数是利润最大化,政府的目标函数是发展最大化(经济发展是对政府的充分就业、物价稳定和经济增长三个目标的概括)。这三个行为主体的目标函数具有一致性,表现在两个方面:一是相互的制度界定是其发展的必要条件;二是共享的价值理念是其发展的充分条件。     

Efficient government size: France in the 20th century

The benefits and costs of government suggest an efficient government size. We investigate efficient government size by analyzing the relation between public spending and real GDP for France in the period 1896–2008. The results show a co-integration nonlinear relationship. Our time-series data on France represents one of the longest periods studied in literature. Our empirical findings suggest that efficient government size measured by public spending was reached when public spending was around 30% of GDP. Conclusions point to particularities of countries that suggest efficient government size is specific to different countries.     

Decentralization and regional government size in Spain

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decentralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn??t reject the ??Leviathan?? hypothesis and neither does the ??common pool?? hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the ??Wallis???? hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power.     

市场诱致、政府推动与金融结构变迁

金融结构变迁的动因可归结为市场诱致和政府推动.市场诱致金融结构变迁是因为金融结构对经济发展的响应、金融企业追逐利润的本性和竞争淘汰机制的存在,政府推动是因实现"追赶战略"和克服"市场失灵"而介入金融结构变迁.从微观角度看.市场力量诱致金融结构变迁通过投资者对金融产品的选择得以实现,金融产品之间的马歇尔需求交叉弹性决定了金融结构变迁的强度;政府力量通过制度结构变迁对单个金融企业的激励和抑制效应推动金融结构变迁.     

On the size of government spending multipliers in Europe

This article compares the size of government spending multipliers in Europe by applying a panel structural vector autoregression analysis on 11 eurozone and 8 non-eurozone countries using quarterly data from 1991Q1 to 2012Q4. We find that (i) spending multipliers are smaller in eurozone compared to non-eurozone countries, (ii) across the euro area the impact of government spending on GDP has been higher before than after the introduction of the euro, (iii) spending multipliers are larger in the eurozone periphery than in the core countries and (iv) since the beginning of the recent financial crisis, spending multipliers have become larger both for eurozone and for non-eurozone countries. We relate these results to an emerging theoretical literature linking the size of fiscal multipliers to the monetary policy stance. We also discuss the implications of our findings for the effectiveness of fiscal policy in Europe.     

The size and composition of government expenditure

This paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure. The purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification, to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories, and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude. Using Government Financial Statistics data from the IMF covering over 100 countries from 1970–2000, I look at cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure (such as defense, education, health care) and different levels of government (central, and local). Among other results, I find a new explanation for Wagner's Law, widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures, that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk, and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance.     

Membership size in the educable cooperative facing uncertain demand

This article explicitly incorporates layoff and hiring costs into a discretetime dynamic model with stationary demand uncertainty, in which managers in a cooperative learn something about the demand process over time, and anticipate learning something about that process. It is shown how the opportunity to learn affects initial membership size and how the knowledge gained induces changes in membership, as well as how risk preferences impact on membership size at any point in time.     

Optimal size of the government: the role of the elasticity of substitution

This paper analyzes the optimal fiscal policy in an endogenous growth model with productive public services. Government expenditure, which may be subject to different degrees of congestion, is financed by distortionary income taxation. The standard result on the equality between the growth-maximizing, welfare-maximizing and first-best income tax rates holds if and only if production is Cobb–Douglas or there is proportional congestion. With non-proportional (or in the absence of) congestion, the first-best income tax is lower than the (second-best) welfare-maximizing income tax which, in turn, is lower than the growth-maximizing income tax if the elasticity of substitution is below unity. Under mild conditions these relations are reversed if the elasticity of substitution is above unity. Intuition on these results is also provided.     

The size and scope of government:: Comparative politics with rational politicians

We try to demonstrate how economists may engage in research on comparative politics, relating the size and composition of government spending to the political system. A Downsian model of electoral competition and forward-looking voting indicates that majoritarian – as opposed to proportional – elections increase competition between parties by focusing it into some key marginal districts. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, more redistribution and larger government. A model of legislative bargaining and backward-looking voting indicates that presidential – as opposed to parliamentary – regimes increase competition between both politicians and voters. This leads to less public goods, less rents for politicians, less redistribution, and smaller government. We confront these predictions with cross-country data from around 1990, controlling for economic and social determinants of government spending. We find strong and robust support for the prediction that the size of government is smaller under presidential regimes, and weaker support for the prediction that majoritarian elections are associated with less public goods.     

Employment changes, the structure of adjustment costs, and plant size

In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants.