Chief executive officers' dispositional optimism,host country's rule of law,and foreign market equity mode choice of Ghanaian small and medium‐sized enterprises

Despite a growing interest in the influence of managerial characteristics on firms' strategic decision‐making process, scholarly knowledge is limited with regard to how and when psychological attributes of executives affect firms' foreign entry mode decision. Building on behavioral decision‐making theory, we address this gap by investigating the effect of chief executive officers' (CEOs') optimism on firms' foreign market equity mode choice. In addition, we examine the moderating influence of the host country's rule of law on this relationship. Using primary data from 227 small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana, we found that increases in the levels of CEOs' optimism are related to the increases in preference for equity entry mode. This relationship is amplified when CEOs perceive the host country to have stronger rule of law. The findings have theoretical, managerial, and policy implications for SMEs' foreign market entry mode strategy.     

The perils of personal capital in antebellum America: John Spotswood Wellford and Virginia's Catharine Furnace

The Fredericksburg Iron and Steel Manufacturing Company's ironmaking facility, Catharine Furnace, had the look of a prime mover in antebellum Virginia's industrial sector when it opened in 1838. Its manager and principal owner, John Spotswood Wellford, successfully tapped into his social capital to secure military ordnance contracts, but in the process the firm became utterly dependent upon his ability to secure this work through personal connections. By failing to expand the market for its pig iron and castings in local, regional, and national markets, the firm relied upon these ordnance contracts for shot and shell for its existence. When Wellford died in 1846, the Fredericksburg Iron and Steel Manufacturing Company collapsed. A few years later, Catharine Furnace stood cold and abandoned – a severe reminder of the limited prospects of Virginia's industrial economy and the perils of relying on an individual entrepreneur's personal capital during a critical period of American industrialisation.     

Underpaid and Corrupt Executives in China’s State Sector

This study examines the role of executive compensation in public governance. We collect data on corruption cases that involve top-level executives in Chinese listed state-controlled firms. We find a significant positive relationship between underpayment of executives and the likelihood of an investigation into corrupt behavior. We also show that corruption is positively associated with firm performance and that the relationship between underpayment of executives and corruption is influenced by firm performance, suggesting that top managers are more likely to engage in illicit behavior if they are compensated poorly while the firms under their control perform well. Finally, we find that pay-performance sensitivity decreases when top executives are involved in corruption investigations, indicating a lack of pecuniary incentives. Our empirical findings point toward an important relationship between executive compensation and corrupt behavior, thus providing valuable input to the understanding of executive pay and its effects in China’s state sector.     

Customer satisfaction underappreciation: The relation of customer satisfaction to CEO compensation

Customer satisfaction contributes to firm financial performance, but does it contribute to top executives' pay? Our empirical evidence shows that it may not. Customer-satisfying executives tend to have lower pay than their productive peers, even if both satisfaction and productivity contribute to firm financial performance. Thus, customer satisfaction is underappreciated, which may result in both less societal welfare and worse company performance. We propose a board myopia mechanism to account for this phenomenon. In facing short-term financial performance pressure from investors, and the asymmetric information availability between accounting-based and market-based assets for compensation decisions, the board of directors may be myopic, underappreciating executives who invest in market-based assets such as customer satisfaction that drive long-term returns. We examine this satisfaction underappreciation phenomenon empirically using 23 years of panel data that detail firm productivity, customer satisfaction, firm financial performance, and executive compensation. The longitudinal data are analyzed using fixed-effect panel models and a simultaneous system of panel vector autoregression equations with interactions to assess the direct effect of firm financial performance and its carryover effect to executive compensation across executives who are productive, customer-satisfying, or both. The results confirm that customer-satisfying executives are underappreciated: being productive is financially rewarding for both firms and executives, while being customer-satisfying is financially rewarding for firms but not as much for executives. We further demonstrate that using total shareholder returns to benchmark firm financial performance and reward executives with a higher proportion of stock compensation can encourage a long-term focus that alleviates this customer underappreciation.     

市场化进程、企业特征与高管薪酬—业绩敏感性

结合中国市场化改革的制度背景,就不同地区市场化进程差异对企业高管薪酬契约的影响进行理论分析和实证检验,结果发现:随着市场化进程的加快,高管薪酬与会计业绩的敏感性降低,与市场业绩的敏感性增加,这表明市场化改革的深化改变了高管薪酬契约中不同业绩指标所占比重的大小;同时,区分不同性质和行业的研究发现,市场化进程对国有企业高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响显著大于非国有企业,对保护性行业高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响显著小于竞争性行业,这表明市场化进程的宏观背景对不同性质和行业的企业高管激励契约的影响程度存在差异。     

Executive migration and international mergers and acquisitions

This study applies the microfoundations approach to examine the impact of migrating executives on firms’ selection of host country in their international acquisition decisions. Viewing executive migration as a conduit for inter-organizational learning, this study offers the first empirical findings that a migrating executive’s inter-organizational learning associated with two specific types of international acquisition experience, i.e., general and country-specific, accumulated at a prior affiliated firm positively impacts host country selection in the executive’s current affiliated firm’s acquisition decisions. The findings further suggest that the migrating executive’s prior country-specific international acquisition experience has a greater influence compared with the migrating executive’s prior general international acquisition experience. Last, the findings show that industry similarity between a migrating executive’s prior and current affiliated firms enhances the effect of the migrating executive’s specific host country acquisition experience. In sum, this study contributes by introducing migrating executives as a new learning conduit in international acquisitions.     

The Effect of Cross‐Border Mergers and Acquisitions on Earnings Quality: Evidence from China

Despite the fruitful research on the motives and outcomes of cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs), there has been scant research on the impact of cross‐border M&As on corporate governance. In this article, we fill the research gap by exploring whether cross‐border M&As may lead to an improvement in corporate governance of Chinese acquirers. In particular, we examine the impact of cross‐border M&As on earnings quality of Chinese MNCs. We find that the acquisition of a target firm from a developed country leads to a significant improvement on the acquirer's earnings quality. In comparison, the acquisition of a target from an emerging market does not have such an impact. Our results are robust to various corporate governance measures, alternative econometric methods, and controls of relevant firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Finally, we show that the effect of cross‐border M&As on earnings quality is more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs) that have conducted large M&A deals. Our article offers new insight to the international business literature on latecomer perspective and liability of foreignness. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Strategic roads that diverge or converge: GM and Toyota in the battle for the top

General Motors (GM) and Toyota competed in the global automobile industry for many decades. While GM hung on to the Number 1 position longer than any other automaker, it lost this position to Toyota in 2008. It took Toyota 71 years to beat GM but only 2 years for GM to regain the top spot in 2011. Through a brief analysis of the history of these two rivals, I explain why GM and Toyota demonstrated different ways of falling from the Number 1 spot. I argue that the reason for the reversal of leadership positions for these two automakers can be understood by examining executive hubris and the way it either facilitated path dependence or promoted a departure from an established path for the perpetuation of market leadership. I then demonstrate how GM and Toyota acted contrastingly with respect to path dependence and how their CEOs injected hubris almost the same way in their decisions to hold on to the top position. Contrary to the longstanding myth, I also demonstrate that it was hubris—as opposed to humility—that characterized executive leadership in Toyota in its last 15 years. Recommendations for practicing or budding executives of large corporations are given.     

Does ‘Best Practice’ in Setting Executive Pay in the UK Encourage ‘Good’ Behaviour?

We examine how UK listed companies set executive pay, reviewing the implications of following best practice in corporate governance and examining how this can conflict with what shareholders and other stakeholders might perceive as good behaviour. We do this by considering current governance regulation in the light of interviews with protagonists in the debate, setting out the dilemmas faced by remuneration-setters, and showing how the processes they follow can lead to ethical conflicts.Current ‘best’ practice governing executive pay includes the use of market benchmarks to determine salary and bonus levels, significant levels of performance-related pay, the desire for executives to hold equity in their companies, the disclosure of total shareholder return compared to an index, and a perceived need for conformity, in order to grant legitimacy to policies. Whilst each of these may in some circumstances lead to good practice, each has the potential to cause dysfunctional behaviour in executives. Overall, we conclude that although best practice might drive good executive behaviour that coincides with the company’s and key stakeholders’ objectives, there are many reasons why it should not.     

Hedging under counterparty credit uncertainty

This study investigates optimal production and hedging decisions for firms facing price risk that can be hedged with vulnerable contracts, i.e., exposed to nonhedgeable endogenous counterparty credit risk. When vulnerable forward contracts are the only hedging instruments available, the firm's optimal level of production is lower than without credit risk. Under plausible conditions on the stochastic dependence between the commodity price and the counterparty's assets, the firm does not sell its entire production on the vulnerable forward market. When options on forward contracts are also available, the optimal hedging strategy requires a long put position. This provides a new rationale for the hedging role of options in the over‐the‐counter markets exposed to counterparty credit risk. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 28: 248–263, 2008     

The influence of firm and executive characteristics on performance-vested stock option grants

Motivated by the considerable changes over the last two decades in the form and composition of executive remuneration schemes and the increasing use of performance-vested stock options (PVSOs), this study examines the determinants of PVSO grants. Using data on 4193 executive-year observations of 1373 executive directors in 243 FTSE 350 non-financial companies from 1999 to 2004, I examine the factors that influence PVSO grants at both the firm and the executive level. While controlling for unobservable industry, firm, and executive level fixed effects, the evidence shows that the PVSO grants awarded to individual executives are associated with observable features of corporate governance and indicators of managerial power. More specifically, the results support the following statements: (1) good corporate governance structures facilitate the use of PVSO plans; (2) the proportion of PVSO grants in the total compensation package is smaller for top mangers with more controlling power; (3) PVSO plans are less frequently used to compensate managers who are approaching their retirement and/or have a large equity stake in the firm; (4) relative to non-CEO executives, CEOs are more likely to be rewarded with PVSOs.     

Production and hedging under state‐dependent preferences

This study examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty and state‐dependent preferences. When there is a futures market for hedging purposes, the firm's optimal production decision is independent of the output price uncertainty and of the state‐dependent preferences. If the futures contracts are unbiased, the firm's optimal futures position is an over‐hedge or an under‐hedge, depending on whether the firm is correlation averse or correlation loving, and on whether the output price is positively or negatively expectation dependent on the state variable. When the firm has access not only to the unbiased futures but also to fairly priced options, sufficient conditions are derived under which the firm's optimal hedge position includes both hedging instruments. This study thus establishes a hedging role of options, which is over and above that of futures, in the case of state‐dependent preferences. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 32:945–963, 2012     

Evaluating the effects of executive learning and development on organisational performance: implications for developing senior manager and executive capabilities

In spite of decades of research into high‐performance work systems, very few studies have examined the relationship between executive learning and development and organisational performance. In an attempt to close this gap, this study explores the effects of a validated four‐dimensional executive learning and development measure on a composite measure of organisational performance. The study is based on ordinal regression analysis with empirical data elicited from 222 executives and senior leaders drawn from a wide geographic region. The theoretical link theoretical between the two variables was established by building on the Activity‐Motivation‐Outcome concept in order to encapsulate human capital, dynamic capability, resource dependency, social exchange and leader‐member‐exchange theories. The study reported an overall positive effect of executive learning and development on firm performance and has significant implications for the effective development of executive and senior management capabilities as a means of improving organisational effectiveness.     

The Shareholder–Manager Relationship and Its Impact on the Likelihood of Firm Bribery

We examine the impact on firm bribery of two corporate governance devices heavily studied in corporate governance research—i.e., separation of ownership and control, and equity share of the largest shareholder. In addition, we investigate the impact of the principal–owner’s gender on firm bribery. From agency theory, we predict that firms with the owner also acting as a manager (owner–manager) are more likely to engage in bribery compared to their counterparts with separation of ownership and control. We argue that an increase of the equity share of the largest shareholder can either increase or decrease firm bribery likelihood depending on the net cost-benefit effect of such bribery actions. In addition, we predict that bribery is more likely to occur when the principal–owner is male rather than female. Using a rich dataset of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys of 2002–2005, we find that the equity share of the largest shareholder is negatively and male principal–owner is positively associated with the likelihood of firm bribery. Furthermore, we reveal that owner–manager is more likely to bribe when the principal–owner is male rather than female. We also observe that the effect of owner–manager is smaller as the equity share of the largest shareholder increases.     

Foreign ownership and bribery: Agency and institutional perspectives

In this study we examine the effectiveness of formal institutions (as the macro-level mechanism) and external auditing (as the micro-level mechanism) in controlling multinational firms’ engagement in bribery. We adopt World Bank’s data and investigate 38,673 firms in 113 countries. Our results suggest that a firm’s engagement in bribery is positively related to its foreign ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate the substitute effects of formal institutions and external auditing in controlling this unethical activity. We argue that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm’s internal governance mechanism plays a vital role in controlling bribery.     

Cross Hedging with Currency Forward Contracts

This study examines the behavior of a competitive exporting firm that exports to a foreign country and faces multiple sources of exchange rate uncertainty. Although there are no hedging instruments between the home and foreign currencies, there is a third country that has well‐developed currency forward markets to which the firm has access. The firm's optimal cross‐hedging decision is shown to depend both on the degree of incompleteness of the currency forward markets in the third country, and on the correlation structure of the random spot exchange rates. Furthermore, the firm is shown to be more eager to produce and expand its exports to the foreign country when the missing currency forward contracts between the home and foreign currencies can be synthesized by the existing currency forward contracts. In this case of perfect cross hedging, the separation theorem holds but the full‐hedging theorem may or may not hold. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark     

Imported Intermediates,Absorptive Capacity and Productivity: Evidence from Ghanaian Manufacturing Firms

This paper analyses whether the use of imported intermediates improves productivity using firm‐level panel data of manufacturing firms in Ghana covering the period between 1991 and 2002. This includes examining the importance of absorptive capacity (ABC) in enhancing the productivity gains from imported intermediates. We propose lagged relative productivity as a new measure of ABC. For any given period, ABC is defined as the natural logarithm of a firm's total factor productivity (TFP) in the previous period relative to the firm's initial TFP. An alternative measure of ABC considers real value added per worker in lieu of TFP. Overall, we find that firms with high levels of ABC derive productivity gains from the contemporaneous and prior use of imported intermediates, particularly for firms operating in the input‐intensive industries. Our findings are robust to different specifications of the base model and different estimation techniques.     

Executive Entrenchment in Founder‐Managed Firms: An Empirical Study from China

We study the relationship between past firm performance, ownership concentration, board independence, and industry competition on the likelihood of dismissal for both founder and nonfounder executives using a panel data set of Chinese founded firms during 1999–2007. Results indicate a persistent presence of entrenchment of founder executives. Compared with the founder, the nonfounder executive is more likely to be dismissed following periods of poor firm performance combined with ownership concentration and board independence except under high levels of industry competition when founder executives are more likely to be held accountable through dismissal by independent boards.     

Family firms and the interests of non‐family stakeholders: The influence of family managers' affective commitment and family salience in terms of power

The goal of this research is to analyze the heterogeneity of family firms in the normative attention to their non‐family stakeholders. With this aim, we suggest that the psychological process of top family managers in terms of individual affective commitment to their firms is a key variable to explain that heterogeneity. However, we also suggest a moderator effect of the family stakeholder salience in the relationship between the managers' affective commitment to the firm and the establishment of firm goals toward non‐family stakeholders. The results of a hierarchical regression analysis on data obtained from 207 family executives show a significant positive influence of managers' affective commitment on the establishment of goals related both to internal (employees) and external (customers and community) non‐family stakeholders. In addition, we can observe a negative moderator effect of the family utilitarian power—as an indicator of the family stakeholder salience—on the relationship between the family managers' affective commitment and the goals related to non‐family employees.     

They Are Not All the Same! Investigating the Effect of Executive versus Non‐executive Family Board Members on Firm Performance

Drawing on faultlines and challenging the assumption that family board members form a homogenous subgroup, we hypothesize that the distinction between executive and non‐executive family board members can create faultlines that affect firm performance. We propose that the discrepancy between results and goals can activate and exacerbate faultlines. Using a sample of 421 family small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we find a U‐shaped relationship between the ratio of family executive board members and firm performance showing the consequences of relationship‐based and task‐related faultlines. Moreover, we find that the U‐shaped relationship occurs when firms perceive that they under‐achieve their objectives, whereas a reverse J‐shaped relationship appears when firms over‐achieve their objectives.